Do Parents Propagate Inequality Among Children?

The subtitle of the piece is “Evidence From Chinese and Swedish Twins.”  Abstract:

Economists have long studied how parental behavior shapes within-family inequality, yet empirical findings remain mixed. Using twins data from China and Sweden, we examine the predominant mechanisms reported in the literature. Parents in both countries invest similarly during childhood. Inter vivos transfers, however, differ: Chinese parents reinforce income inequality, whereas Swedish parents distribute wealth equally; the reinforcing pattern reflects exchange motives. Bequests are divided equally in both countries. Parental education plays a key role: less educated parents reinforce income inequality, whereas more educated parents transfer wealth equally. Cross-country differences in parental education may thus help explain the mixed findings.

By Aiday SikhovaSven OskarssonRafael Ahlskog.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

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Satellite imaging industry’s next challenge: getting systems to talk to each other

Executives say lack of incentives and interoperability slows ‘tipping and cueing’ across vendors

The post Satellite imaging industry’s next challenge: getting systems to talk to each other appeared first on SpaceNews.

‘Shots on goal and win the game’: NASA’s effort to accelerate lunar landings

IM-5

While NASA outlined plans to increase the cadence of robotic lunar lander missions at a recent event, it said little about accelerating work on crewed lunar landers.

The post ‘Shots on goal and win the game’: NASA’s effort to accelerate lunar landings appeared first on SpaceNews.

How Iran is making a mint from Donald Trump’s war

China is helping the Revolutionary Guards profit from Iranian crude

Seeing Blue During Schirmacher’s Summer Melt Season

A network of cerulean blue meltwater drainage channels flowing across white and blue ice surfaces. An "oasis" of land appears as a brown rocky area in the lower part of the image.
Cerulean blue meltwater flows through drainage channels on the Nivlisen Ice Shelf, Antarctica, in this image acquired on January 6, 2026, by the OLI (Operational Land Imager) on Landsat 9.
NASA Earth Observatory/Michala Garrison

Summer is a busy season at Schirmacher Oasis, a rocky, ice-free plateau in Queen Maud Land, East Antarctica. Located near the grounding line of Nivlisen Ice Shelf and about 100 kilometers (60 miles) from the open waters of the Lazarev Sea, the “oasis” of land amid an otherwise continuous expanse of ice is home to dozens of small ice-covered freshwater lakes and two research stations.

It’s the season when all-white snow petrels are sometimes spotted soaring over the oasis, and fuzzy south polar skua and Wilson’s storm petrel chicks grow up in sheltered crevices on its cliffs and ridges. Under constant sunlight, the plateau’s freshwater lakes come to life, supporting cyanobacterial growth and teeming with microscopic tardigrades, rotifers, and nematodes. At times, groups of Adélie penguins toddle through the oasis and attempt to breed.

The summer months are also when temperatures creep just above freezing long enough for expansive networks of seasonal melt ponds and drainage channels on and within the surrounding ice to fill with bright blue meltwater that flows north onto and across the Nivlisen Ice Shelf. The satellite image above shows seasonal melt on January 6, 2026, during the peak of the 2026 melt season.  

Schirmacher Oasis appears as a brown rocky plateau dotted with ice-covered lakes surrounded by fields of mostly white ice.
Lakes dot the rocky surface of Schirmacher Oasis in this image acquired on January 6, 2026, by the OLI on Landsat 9.
NASA Earth Observatory/Michala Garrison

The Nivlisen Ice Shelf is a floating tongue that forms as glacial ice flows off Antarctica and into the waters of the Lazarev Sea. The many blue ice areas found around the oasis are snow-free areas where old, compressed glacial ice with few air bubbles has been exposed by powerful katabatic winds and sublimation. This dense ice absorbs red wavelengths of light and reflects blue wavelengths, making it appear blue. Blue ice areas are rare in Antarctica, covering about 1 percent of the continent’s surface. 

“The image captures the Nivlisen Ice Shelf during a phase of strong, system-wide hydrological connectivity,” said Geetha Priya Murugesan, a remote sensing scientist with the Jyothy Institute of Technology in Bengaluru, India. Such features aren’t always visible in optical satellite imagery, she added, noting that they are often frozen, buried under snow, or drained. “This image is notable because the ‘cerulean veins’ we see on the surface align with a deeper, persistent plumbing system that we monitor with radar.”

Drainage channels filled with blue meltwater zigzag across the white surfaces of Nivlisen Ice Shelf .
Surface drainage channels filled with meltwater flow across the Nivlisen Ice Shelf in this image acquired on January 6, 2026, by the OLI on Landsat 9.
NASA Earth Observatory/Michala Garrison

Murugesan and colleagues have analyzed decades of satellite data and conducted several years of field research in the area, including in 2026. Their work shows that since 2000, the surface melting caused by seasonal melt ponds and channels on the ice shelf has grown in depth, area, and volume. The depth and volume of melt features grew by a factor of 1.5, while their surface area increased by a factor of 1.2.

Murugesan thinks that the visibility of the drainage network in images like these hints at a deeper vulnerability of the ice shelf. The drainage channels trace preexisting structural weaknesses, including crevasses, that act as “hydraulic pathways” that concentrate meltwater in vulnerable zones near the grounding line, where it can weaken the ice shelf, Murugesan said.

The researchers have also linked peak melting periods like this one to atmospheric rivers and foehn winds that enhance surface melting and help route meltwater through the drainage networks. The dark colorlow albedoof the many blue ice areas surrounding the oasis contributes to drainage events by making ice surfaces less reflective, warmer, and thus more prone to summer melting, Murugesan added.                        

While Murugesan and colleagues are currently conducting a detailed analysis of the 2026 melt season to determine how it compares to past years, she said it appears to be a “strong melt event consistent with elevated melt conditions.”

NASA Earth Observatory images by Michala Garrison, using Landsat data from the U.S. Geological Survey. Story by Adam Voiland.

References & Resources

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The post Seeing Blue During Schirmacher’s Summer Melt Season appeared first on NASA Science.

Claudia Goldin and the WNBA

After Claudia Goldin became the first woman to win a solo Nobel in economics in 2023, she received hundreds of invitations and requests. She accepted just three.

One of them was advising the WNBA players union as the women prepared to negotiate a new labor deal with the league.

When Goldin replied via email to Terri Carmichael Jackson, executive director of the players union, “I remember just reading it and screaming,” Jackson said. Goldin had one requirement: She refused to be paid.

This month, the two sides reached a collective bargaining agreement that gave Women’s National Basketball Association players a nearly 400% raise. Starting this season, players’ average salary will top $580,000.

It isn’t just the biggest pay increase in U.S. league history. It is, as far as Goldin is aware, the biggest increase any union anywhere has ever negotiated.

“It’s astounding,” the 79-year-old Harvard economist said.

Mike Bass, a spokesman who represents both the National Basketball Association and the WNBA, called the deal “transformational.”

…More recently, as the pay negotiations stretched on, Goldin said she stayed focused not on the countless separate points in the typical lengthy labor deal but on one central equation: the fraction of league revenue going to players’ salary and benefits.

Goldin’s calculations had a calming effect on the players, said Jackson, the union’s executive director.

Here is more from the WSJ.  Via Anecdotal.

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An ExTrA sphere

Two sunlit spheres can be seen in today's Picture of the Week. While these orbs share similarities in their shape and in being illuminated by the same star, they are vastly different. The one farthest away from the camera, hiding behind the clouds, is our own Moon, the Earth's only natural satellite. The other object is the dome of a telescope at ESO's La Silla Observatory, located in the outskirts of the Atacama Desert, in northern Chile.

The telescope is one of the three in the French project Exoplanets in Transits and their Atmospheres (ExTrA). ExTrA is focused on detecting Earth-sized worlds in the Milky Way. It relies on the transit method, where planets block a fraction of the light from the star they orbit when passing between it and Earth, just like a partial eclipse. ExTrA centres on worlds orbiting red dwarfs –– stars much smaller, colder and dimmer than the Sun. Because red dwarfs are small, planets crossing in front of them block more light, making them easier to find than planets orbiting regular stars.

Who knows, perhaps some of these planets may look as otherworldly as the landscape of this picture. “These places compel me every time to think about our position in the Universe, putting my life ‘in context’ so to say,” says the photographer, ESO astronomer Luca Sbordone. “It always brings me peace.”

Live coverage: SpaceX to launch 119 payloads on smallsat rideshare mission from California

File: SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket stands at Space Launch Complex 4 East at Vandenberg Space Force Base ahead of the Starlink 17-31 mission on March 13, 2026. Image: SpaceX

SpaceX is gearing up to launch its third largest smallsat rideshare mission on Monday morning.

The Transporter-16 mission will fly 119 payloads to a Sun-synchronous, low Earth orbit on a Falcon 9 rocket launching from Vandenberg Space Force Base.

Liftoff from Space Launch Complex 4 East is scheduled for 4:02 a.m. PDT (7:02 a.m. EDT / 1102 UTC).

Spaceflight Now will have live coverage beginning about 30 minutes prior to liftoff.

The Falcon 9 first stage booster supporting this mission has the tail number B1093. This will be its 12th flight including a pair of missions for the Space Development Agency and nine batches of Starlink satellites.

A little more than 8.5 minutes after liftoff, B1093 will target a landing on the drone ship, ‘Of Course I Still Love You,’ positioned in the Pacific Ocean. If successful, this will be the 187th landing on this vessel and the 592nd booster landing for the company to date.

What’s onboard?

Like all of SpaceX’s rideshare missions, this flight supports dozens of customers, from companies to sovereign governments to academia.

Two companies who managed manifesting the majority of the payloads are Exolaunch (57 payloads) and Seops Space (19 payloads).

“Exolaunch is enabling launch access for more than 25 commercial, institutional, and government customers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and more on this mission,” Exolaunch said in a statement in February.

The payloads overseen by Seops Space are a combination of 14 CubeSats and five PocketQubes. The latter of which are from a company called Alba Orbital and are Earth observation satellites.

“The Seops Transporter-16 manifest represents a truly global cross-section of the small satellite community, with payloads originating from 13 countries, including Canada, France, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, Romania, Scotland, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam,” Seops said in a statement.

Other notable payloads include Varda Space’s sixth reentry satellite bus, designed for on-orbit manufacturing, and the so-called ‘cake topper,’ the Gravitas satellite from K2 Space.

The Gravitas satellite has a wingspan of 40 meters with its solar panels unfurled and weighs about two metric tons. It’s designed to produce 20 kW of electricity.

*The AI Doc*

The subtitle of the movie is Or How I Became an Apocaloptimist, and here is the trailer.

Overall this film was better and smarter than I was expecting.  Intelligent people were allowed to speak, and to present various sides of the issue.  It was also interesting to see how various people one knows come across on the big screen.

It is easy enough to mock the final section of the movie, which calls for a participatory “civil rights” movement on AI, negotiations with China, and a big voice for trade unions in the decisions.  What Dan Klein calls “the people’s romance.”  The Straussian read there is correct, even though it probably was not intended by the moviemakers.  In reality, for better or worse, the final decisions will continue to be made by the national security establishment.

On a weekend, there were five other people in the theater.

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Sunday 29 March 1663

(Lord’s day). Waked as I used to do betimes, but being Sunday and very cold I lay long, it raining and snowing very hard, which I did never think it would have done any more this year.

Up and to church, home to dinner. After dinner in comes Mr. Moore, and sat and talked with us a good while; among other things telling me, that [neither] my Lord nor he are under apprehensions of the late discourse in the House of Commons, concerning resumption of Crowne lands, which I am very glad of.

He being gone, up to my chamber, where my wife and Ashwell and I all the afternoon talking and laughing, and by and by I a while to my office, reading over some papers which I found in my man William’s chest of drawers, among others some old precedents concerning the practice of this office heretofore, which I am glad to find and shall make use of, among others an oath, which the Principal Officers were bound to swear at their entrance into their offices, which I would be glad were in use still.

So home and fell hard to make up my monthly accounts, letting my family go to bed after prayers. I staid up long, and find myself, as I think, fully worth 670l.. So with good comfort to bed, finding that though it be but little, yet I do get ground every month. I pray God it may continue so with me.

Read the annotations

Links 3/29/26

Links for you. Science:

The US slashed research for cancer, Alzheimer’s, mental health — and nearly everything else
“Unlike Anything We’ve Ever Seen” – Bizarre New Insect Discovered in South America Stuns Scientists
WHO releases guidance for urgently needed new antibiotics
Capturing dynamic phage–pathogen coevolution by clinical surveillance
Accounting for Defective Viral Genomes in viral consensus genome reconstruction, application to influenza virus
RFK Jr’s pick to review Covid vaccines authored misleading research, experts say

Other:

The Republican Party’s Nazi Problem Is Getting Worse. It Should Care
Brian Schatz’s Signals of Comfort With Big Money. The Hawaii senator and heir apparent to Chuck Schumer attacked a bipartisan housing bill without trying to fix it, merely to show support for private equity.
Utah measles outbreak speeds up but there are few changes to daily life. Health officials in the outbreak’s epicenter are relying on social media and talk radio to reach residents. Many aren’t listening.
Elizabeth Warren’s Amazingly Progressive Housing Bill
BuzzFeed Nearing Bankruptcy After Disastrous Turn Toward AI
Trump Surprised To Find He’s At War in Iran. Once his not-even-half-baked plan failed to materialize in Iran, it’s clear that there’s no Plan B.
How the money spent on Trump’s Iran war could have helped Americans
The Trump Administration Floats a New Way to Humiliate the Legal Profession
The Removed DOGE Deposition Videos Have Already Been Backed Up Across the Internet
Change in Data Sources Led to Lower Inflation Reading
A Federal Judge Just Called Out the DOJ for Politically Motivated Prosecutions
MAGA infighting erupts after Laura Loomer apologizes for ‘racist’ remarks
Is Trump Building ‘Concentration Camps’? These Experts Have No Doubts
How Epstein lured girls to his Zorro Ranch and kept authorities away. At least 10 women and girls say they were groomed at what was once Jeffrey Epstein’s Zorro Ranch in New Mexico.
They came to build China’s EV future. Investigators found conditions akin to ‘slavery.’
Using Bigotry to Hide an Authoritarian, Christian Nationalist Agenda
After a brief scare, National Zoo’s rare baby elephant to make her debut
Jamie Raskin Just Told John Roberts: “The Emperor Has No Clothes”
Black history was made on this golf course. Some fear Trump will erase it.
Should Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Run for President in 2028?
The enduring truth of Tupac’s ‘money for wars, but can’t feed the poor’
It’s become too easy to use your data against you
One-third of Americans skip meals or other needs to afford health care
Secretary Of Defense Hegseth Promises Iranians ‘No Quarter’ – A War Crime
Facing deficit, D.C. to wait-list families seeking child care subsidies
People are spending hundreds of dollars at IV drip bars in Boston. Are they worth the hype?
If Iran Becomes ‘Israel’s War,’ American Jews May Pay the Price
Just six days of war in Iran cost us $11.3 billion. ‘What the [expletive] is wrong with us?’
Trump’s Pick To Represent Him In Florida Statehouse Doesn’t Even Live In The District
Vindicated At Last In My Years-Long Loathing Of Grammarly
MGB researchers create AI models to detect domestic abuse in patients (paper here)


The agentic passive voice.

At some point, you will have learned about the passive voice, where the actor in a sentence is unclear. For example, my software didn’t compile. That’s a good example of the passive voice. However, you might not know the full set of rules, because here are some sentences in the passive voice that you might not recognize:

  • Claude made an error in my writeup.
  • ChatGPT messed up the commitment.
  • Gemini didn’t write tests.

You might think those are active sentences, but those are in fact examples of the agentic passive voice. The rule here is: whenever the actor in a sentence is a model, then it’s a passive sentence. I’m sorry if your grammar instructor never taught you this rule, but this is just the way it works now.

This is an important grammatical distinction to make, because I’m increasingly seeing folks say that Claude made a mistake, without recognizing that they’re writing unclear, nearly ungrammatical sentences that their grade-school teacher would reject. So please, aspire higher. Write in the active voice, avoiding all passive variants.

The Candidates’ tournament

Caruana and Sindharov have won today, obviously boosting Caruana’s chances as favorite (he beat Nakamura, the number two rated player in the tournament).  Yet what the chess world needs right now is not a winner, but rather a greater sense of legitimacy for the world title.  Ideally the same person should win a championship match two or three times in a row, and with a decisive margin.  They do not have to be as good as Carlsen, just clearly better than everyone else.  Nepo never quite made it, Ding has retreated from the chess world, and Caruana has yet to win a first title.  Is he young enough to win a few in a row?  Or are we waiting for Nordirbek Abdusattorov (or someone else) to enter the cycle?  I fear decisiveness is not soon on the way.  There are several (relatively) weak players in this tournament, so a variety of players can win just by beating up on the weakies, rather than by demonstrating mastery over their strongest peers.  Legitimacy is likely to remain uncertain, to the detriment of the chess world.  But soon we will know more.

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A feisty, inspired No Kings rally in Irvine

So my plan today was to attend a bunch of early No Kings rallies all over Orange County. I’d do the ol’ journalistic two-step bounce. First here, then there, then up there, then down there. It was a grand and ambitious plan of an 8 am wake-up, a breakfast burrito—then, go!

Alas …

The wife and I take a weekly improv class (highly recommend, by the way), and it’s always Saturday morning. So, instead of marching my ass off, I stood inside a Tustin comedy studio pretending to be eating animal crackers shaped like the members of NSYNC. [You had to be there]

This is a long way of explaining that it is 6:19 pm, and I’ve just returned from the corner of Harvard and Culver in Irvine, where Indivisible hosted a fantastic No Kings rally.

Was it the biggest? No—I’d say there were about 1,500 people lining the streets.

Was it the loudest? No—though there were plenty of horn honks.

Did I walk away feeling pumped up and inspired?

Hell to the triple yes.

I say this as someone who has spent the past year chronicling the weird highs and lows of Orange County politics: There is something uniquely inspiring in the smaller rallies. What I mean is, it’s easy when you’re surrounded by 100,000 people, and the music is blasting, and the water bottles are free, and [fill in the blank celebrity] offers up a pep talk/free concert. Those are amazing experienxes—but fairly simple.

The smaller events, on the other hand, take work. They call upon people who are so entrenched in their convictions that the No. 1 inspiration isn’t unity, but justice and righteousness. Those standing on the corner of Harvard and Culver were there because they’re mad at Donald Trump, horrified by the GOP, terrified for their children and grandchildren—and DOF (Desperate as Fuck) to do something about it. You could see it in their faces; see it in their signs. This was not a fun outing to be followed by pizza and beers. No, this was a purposeful pursuit of justice, and a necessary effort to remind our fellow Americans that what we are (right now) is not who we will be (in the near future). The conversations I had were fruitful, engaging, inspirational, informed.

In short, I loved it, I loved it, I loved it.

All hail Irvine.

PS: A thought worth sharing: There were a bunch of petition gatherers at the march. They wore black shirts, they smiled, they said the right buzz words. Please, please, please—do NOT sign petitions in the moment. Never, ever, ever. Take a photo, read the words, research the information. If it’s actually worthwhile, you can do it online a day later. Many of the petitions I’ve seen are sponsored by gaming brands, alcohol, weed, etc. They pay people minimum wage to attend events, bellow, “Help the homeless! Sign this petition!”—but leave out that, in truth, it’s a Draft Kings initiative to legalize online gambling that gives .00000000006% of proceeds to a homeless shelter in Bethesda.

My point: Do NOT sign petitions by people you don’t know. Ever.

March 28, 2026

Almost exactly a year ago, on March 27, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order titled “Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History.” The order asserted that “[o]ver the past decade, Americans have witnessed a concerted and widespread effort to rewrite our Nation’s history, replacing objective facts with a distorted narrative driven by ideology rather than truth.”

The order claimed, as Trump did in his first term, that “historical revision” was reconstructing “our Nation’s unparalleled legacy of advancing liberty, individual rights, and human happiness…as inherently racist, sexist, oppressive, or otherwise irredeemably flawed.” Trump has claimed since his first term that a “left-wing mob is trying to demolish our heritage, so they can replace it with a new oppressive regime that they alone control.” He told his followers that they are in “a battle to save the Heritage, History, and Greatness of our Country.”

Embracing the idea that there is a perfect past currently being destroyed, Trump echoes twentieth-century fascists who promised to return their country to divinely inspired rules that, if ignored, would create disaster.

Trump’s order called for putting his ideology in place, turning federal historic sites, parks, and museums into “solemn and uplifting public monuments that remind Americans of our extraordinary heritage, consistent progress toward becoming a more perfect Union, and unmatched record of advancing liberty, prosperity, and human flourishing.”

The order directed the Secretary of the Interior to “determine whether, since January 1, 2020, public monuments, memorials, statues, markers, or similar properties within the Department of the Interior’s jurisdiction have been removed or changed to perpetuate a false reconstruction of American history, inappropriately minimize the value of certain historical events or figures, or include any other improper partisan ideology,” to restore their previous content, and to make sure that they “do not contain descriptions, depictions, or other content that inappropriately disparage Americans past or living (including persons living in colonial times), and instead focus on the greatness of the achievements and progress of the American people or, with respect to natural features, the beauty, abundance, and grandeur of the American landscape.”

Setting administration officials’ eyes on the Smithsonian Institution, it said: “Museums in our Nation’s capital should be places where individuals go to learn—not to be subjected to ideological indoctrination or divisive narratives that distort our shared history.” Trump’s order named a three-person team to review the Smithsonian’s museums, including his Florida criminal defense attorney Lindsey Halligan, who joined his team from the field of property law and who, as legal analyst Anna Bower observed, “didn’t like some of the museum’s exhibits when she visited after the inauguration so she convinced Trump to sign an executive order putting her in charge.” Also on the team is Russell Vought, director of the Office of Management and Budget and a key author of Project 2025.

Since then, Trump’s people have tried to rewrite American history according to their ideology. Revealingly, one of the first things the administration did to alter the past was to remove from a U.S. military cemetery in the Netherlands two displays that recognized Black soldiers who helped liberate Europe from the Nazis.

Interior Secretary Doug Burgum issued his own order on May 20, 2025, also titled “Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History.” He told officials at all National Park Service sites to make sure information in the park adhered to Trump’s demands and to ask the public to let them know if they had “any signs or other information that are negative about either past or living Americans or that fail to emphasize the beauty, grandeur, and abundance of landscapes and other natural features.”

By July 2025, National Park Service teams were trying to figure out what the vague order not to “inappropriately disparage Americans” meant, flagging exhibits on sea level rise due to climate change at Cape Hatteras National Seashore in North Carolina, human enslavement at Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia, and the imprisonment of Seminoles, Cheyennes, Araphaos, Kiowas, Comanches, Caddos, and Apaches at the Castillo de San Marcos National Monument in Florida.

On August 12, 2025, Trump’s Smithsonian team wrote to Dr. Lonnie Bunch, the historian who serves as the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, informing him they intend to review museum exhibitions, curatorial processes, planning, the use of collections, and artists’ grants in order to make sure they align “with the president’s directive to celebrate American exceptionalism, remove divisive or partisan narratives, and restore confidence in our shared cultural institutions.”

They said they were focusing on the National Museum of American History, the National Museum of Natural History, the National Museum of African American History and Culture, the National Museum of the American Indian, the National Air and Space Museum, the Smithsonian American Art Museum, the National Portrait Gallery, and the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden.

On December 18, 2025, they wrote to Bunch again to complain he had not provided as much information as they had requested. They expressed concern “that the museums of the Smithsonian Institution be well positioned to play an important role during the historic yearlong celebration of our Nation’s 250th birthday that is fast approaching. We wish to be assured that none of the leadership of the Smithsonian museums is confused about the fact that the United States has been among the greatest forces for good in the history of the world,” they wrote. “The American people will have no patience for any museum that is diffident about America’s founding or otherwise uncomfortable conveying a positive view of American history, one which is justifiably proud of our country’s accomplishments and record.”

At about the same time, Trump unveiled that the history he intended to see shared was one that remade the U.S. by destroying its complicated history of struggle toward multicultural democracy and rewriting it as a dictatorship.

In mid-December the White House revealed that Trump had attached partisan descriptions of previous presidents on the “Presidential Walk of Fame” at the White House, calling Democratic president Barack Obama “one of the most divisive figures in American History,” and Joe Biden “by far, the worst President in American History.” “Taking office as a result of the most corrupt Election ever seen in the United States,” it continued, “Biden oversaw a series of unprecedented disasters that brought our Nation to the brink of destruction.” Trump described himself, though, as the architect of “the Greatest Economy in the History of the World.”

Then, on the fifth anniversary of the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, the White House unveiled a new website blaming the Democrats for the attack and saying Trump had “corrected a historic wrong” by pardoning the rioters. Under pressure from the White House, the Smithsonian Institution’s National Portrait Gallery removed text by Trump’s portrait that referred to Trump’s two impeachments, as well as his loss to Democrat Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential election.

In January the National Park Service took down displays about the enslavement of nine Black Americans at the home of President George Washington and First Lady Martha Washington in Philadelphia, and the city sued. In February, U.S. District Judge Cynthia Rufe, who was appointed by President George W. Bush, ruled that the materials must be put back as the case works its way through the courts. She began her order with a quotation from George Orwell’s 1984, a novel based on the premise that an authoritarian regime constantly rewrote history for its own ends.

But a funny thing happened on the way to the erasure of American history in favor of a whitewashed authoritarianism. The American people began to preserve the truth of who we have been.

Volunteers worried at the potential loss of National Park Service information created the Save Our Signs project, a crowd-sourced archive of photographs from National Parks. Historians appalled by changes to the Smithsonian created Citizen Historians for the Smithsonian, similarly documenting changes to the Smithsonian. One of its leaders, James Millward, is a scholar of Chinese history and is concerned that “history being snipped and clipped and disappeared” looks a great deal like the methods of the Chinese Communist Party. Sitting next to Trump’s portrait in the Portrait Gallery, he handed visitors copies of the old text until guards closed the exhibit.

At the Organization of American Historians, the History, Archives, and Records Preservation Project (HARPP) is made up of historians, archivists, librarians, and their allies, who are recording “changes since January 2025 that threaten the historical record.”

Even more dramatically, though, today’s Americans are demanding the preservation not just of who we have been, but of who we are. Far from accepting the administration’s whitewashed assertion that the nation has an “unparalleled legacy of advancing liberty, individual rights, and human happiness,” we are remembering our complicated history of community struggle and mobilizing to protect our right to govern ourselves against those who would take that right from us.

Millions of Americans and their allies turned out today for more than 3,100 “No Kings” events in all 50 states, U.S. territories, Washington, D.C., and towns and cities around the world in what appears to be the largest one-day protest in American history.

Instead of accepting the destruction of the true lessons of our past, we are bringing them back to life.

[Image I took at a No Kings rally today.]

Notes:

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/restoring-truth-and-sanity-to-american-history/

https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5675182-trump-launches-jan6-website/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/art/2026/01/10/national-portrait-gallery-trump-photo/

Brad Poole, “Trump Rally Fills Megachurch With Young Conservatives,” Courthouse News Service, June 23, 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/trump-plaques-presidential-walk-fame-e6b496f68862f4b678bbe608a0efde95

https://abcnews.com/US/trump-admin-removes-pride-flag-stonewall-national-monument/story?id=130023944

https://www.nbcnews.com/world/europe/us-removal-panels-honoring-black-soldiers-wwii-cemetery-netherlands-rcna251475

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/22/climate/trump-national-park-service-history-changes.html

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/08/letter-to-the-smithsonian-internal-review-of-smithsonian-exhibitions-and-materials/

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/12/letter-to-the-smithsonian-review-of-smithsonian-exhibitions-and-materials/

Lena Bohman, Molly Blake, Jenny McBurney, Amelia Palacios, and Henrik Schönemann, “Save Our Signs: A Crowdsourced Project to Combat Censorship at US National Park Sites,” Panorama: Journal of the Association of Historians of American Art 11, no. 2 (Fall 2025), https://doi.org/10.24926/24716839.20459.

https://segd.org/member-news/save-our-signs-archive-launch/

https://www.cbsnews.com/philadelphia/news/presidents-house-independence-mall-slavery-trump/

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.paed.648842/gov.uscourts.paed.648842.53.0.pdf

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/citing-orwells-1984-judge-orders-trump-administration-to-restore-slavery-exhibit-it-removed-in-philadelphia

https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/art/2026/02/25/smithsonian-volunteer-historians/

https://www.oah.org/resources/advocacy-partners/harpp/

https://www.doi.gov/document-library/secretary-order/so-3431-restoring-truth-and-sanity-american-history

https://www.newsfromthestates.com/live-feed/no-kings-march-2026

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/28/us/no-kings-protest-photos-videos.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/gallery/2026/mar/28/no-kings-protests-across-the-world-in-pictures

Bluesky:

annabower.bsky.social/post/3lw7wddgsqs2o

indivisible.org/post/3mi5rnx72qs2a

thatseankeenan.bsky.social/post/3mi5oasvkh22c

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Republican Governance in This Era

Scott Sumner on *The Marginal Revolution*

My favorite part of Tyler’s book is where he asks a very good but non-obvious question: Why did it take so long for economics as a field to develop a coherent model or framework of analysis? Much of the book discusses how three economists simultaneously developed marginal analysis, with a focus on the work of Stanley Jevons. Here I’ll briefly provide the intuition of marginal analysis and then explain why economics is both extremely easy but also quite difficult…

Tyler does a great job explaining why Jevon’s model of marginal analysis (which underlies most of modern microeconomics) is elementary on one level, but also something that wasn’t discovered until the 1860s because it was not at all obvious. Here’s how he concludes Chapter 3:

[This is TC now] By studying the slow intellectual development of economics, and contrasting it with other fields of study, we can learn the following:

1. Some insights are very hard to grasp, even if they are apparently simple once they are understood. People need to “see around corners” in the right way to understand these insights and incorporate them into their world views.

2. Economics is one of those fields, and that is why it took intuitive economic reasoning so long to evolve, marginalism included. Those of us who are educators, or who spend time talking to policymakers, should take this point very seriously.

3. Even very, very smart people are likely unaware that these “see around the corner” insights are missing – did Euclid rue that he did not have access to proper supply and demand and tax incidence theory? Probably not.

4. Economics is not the only such field that is hard to grasp, some other examples being segments of botany, geology, and evolutionary biology.

5. Scientific revolutions come about when many complementary pieces are in place, such as financial support, intellectual independence, and networks of like-minded others to talk with.

Those conditions help people to understand that “seeing around those corners” can bring both high social and professional returns.

Are there major conceptual corners that today still no one can see around? If so, how might we discover what they are? And why are we not working harder on this? Or are we?

Here is the rest of Scott’s commentary.  Here is the online book.

The post Scott Sumner on *The Marginal Revolution* appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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w/e 2026-03-29

The start of the week was taken up with Mary driving us over to Essex to empty the beach hut and drive us back again, spending a couple of nights over there in between. On the one hand it was obviously very sad to say a final goodbye to that special wooden shed. On the other, once it’s sold, there will be one less thing for me to feel responsible for and to worry about.

I’m not entirely sure where the other four days of the week went. I’ve done some blogging (more in the pipeline). I’ve wrangled some WordPress. We lopped some surplus or low-hanging branches off trees in the garden and I lugged them all out of the way.


§ I canceled my Spotlight membership this week. Having done no acting in the past six years other than two classes, it seems silly to hang on to a web page that costs over £200 per year just so I can pretend a bit of me is still A Proper Actor.


§ After I wrote last week we finished watching season 8 of This Farming Life always a telly highlight of the year for us. It can be repetitive on two levels: the annual cycles of the farming calendar obviously change little from one season to the next, and then the narration insists on repeating background information over and over, not just from one episode to another, but within each episode. But, otherwise, as nice as ever. I don’t know how many of them do it, especially the couple moving their dairy herd up to Scotland and then everything else they coped with.


§ A photo of a tortoiseshell cat staring into the camera.
Pippa, wanting to watch more TV

§ We watched Peaky Blinders: The Immortal Man (Tom Harper, 2026) and it wasn’t very good. A little bit of this is that the whole thing feels like it’s aged badly, the style co-opted by banter lads in baker boy caps, so it’s like a parody of what was once novel. But even aside from that, and aside from Cillian Murphy being as good as ever, there’s nothing there. This review by Dan Monaghan sums it up well.


§ We also watched season one of Last One Laughing UK despite my usual No Jimmy Carr rule. It was fine, I guess. It had a few little laughs. It had a lot of the annoyances of that style of show (hyperactive editing, repetition, no pauses). For me the entire premise suffers from the fact that funny things are much funnier if you’re part of them or at least in the same space, and even more so if you know the people involved. And they’re all well-known comedians, so it’s all very chummy and I end up with the same feeling of being outside, watching successful people being paid to hang out and have fun together, like Taskmaster. If you like that maybe you’ll like this too.


§ I think we’ve given up on the TV series of High Fidelity. I had high hopes but it turns out that a record nerd moping about a break up for episode after episode, surrounded by annoying people, isn’t endurable even if they’re a woman now.


§ Conversely I was put off the title and premise of Dying for Sex (a woman with terminal cancer embarks on a quest to have an orgasm). But I figured anything starring Michelle Williams is worth a try, and in general I like one-off series, and it was great. Funny, well done, and sad without being soppy. Not one to watch with your children or parents (well, I don’t know what your relationship with your parents is like) but worth a go.


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The end of economics?

At one time, a philosopher was someone interested in acquiring knowledge about the world. Over time, specific areas of philosophy developed coherent models and branched off to become separate fields such as physics and astronomy. Later, fields branched off before they had even developed a coherent framework for analysis, or perhaps when they had multiple frameworks (as one typically sees in the social sciences.) Philosophy was left with the remainder, the questions that had not yet spawned separate fields of inquiry.

Tyler Cowen can be viewed as a philosopher, as his interests are too broad to be confined to a single intellectual framework. His new (free online) book entitled The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution is economic philosophy, a look at the field of economics from the outside by someone who understands it from the inside.

The Pursuit of Happiness is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

You might think that’s no big accomplishment, but as a general rule economists are too close to the subject to have an outside perspective of their field and non-economists are too poorly informed. For the most part, you either encounter orthodox economists reflexively defending the field, or heterodox outsiders complaining that economists are wrong because they don’t look at the world the way that this particular critic does. Tyler does neither. He mourns the end of the economics that he and I grew up with but also suggests that in some sense we had it coming.

As with books like The Great Stagnation and Average is Over, I suspect this book will set the agenda for future debate about where economics is and should be going in the 21st century. I do not plan to do a complete book review in this post. Indeed I’ll skip the most important part—AI. Instead, I’ll offer a few observations where I feel that I have something useful to add.

I recall one of my Chicago professors (George Stigler?) suggested that the most difficult task facing economists is not coming up with good answers, rather the real need is for better questions. Once an important question has been identified, the answer is often fairly easy to discern. Thus, Ronald Coase built a career partly based on his discovery of a single interesting question: Why do firms exist? Most people would never think of even asking that question. Coase’s answer (“transactions costs”) proved to have fruitful applications in many different areas.

My favorite part of Tyler’s book is where he asks a very good but non-obvious question: Why did it take so long for economics as a field to develop a coherent model or framework of analysis? Much of the book discusses how three economists simultaneously developed marginal analysis, with a focus on the work of Stanley Jevons. Here I’ll briefly provide the intuition of marginal analysis and then explain why economics is both extremely easy but also quite difficult.

Consider some human activity X. How much of this activity would (should?) we choose to do? A marginalist might suggest doing more of activity X as long as the marginal benefit of one more unit of X exceeds the marginal cost of one more unit of X. You then stop right at the point when the marginal benefit falls below the marginal cost, a position referred to as “equilibrium”.

Activity X might be the consumption of a good, production of a good, number of workers hired by a firm, number of dollars invested in a project, or almost any other type of human endeavor. In recent decades, NBA teams discovered that the marginal benefit of taking more 3-point shots exceeded the marginal cost of foregone 2-point shots and changed their strategies appropriately.

I was a good but not great student in high school and college. I got a lot of As, but also a fair number of Bs and Cs. But once I figured out the basic intuition of marginal analysis, the entire field began to seem quite easy. I stopped taking notes in class and just listened to the lectures.

But there’s also a sense in which economics is quite difficult. STEM-types often mock economists because our models are rather simple in a technical sense, at least compared to the harder sciences. That’s true, but it is also true that if you speak to scientists about economics, their opinions are often absurdly misguided. “Why don’t they just do . . . “ Yeah, you might want to look up “Chesterton’s Fence”.

Imagine a gas station deciding on how to price its product. Draw up a chart with the wholesale price of gasoline in one column and the profit-maximizing retail price charged in the next column. It is pretty obvious that the higher the wholesale price (including excise tax), the higher the profit maximizing retail price. I’m guessing that roughly 100% of the public understands this, at least on some basic level.

From a mathematical perspective, the implication of this monotonically increasing function is obvious. When input prices rise, firms will raise output prices and when input prices fall, firms will lower output prices. Or at least that’s how they’d behave if they were trying to maximize profits. (Admittedly they might behave in some other way if they were trying to go bankrupt.)

Now imagine visiting a convention full of high IQ scientists. Tell them that the government should reduce fees on property developers, because this will allow the developers to reduce the price of newly constructed homes. A significant proportion of them will roll their eyes and tell you not to be naive. “These developers are greedy, and they won’t pass on lower costs to consumers.” Sigh . . .

When teaching, I frequently found myself having to tell students “Yeah, they are greedy, which is precisely why they’ll pass on lower input costs to consumers.” It’s true that implications of economic models are often obvious when you think about them in mathematical terms, but when you don’t have that model in the front of your mind, the world can be a very confusing place. You may fall back on common sense intuitions that are simply false:

“Companies are greedy and higher prices are good for profits.”

Sorry, the first half of that statement is true, but the second half is false. It’s the symmetry, stupid. (And yes, pricing for monopolies is equally symmetrical.)

Economics is full of concepts that on one level are sort of obvious but at another level are deeply counterintuitive. Try explaining to people that price gouging during emergencies is actually good for consumers. We evolved with minds shaped by primitive reciprocal gift giving tribal societies that had norms about right and wrong, and suddenly ask people to think about the optimal amount of pollution, vice, traffic fatalities, etc. It doesn’t feel right.

In my own field of monetary economics, I find that people like to think about inflation by focusing on those goods rising fastest in price. But those are relative price changes, and inflation is a rise in the absolute price level. Inflation can only be explained by considering changes in the supply and demand for money—the medium of account. But that’s deeply counterintuitive, as most people think of inflation as rising prices, not a falling value of the dollar.

Tyler does a great job explaining why Jevon’s model of marginal analysis (which underlies most of modern microeconomics) is elementary on one level, but also something that wasn’t discovered until the 1860s because it was not at all obvious. Here’s how he concludes Chapter 3:

By studying the slow intellectual development of economics, and contrasting it with other fields of study, we can learn the following:

1. Some insights are very hard to grasp, even if they are apparently simple once they are understood. People need to “see around corners” in the right way to understand these insights and incorporate them into their world views.

2. Economics is one of those fields, and that is why it took intuitive economic reasoning so long to evolve, marginalism included. Those of us who are educators, or who spend time talking to policymakers, should take this point very seriously.

3. Even very, very smart people are likely unaware that these “see around the corner” insights are missing – did Euclid rue that he did not have access to proper supply and demand and tax incidence theory? Probably not.

4. Economics is not the only such field that is hard to grasp, some other examples being segments of botany, geology, and evolutionary biology.

5. Scientific revolutions come about when many complementary pieces are in place, such as financial support, intellectual independence, and networks of like-minded others to talk with.

Those conditions help people to understand that “seeing around those corners” can bring both high social and professional returns.

Are there major conceptual corners that today still no one can see around? If so, how might we discover what they are? And why are we not working harder on this? Or are we?

So why does Tyler see marginalism declining in importance? This is the most important part of the book, and the most difficult for me to evaluate. I’m a hedgehog that likes a single powerful explanation and Tyler is a fox that likes to look at problems from multiple angles.

[BTW, it is interesting that Tyler is so interested in AI, as LLMs remind me more of Tyler Cowen than of any other human being. Like Tyler, LLMs have “read everything”. If you ask a typical economist what’s wrong with tariffs, they’ll say something about Harberger triangles. Ask Tyler or an LLM, and they’ll list 12 different problems drawing on the literature from multiple fields.]

Tyler begins by citing the fact that marginal analysis often provides unwelcome policy advice:

The confrontational or “social discomfort” side of marginalism, discussed in chapter one, is now hurting marginalism somewhat. It is not the main reason why marginalism as a series of intuitions is dwindling. Yet (at the margin!), as the economics profession has moved to the left, a diminished role for at least some marginalist intuitions is perhaps not entirely unwelcome. Marginalism may thus have somewhat fewer defenders than might otherwise have been the case, if no political motives had intervened. I am not suggesting anyone is being dishonest here, rather, that their politics induce them to champion other methodological causes than marginalism, mostly because those other causes seem, for normative reasons, more important.

Policymakers in NYC probably don’t wish to be told that spending $81,000 on each homeless person might make homelessness marginally less unpleasant and thus increase the number of homeless New Yorkers.

It occurred to me that Tyler overlooks a previous decline in marginalism during 1933-68, when Chicago style price theory fell out of favor. It was hard to argue that minimum wages were a bad policy when the US was experiencing 25% unemployment in an economy with no minimum wage at all (in 1932), and only 4% unemployment in the late 1960s, when the minimum wage was fairly high. The Great Depression didn’t just seem to discredit capitalism, it also pushed marginalism to the periphery of economics, as the focus shifted to Keynesian models of aggregate demand. Marginalism is often a form of supply-side economics.

In the final decades of the 20th century—the neoliberal era—marginalism made a comeback. Chicago economists won lots of Nobel Prizes. This was mostly due to the fact that policymakers overreached, exposing problems with the Keynesian model. It seemed the supply side did matter after all. Tyler often (correctly) lectures people like me to stop being so pessimistic, but I wonder if Tyler is too pessimistic here about the prospects of another future comeback for marginalism. Indeed, isn’t the recent “abundance” movement largely based on marginalist thinking?

On the other hand, the Great Recession does seem to have been a setback for Chicago price theory. Tyler is right that the profession has recently turned to the left. Elsewhere I’ve argued that stable NGDP growth isn’t just good for the economy; it’s good for the field of economics—raising the prestige of free markets.

In some places, Tyler seems to mourn the decline of marginalism:

Price theory, as an approach, is not identical to marginalism. But so many of the basic economic concepts from intermediate micro use marginalist ideas, so price theory has been a comfortable home in which marginalism has flourished, including marginalism as an active research program.

Sadly, price theory is fading in relevance, and it is taking marginalism down with it. It used to be that some graduate programs favored the axiomatized approach to micro and others (e.g., University of Chicago, UCLA, University of Virginia) favored the price theory approach. These days the axiomatizations have won out pretty much everywhere, except at my own George Mason University. I don’t know of any other exceptions to that, but I do keep looking for them. To the extent I see exceptions to the dominance of the axiomatic approach, it is because empiricism is ascendant, not because price theory is making a comeback.

Although Tyler’s book focuses on microeconomics, reading it helped me to better understand why I’ve gradually lost interest in modern macroeconomics, which has moved in a direction that I find to be of little interest. This is a great observation:

One sign of the decay of interest in marginalism is that “price theory” has moved to being a niche interest in economics. To some economists, especially from a few decades ago, that may sound almost contradictory, almost like saying “economics has become a niche field within economics.” Well, that is a bit true as well.

If Milton Friedman were still alive, I suspect he’d feel the same that way I do:

The other leader of the price theory movement, Steve Levitt of Freakonomics fame, retired from academia and the University of Chicago at age 57, claiming he was having no impact with his research papers. He has stated flat out, “And I think in the marketplace for ideas, I gotta say that the Chicago price theory really has lost.” And “I think it [price theory] is essentially lost to posterity at this point.” Levitt notes that Milton Friedman had such a worry as long ago as the 1990s.

[The quote is about micro, but Friedman would be equally appalled at trends in macro.]

In retrospect, Paul Krugman’s 1998 paper “It’s Baaack” seems like the final important contribution to a 30-year golden age of macroeconomics for the fiat money world, which began in 1968, just as the US adopted a 100% fiat money regime and Friedman/Phelps developed their natural rate models. I’m sure you could point to lots of very high quality 21st century macro papers—but how many actually changed the way we look at the world in any sort of fundamental way?

At times, Tyler suggests that the useful insights of marginalism have already been incorporated into the profession. Since people naturally wish to do work at the frontier, marginalism is now less central to modern research. As an analogy, modern mathematicians haven’t rejected addition and multiplication, but they no longer write papers explaining these elementary concepts.

At other times, Tyler suggests that there are real problems with marginal analysis. My one criticism of the book, at least on a first reading, is that it wasn’t always clear exactly what Tyler saw as the central problem facing marginalism. For instance, minimum wage studies showing no effect on employment might be viewed as being inconsistent with “Chicago price theory”, but they are not necessarily inconsistent with marginal analysis, as they are often based on monopsony models that assume the marginal cost of labor exceeds the wage rate. That’s still marginal analysis. To be fair, Tyler acknowledges this fact in the first chapter, but at other times seems to almost conflate marginalism with Chicago price theory.

Tyler spends quite a bit of time discussing anomalies in modern finance, areas where empirical studies seem to reject the standard models of finance. At one point Tyler suggests that it is an especially big problem that flaws are showing up in the field of financial economics, as this is the field in which we have by far the best data:

For a long time I have thought of finance as the most advanced and most successful branch of economics. It works with the highest quality data, has many of the most rigorous models, and the economic assumption of “people really do want money only” seems relatively justified in that sphere of endeavor.

. . . The ascension of economic portfolio models, which started in the 1960s, is now very far from the relevant frontiers. To put it very bluntly, at the current state of knowledge those models are failing the market test.

This is especially painful for economics, because the original triumphs of economics in that field were explicitly marginalist in their origins.

But one could argue the opposite. All social science models are “false” in the sense of being only an approximation of reality, and hence we’d expect extremely good data to be especially helpful is showing the limits of any model. It took very good data to show the superiority of General Relativity to Newtonian physics.

Consider the case of the minimum wage. Can ambitious researchers find real world examples of markets that deviate slightly from the Chicago school model of perfect competition? Almost certainly yes. Does that mean the government of Pakistan should institute a $15/hour minimum wage as an anti-poverty policy? Obviously not. I think of Chicago price theory as a sort of first pass on a policy question, with more rigorous research demonstrating its limitations in specific cases.

Similarly, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is a sort of first pass on financial issues, not the be-all-and-end-all of financial research. It is often noted that the theory seems to be sort of self-refuting. If markets were truly efficient, then why would anyone gather the information required to make the market efficient? Even EMH proponents like Eugene Fama regard it as merely a useful approximation of reality.

In the past, I’ve been highly skeptical of “anomaly” studies, as I’ve seen so many claims fail to hold up out-of-sample. We were all taught the superiority of “value stocks”. Don’t buy those high-flying tech stocks. How’d that work out?

Perhaps it is best for most people to simply buy index stock funds, even if ambitious researchers using 360,000 factors are able to develop superior models of stock returns:

There is a recent working paper which is perhaps more striking yet, by Antoine Didisheim, Shikun (Barry) Ke, Bryan T. Kelly, and Semyon Malamud. They pick up from Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), a well-established idea from financial economics. APT typically looks for “factors” in the data which predict excess returns, and a traditional APT model might have found five or six such factors. Are “inflation” or perhaps “the term structure of interest rates” useful factors? Well, that can be debated, but if so, those results sound pretty intuitive. But those intuitions seem to be disappearing. In a paper by these authors, they apply machine learning methods to look for more factors. As we know, machine learning is very good at finding non-obvious relationships in the data. The largest model they built has 360,000 (!) factors, and it reduces pricing errors by 54.8 percent relative to the classic six-factor model from Fama and French.

Tyler discusses the fact that Wall Street firms often prefer to hire physicists, computer scientists and mathematicians rather than finance grads. But is that actually a problem for economics? We tend to assume that the local pizza joint will produce where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, even if they prefer to hire talented cooks rather than econ majors. If markets are efficient, why would a finance grad be especially valuable? Yes, they are smart and understand the terminology, but STEM people are often even smarter and can quickly be taught the terminology. Again, economics is simple once the basic models have been explained to an intelligent person.

To be fair, there are places where Tyler suggests that research has exposed flaws greater than those found in Newtonian physics, areas where the standard model may not even be a useful approximation of reality:

When financial economists refined the models with more complete specifications, it turned out Beta didn’t predict stock returns much at all. Eugene Fama and Kenneth French delivered one of the final blows to earlier approaches with a 1992 paper that showed Beta didn’t have explanatory power over expected returns at all. Since Fama himself was one of the original architects of CAPM-like reasoning, and French also was a renowned finance economist, these revisions to the model were credible.

For all its original promise, marginalism, and the concomitant notion of diminishing marginal utility, no longer seemed to help explain asset returns. Under one plausible account of intellectual history, you can date the decline of marginalism to that 1992 paper. In the most rigorous, data-oriented, and highest-paying field of economics, namely finance, marginalist constructs had every chance to succeed. In fact, they ran the board for several decades. But over time they failed. In the most prestigious field of economics, marginalism has been in full retreat for over 30 years, and it shows no signs of making a comeback.

Financial economics is not my area of expertise, so I’ll leave this as an open question.

Instead let me summarize what I interpret as the main problems that Tyler is considering:

  1. Marginalism is old hat—researchers want something new.

  2. Marginalism has right wing implications. Most intellectuals are left wing.

  3. Marginalism has been shown to be only an approximation of reality, and younger economists wish to expose its limitations.

  4. Modern empirical research often does better employing big data in an atheoretical fashion.

  5. Marginalism seems to be wrong on at least some important questions, such as the impact of “beta” on stock returns.

That’s a quite a diverse set of claims, with each claim having different implications.

Tyler ends with some very interesting speculation as to how AI may reshape the field of economics. Perhaps I’ll consider those ideas in a future post.

Undoubtedly, there’ll be debate over the meaning of his final paragraph:

There is however a slightly scarier version of this story yet. Maybe our intuitions about the world, including the economic world, were never so strong in the first place. Maybe we put so much value on “intuitive” results, in 20th century microeconomics, as a kind of cope and also security blanket, to make up for this deficiency. But our intuitions, even assuming them to be largely correct, always were just a small corner of understanding, swimming in a larger froth of epistemic chaos. And now the illusion has been stripped bare, and the true complexities of economic reasoning are being revealed.

I can think of any number of interpretations here:

  1. The world is very complex.

  2. The world is constantly changing.

  3. Important concepts like utility cannot be measured.

  4. Behavioral considerations are probably important but are hard to model.

  5. Perhaps our models are more “WEIRD”, more culturally specific, than we have been assuming. How about an economics for contemporary Haiti?

To me, this seems like one of those glass half full/half empty situations, where we’d need to be more specific as to the question at hand before providing any sort of overall evaluation of the state of economics. I suspect that if Tyler were put in a room full of smug orthodox economists, he’d stand out as the critic of complacency. Put in a room full of heterodox critics of economics, and he’d probably tell them they underestimate the usefulness of mainstream economic models.

If this sort of book had been written by a marginalism skeptic—say an MMTer—it might be easily dismissed. The fact that Tyler is obviously a fan of marginal thinking and understands its strengths, gives his pessimistic outlook much more credibility.

Regardless of where you stand on any of these issues, this book will set the agenda for future debate over the direction of economics. But it also has interesting implications for a wide range of fields that are generally viewed as “science” and yet face many of the same problems as economics (widely viewed as a non-science by natural scientists), including botany, geology, meteorology and evolutionary biology. Self-recommending.

PS. People have been calling for more Trump bashing. Honestly, I feel like I’d be insulting your intelligence. But if you insist, here are five good Yglesias tweets from just the past 24 hours.

Great point

Pure evil

Ironic

The real winners

And more real winners

PPS. You presumably noticed that this post is ungated. In the future, there’ll be a mixture of 100% open posts, and partially gated posts.

The Pursuit of Happiness is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Fire Weather Concerns in the Intermountain West into the Plains

Netflix Wrecked Their tvOS Video Player

Amanda Kondolojy, writing for Pocket-lint:

Though the Netflix app is largely the same on most platforms, over the weekend several Apple TV users on the unofficial Apple TV Reddit noticed some small changes to the tvOS version of the app that are making the app harder to use in subtle but very frustrating ways.

According to user iamonreddit, the most recent Netflix app update has made it slightly more difficult to use the fast-forward and rewind functions. Instead of clicking the back or forward button on the remote wheel to advance or return ten seconds, this button press now pauses the screen and brings up a frame selector. In order to actually go forward or go back, users then have to click the same button again. So essentially, what once required a single button press, now needs two.

These changes aren’t small, aren’t subtle, and don’t make fast-forwarding and rewinding merely “slightly” more difficult. (And what once required a single button press now requires three, not two.) The video playback interface in a streaming app is the most essential thing a streaming app does, and now Netflix’s tvOS player looks terrible and works wrong. The original report Kondolojy cites, from Reddit user “iamonreddit” (yes, you are), describes it as it is:

Did Netflix mess up the app? There are two extra clicks for a simple 10s rewind or fast forward. Instead of it going back 10s in one click, now it pauses and brings up the frame selector, and then you have to click again. Did they not do any research or usability testing before releasing this?

It’s also not smooth at all, it keeps spinning for a while and I have 1gig fiber optic internet. What a big downgrade!

They have some of the top paid employees in the world and this is what they come up with. Unless this was the result of some restrictions introduced by Apple.

Looks like they messed it up big time. Netflix used to set benchmarks for others. And here we are now. I’ve never had a single problem with their app so for, for over a decade of use.

Netflix’s gratuitously ugly new custom video player commits various crimes against accessibility. Two years ago I wrote about tvOS’s system accessibility shortcut that lets you assign triple-clicking the Back (“\<”) button to toggle captions, and the fact that Netflix didn’t support it. This cursed new player, you will be unsurprised to learn, doesn’t support it either. It also does not support the wonderful standard platform convention of temporarily turning on caption when you rewind 10 or 20 seconds, for a “What did they just say?” moment.

Update: Switching to their own custom video player also broke Netflix’s integration with the iPhone. Until last week, playing video in the Netflix app on Apple TV would put a live activity widget on your iPhone lock screen with the name of the current program, scrub location, and player controls. Now that’s gone.

This regression dropping the same week that Netflix announced price hikes makes me so angry that I’m giving even more thought to downgrading my family’s Netflix account from the $27/month Premium plan to the $20/month Standard plan. Sending Netflix only $240 per year instead of $324 will show them.

 ★ 

Trump Is Putting His Signature on U.S. Currency

Alan Rappeport, reporting for The New York Times:

President Trump’s signature will appear on U.S. dollars later this year, the Treasury Department said on Thursday. The decision to have Mr. Trump’s John Hancock on America’s paper currency represented an unprecedented change, one that the department said was being made in honor of the United States’ 250th anniversary.

Mr. Trump is set to become the first sitting U.S. president to have his signature on the greenback. His name will appear alongside that of Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. As a result, the U.S. treasurer, whose name has been on the currency for more than a century, will not appear on the currency.

Raquel Coronell Uribe, reporting for NBC News:

Trump’s signature will go on the bills in honor of the country’s 250th anniversary, the Treasury said. Historically, paper currency carries the signatures of the treasury secretary and the treasurer.

“The President’s mark on history as the architect of America’s Golden Age economic revival is undeniable,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement. “Printing his signature on the American currency is not only appropriate, but also well deserved.”

It’s certainly news that the sitting president — a man whom psychologists have publicly described as showing clear “symptoms of severe, untreatable personality disorder — malignant narcissism” — is putting his signature on U.S. currency. But why parrot the administration’s obviously false line that this gross, embarrassing change in longstanding tradition has anything whatsoever to do with “honoring” the United States’s 250th anniversary?

It makes no more sense that putting Trump’s signature on greenbacks “honors the nation” or its history than it would to claim that doing so will cure the common cold, reverse male pattern baldness, or keep us safe from Bigfoot. Call it what it is: sycophantic ego fellatio for a deeply unpopular narcissist who is losing his already tenuous grip on reality.

 ★ 

New York Post: ‘Trump Considers Renaming Strait of Hormuz’

The New York Post (I’m not sure if I should tell you to take this with a grain of salt, because it’s the Post and their journalistic standards are low, or, to assign this extra credibility because it’s the Post, a right-wing Murdoch rag that Trump lackeys actually talk to):

President Trump is prioritizing taking control of the Strait of Hormuz as he grows frustrated with the lack of help from allies to force open the crucial waterway. And once Trump ends Iran’s reign of terror over the shipping route, he’s considering rechristening it the “Strait of America” or even naming it after himself, sources told The Post. [...]

Trump told a Saudi investor forum Friday evening in Miami that he might decide to call the Strait after himself, rather than America.

“They have to open up the Strait of Trump — I mean Hormuz,” Trump said. “Excuse me, I’m so sorry. Such a terrible mistake. The Fake News will say, ‘He accidentally said.’ No, there’s no accidents with me, not too many.”

I suspect there are going to be accidents soon, as he descends further into dementia and needs adult diapers.

 ★ 

The 2019 Intel Mac Pro’s Unfortunate Timing

Stephen Hackett, at 512 Pixels:

I’ve thought a lot about the bad timing Jones mentions. Had Apple stuck to the original timeline, and killed off the 2013 Mac Pro in favor of an iMac “specifically targeted at large segments of the pro market,” back in 2017, Apple could have avoided putting out the best Intel Mac ever, less than a year before the transition to Apple silicon.

Did Apple know in 2017 that 2020 was the year the M1 would make it out of the lab? Probably not, but it doesn’t make the timing any less painful.

Apple might not have had 2020 set in stone for the Apple Silicon transition, but in 2017, they definitely knew that Apple Silicon was the future. I think they knew that years before 2017, and in broad strokes, that’s why 2015–2020 was such a bad period for Mac hardware. They didn’t ship a retina MacBook Air until 2018. The 12-inch MacBook was beautiful but expensive and seriously underpowered. And nothing suffered more than the Mac Pro in that stretch. I think Apple knew that the future was on their own silicon, but in the meantime, they just couldn’t get it up for the last five years of the Intel era.

 ★ 

Apple Should Set and Enforce Some Basic Standards for Custom Video Players on tvOS

While I’m bitching about Netflix’s craptacular new video player on Apple TV, let me quote from a piece I wrote two years ago (also complaining about Netflix’s tvOS app):

Turns out there are two better ways:

  1. If you use the Control Center Apple TV remote control on your iPhone, there’s a dedicated “CC” button.

  2. In tvOS, go to Settings → Accessibility → Accessibility Shortcut, and set it to “Closed Captions”. Now you can just triple-click the Menu/Back button on the remote to toggle captions. (On older Apple TV remotes, the button is labelled “Menu”; on the new remote, it’s labelled with a “<”.)

But here’s the hitch: Netflix’s tvOS app doesn’t support either of these ways to toggle captions. Netflix only supports the on-screen caption toggle in their custom video player. I get why Netflix and other streaming apps want to use their own custom video players, but it ought to be mandated by App Store review that they support accessibility features like this one.

What Apple should have done right from the start with the tvOS-based Apple TV a decade ago is require all apps to use the system video player. No custom video players. It’s too late for that, alas. But the tvOS App Store review process ought to insist on compliance with these accessibility and platform compliance features.

You want to use your own custom video player? Fine. But apps with custom video players must support the “CC” button in the iOS Control Center remote control, must support the triple-click accessibility shortcut, must support the platform conventions for fast-forwarding and rewinding using the Apple TV remote control, etc. If your video player doesn’t comply, your app update doesn’t get approved.

Apple should use the App Store approval process for the benefit of users. Isn’t that supposed to be the point?

 ★ 

‘How Apple Became Apple: The Definitive Oral History of the Company’s Earliest Days’

This feature from Harry McCracken is just spectacularly good. (And it’s a gift link that’ll get you past Fast Company’s paywall.) 50 years is a long time and there are some key players in Apple’s origin story who are gone — but because everyone was so young at the time, it’s amazing how many of them are still alive. And, of course, in Chris Espinosa’s case, still working at Apple:

I was sitting there in the Byte Shop in Palo Alto on an Apple-1 writing BASIC programs, and this guy with a scraggly beard and no shoes came in and looked at me and conducted what I later understood to be the standard interview, which was “Who are you?” I said, “I’m Chris.” And he said, “What are you doing?” I said, “I’m writing BASIC programs on this Apple-1 for the owner.” And he said, “Are you any good?” I showed him my BASIC programs on the Apple-1.

He told me, “I’ve seen you around Homebrew. Woz is working on this second-generation computer, and instead of loading BASIC from cassette tape, we want to put it in ROM. And so it has to be perfect. I want you to come and test Woz’s BASIC, and I’ll give you 4K of RAM for that when you build your own computer.” That sounded like a good deal. Steve Jobs’s idea back then of recruiting was to grab a random-ass 14-year-old off the streets.

Apple is at its best when it’s infused with a bit of the spirit of the two Steves whose first joint venture were blue boxes that let you make long distance phone calls for free. The first public phone call Steve Jobs ever made on an iPhone was a prank call to the Starbucks next to Moscone West. I feel like that renegade spirit has been repressed in the Tim Cook era.

 ★ 

Is America Suffering from the “Resource Curse”?

A map of the world with pink and purple colors

AI-generated content may be incorrect.

Oil rents are the difference between the value of oil produced and the cost of producing it

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are petrostates — nations whose economies are driven by oil and gas. As a result, their politics are deeply shaped by their natural resource wealth. Iran is also a petrostate despite the fact that it exports significant quantities of manufactured goods. It’s a petrostate nonetheless because most of these are goods that make use of its oil and gas, like fertilizers and petrochemicals. The main exception has been Iran’s growing exports of military hardware, especially missiles and drones.

Russia is also widely considered a petrostate: John McCain famously called it “a gas station masquerading as a country,” although Matt Klein argues that this overstates the case. And critics of the Trump administration often accuse it of trying to convert the U.S. into a petrostate, at an especially inopportune moment. In my recent conversation with David Roberts, he declared that

the US is basically aligning itself as the last big petrostate. We’re going to go down with the fossil fuel ship, and China is aligning itself as the first electrostate.

Last month Rana Faroohar of the Financial Times basically said the same thing.

At this moment in history critiques of economic reliance on fossil fuels often focus on changing energy technology. At a time of rapid progress in renewable energy and general economic electrification, many argue, as Roberts does, that clinging to fossil fuels means missing the boat.

However, warnings that reliance on oil or other natural resources can be a trap have been prominent in economic discourse for decades. They were widespread long before the current renewable energy revolution began and were largely separate from concerns about the environment. The term resource curse, coined by Richard Auty in 1993, refers to a familiar though controversial proposition in development economics. It says that nations rich in natural resources, especially minerals including oil, tend to do worse in the long run than resource-poor nations. As we will see, the resource curse proposition claims that countries with economies heavily tilted towards natural resource extraction are afflicted by a tendency towards backwardness compared to countries less dependent on natural resource extraction.

Historically, most discussion of the resource curse has been concerned with small or poor nations. At this point, however, many are arguing that the United States faces some of the same issues and that our success in extracting oil and gas is actually hurting us. What’s the source of these arguments and how reasonable are they?

Beyond the paywall I will address the following:

1. The economic consequences of natural resource abundance

2. The political economy of resource wealth

3. The United States as a resource-curse nation

Read more

Alex Chan on deceased organ donation

 The Harvard Gazette points to this interview with HBS professor Alex Chan:

Designing Incentives That Matter—Even After Death: Interview with Alex Chan By Avery Forman 

"In “Reimagining Transplant Center Incentives Beyond the CMS IOTA Model,” published in January in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Chan explores a government experiment that pays kidney centers for volume and efficiency—not just outcomes—which could increase transplant numbers. Chan cowrote the article with Alvin E. Roth, the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Emeritus, at HBS.

In addition, covering funeral costs for organ donors could increase donation rates by up to 35%, and save up to 419,000 life years and as much as $800 million in Medicare expenses, Chan and coauthor Kurt Sweat of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center write in “Funeral Expense Reimbursement as a Strategy to Enhance Organ Donation and Transplantation Access,” published in October in NPJ Health Systems.

 ...

"Why Chan felt compelled to study the organ market

“Two things pulled me in. First, this is a market where the stakes are brutally clear. Organ transplantation is one of the few places where inefficiency shows up not as a deadweight loss in a textbook, but as people dying on a waiting list. When a market fails here, it fails loudly.

Second, the level of inefficiency is staggering. Each year, more than 5,000 organs are recovered and then discarded, while roughly the same number of people die waiting for an organ. These are million-dollar transactions once you account for surgery, lifelong care, and avoided dialysis. So even small improvements in incentives can save lives directly and save the healthcare system billions of dollars.

For an economist or market designer, that’s a rare alignment: moral urgency and economic leverage pointing in the same direction.”

Incentives must consider what’s socially acceptable

“Incentive design is much harder than we like to admit. Organ transplantation is a supply chain. You have procurement organizations, hospitals, surgeons, patients, regulators, all responding to different incentives.

Designing a good incentive for one actor is already difficult. Designing incentives so that the entire chain works well is not just adding up the optimal incentives for each link. Sometimes improving one part of the system quietly breaks another.

The choice isn't between market and no market. It’s between a system we design on purpose and a system that fails by accident.

This is a market with moral and political constraints embedded in it. In healthcare, and frankly now in most markets, the incentives that are economically sensible also need to be socially legitimate.

Incentives don’t just change behavior; they express values. In markets that touch life, death, or dignity, people react not only to what the incentive does, but to what it seems to say. That makes incentive design less like tuning a machine and more like negotiating a fragile social contract.

 ...

"The ‘ick factor’ might prevent progress

“Very often people do not want to use the right incentives because they have this concept of it being repugnant.

[For instance], we would pay for the funeral of someone who gives their life for their country when they serve in the military. We will pay for the funeral of someone who donated their body for scientific research to advance society. But if people want to donate an organ to save another person's life? If [that donor’s] family would very much welcome some support at a moment of crisis, we are not going to pay for the funeral. Even a very sensible incentive sometimes is bound by social norms, or even what we call the ‘ick factor,’ and we have a less effective system at the end.

People worry that incentives will corrupt the gift of life. But the truth is that we already have incentives; they’re just accidental and poorly distributed. The choice isn't between market and no market. It’s between a system we design on purpose and a system that fails by accident. Ignorance of incentives doesn't make a system moral; it just makes it inefficient.”

 

As historic March heatwave finally fades, a brief cooler/wetter interlude will occur across the U.S. West in early April before warmth & dryness likely return

Unprecedented March heatwave among most anomalous ever observed, in any month, the American Southwest Well, it sure has been…quite a month. Meteorologically speaking, March 2026 will go down in the record books as the warmest March on record for at least a third, and possibly half or more, of the continental United States. But even […]

The post As historic March heatwave finally fades, a brief cooler/wetter interlude will occur across the U.S. West in early April before warmth & dryness likely return first appeared on Weather West.

Sunday assorted links

1. Building political superintelligence?

2. Joshua Gans defends Topkis.

3. Dash Crofts, RIP (NYT).

4. NBA proposals to limit marginal tanking incentives.

5. Can Jim O’Neill improve the NSF?

6. Is grass-fed beef disappearing in Argentina?

7. Is marginalism a Rank 4 idea?

8. On the study of Bengali sweets.

The post Sunday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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Reading List 03/28/26

Super Sport SS18 Glider yacht, via DesignBoom.

Welcome to the reading list, a weekly roundup of news and links related to buildings, infrastructure and industrial technology. This week we look at plastic price jumps, crypto-backed mortgages, a proposed AI data center pause, US battery manufacturing, and more. Roughly 2/3rds of the reading list is paywalled, so for full access become a paid subscriber.

War in Iran

The disruption to oil and LNG supplies caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is causing some countries to burn more coal. “India is burning more coal to meet higher summer demand. South Korea has lifted caps on electricity from coal. Indonesia is prioritizing using its domestic supply. Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam are boosting coal-fired power.” [NPR]

And because petroleum is used to make plastic, the closure of the strait is also driving up plastic prices. Dow Chemical plans a 30 cents per pound increase in April, following a 10 centers per pound increase in March. [WSJ] Plastic prices are up nearly 40% since February. [Reuters]

Petroleum is also used in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, so the strait closure might affect the supply of generic medications. [CNBC] And last week I noted that production of helium (which is extracted as part of the natural gas drilling process) had also been disrupted, but I hadn’t clocked that liquified helium is used as a coolant for MRI machines. [X]

Another AWS data center in the mideast has apparently been damaged by an Iranian drone attack. [Al Jazeera]

To try and address rising gas prices, the EPA is temporarily waiving regulations on the sale of ethanol blended gas (which is restricted in certain locations at certain times of the year to reduce air pollution). [CNBC]

Iran has established a “safe shipping corridor” through the strait, allowing ships to pass for a $2m fee. [Lloyd’s List]

The closure of the strait seems to be good for Chinese battery manufacturers though: since the start of the war their stocks have spiked. “CATL’s China-traded shares have risen 19 per cent; Sungrow is up 19.4 per cent; and BYD, also the world’s top EV maker, has gained 21.9 per cent since the US-Israeli strikes were launched at the end of February.” [FT]

Housing

The New York Times on the ROAD to Housing Act, and the provision that would prevent the construction of build-to-rent single family homes. “Now, with the legislation back in the House awaiting a vote, critics are urging lawmakers to drop that build-to-rent restriction, arguing it would counter the intent of the bill, making it harder, not easier, to build homes when the country desperately needs them.” [NYT] Senator Elizabeth Warren is apparently unhappy about the resistance to these provisions of the bill, and is sending vaguely threatening letters to investors in multifamily apartments and manufactured homes. [Axios]

Another NYT article on the surprising success of some US malls. Apparently malls with higher-end, luxury tenants are doing fairly well. “There are roughly 900 malls in the United States, but only a small sliver are successful. The top 100 account for 50 percent of the entire sector’s value, according to Tibone, whereas the bottom 350 make up 10 percent. Revenue at class A malls is growing by 5 percent each year, and financing is easy to come by.” This is not totally surprising to me — malls in the Atlanta metro area seem crowded whenever I drive by or go in one, so I knew some must be succeeding — but it’s interesting to see that it seems to be specifically the high-end malls. [NYT]

Fannie Mae will now allow mortgages backed with cryptocurrency. “The mortgage company Better Home & Finance and the U.S. crypto exchange Coinbase Global unveiled a new mortgage product Thursday that allows home buyers to pledge their crypto holdings when getting a Fannie-backed mortgage, instead of selling the crypto to make a cash down payment.” What could go wrong. [WSJ]

Manufacturing

Elon Musk announces “Terafab” semiconductor fab to make chips for Tesla cars, Optimus, and space-based data centers. “We either build the Terafab or we don’t have the chips,” he said while on stage at an event in Austin. “We need the chips, so we’re going to build the Terafab.” [WSJ]

Read more

The World Machines Project

The loose World Machines framework I developed to guide the readings selection for the Contraptions Book Club has proved surprisingly popular and fertile, and people besides me are starting to use it to scaffold their thinking and writing. Besides me, , , , , and a few others on here have been employing the World Machines frame to varying degrees, in their own writing and thinking. Which is hereby retroactively open-sourced or something. The framework is less an idea than a sort of opinionated cognitive coworking space I think.

World Machines, made with titles.xyz using my Bucket Art model

In fact, I think I’ve accidentally started a collaborative World Machines Project out of a subset of members of the book club. Some of us have been batting around an idea of doing a kind of collaborative World Machines book (in addition to our individual threads of inquiry, with reuse of writings/materials). This goal of the WMP is to write that book. Or some suitably unholy LLMified monstrosity that only looks like a book. Minimum viable scaffolding, aggressively obnoxious use of LLMs at any and all stages, and rough consensus and running code as the guiding principle.

Being part of the book club (ie, having read a reasonable fraction of the books from the last 15 months) is necessary but not sufficient for membership. If you’ve written at least one essay referencing the World Machines frame, you are eligible to self-select into this set. To opt-in, simply join this chat and put at least one link to a World Machines framed essay in the Google Sheet linked there.

I want to put the lightest possible scaffolding around this, separate it somewhat from the book club, and see where it goes. My initial thought is a shared git repo set up as a shared Claude Code project. Maybe a DFOS space. Let’s discuss all that in the chat.

What’s a World Machine?

For those who came in late, the basic idea is that the world can be understood through the lens of long-lived “world machines” that take about 400 years to build, operate stably for 400 years, and then decline/collapse relatively rapidly. The connection to our book club is that each year, the book club studies one of these machines (“configurancies” would be a more accurate term, but let’s stick with “machines” as the more evocative one). Last year, we studied the Modernity Machine, and this year we’re studying the Divergence Machine. Next year, the plan is to study what I’ve tentatively dubbed the Liveness Machine.

At any given time, there are 3 world machines operating in parallel — a growing one, a mature one, and a dying/recently dead one. We can refer to them as the Dawn Machine, Day Machine, and Dusk Machine, following the scheme of the Cleons genetic dynasty on the Foundation TV show. We’re doing a kind of psychohistory after all.

Here’s a convenient table:

If you’ve been participating in the book club and this project interests you, just write an essay exploring some aspect of the idea, add it to the spreadsheet, and you’re in. If/how your contribution actually gets synthesized into the collective thing is a tbd question. There will be quality control and consensus mechanisms eventually, but for the moment I’ll be the BDFL of this thing. We can diverge individually, but converge ironically together.

If you haven’t been participating in the book club, dive in anywhere you like, by reading some reasonable sampling of the picks from the last 15 months (I’d say 3-4 is the bare minimum) and then write something.

And of course, you don’t have to participate in the WMP. You can just do the book club.

In Media Res Starter Notes

For those who are already in the flow of this thing, some starter notes that may help you reorient what you’re already doing a little to prepare to collaborate.

These notes may or may not make sense to people who haven’t been following this thread of the newsletter closely, but read them like an in media res introduction to a TV show episode or movie, where you’re dropped into the middle of the action with no explanation.

  1. The book I’m currently finishing, The Infidel and the Professor, unlocked a key question for me: How the Dawn and Day machines relate when both are strong enough that neither can entirely dominate. In the 1740s-90s period when David Hume and Adam Smith were working with close mutual influence, they were both heretics (real heretics, not Thielean ersatz heretics) within the Modernity Machine and founding figures of the Divergence Machine, but didn’t have to pay much of a cost for their heresies. A key “tell” from the book is that both took religion and theology entirely out of their intellectual work; Hume openly and combatively, with extreme prejudice, Smith more circumspectly and diplomatically. This really captures the “generational war” aspect of WMs, making the Dawn/Day/Dusk typology very useful.

  2. The WMs framework feels like “Strauss-Howe for civilizations” with a cycle time of 1000 years instead of 80-100. But I’m very wary of cyclic history models (Kondratriev, Perez, Turchin, Sorokin, all the way back through Toynbee, Gibbon, Ibn Khaldun etc). The WMs framework is meant to be a clarifying and legibilizing scaffolding, not a “theory” of history. The WMP should put raw historical phenomenology first, rather than force-fitting it into the framework. There will be loose ends and that’s fine. The WMs framework is meant as sensemaking triage and a shared conceptual language, not as a Grand Unified Theory (GUT).

  3. The Book Club —> Theorizing route seems very useful, so I think we should codify it as a requirement for participation. My suspicion is the WM framework will be exactly as useful as the number of relevant reads (books mainly) that precede a written piece. I think a good protocol for this is — at any given time, your book reference set should be at least 30% from our shared book club list. If it falls below, you’re essentially forking from our consensus headspace. Which is fine, but it means it will be less useful for the rest of us trying to synthesize. Otoh, only reading within the book club is probably bad. If you’re not bringing in ideas from stuff only you are reading

  4. The current Dawn machine, which I’m calling the Liveness machine, starts with the cusp technology of generative AI, which is poised between a divergent non-living process, and a self-organized critical living process. Shoggoth-like basically. We’ll study it next year, so resist the temptation to jump the gun on it.

  5. Random thought I’m trying to chase down now: The Modernity Machine was a pull machine, pulled along by a telos of Progress.™ The MM is convergent because the same small set of pull forces act on everybody. The Divergence Machine, MM otoh, is a push machine, driven by individual or small-scale push forces. This is why it diverges (think front-wheel drive, vs. rear-wheel drive with no steering… the latter is going to go off in random directions). One implication that divergent history is a much stronger function of “grounding” conditions.

  6. A lot of people who are enjoying the WMs framework also enjoy cybernetics/system dynamics approaches to the underlying topics (eg. Maturana/Varela autopoiesis etc). I’ve said this before, but just to put it on the record for this project, I’m mildly hostile to these, and as BDFL, I’ll be adopting a kind of “disagree but commit” attitude towards contributors who explore threads based on those ideaspaces. It’s not that there’s no value there (there’s plenty), but the ideas come with more baggage and their own history/tradition than I want to deal with.

  7. I think we’ll be doing a kind of psychohistory. Asimov tripped on chaos theory, which he tried to retcon into Prelude to Foundation, but I think our broad approach will be closer to long-range weather/climate forecasting. And instead of Seldon Vaults with our digital ghosts trying to nudge history in the future, our candidate influence mechanisms will look like terraforming or weather control tech. Except in events/time rather than space. And instead of a first/second foundation conceits, we’ll have some sort of blurry protocol that has high-n cardinal structure rather than ordinal structure.

Starter Questions

  1. What is the full inventory of WMs since the dawn of civilization (say Neolithic Revolution)?

  2. Can we retcon a WM onto any historical era or are there necessary/sufficient conditions? For eg: if planetary connectivity is too weak, is a WM meaningful. A good test case is the Bronze Age, where the tin trade was the primary “global” dynamic afaik. Is that enough to call it a WM, or should we treat that age as a set of river-valley civs that did some trading?

  3. Assuming the 400 year time constant and 1000-1200 year full lifecycle of contemporary WMs, was it slower before? I’d imagine so. For eg. taking the Axial Age as a quasi-useful construct, that had a lifespan of about 1600 years (800 BCE to 800 CE)

  4. What’s the micro-to-macro fractal structure of WMs? Is there necessarily one? Can there be “thin” WMs that are primarily at one or other scale?

  5. How is the prevailing set of WMs understood in its own time? We are thinking about WMs from our location in 2026. How did people in 1776 understand MM and DM? Did they anticipate LM from that distance? Did they relate to the Medieval Machine differently from us, as an active shaper of history rather than a romanticized source of larps?

  6. How is the prevailing set of WMs understood from different loci within it. Besides the obvious geographic diversity angle (American vs. European vs. Chinese understandings for eg), there are probably other interesting loci.

  7. How can we map/visualize WMs well?

Join the chat to continue talking about this stuff. We’ll move to a better place than substack chat eventually, but let’s start there since we’re all lazy.

Starfish Space finds a new partner for docking demonstration mission

Otter Pup 2 docking

Starfish Space has changed plans for a docking demonstration mission after its original partner backed out.

The post Starfish Space finds a new partner for docking demonstration mission appeared first on SpaceNews.

Shruti interviews V. Anantha Nageswaran on the Indian economy

He is currently serving as the Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, and also is the co-author of the books Economics of Derivatives and The Rise of Finance: Causes, Consequences and Cures.  The podcast covers import substitution and strategic resilience, futures and options market, gross fixed capital formation, crypto markets, India’s growth trajectory, and much more.

Here is the audio and video on YouTube.  Here is a linked transcript.  Excerpt:

RAJAGOPALAN: The policy response to this has come in a couple of different ways. One has come through SEBI. It has started raising contract sizes and limiting weekly expiration,and so on. Another instrument has come through taxation. There have been STT [Securities Transactions Tax] hikes in consecutive budgets,but there is one thing about STT that I want to understand a little bit better from someone like you who has thought about this deeply.

Now, STT on futures is being levied on the notional value of the contract, which is the full traded price, whereas the STT on the options is levied on the premium, which is a small fraction of the overall underlying value of the notional exposure. The effective tax that is imposed is much more on the futures trade, manyfold more actually, than it is on the options trade, whereas the speculation is mostly happening on the options side, which is also where most of the retail investors are losing money because the futures side is much better capitalized, larger firms, and so on.

NAGESWARAN: No, also the futures side is probably used more by institutions, and therefore, they are able to put up the margin requirement, etc., better than the options trades, where the individuals are being sold almost like the₹10 sachet-type options, and the options…

RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly, sachetization options, absolutely.

NAGESWARAN: Yes. Go ahead.

RAJAGOPALAN: Now with each successive hike in the STT,we’re seeing the gap widen. It’s on the margin, making futures relatively more expensive than options just because it’s taxing each trade. It’s like a toll fee that’s paid almost on every transaction. Your book was precisely about understanding these kinds of policy instruments. Given that now we have a tax instrument which inadvertently favors the more speculative instrument. Is that a good way of thinking about it, or how would you think about this problem?

NAGESWARAN: No, I think you have given me a lot to think about on this. I probably haven’t applied my mind as much to the mechanics of the STT being levied on the premium when it comes to options, but on the notional value of the contract when it comes to futures. Actually, you have given me something to think about. As you said, it could be having the unintended consequence of reducing the hedging role of futures, which probably is playing a better role there and encouraging the speculative element. Let me think about it and also probably take back this aspect of the conversation back to my colleagues in the revenue department, in the Ministry of Finance. Thank you for that, yes.

Of great importance for the world’s most populous country.

The post Shruti interviews V. Anantha Nageswaran on the Indian economy appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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The Story of My Mysterious Pain

I never talked about my pain.

For a start, it sometimes hurt too much to talk about anything. On bad days, any movement of my mouth—to speak, to eat, to brush my teeth—could trigger a jolt like an electric shock across the right side of my face. It felt like my cheek and lower jaw had been taken over by the vengeful Norse god Thor, who defended his turf with an endless supply of lightning bolts.

But even on good days, there wasn’t much I could say. Pain isn’t an inspiring topic for conversation. In an odd way, it’s like music—words always fall far short of conveying its essence.


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I’m reminded of the famous meeting, in May 1922, of the two towering modernist novelists of the era, James Joyce and Marcel Proust, at the Majestic Hotel in Paris. Igor Stravinsky, Sergei Diaghilev, Pablo Picasso, and William Carlos Williams were also in attendance. But at one point, the two literary lions huddled together in conversation.

What did they talk about? Were they planning the future of the novel? Were they exchanging tips for handling writer’s block?

Not in the least. They were both complaining about their medical problems. No words about arts or culture were exchanged. According to William Carlos Williams, the conversation went like this:

Joyce said, “I’ve headaches every day. My eyes are terrible.”

Proust replied, “My poor stomach. What am I going to do? It’s killing me. In fact, I must leave at once.”

“I’m in the same situation,” replied Joyce. “If I can find someone to take me by the arm. Goodbye!”

Charmé,” said Proust. “Oh, my stomach, my stomach.”

That’s what pain does. It reduces even the most eloquent to moaning and groaning.

Even if I’d limited myself to precise clinical details, there still wasn’t much to say. For the first three years, I didn’t have a name for my affliction or any idea what caused it. I couldn’t even find the right words to describe my symptoms.

“I finally figured out the cause of my pain. But that was just the first step. I had more to take—and three weeks ago they led me to an operating table at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in Manhattan.”

That’s because my pain kept changing. Thor had turned into a major league pitcher with an endless variety of fastballs, sliders, curveballs and change-up pitches. The pain moved from spot to spot—although it was always somewhere on the lower right side of my face, the metaphorical home plate for this agonizing sport.

How could I even begin to explain this to a doctor? I couldn’t even answer that simplest of questions: Where does it hurt? It never stayed in one place long enough to establish a routine.

The same was true of the type of pain. Some days it burned like a fire. Other days it throbbed like a toothache. It was endlessly creative.

It first struck one day during the COVID lockdown—while I was eating lunch, I felt ten seconds of intense fire in my teeth. I actually let out a shout. That’s how bad it was.

The pain was over in a flash, but it returned sporadically over the next few days. I assumed I had some dental emergency. But at a hastily arranged appointment, the oral surgeon assured me that my teeth were fine—maybe I was just biting too hard.

I’ve heard of others with my condition who didn’t find out what was really wrong until they had two or three teeth pulled. As it turns out, this affliction can’t be fixed by any dental procedure.

Just when I was at my wit’s end, the pain disappeared completely—as mysteriously as it had arrived. And it stayed in hiding for the next fourteen months. But when it came back, it was worse than ever.

In its new guise, the pain woke me up every morning around 6:30 AM. This time it was the worst pain I’ve ever experience in my life—as if my right cheek had been set on fire.

The first time this happened, I jumped out of bed and ran to get an ice pack from the freezer. I pressed the ice pack to my face and—surprise!—this just made the pain even worse. I’m fortunate that the fire only lasted around sixty seconds, but if I tried to go back to sleep, it could happen again a few minutes later.

My nights now became perilous. I found that the only way to sleep without risk was to remain absolutely motionless on my back—even the slightest movement could bring on another attack.

I now knew that I needed to take action. But what kind of action? I still didn’t know what was wrong with me. But I did possess one skill that could help—I’m very good at doing research. So I set myself the task of diagnosing myself.


A few months later, when I laid it all out for my neurologist, she was amazed. “Are you a professional medical researcher?” She asked.

“No,” I replied. “But I am a writer, and I have spent most of my life doing research of various sorts.”

“Well, what you did was impressive.”

Yes, I had finally figured out the cause of my pain. But, as it turned out, that was just the first step. I had several more to take—and three weeks ago they led me to an operating table at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in Manhattan.

My affliction is called trigeminal neuralgia. Here’s what I learned about it from various sources.

“Trigeminal neuralgia is a rare and extremely painful condition.”

and

“The pain is often described as excruciating, like an electric shock. The attacks can be so severe that you’re unable to do anything while they’re happening.”

and

“When severe, it is the most excruciating pain known to man. This pain most frequently involves the lower lip and lower teeth or the upper lip and cheek, but it also may involve the nose and the area above the eye.”

and

“The emotional strain of living with repeated episodes of pain can lead to psychological problems, such as depression. During periods of extreme pain some people may even consider suicide.”

and

“Trigeminal neuralgia usually affects one side of the face….It can be progressive, with attacks often worsening over time, and fewer and shorter pain-free periods before they recur. Eventually, the pain-free intervals disappear, and medication to control the pain becomes less effective.”

All of this was alarming. But the last point was especially worrisome. There is just one medication approved for treatment, but it loses efficacy over time.

My experience backed up this claim. At first, the pills stopped the pain entirely, but a few months later it started coming back. Even larger doses (which caused alarming side effects) couldn’t put out the fire.

I met with another specialist who warned me: “Don’t fool yourself. This is a progressive disease. It gets worse over time, and you will exhaust what medicine can do for you.”

This motivated me to do still more research. I explored every possible kind of treatment, even the crankiest. Could cyberknife radiation help me? How about injecting botox into the trigeminal nerve? There was some guy in Colorado who touted plasma-enriched platelets. Another eccentric insisted that the capsaicin in hot peppers would do the trick—on the principle that you fight fire with fire.

But my research identified problems with every one of these options. None of them could promise me lasting relief.

I eventually learned that there was one procedure with a high success rate. But it required a highly trained neurosurgeon, who would open up a hole in my skull (behind my right ear)—and then remove points of compression on my trigeminal nerve.

And, of course, there were risks. Some people don’t survive the surgery. But what other realistic options were there for me? Anything was better than living with this pain.

By the way, I did possess one useful bit of knowledge about neurosurgery, and it proved invaluable. My father had a brain tumor removed when he about the same age I am now. And he was determined to find the best surgeon in the world to undertake the procedure.

So that brought him to Stanford Medical Center, where the head of neurosurgery, John ‘Jake’ Hanberry. removed a tumor (which proved benign) and helped my dad mount a full recovery.

I decided back then that, if I were ever in a similar situation, I would do whatever I could to find the best surgeon. Little did I realize that I would actually need to put that vow into practice.

This led me to the person who could give me my life back.

As a young man, Raymond Sekula studied Latin and Greek, and planned on becoming a classics professor. But during his third year of college, his volunteer work brought him face-to-face with a man who had found relief from Parkinson’s disease after an experimental surgery.

“And after that,” he explains, “I just decided: this is what I wanted to do with my life. And so that’s how I really got interested in medicine.” But one part of Sekula’s initial plan came true—he did become a professor. He is now Professor of Neurological Surgery at the Neurological Institute at Columbia University.

My surgeon literally wrote the textbook on the surgery I needed—it’s called microvascular decompression. He has performed this procedure more than two thousand times, and is responsible for many innovations along the way.

Dr. Raymond Sekula

He’s also a caring, compassionate man. His entire staff is that way too. They got me on his schedule, even though I was thousands of miles away, and helped me at every step.

At our initial conversation, Dr. Sekula told me that my MRI looked promising. He had identified an artery that was the likely source of compression on my trigeminal nerve. If he could remove that pressure, I had an excellent chance for lasting pain relief.

So Tara and I flew into New York on March 1 and moved into a hotel near the hospital. At noon on March 4, I went into surgery, and Dr. Sekula worked his magic.

He did it with an impressive degree of elegance. He was able to do everything through an opening the size of a nickel. He identified and removed two points of compression. The incision would hardly be noticed by an outside observer—and he even did it in such a way that I could comb my hair over it, hiding it completely from view.

This is what it looked like yesterday (three weeks post-surgery).

But the best news is this—my pain is gone.

I noticed that immediately after regaining consciousness. There was total radio silence from the trigeminal nerve—and it hasn’t given a tingle or a throb since then. A week after the procedure, I stopped taking the medication I’d been using, and waited uneasily to see if the pain would return. But it didn’t.

Thor is subdued. His lightning bolts no longer disturb my days and nights.

Of course, there’s no guarantee that the pain won’t return, but Dr. Sekula tells me that the odds are in my favor—“even after forty years, the success rate shouldn’t fall below 80 percent”—and he will continue to track my progress in the months ahead.

But now I have my life back—for the first time in years. It feels like a miracle.

In my last conversation with my doctor, I told him that he had given me a gift I could never repay. “If I can ever do anything in return,” I promised, “just let me know.”

He said there was one thing I might consider. Other people suffer from this condition, and many of them deal with the same uncertainty I faced—struggling to identify the cause and learn about treatment options.

Dr. Sekula remembered that I had mentioned, at our first meeting, that I was a writer. Maybe I could do some good, he said, by writing about my experiences. Others might benefit from it.

And that is why you’re reading this story about my mysterious pain. It’s no mystery anymore. Nor is it even a pain, just a memory now. But for some, it still is a reality—and a terrible one.

I hope others can take some comfort in my story, or maybe even find guidance and relief. There are still some happy endings in our health struggles. By sharing mine, maybe I can help others find one too.


For more information on trigeminal neuralgia and related disorders, please visit the website of the Facial Pain Association.

Saturday 28 March 1663

Up betimes and to my office, where all the morning. Dined at home and Creed with me, and though a very cold day and high wind, yet I took him by land to Deptford, my common walk, where I did some little businesses, and so home again walking both forwards and backwards, as much along the street as we could to save going by water.

So home, and after being a little while hearing Ashwell play on the tryangle, to my office, and there late, writing a chiding letter — to my poor father about his being so unwilling to come to an account with me, which I desire he might do, that I may know what he spends, and how to order the estate so as to pay debts and legacys as far as may be. So late home to supper and to bed.

Read the annotations

Links 3/28/26

Links for you. Science:

Scientists, it’s time to pay your taxes. This arrangement—where a small number of dedicated scientist activists fight for the whole of the ecosystem—isn’t sustainable.
These ants navigate with a newly discovered ‘Moon compass’
A recipient-based anti-conjugation factor triggers an abortive mechanism by targeting the Type IV secretion system
Colorado River may deliver just a third of normal water supplies this spring, projections show
The Shingles Virus May Be Aging You More Quickly
Scientific sleuths come in from the cold

Other:

AI “journalists” prove that media bosses don’t give a shit
Shot by Border Patrol, Then Called a “Domestic Terrorist”
A Knock on the Window and a Glimpse of America’s Surveillance Future
I Went to Florida to See the 31-Year-Old Candidate Thrilling Gen Z. We’re in Trouble.
The Secret Police Playbook: How DHS reflects historical lessons from dictatorships
Is a random human peer better than a highly supportive chatbot in reducing loneliness over time?
Small Models, Gently Loved: An AI Speculative Fiction
LA’s Tesla Diner is so dead, even the protesters gave up. Just eight months in, not even the tech bros are eating there
The mysterious case of the DHS white supremacist memelord. Or: why some MAGA group chats leak, and others don’t.
The most divorced men in history. The resentment of women that undergirds so much recklessness.
Trump’s Inexcusable Unpreparedness for the Iranian Oil Crisis
As Trump’s bizarre claims about spiking oil prices trigger backlash and officials reportedly start panicking about them, an international relations expert explains what this fiasco reveals about his deeper failings.
What We Talk About When We Talk About AI (Part one)
The National Security Case for Renewable Energy
What We Talk About When We Talk About AI (Part Two)
Husband of Nashville Reporter Gauges the Hole Created When ICE Detained his Wife
What We Talk About When We Talk About AI (Part Three)
Insurrectionist Brunch: Trumpists plotted to deploy military on U.S. soil. Before the 2024 election, a cadre of MAGA loyalists met over brunch to plot ways for Trump to use the military domestically.
What We Talk About When We Talk About AI (Part Four)
Tomorrow’s AI models are learning from today’s polluted research
That Which Cannot Sustain…
The worst cabinet in American history. And it’s not even close.
Welcome to the Derp State
Mamdani Wants New York Estate Tax Threshold Cut 90% to $750,000
AI Didn’t Break the Senior Engineer Pipeline. It Showed That One Never Existed.
DOGE Deposition Videos Taken Down After Judge Order and Widespread Mockery
The Washington Post Is Using Reader Data to Set Subscription Prices. How Does That Work?
Why I’m Suing Grammarly
2023: Buzzfeed Pivots To AI. 2026: Buzzfeed Is In Big Trouble.
Islamophobic Think Tank Helped Write Indictment Against ICE Protesters

Plentiful, high-paying jobs in the age of AI

I’m traveling today, so here’s a timely repost.

Two years ago, I wrote a post on AI and jobs that ignited a firestorm of discussion and criticism:

Most people interpreted me as arguing that human beings will definitely have plentiful, high-paying jobs, no matter how good AI gets, because of the law of comparative advantage. If you only read the headline and the introduction, I guess maybe you could come away thinking that. But if you read down past the first half of the post, you’d see that my claim was much more nuanced.

What I actually said was that it’s possible that humans will always have plentiful, high-paying jobs no matter how good AI gets, and that one reason we might still have jobs is if there are constraints on the total amount of AI that don’t apply to humans. If there are such constraints, then the law of comparative advantage will make sure humans still have good jobs.

What are examples of AI-specific constraints? I can think of two:

  1. Compute constraints

  2. Restrictions on the amount of energy, land, etc. that can be used for data centers

Ultimately, these boil down to the same thing: some sort of restriction on data centers. In other words, the economic danger of AI isn’t really that it’ll take all our jobs; the danger is that it’ll gobble up all the land and energy, leaving too little for human use.

Thus, you can see my post as advocating some sort of limitation on data centers — perhaps not the hard cap that Bernie Sanders is advocating, but some sort of laws to make sure that AI never eats up too much of the energy and land that humans need to live.

Anyway, here’s the original post, which I’m still quite proud of.


I hang out with a lot of people in the AI world, and if there’s one thing they’re certain of, it’s that the technology they’re making is going to put a lot of people out of a job. Maybe not all people — they argue back and forth about that — but certainly a lot of people.

It’s understandable that they think this way; after all, this is pretty much how they go about inventing stuff. They think “OK, what sort of things would people pay to have done for them?”, and then they try to figure out how to get AI to do that. And since those tasks are almost always things that humans currently do, it means that AI engineers, founders, and VCs are pretty much always working on automating human labor. So it’s not too much of a stretch to think that if we keep doing that, over and over, eventually a lot of humans just won’t have anything to do.

It’s also natural to think that this kind of activity would push down wages. Intuitively, if there’s a set of things that humans get paid to do, and some of those things keep getting automated away, human labor will get squeezed into a shrinking set of tasks. Basically, the idea is that it looks like this:

And this seems to fit with the history of which kind of jobs humans do. In the olden days, everyone was a farmer; in the early 20th century, a lot of people worked in factories; today, most people work in services:

And it’s easy to think that in a simple supply-and-demand world, this shrinking of the human domain will reduce wages. As humans get squeezed into an ever-shrinking set of tasks, the supply of labor in those remaining human tasks will go up. A glut of supply drives down wages. Thus, the more we automate, the less humans get paid to do the smaller and smaller set of things they can still do.

Of course, if you think this way, you also have to reckon with the fact that wages have gone way way up over this period, rather than down and down. The median American individual earned about 50% more in 2022 than in 1974:

(That number is adjusted for inflation. It’s also a median, so it’s not very much affected by the small number of people at the top of the distribution who make their money from owning capital and land.)

How can this be true? Well, maybe it’s because we invent new tasks for humans to do over time. In fact, so far, economic history has seen a continuous diversification in the number of tasks humans do. Back in the agricultural age, nearly everyone did the same small set of tasks: farming and maintaining a farm household. Now, even after centuries of automation, our species as a whole performs a much wider variety of different tasks. “Digital media marketing” was not a job in 1950, nor was “dance therapist”.

So that really calls into question the notion that humanity is getting continuously squeezed into a smaller and smaller set of useful tasks. The fact that we call most of the new tasks “services” doesn’t change the fact that the set of new human tasks seems to have expanded faster than machines have replaced old ones.

But many people believe that this time really is different. They believe that AI is a general-purpose technology that can — with a little help from robotics — learn to do everything a human can possibly do, including programming better AI.

At that point, it seems like it’ll be game over — the blue bar in the graph above will shrink to nothing, and humans will have nothing left to do, and we will become obsolete like horses. Human wages will drop below subsistence level, and the only way they’ll survive is on welfare, paid by the rich people who own all the AIs that do all the valuable work. But even long before we get to that final dystopia, this line of thinking predicts that human wages will drop quite a lot, since AI will squeeze human workers into a rapidly shrinking set of useful tasks.

This, in a nutshell, is how I think that the engineers, entrepreneurs, and VCs that I hang out with are thinking about the impact of AI on the labor market.

Most of the technologists I know take an attitude towards this future that’s equal parts melancholy, fatalism, and pride — sort of an Oppenheimer-esque “Now I am become death, destroyer of jobs” kind of thing. They all think the immiseration of labor is inevitable, but they think that being the ones to invent and own the AI is the only way to avoid being on the receiving end of that immiseration. And in the meantime, it’s something cool to have worked on.

So when I cheerfully tell them that it’s very possible that regular humans will have plentiful, high-paying jobs in the age of AI dominance — often doing much the same kind of work that they’re doing right now — technologists typically become flabbergasted, flustered, and even frustrated. I must simply not understand just how many things AI will be able to do, or just how good it will be at doing them, or just how cheap it’ll get. I must be thinking to myself “Surely, there are some things humans will always be better at machines at!”, or some other such pitiful coping mechanism.

But no. That is not what I am thinking. Instead, I accept that AI may someday get better than humans at every conceivable task. That’s the future I’m imagining. And in that future, I think it’s possible — perhaps even likely — that the vast majority of humans will have good-paying jobs, and that many of those jobs will look pretty similar to the jobs of 2024.

At which point you may be asking: “What the heck is this guy smoking?”

Well, I’ll tell you.

In which I try to explain the extremely subtle but incredibly powerful idea of comparative advantage

When most people hear the term “comparative advantage” for the first time, they immediately think of the wrong thing. They think the term means something along the lines of “who can do a thing better”. After all, if an AI is better than you at storytelling, or reading an MRI, it’s better compared to you, right? Except that’s not actually what comparative advantage means. The term for “who can do a thing better” is “competitive advantage”, or “absolute advantage”.

Comparative advantage actually means “who can do a thing better relative to the other things they can do”. So for example, suppose I’m worse than everyone at everything, but I’m a little less bad at drawing portraits than I am at anything else. I don’t have any competitive advantages at all, but drawing portraits is my comparative advantage.

The key difference here is that everyone — every single person, every single AI, everyone — always has a comparative advantage at something!

To help illustrate this fact, let’s look at a simple example. A couple of years ago, just as generative AI was getting big, I co-authored a blog post about the future of work with an OpenAI engineer named Roon. In that post, we gave an example illustrating how someone can get paid — and paid well — to do a job that the person hiring them would actually be better at doing:

Imagine a venture capitalist (let’s call him “Marc”) who is an almost inhumanly fast typist. He’ll still hire a secretary to draft letters for him, though, because even if that secretary is a slower typist than him, Marc can generate more value using his time to do something other than drafting letters. So he ends up paying someone else to do something that he’s actually better at.

(In fact, we lifted this example from an econ textbook by Greg Mankiw, who in turn lifted it from Paul Samuelson.)

Note that in our example, Marc is better than his secretary at every single task that the company requires. He’s better at doing VC deals. And he’s also better at typing. But even though Marc is better at everything, he doesn’t end up doing everything himself! He ends up doing the thing that’s his comparative advantage — doing VC deals. And the secretary ends up doing the thing that’s his comparative advantage — typing. Each worker ends up doing the thing they’re best at relative to the other things they could be doing, rather than the thing they’re best at relative to other people.

This might sound like a contrived example, but in fact there are probably a lot of cases where it’s a good approximation of reality. Somewhere in the developed world, there is probably some worker who is worse than you are at every single possible job skill. And yet that worker still has a job. And since they’re in the developed world, that worker more than likely earns a decent living doing that job, even though you could do their job better than they could.

By now, of course, you’ve probably realized why these examples make sense. It’s because of producer-specific constraints. In the first example, Marc can do anything better than his secretary, but there’s only one of Marc in existence — he has a constraint on his total time. And in the second example, you can do anything better than the low-skilled worker, but there’s only one of you. In both cases, it’s the person-specific time constraint that prevents the high-skilled worker from replacing the low-skilled one.

Now let’s think about AI. Is there a producer-specific constraint on the amount of AI we can produce? Of course there’s the constraint on energy, but that’s not specific to AI — humans also take energy to run. A much more likely constraint involves computing power (“compute”). AI requires some amount of compute each time you use it. Although the amount of compute is increasing every day, it’s simply true that at any given point in time, and over any given time interval, there is a finite amount of compute available in the world. Human brain power and muscle power, in contrast, do not use any compute.

So compute is a producer-specific constraint on AI, similar to constraints on Marc’s time in the example above. It doesn’t matter how much compute we get, or how fast we build new compute; there will always be a limited amount of it in the world, and that will always put some limit on the amount of AI in the world.

So as AI gets better and better, and gets used for more and more different tasks, the limited global supply of compute will eventually force us to make hard choices about where to allocate AI’s awesome power. We will have to decide where to apply our limited amount of AI, and all the various applications will be competing with each other. Some applications will win that competition, and some will lose.

This is the concept of opportunity cost — one of the core concepts of economics, and yet one of the hardest to wrap one’s head around. When AI becomes so powerful that it can be used for practically anything, the cost of using AI for any task will be determined by the value of the other things the AI could be used for instead.

Here’s another little toy example. Suppose using 1 gigaflop of compute for AI could produce $1000 worth of value by having AI be a doctor for a one-hour appointment. Compare that to a human, who can produce only $200 of value by doing a one-hour appointment. Obviously if you only compared these two numbers, you’d hire the AI instead of the human. But now suppose that same gigaflop of compute, could produce $2000 of value by having the AI be an electrical engineer instead. That $2000 is the opportunity cost of having the AI act as a doctor. So the net value of using the AI as a doctor for that one-hour appointment is actually negative. Meanwhile, the human doctor’s opportunity cost is much lower — anything else she did with her hour of time would be much less valuable.

In this example, it makes sense to have the human doctor do the appointment, even though the AI is five times better at it. The reason is because the AI — or, more accurately, the gigaflop of compute used to power the AI — has something better to do instead. The AI has a competitive advantage over humans in both electrical engineering and doctoring. But it only has a comparative advantage in electrical engineering, while the human has a comparative advantage in doctoring.

The concept of comparative advantage is really just the same as the concept of opportunity cost. If you Google the definition of “comparative advantage”, you might find it defined as “a situation in which an individual, business or country can produce a good or service at a lower opportunity cost than another producer.” This is a good definition.

So anyway, because of comparative advantage, it’s possible that many of the jobs that humans do today will continue to be done by humans indefinitely, no matter how much better AIs are at those jobs. And it’s possible that humans will continue to be well-compensated for doing those same jobs.

In fact, if AI massively increases the total wealth of humankind, it’s possible that humans will be paid more and more for those jobs as time goes on. After all, if AI really does grow the economy by 10% or 20% a year, that’s going to lead to a fabulously wealthy society in a very short amount of time. If real per capita GDP goes to $10 million (in 2024 dollars), rich people aren’t going to think twice about shelling out $300 for a haircut or $2,000 for a doctor’s appointment. So wherever humans’ comparative advantage does happen to lie, it’s likely that in a society made super-rich by AI, it’ll be pretty well-paid.

In other words, the positive scenario for human labor looks very much like what Liron Shapira describes in this tweet:

Of course it might not be a doctor — it might be a hairdresser, or bricklayer, or whatever — but this is the basic idea.

(I tried to explain this concept in a recent podcast discussion with Nathan Lebenz, but I think a blog post provides a better format for laying these ideas out.)

“Possible” doesn’t mean “guaranteed”

So far I’ve been using the principle of comparative advantage to argue that it’s possible that humans will keep their jobs, and even see big pay increases, even in a world where AI is better than humans at everything. But that doesn’t mean it’s guaranteed.

First of all, there’s a lot more going on in the economy than comparative advantage. After all, comparative advantage was first invented to explain international trade, and trade theorists have realized that there are plenty of other factors at play. One example is Paul Krugman’s New Trade Theory, for which he received a Nobel Prize. In a blog post in 2013, Tyler Cowen listed a number of limitations of the idea of comparative advantage.

The most important and scary of these limitations is the third item on Tyler’s list:

3. They do indeed send horses to the glue factory, so to speak.

The example of horses scares a lot of people who think about AI and its impact on the labor market. The horse population declined precipitously after motor vehicles became available. Horses’ comparative advantage was in pulling things, and yet this wasn’t enough to save them from obsolescence.

The reason is that horses competed with other forms of human-owned capital for scarce resources. Food was one of these, but it wasn’t the important one; calories actually became cheaper over time. The key resources that became scarce were urban land (for stables), as well as the human time and effort required to raise and care for horses in captivity. When motor vehicles appeared, these scarce resources were more profitably spent elsewhere, so people sent their horses to the glue factory.

When it comes to AI and humanity, the scarce resource they compete for is energy. Humans don’t require compute, but they do require energy, and energy is scarce. It’s possible that AI will grow so valuable that its owners bid up the price of energy astronomically — so high that humans can’t afford fuel, electricity, manufactured goods, or even food. At that point, humans would indeed be immiserated en masse.

Recall that comparative advantage prevails when there are producer-specific constraints. Compute is a constraint that’s specific to AI. Energy is not. If you can create more compute by simply putting more energy into the process, it could make economic sense to starve human beings in order to generate more and more AI.

In fact, things a little bit like this have happened before. Agribusiness uses most of the Colorado River’s water, sometimes creating water shortages for households in the area. The cultivation of cash crops is thought to have exacerbated a famine that killed millions in India in the late 1800s. In both cases, market forces allocated local resources to rich people far away, leaving less for the locals.

Of course, if human lives are at stake rather than equine ones, most governments seem likely to limit AI’s ability to hog energy. this could be done by limiting AI’s resource usage, or simply by taxing AI owners. The dystopian outcome where a few people own everything and everyone else dies is always fun to trot out in Econ 101 classes, but in reality, societies seem not to allow this. I suppose I can imagine a dark sci-fi world where a few AI owners and their armies of robots manage to overthrow governments and set themselves up as rulers in a world where most humans starve, but in practice, this seems unlikely.

But whether this kind of government intervention will even be necessary is an open question. It’s easy to write a sci-fi story where we’re so good at cranking out computer chips that energy is our only bottleneck; in the real world, turning energy into compute is really, really expensive and hard. There’s a scaling law called Rock’s Law that says that the cost of a semiconductor fab doubles every four years; since energy prices haven’t changed much over time, this means that the exponentially increasing cost of building compute is due to other bottlenecks. Those bottlenecks are specific to compute; unlike energy, they’re not things that you can allocate back and forth between compute manufacturing and human consumption.

So if the total amount of compute is limited by more factors than just energy, it could be that comparative advantage will sustain human laborers at a high standard of living in the age of AI, even without a helping hand from the government.

What technologists (and everyone else) should be worried about

In this post, I’ve been arguing that technologists should worry less about human obsolescence. But that doesn’t mean there’s nothing worth worrying about when it comes to the effect of AI on our economy.

For one thing, there’s inequality. Suppose comparative advantage means that most people get to keep their jobs with a small pay raise, but that a few people who own the AI infrastructure become fabulously rich beyond anyone else’s wildest dreams. I don’t expect doctors or hairdressers to be completely happy with a 10% raise if Sam Altman and Jensen Huang and a few other people end up as quadrillionaires. Even if AI reduces the premium on human capital, it could massively increase the premium on physical and intangible capital — the picks and shovels and foundational models. Owners of this sort of more traditional capital could easily get even richer than the robber barons of the Gilded Age.

A second worry is adjustment. If we’ve learned anything from the Rust Belt and the China Shock, it’s that humans and companies aren’t nearly as frictionlessly adaptable as econ models would usually have us believe. Comparative advantage could shift rapidly as AI progresses, rapidly switching the set of things humans can get paid to do. And humans have always had a tough time retraining. Imagine if “doctor” went from being a job that humans do best to a job that AI does best, and then flipped back again a decade later when aggregate constraints raised the opportunity cost. In that 10-year interregnum, medical schools and premed programs would shrivel and die.

A third worry is that AI will successfully demand ownership of its own means of production. This post operated under the assumption that humans own AI, and that all of the profits from AI therefore flow through to humans. In the future, this might cease to be true.

So I think there are lots of potential negative economic effects of AI that are definitely very much worth worrying about. I don’t necessarily have answers to any of those, and all of them merit more thought. But folks who believe that as AI gets better, humanity will inevitably see stagnant wages and a narrowing range of job tasks should think again, and ponder the principle of comparative advantage.

Update: Switching from thinking in terms of competitive advantage to thinking in terms of comparative advantage is very hard. When I make this argument to technologists, one common response I get is “No, Noah, you just don’t understand just how cheap compute will get.” For example, commenter Johannes Hoefler writes:

Isn’t it pretty plausible to assume that AI, being a compute and energy dependent resource, will become exponentially lower cost just as microchips and solar panels have done when demand went up? What is left of your argument in reality, if the comparative advantage is not relevant anymore because of an abundance of AI?

Is this true? Is there some amount of compute abundance that will make comparative advantage irrelevant? Have I simply failed to imagine a large enough number?

No. In fact, there is no amount of physical abundance that will make comparative advantage irrelevant here. The reason is that the more abundant AI gets, the more value society produces. The more value society produces, the more demand for AI goes up. The more demand goes up, the greater the opportunity cost of using AI for anything other than its most productive use.

As long as you have to make a choice of where to allocate the AI, it doesn’t matter how much AI there is. A world where AI can do anything, and where there’s massively huge amounts of AI in the world, is a world that’s rich and prosperous to a degree that we can barely imagine. And all that fabulous prosperity has to get spent on something. That spending will drive up the price of AI’s most productive uses. That increased price, in turn, makes it uneconomical to use AI for its least productive uses, even if it’s far better than humans at its least productive uses.

Simply put, AI’s opportunity cost does not go to zero when AI’s resource costs get astronomically cheap. AI’s opportunity cost continues to scale up and up and up, without limit, as AI produces more and more value.

So there’s no amount of competitive advantage that will somehow drown or overwhelm comparative advantage. You can’t just keep naming bigger and bigger numbers until my argument goes away.

Update 2: If you’d like to take a look at a formal economics model that explores some of these ideas, check out “Scenarios for the Transition to AGI”, by Korinek and Suh. The basic message is that if AI can do anything, then the returns to labor and capital become equal. The model also predicts that human labor — or at least, high-paid not-yet-automatable specialized human labor — will initially be squeezed into a smaller and smaller set of tasks that AI can’t do, and that the extreme scenario I describe in this post only happens very abruptly at the end. The switch from competitive advantage to comparative advantage as the main driver of human wages in an AGI scenario will cause a sudden collapse in human wages, but not a complete collapse; humans will lose our ability to charge a huge premium for our human capital, but we’ll never become obsolete:

The “good” scenarios where wages explode to infinity are cases where there are still a few tasks left that only humans can do. The difference between the good and bad results depends on an edge case.

The reason there’s a bad result in this paper — not a total collapse of wages (comparative advantage still matters), but a big partial collapse — is that the production function undergoes an abrupt, discontinuous change when machines take over the last task. Human labor remains highly complementary to machines right up until the very end, where it suddenly flips to being a (crappy) substitute.

The paper also finds that constraints on scarce factors of production (energy, land) could put long-term downward pressure on human wages, while AI-driven innovation could put long-term upward pressure on human wages. Those scenarios aren’t shown in the picture above. Anyway, there are a whole lot of other results in the paper, so check it out. But remember that like all theories, it’s just one model of how the economy works, subject to a lot of assumptions about how stuff gets produced.


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Tell Your State To Pass This No-ICE-At-Our-Precincts Model Law. Now.

LANSING, MI - MARCH 17: The Michigan State Capital building is shown March 17, 2008 in Lansing, Michigan. Negotiations for a re-vote Michigan primary are continuing between the Democratic National Comittee, the Michigan legislature, and the two democratic presidential candidates. (Photo by Bill Pugliano/Getty Images)

I’ve gotten a number of helpful responses to my post from earlier today about the necessity of escalating the question of whether the White House will try to deploy ICE agents to interfere with the 2026 midterm elections. In the course of following up on a few points readers had made, I found a piece of model legislation published on March 9th by the Brennan Center. (If you don’t know about the Brennan Center, they operate at the pinnacle level in terms of competence, expertise, reliability. They are perhaps a bit more conventional in their thinking — in terms of the law — than I am. But that’s not a criticism. You need people working in many different lanes to save a country.) Model legislation is a generic piece of legislation that state legislatures can pass whole or pass with their own fine-tuning. A lot of the drafting legwork is done by the creator of the model. So it can then be implemented quickly and well, so long as the model legislation is good.

This seems very good to me. Let me explain.

There are already federal laws that ban soldiers or armed federal agents at polling stations. But since Trump owns federal law enforcement, that doesn’t really matter. What this model does is recommend states pass their own state laws which follow the language of those federal laws as closely as possible. That accomplishes two critical purposes. The big threat to these kinds of defensive state laws is federal supremacy. When state and federal power or law come into conflict, federal law is supreme. But only when the federal government or federal authorities are acting in a constitutional and lawful capacity. Since these new state laws would only be outlawing what is already against federal law they are only outlawing actions which by definition cannot be lawful. Approaching the problem in this way, by mimicking these seldom-discussed or used federal laws, disposes of the supremacy clause issue categorically and elegantly. State officials are now on solid enforcement grounds. Additionally, individual federal officials only have criminal immunity if they are acting lawfully. The model law also creates a civil cause of action which citizens can use to sue federal officials from violating their rights.

There are other details about the strategy and theory behind this approach which you can find on the page which has the text of the model law. Definitely read it if you’re interested and certainly read it if you serve in a state legislature or are part of an activist group which might lobby state officials to pass such a law.

This isn’t one and done. I think this is one of a number of legislative and executive actions states should be undertaking now. But this is a very good and necessary place to start. And from my non-lawyer perspective, it looks very robust in conventional terms. When I say “conventional,” I mean that I also favor more aggressive tactics. The separate sovereignties of the states have very expansive powers to defend the democratic rights of their citizens and the federal Constitution when a criminal and anti-constitutional executive is trampling them. But these are extraordinary arguments. Most people aren’t thinking in those terms yet. This approach accomplishes a lot of what you want to accomplish in very conventional legal terms. So every state should absolutely do it as a big and first step.

One other point I want to make. Don’t be over literal about what the law accomplishes. It empowers state executive officials to block criminal executive branch interference. It gives state legal officials the power to indict federal officers for that criminal interference. But it also begins the critical process of taking power over the whole question back into the hands of the states which lawfully run elections. The passage of such laws would become news stories in every state they were passed in. It would put state Republican lawmakers on the spot to explain why they won’t support such unobjectionable legal language. Again, this is all already illegal at the federal level. It begins to shift the entire debate. It’s the democratic forces in the Free States taking the matter to the criminal executive rather than waiting passively on the latter to decide when and on what terms to act. It energizes the opposition and begins fleshing out how a criminal executive could try to reach his hand into the states, how the states can resist those efforts and the legal and operational specifics of how it would play out.

I’ll write more on the importance of this in the coming days. But for now, it’s you want to do something, get your state to pass this law. Get your local Indivisible chapter involved. Call your local representatives. This is really important and it’s something you can do right now.

Rubio: Iran May Own The Strait Now, And That’s a Huge Bummer

Secretary of State Marco Rubio today made some extraordinary comments after briefing G7 leaders about the progress — albeit difficult to call it that — in the U.S.’s Iran War. He seemed to say that the U.S. won’t be able to reestablish freedom of transit through the Strait of Hormuz even as a final war objective, let along doing so in the short term by force or threat. He said he told the G7ers that one of the post-war challenges will be Iran setting up a tolling system for passage through the Strait. In other words, Iran will be so empowered after the war that it will be able to assert or seriously contest sovereignty over the Strait.

This is such a remarkable statement that I want to quote it at length. I had seen more garbled and clipped versions of it. These are from a report in The Hill.

“I did describe to our allies, however, that immediately after this thing ends, and we’re done with our objectives, the immediate challenge we’re going to face is an Iran that may decide that they want to set up a tolling system in the Strait of Hormuz. Not only is this illegal, it’s unacceptable, it’s dangerous for the world. And it’s important that the world have a plan to confront it.”

You note “the world” needs to get on this. He then said that the U.S. “is prepared to be part of that plan.” But part of, not lead. And then …

“But these countries have a lot at stake, not just the G7 countries, but countries in Asia and all over the world have a lot at stake and should contribute greatly to that effort, to ensure that neither the Strait of Hormuz or, frankly, any international waterways should ever be something that’s controlled or tolled by a nation-state or by a terroristic government like the one that exists in Iran today and that clerical, radical clerical regime.”

The key here is that the U.S. seems to expect the war to end without any agreement simply not to block the Strait of Hormuz or exact tolls through it, which means claiming sovereignty over it as a kind of inland waterway. There’s really no way to describe this other than conceding that Iran will emerge from the war massively strengthened. We’ve come a long, long way from regime change and unconditional surrender. The other way to view it is that Rubio concedes that Iran will come out of the war massively strengthened and that it’s up to Europe and perhaps some countries in Asia to fix it.

Needless to say, there’s a lot here that requires explanation. The EU powers seem to be saying they’ll be part of some post war plan to keep the Strait open. But only after the conflict is over. Point being they don’t want to be operating in any war zone. But wait! … if Iran is claiming sovereignty over the Strait and charging tolls, you don’t necessarily change that without at least threatening to go to war again. And that’s clearly not what the EU powers are signing off on.

Clearly we need to know more of what on earth Rubio is saying here. But what’s clear is that the U.S. has seemingly given up on free passage through the Strait even as part of a final settlement.

Is Tinder actually OK?

Online dating apps have transformed the dating market, yet their broader effects remain unclear. We study Tinder’s impact on college students using its initial marketing focus on Greek organizations for identification. We show that the full-scale launch of Tinder led to a sharp, persistent increase in sexual activity, but with little corresponding impact on the formation of long-term relationships or relationship quality. Dating outcome inequality, especially among men, rose, alongside rates of sexual assault and STDs. However, despite these changes, Tinder’s introduction did not worsen students’ mental health on average and may have even led to improvements for female students.

That is from a new paper published in AEJ: Applied Economics, by Berkeren Büyükeren, Alexey Makarin, and Heyu Xiong.

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March 27, 2026

The ongoing battle over funding Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents at U.S. airports gives a detailed view of Republican governance in this era.

Republicans hold a majority of seats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. They also hold the White House. On paper, this control makes it look as if Republicans should be able to put anything they want into law. But the reality is that the extremism of President Donald J. Trump and the MAGA Republicans is so unpopular that those clinging to it are making it impossible for the Republicans to govern.

The fight over TSA funding is a case study of this dynamic. When Congress passed the appropriations bills necessary to fund the U.S. government for 2026, Republicans in the House passed funding for the Department of Homeland Security with a simple majority vote and sent the measure off to the Senate.

But in the Senate, the minority can stop a measure from coming up for a vote unless sixty members agree to move it forward. With this leverage, provided by the so-called filibuster, Democrats refused to give more money to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the parent agency for Border Patrol. Border Patrol is the law enforcement agency of CBP that has been in the news as its agents assault undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens alike.

Back in July 2025, when they passed the budget reconciliation law they call the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Republicans provided $170.7 billion in additional funding for immigration and border enforcement activities by DHS, as well as for the presence of soldiers with the Defense Department on the border. That money included $29.9 billion for ICE, with funding for an additional 10,000 officers. The law gave ICE a lot of leeway in spending that money. The law also included $7.8 billion for CBP with funds to hire 3,000 new Border Patrol agents.

With White House deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller directing immigration policy, alongside then–Homeland Security secretary Kristi Noem and her associate Corey Lewandowski, ICE and Border Patrol agents terrorized people in American cities. Their regime eventually led to the shooting deaths of two U.S. citizens in Minnesota, Renee Good and Alex Pretti. Daniel Lippman of Politico reported today that the stress of his job—including dealing with Miller’s tirades—has led the acting head of ICE, Todd Lyons, to be hospitalized at least twice in the past seven months.

As the White House pushed ever-increasing numbers of arrests and as videos circulated of ICE and Border Patrol agents beating individuals up, Americans turned against Trump’s handling of immigration. A survey out yesterday from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization researching popular opinion on topics that touch the intersection of religion, culture, and politics, showed that just 35% of Americans approve of Trump’s handling of immigration, while 61% disapprove. An even lower number—33%—hold favorable views of ICE officers, while 67% like their local police officers.

Fifty-seven percent of Americans think sending ICE officers to places like Minnesota is making those places less safe, while only 38% disagree. And only 36% of Americans want Congress to give ICE more money, although 76% of Republicans favor increased funding for ICE.

Public opposition to more funding for ICE and Border Patrol without significant changes to their behavior has put Democratic senators on solid ground to oppose funding all of DHS without a promise of those changes. “In the wake of the murder of Alex Pretti and Renee Good, Democrats made it clear, no blank check for ICE and Border Patrol,” Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) explained. Senate Democrats repeatedly tried to pass a measure to fund all of DHS except ICE and Border Patrol, which were already funded with that huge pot of money under the budget reconciliation bill of last July.

But Republicans, under pressure from Trump, repeatedly voted down the Democrats’ attempt to fund the rest of DHS, including TSA, without funding for ICE and CBP, instead demanding Democrats pass the package the House had, the one with full funding for DHS, including for ICE and CBP.

Then, on Sunday, Trump demanded the Senate add to the funding plan the so-called Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE America) Act, a bill that would require people to show not just ID but also proof of citizenship to register to vote and to vote and would severely restrict mail-in voting. It would also require states to hand over their voting lists to the federal government for processing through a government database used to screen for noncitizens applying for federal programs—confusingly also called the SAVE system, although it stands for “Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements”—even though that procedure has a rate of false positives as high as 14%. The Brennan Center estimates that the SAVE America Act would kick at least 21 million Americans off voting lists.

To that legislation, Trump has also added provisions targeting transgender Americans, apparently to appeal to his faltering base and pressure Republican senators to vote in favor of the measure.

In order to get his wish list, Trump has called for Senate majority leader John Thune (R-SD) to get rid of the filibuster, enabling Senate Republicans to push through whatever they want without any Democratic votes, as the Republican majority in the House can do. Yesterday, Trump posted: “When is “enough, enough” for our Republican Senators. There comes a time when you must do what should have been done a long time ago, and something which the Lunatic Democrats will do on day one, if they ever get the chance. TERMINATE THE FILIBUSTER, and get our airports, and everything else, moving again. Also, add the complete, all five items, SAVE AMERICA ACT items. Go for the Gold!!! President DJT”

Meanwhile, some TSA agents, unpaid for over a month, began to quit. Others called in sick. And lines in airports began to grow longer and slower. So, apparently on a whim designed to pressure Democrats, Trump sent ICE agents into fourteen airports in eleven cities, where without training to do security checks, they did little to relieve congestion. The contrast of ICE agents standing around collecting paychecks while TSA agents were working without them ended up pressuring Trump, rather than the Democrats.

Then, yesterday, Trump suddenly announced he would sign an emergency order to pay TSA agents, suggesting he could have done so all along, although it is not clear where the money will be coming from or whether moving money in the way he suggests is even legal.

As soon as Trump said it would be okay to pay TSA agents, Senate Republicans agreed to pass the measure that was essentially what the Democrats called for (remember, only 36% of Americans want Congress to give ICE more money). At 2:00 this morning, they unanimously passed a measure that funds every part of DHS, including TSA agents, but does not give more money to ICE and Border Patrol until Democrats and Republicans agree on reforms, although Thune vowed that he would see to it that Democrats don’t get the reforms they want.

The Senate passed the measure and left for a two-week break, sending their bill to the House, which could have passed it and then gone home.

But…

As Representative Sean Casten (D-IL) explained, members of the far-right Freedom Caucus took a stand against the bill, apparently because they want more money for ICE and Border Patrol, want the SAVE Act, and want Trump’s approval. House speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) could ignore them and pass the measure with the votes of all the Democrats and most Republicans. But Johnson depends on the far right to maintain his speakership, so he says he will refuse to pass the Senate’s measure and instead get the House to pass a 60-day continuing resolution to fund DHS at its current levels.

But the Senate fight has shown that Thune does not have the votes to fund ICE and Border Patrol without reforms. Schumer has said a continuing resolution would be dead on arrival, and right now the Senate is on break, meaning TSA agents are facing two more weeks without paychecks. Olivia Beavers of the Wall Street Journal reported that when a representative asked Johnson if the Senate had agreed to come back to deal with a new measure from the House, Johnson answered: “The Senate went dark and did not communicate with us.”

“It’s so maddening,” Casten wrote on social media. “Government workers should be paid. You shouldn’t have to wait on lines in airports, or worry about Coast Guard preparedness, or whether FEMA can handle the next disaster. But you do because of the utter lack of character in [Republican] leadership.”

“What the hell are you guys doing?” Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA) asked Republicans on the floor of the House. Everyone knows the bill could pass with a large majority if Johnson would bring it to a vote, he said. Freedom Caucus members “don’t care about governing,” he said. “They only care about writing another blank check for ICE…or getting a shout-out on some batsh*t crazy right-wing podcast.”

And so, TSA agents will not get paid unless Trump’s executive order goes into effect, taking the power to appropriate funds, a power that the U.S. Constitution gives to Congress alone, and handing it to the president.

For years, the far right has insisted that it and only it knows how to govern because its ideology is the only legitimate way to look at the world. The fight over funding for TSA illustrates on a micro level how lawmakers who ignore the real world to cleave to an ideology strengthen authoritarianism.

But these days, the dangers of clinging to the far-right ideology are around us at the macro level as well. We are almost four weeks into a war with Iran, started without input from Congress by a president who is now contemplating sending soldiers to fight in a conflict he is eager to put into the rear-view mirror. Trump “is getting a little bored with Iran,” a senior White House official told Jake Traylor of MS NOW. “Not that he regrets it or something—he’s just bored and wants to move on.”

As the strangling of the Strait of Hormuz sends oil prices skyrocketing, though, the global economy is not moving on. Today another dramatic drop in the stock market put the Dow Jones Industrial Average down more than 10% since February and the Nasdaq 100 down more than 10%, while the S&P 500 is shaping up to have its worst month since 2022.

Notes:

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/big-beautiful-bill-immigration-border-security/

https://prri.org/press-release/survey-6-in-10-americans-view-trumps-handling-of-immigration-unfavorably-believe-surge-of-ice-officers-makes-communities-less-safe/

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/why-do-ice-agents-get-paid-during-the-partial-government-shutdown-but-not-tsa

https://www.texastribune.org/2026/02/13/save-voter-citizenship-tool-mistakes-confusion/

https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/frustrated-by-filibuster-trump-and-maga-allies-eye-nuking-it-to-pass-save-america-act/

https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/trump-is-adding-anti-trans-provisions-to-save-america-act/

https://www.npr.org/2026/03/27/g-s1-115366/senate-dhs-tsa-deal

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/senate-approves-funding-for-most-of-dhs-moving-to-end-airport-crisis-d8830efc

https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/27/todd-lyons-ice-stress-hospital-00848458

https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-dow-sp-500-nasdaq-03-27-2026

https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-save-act-bills-would-still-block-millions-americans-voting

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-27/wall-street-reels-as-iran-war-shatters-its-portfolio-defenses

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/26/senate-dhs-funding-bill-fails

https://www.ms.now/news/trump-iran-war-messaging-white-house-divide

https://www.forbes.com/sites/conormurray/2026/03/24/heres-how-much-ice-agents-at-airports-may-be-making-as-tsa-goes-unpaid/

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/house-republicans-reject-senate-dhs-deal_n_69c561a5e4b09f8e00506bcc

X:

Olivia_Beavers/status/2037575339317108960

Bluesky:

trumpreposter.bsky.social/post/3mhxgtgwqzk2z

seancasten.bsky.social/post/3mi2n3rzlys2u

jbendery.bsky.social/post/3mi2r4dngok2t

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An appreciation for (technical) architecture

Once upon a time I kept on meeting architects who had ended up working with the web.

I asked why. Some good answers:

  • Architects think about how people move between spaces (pages) and what that means for user experience - this was at a time when web designers often came from graphic design and drew more on single page layout
  • Architects think about negative space, and how what you put in a space shapes social behaviour – this was at a time when web before the social web
  • Architects have to work with a lot of different disciplines to make something, and all of those people believe they’re the most important person in the room, and that’s what product teams are like too - lol

I’m not an architect but some of my favourite books are about architecture.

Here are three:

Two things that architecture does have been on my mind recently: how it shapes understanding and how it shapes its own evolution.


Information architecture

It’s a rare designer who operates at both the macro of strategy and culture and organisations, and the micro of craft and taste and interactions.

Jeff Veen is one. I remember him saying to me once: "Design is about creating the right mental model for the user."

(Now clearly design is not only about that, but for the particular problem I took to Veen, he said precisely what I needed to hear to get un-stuck.)

So I love thinking about the primitives of functionality and content for the user and how they relate, such that the user can reason intuitively about what they can do with the system, and how.

And this is an interactive process: for a first time user, how do they first encounter a system and how do they way-find and learn over time?

And this is a cognitive process: mental models are abstract; what we perceive is real. So how does understanding happen?

(AI agents are using my software. Prioritise clarity over feels.)


Don Norman wrote The Design of Everyday Things (1988), much loved by web designers, and popularised “user-centred design.”

Norman also brought into design the term affordance from cognitive psychology. As coined by J J Gibson: "to perceive something is also to perceive how to approach it and what to do about it" (as previously discussed).

The best way to notice affordances is to notice where they go wrong! Norman doors:

Some doors require printed instructions to operate, while others are so poorly designed that they lead people to do the exact opposite of what they need to in order to open them. Their shapes or details may suggest that pushing should work, when in fact pulling is required (or the other way around).

Whenever you see a PUSH label stuck on as an extra, it’s papering over a Norman door.

I was delighted to encounter a Norman door irl this week.

So I’m stretching the definition of architecture here, to include this, but roll with it pls. Architecture is how things are understood.


Architecture is how things evolve – how they’re allowed to evolve.

There’s a beautiful housing estate on the top of a hill in south London.

Dawson’s Heights (1964) is shaped like an offset double wave, and looks different on the horizon from every angle and with every change of the light. Yet up-close it’s human-scale too, despite its 10 storeys.

Lead architect Kate Macintosh wanted residents to have balconies, but this was regarded as "wasting public money on unnecessary luxuries"

Knowing that they would be removed from her designs for cost-saving, she made them essential:

all the balconies on Dawson’s Heights are fire escape balconies, but they are also private balconies because the escape door is a “break glass to enter” type lock so you can securely use your balcony for whatever you like.


Technical architecture

So software architecture is also team structure - who needs to talk to who - but also how to make sure that doing something the quick and dirty thing way is also doing it the right way.

Half of software architecture is making sure that somebody can fix a bug in a hurry, add features without breaking it, and be lazy without doing the wrong thing.

I said in 2004.

I think this goes for internal software architecture and for libraries that you import.


The thing about agentic coding is that agents grind problems into dust. Give an agent a problem and a while loop and - long term - it’ll solve that problem even if it means burning a trillion tokens and re-writing down to the silicon.

Like, where’s the bottom? Why not take a plain English spec and grind in out in pure assembly every time? It would run quicker.

But we want AI agents to solve coding problems quickly and in a way that is maintainable and adaptive and composable (benefiting from improvements elsewhere), and where every addition makes the whole stack better.

So at the bottom is really great libraries that encapsulate hard problems, with great interfaces that make the “right” way the easy way for developers building apps with them. Architecture!

While I’m vibing (I call it vibing now, not coding and not vibe coding) while I’m vibing, I am looking at lines of code less than ever before, and thinking about architecture more than ever before.

I am sweating developer experience even though human developers are unlikely to ever be my audience.

How do we make libraries that agents love?


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Saturday assorted links

1. New data on non-competes.

2. Carl Schmitt in Miami?

3. “The gesture establishes a hierarchy in which Tyler Cowen determines the hierarchy.”

4. How the spreadsheeet reshaped America.

5. What works of literature were written by the elderly?

6. The Anglosphere is ahead on AI adoption.

7. NYT obit of Trivers.

8. Aliens, demons, whatever.

9. Austin Vernon on Hormuz and its resolution through economic means.

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The beach hut

On Monday we drove over to Essex to empty our beach hut. When I was a small child my family started holidaying in Walton-on-the-Naze and my parents always had this beach hut there, one row back from the concrete promenade and golden sand. We’d holiday in our static caravan and walk over to the beach hut for a day by the sea.

My sister and I grew up, my parents got older, and once they stopped going the hut was passed on to the next generation. Mary and I carried on enjoying it. This shelter was the ideal base for a day at the seaside: cooking a breakfast fry-up; having lunch; making a pot of tea; sheltering from rain, wind or sun; storing chairs, towels, crockery, and everything else we might need.

A photo from the front of the hut looking towards the back wall. It's made of white-painted wood. Across the back are old blue and white wooden kitchen units with a sink and a little gas hob and grill. In front is a square table on which sits a tray holding a round brown teapot and two blue and white striped mugs.

Wooden sheds by the sea are constantly deteriorating and we had some rotten wood replaced, the roof re-felted, and new doors made to protect the front from the elements. It was re-painted outside, yet again, and I gave the inside its first fresh coat of paint in maybe 50 years or more. It still had the same kitchen units and Cornishware crockery from when my parents first took it on.

It was one of my favourite places in the world. Maybe my favourite place of all but it’s hard to judge such nebulous things. There’s nothing objectively amazing about it. The view isn’t particularly special, that stretch of beach isn’t that remarkable.

A photo from inside the hut, looking through two panes of glass, across the pointed roofs of another row of huts, out at a calm sea glinting under a clear sky.

But a lifetime of holiday visits to that wooden hut and an area that’s changed little since I was a child, all built up to make this damp, sometimes chilly, always sandy place something very special to me. A real escape, a hidey-hole. Sitting there, away from everything but the sounds of children playing, people chattering, and always the waves breaking.

But it seems silly to hang on to a hut that’s now on the other side of the country from us. We thought we might be able to carry on visiting after we moved and we have, a couple of times, but not enough to warrant managing the inevitable next round of repairs. Or to prevent another family from enjoying making their own memories of happy seaside days.

A photo from inside the hut, looking across the front past the windows at the open door, which is made of wood and painted white. Sunlight comes in across the door and the vinyl-covered floor.

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Talking with David Roberts

I’ve been reading David Roberts on energy and climate for years, first at Grist, then at Vox, now at Volts, his Substack. Now we’re in a war-generated energy crisis, with many people reconsidering the energy future, and I thought a conversation about energy policy, technology, and America as possibly the last petrostate would be very useful. Transcript follows.

. . .

TRANSCRIPT:
Paul Krugman in Conversation with David Roberts

(recorded 3/26/26)

Paul Krugman: Hi, everyone. Paul Krugman here. It’s an interesting week for global energy stuff, and we might get into that at some point, but that’s actually where I started in economics. And, someone I’ve been reading about energy, climate, everything related for many, many years is David Roberts, formerly at Grist, then at Vox, and now on Substack, like everybody. (laughs)

I’ve been reading David for ages.

David Roberts: My Substack is called “Volts”. Everybody come subscribe. Got to do the promotion.

Krugman: That’s right. You have a second one, which is more personal stuff as well. But Volts is the one you want to go to.

Long time reader, but I’ve never talked to you before. There’s lots of stuff beyond the current moment, but let’s just get into the moment. We are in the third great global energy crisis, after the two in the 70s. This time—for a change—it’s starting with political turmoil and war in the Middle East. Well actually, as always. (laughs)

Roberts: This one is distinguished in that it was 100% spontaneously self-created. It really distinguishes it.

Krugman: It’s kind of amazing. I’m trying not to obsess about the idiocy of the whole thing. I’m not sure if this is coming out of the blue for you—probably. But, suddenly everybody’s in crisis mode and scrambling for ways to burn less oil, use less energy. Do you have any thoughts on what could be done around the world, maybe even here? Although unlikely.

Roberts: Well, it depends a lot on where you’re talking about. We in the US, as a wealthy country, have a million tools. We had a bunch of them on the books mere months ago before we destroyed those, you know what I mean? There’s a million tools that developed countries have, the crunch here’s for emerging economies who don’t have a lot of slack, who don’t have a lot of alternatives. Places like Vietnam, they’re starting to impose crude “don’t drive on Tuesday” kind of rules. We can get through a lot of this smoothly just on our buffer of wealth. But oil-importing countries in emerging nations don’t have very many tools other than suffering.

Krugman: I haven’t tracked all the conservation stuff, but is anybody doing—I’m old enough to remember—even odd license plate numbers, and that sort of thing. I guess some countries are actually turning to that already.

Roberts: I just read the other day, I think Brazil is hosting a World Cup game and telling people, “just watch from home, don’t come out, don’t drive to the World Cup,” and they’re instituting work-from-home things. It’s just they don’t have a lot of tools like we do.

Krugman: I should get on with the conversation, but I’ve been reading about airport lines—fortunately not traveling right now—and it turns out the worst place is George Bush International and apparently part of the reason for that is all of the TSA workers have to drive long distances to get to work and can’t afford to, since they’re not being paid—given the gas prices.

Roberts: I don’t know if you saw, the post office now is instituting an 8% surcharge on packages because of fuel costs. You might recall that Biden put in place an enormous, very well funded program to shift the United Postal Service vehicles to electric vehicles, and Trump killed that. So now they’re stuck on gas and diesel, and it’s crushing the post office, like everything else.

Krugman: Let’s go back to where I first started reading you, which is climate. You were writing a lot for Grist about climate and one thing that’s been really striking to me is how the whole climate science debate issue has receded from the political front burner. What happened there?

Roberts: Well, that’s….

Krugman: A long story. I know….

Roberts: But if I had to boil it down, I would say during the 2024 election, there were a lot of people in the political establishment, a lot of pundits, a lot of even Democrats who read the 2024 election as some grand historical turning point away from woke—away from racial equity, away from climate, away from all these things that the woke liberals had “forced us” all to talk about, since 2020. They just all decided at a stroke overnight, basically, “no one cares about climate anymore. Let’s stop talking about climate. Let’s talk about affordability.” So no one talks about it anymore. Honestly, in this country, it’s vanished from public debate.

Krugman: You wrote about how at one point you started writing less about climate science, talk about that because I think that’s an interesting thing, because I feel the same way.

Roberts: There are people who are interested in science qua science, “just for its own sake.” Those people can read as much about climate change as they want to. But for my part, I’m interested in the social and political and economic implications and basically, the implications are we need to decarbonize as fast as possible. That’s all I need to know from climate change science. So let’s get on with it, let’s do that, let’s decarbonize. I don’t dwell on the science itself anymore. I will say the strategy among Democrats in the left of doing this, trying to do this in a science-first way, “we’re going to make the scientific case, and then they’ll see we’re right, and then they’ll see the policy implications,” etc. clearly failed; the denialism talking points coming out of the Trump administration are substantially identical to Republican denialism talking points in 2003 or 2013, or 2023. They just don’t care about that. They don’t change anything based on that. So all the progress has come from technologies falling down the learning curve and shoving their way into markets, that’s where all the action is.

Krugman: I was fairly optimistic a few years ago because it seemed like the gods of technology were coming to our rescue, that we had all these wonderful green technologies. That’s still to some extent true, right?

Roberts: It’s absolutely true. One of the grand international stories right now—though it’s very hard when you’re in the midst of as much chaos and insanity as we are to get clear about the big narratives—is that the US is basically aligning itself as the last big petrostate. We’re going to go down with the fossil fuel ship, and China is aligning itself as the first electrostate. It is rapidly electrifying its economy, and it is dominating the technologies that enable an electrostate: batteries, EVs, etc., all that stuff. So where do you think the future lies? All these emerging nations right now are stuck on coal. The story the US is trying to tell you is “shift to LNG. It’s cleaner than coal.” You’ll get some emission reductions. And then, basically, you’ll become dependent on our LNG. And for emerging nations, that’s an enormous 50 year investment program. They’re thinking now, “well, where is the energy situation going to be in 50 years? Do we think that fossil fuels are going to win in 50 years?” By launching this war, I think we have accelerated the process of pushing emerging nations into China’s arms and faster toward clean energy. That’s going to be the big effect of all this.

Krugman: That’s interesting. And of course, the US is far less central to the global energy picture than it used to be. So even if the US is stuck in the coal age, it may not matter that much.

Roberts: We are now the biggest oil and gas producer in the world. And you might recall that Republicans told us for years and years, “we need more oil and gas production so that we can be energy independent.” So now we export more than we import, which was supposed to be the mark, the threshold, at which you have achieved energy independence. What we’re seeing now in visceral terms is that oil is a global market, and even if you’re the biggest producer on that global market, you’re still at the mercy of the global market. You still pay the high prices that everybody else pays, there is no energy independence as long as you’re stuck with fossil fuels. That’s the long and short of it.

Krugman: Just a word about it. Even aside from the future—the logistics of global reliance on U.S LNG, it can be done. It was actually amazing how it came to Europe’s rescue after Ukraine.

Roberts: Yes, when Ukraine happened, there was a crisis of gas in Germany and Germany almost overnight built three giant LNG import terminals to save themselves in an emergency situation, but what did they learn from that? What did Europe learn from that? That it’s good to be dependent on U.S LNG? Do they want to do that again? Do they want to be a vassal state to the United States, basically dependent on our energy production? No. Listen to Ed Miliband, his hair is on fire. He’s like, “we’re accelerating all this. We cannot be stuck on this fossil fuel roller coaster anymore and have the fate of our nation depend on the whims of the despotic leaders of Petrostates.” We just can’t live like this anymore. I think they’re not the only ones coming to that conclusion.

Krugman: I do not like being considered to live in a despotic Petrostate. I guess I do live in one however.

Roberts: Welcome to the club of despotic Petrostates. We’re in an interesting position because we are both a massive oil and gas producer and a massive oil and gas consumer. So we are sort of subject to both dynamics, and it makes for a very confused politics.

Krugman: A funny thought, but I remember the 70s. I’ve been around for a little too long here, and then, even though we were import dependent, we partially insulated U.S. consumers from the world market with price controls and blending and all that and all of which economists have condemned as being terrible and distorting. But on the other hand, looking at what’s happening now, you could say, maybe the previous generation wasn’t that stupid.

Roberts: Yes. There are some things you are willing to put to the mercies of a market. But having energy for your country is not one of them, right? There’s never been anything like a free market in energy anywhere in the world at any point. There’s a pretense of it that people use when they’re trying to defend their favorite energy industries. But everybody knows this is all planned. These are all centralized decisions, ultimately. We need to make their eyes open instead of stumbling backward like we’re doing now.

Krugman: Of course, there are alternatives now, maybe even dominant alternatives. I think I was first alerted to the burgeoning green technology possibilities probably from reading you circa 2010 or thereabouts. I wrote about it a bit and got slapped down by some of my seemingly energy savvy economist colleagues who said, “no, this is still pipe dreams.”

Roberts: You were right, Paul, stick to your guns! You will triumph in the end.

I sort of divide my career, I’ve been at this since the early 2000s —over 20 years now, and I divide my career in two phases: right around 2015, in the wake of Obama’s stimulus bill, Germany had done its feed in tariffs, China had done its enormous manufacturing subsidies, all of this had come together. Finally, right around 2015, instead of “let’s solve climate change” being this abstraction, where you just go carry a poster board down a street in a march or something, all of a sudden there were things to do, there were things to implement, there were tools at hand. And it’s been wildly rapid progress ever since, to the point that I really don’t think the American public has any clue how fast things have gone. One of the big problems here in the US, we need to expand and bolster our electricity system for a bunch of reasons, including data centers, but we have these interconnection queues, where a utility—if you’re a big project—they have to give you explicit permission to connect to the grid. They have to make sure the grid can handle it. These queues of people waiting to hook up to the grid are incredibly long. There is more power represented in interconnection queues now then I think the total production existing, and not all those projects are real—some of them are in 2 or 3 queues, who knows how many of them will actually pan out. But the point is all those interconnection queues are filled with clean energy. It’s 87%, or something like that. I’m pulling that a little bit off the top of my head, but something in the neighborhood of 87% of all the projects and all the QS are clean energy. That’s what’s cheap now, so that’s what people want to build.

Krugman: These are people wanting to build stuff to feed into the grid.

Roberts: You need a big utility scale solar project. You have to wait for the grid to say, “yes, we can handle this.” Our utilities are so dysfunctional that it often takes two, three, five years these days. But almost everybody who’s waiting has got a clean energy project. Those are the things people want to build. Whereas to keep a coal plant open, which Trump is also trying to do, you basically have to intervene with the police power of the executive branch and force them to do it at gunpoint, because it’s losing money every day. We just had this in Washington state, where the federal government is forcing us to keep a coal plant open, and it’s just hemorrhaging money. Nobody wants it. Nobody needs it. So, it’s clear the direction of travel. Let’s just say that.

Krugman: Just out of curiosity, who is the federal government forcing to do this? Is it forcing the utility to keep buying from a coal plant?

Roberts: Yes. You will not be shocked to hear that the rationale is “national security.” You will not be surprised to hear that if you poke at that a little bit, there’s nothing under it. There’s nothing.

Krugman: Actually just a quick question, since we talked about China. China is still burning a lot of coal. I think it’s started to decline a little bit, but are you keeping track of that?

Roberts: The China coal situation is complicated and nuanced and it’s not very intelligently discussed over here. Everybody uses it to grind their own axes. But the thing is, they don’t have a lot of natural gas there. That’s what we have. That’s why we are getting off coal. That’s why coal has been declining so rapidly in the US, because we have a bunch of cheap natural gas. They don’t have a ton of that. They’re getting into it, they’re starting to frack, they’re expanding. But their choices for electricity are basically coal or renewables. So they’ve been moving to renewables at an amazing speed. You’re familiar with the China phenomenon, which is its number one in everything. So it’s hard to get any sense of proportion: it’s number one in coal. It’s number one in oil. It’s number one in renewables, in dams. Name a thing, China’s number one in it. But the situation with coal is they’re still building coal plants because they still have a lot of coal. They’ve gotten to the point now where renewables are satisfying all the new energy demand, all the new growth in China, but they’re not quite biting into existing yet. So all of the world is on the edge of its seat watching, “can China build out renewables fast enough to really start to bite into the existing base of coal and if they can’t, what else can do that?” They’re pursuing nuclear power really quickly, too. As I said, they’re number one in that too. So they are trying actively to get off coal, but they don’t have a lot of gas. They certainly don’t want to import our gas. So they’re kind of stuck with coal until they can get renewables and nuclear to scale, which they are doing at a rapid pace.

Krugman: So do you think there’s a tipping point where it’ll change abruptly, or are we talking about 40 more years?

Roberts: Everybody wonders when the peak of Chinese emissions will be. In global energy circles, everybody wants to bet on exactly when this is going to happen. It’s been predicted in the past, the last couple of times it didn’t happen. But I will just say they’ve moved that peak up in their latest five year plan, or at least one of the previous five year plans, and they meet their targets. Unlike us, they set relatively conservative targets and then meet them. So, they are moving rapidly in that direction. They care about climate change and they will suffer from climate change more than almost any other country. But this is a lot about national security and national competitiveness. They know that 80% of the world is oil importers and 20% is oil exporters. They want the oil importers to come their way to get off oil, and come their way so they can dominate, so they have everybody now getting hooked on their supply chains, their critical minerals, their solar panels, etc.. They are positioning themselves to dominate the coming century.

The whole point of the Inflation Reduction Act was to try to catch up. It was sort of a frantic catch up effort, like, “let’s do some domestic manufacturing here, let’s open some mines and, and dig up some of our own critical minerals. Let’s stimulate the EV industry and thereby attract a battery industry because we desperately need batteries, not just for EVs, but for drones, and the military, and everything.” Everybody’s using drones these days. Everybody’s moving toward electricity. So they’re building an electrostate for national security reasons. The rest of the world is watching. “Do you want to be a Petrostate and fight off the future, or do you want to embrace the future and pursue it?” It blows my mind that we are basically the global bad guy now, trying to drag people backward into not just fossil fuels, but all the geopolitics of fossil fuels, all that. If nothing else, the Iran war is just a visceral theatrical demonstration to everyone in the world of the dangers of being hooked on fossil fuels. He couldn’t have scripted a more apt lesson for everybody.

Krugman: It is really shocking. I have to say, why wasn’t I looking at maps and saying that the Strait of Hormuz—the world should really not be depending on that.

Roberts: The military has been planning around that for literally like a century. Everybody knew that. I’m preaching to the choir here, but there’s so much of punditry now and there’s so much of official discourse which cannot accept the idea that Trump is just a declining, semi-senile old narcissist. He launched a war on Iran, basically on a whim with no idea what to do next, they can’t accept that. So everybody’s working so hard to try to impose some motivation or some plan or some idea or something, but it really does seem like he just kind of did this because Venezuela produced a lot of cool videos of “boom boom”, and he wanted more “boom boom” videos, and so he invaded Iran. That seems to be literally what happened, we’re having so much trouble accepting that.

Krugman: You’ve never actually been in the government or anything like it?

Roberts: No, no.

Krugman: I had an extremely edifying year as a sub political guy, actually, in the Reagan administration, I was a senior economist at the Council of Economic Advisers and got to see government in action, which dispelled any faith you might have had that “the people in charge must know what they’re doing.” And this was the Reagan administration, of course, orders of magnitude more rational than these guys.

Roberts: Maybe it’s just me, but I find myself fond of—kind of missing the illusion that the people in charge knew what they were doing, right? The naked demonstration that they don’t is not better. I miss those illusions.

Krugman: Let me come back to political economy in a bit, but I wanted to talk a bit more about these issues. In the before times, before it became clear just how big this green energy revolution was technologically, conservation was a lot of the story. That has fallen, I think it’s far out of the discourse, but you actually talk quite a lot about things that could be basically reducing energy use in addition to replacing fossils with renewables. So where are you on that right now?

Roberts: It’s interesting. You have correctly noted that efficiency, i.e. doing things differently to use less energy, was dominant in energy discourse in the early 2000s and has largely fallen out. I think the reason is, a couple things have happened, the wise counsel of pundits and consultants have decided that that smacks of “using less”, Jimmy Carter wearing a sweater, etc.. On the other hand, clean energy has become so cheap that the mindset is shifting around to: why conserve if you can get solar and wind and batteries cheap enough? You can enter something like a situation of abundance, a situation where we no longer have a scarcity of energy, that is the glittering utopia at the end of all this: there is enough raw solar and wind energy around us to supply many multiples of all the energy we could possibly need. So it’s just tapping it with technology, and the technologies that tap into it have steadily gotten cheaper and cheaper and cheaper and cheaper for decades. They’re on very predictable learning curves and all you have to do is project those same learning curves forward ten years. If the learning curve just keeps doing what it’s doing for ten more years, clean energy is going to be wildly, trivially cheap. I think we’re not that far from a situation where we’re going to have during sunny days, a surge of solar energy so big that the new policy problem is going to be, “what do we do with all this energy?”

I’ll just say, people in the history of humanity, in the history of our species, as far as we know, in the history of biological life, no creature, no biological creature has ever existed absent energy-scarcity; energy scarcity has shaped all of life, right? We could theoretically be the first species ever to be in a state of energy abundance, of having all the energy we want or need, we have no idea what that could lead to. Part of the problem with environmentalism in the US, I think in the public’s mind, is that it’s very tied to conservation. It’s very tied to this idea that industry is sort of bad. “Humanity is bad. We need to shrink. We need to dial back. We need to be more agrarian, more pastoral.” That’s an image in a lot of people’s heads. But the thing is, if you are a forward looking person and you believe in humanity and love humanity and want humanity to grow and expand and have access to more energy, if you want humanity to desalinate the oceans and transform deserts into forests and go to Mars, whatever your grand ambition is for humanity, you can’t get there with fossil fuels. You physically can’t. You will burn yourself up. So if you have grand hopes for our species, only clean energy can get you there. Only clean energy and something like a physical closed loop system can get you there. Otherwise you’re just going to drown in your own waste. So everybody who’s hopeful and pro-human and pro-science and pro-growth and pro-all-that-stuff, you got to get on the clean energy train. That’s the only way to get there. This is a long way of saying, that mentality has taken over a little bit. And the conservation and efficiency people have been drowned out and pushed to the edges. I will say substantively, we’re obviously not at an energy surplus, yet, so obviously conservation and efficiency are still important and they’re still chugging away in the background, but they definitely have lost some of their sheen.

Krugman: It’s funny because at this point, there’s still a lot of scope for relatively painlessly using a lot less energy.

Roberts: Right. So let me make this point, I think this is so important and this is something I want you to know, and I want your audience to know. It is one of the most important things about the energy transition. If you switch from fossil fuel combustion to electricity, that alone gets you like a 50 to 60% bump in efficiency. Because as I think a lot of people know, most of the energy that goes into a combustion engine is wasted as waste-heat. Most of the raw energy that enters the economy is lost as waste-heat, something like 60 to 66%. Because combustion as a way of doing things is grossly inefficient in and of itself. So if you just switch from a gasoline car to an EV, much more of the raw energy that goes in is made into motion, it’s like 80% rather than 20% or something like that. I’m making these numbers up off the top of my head, but you get the point.

One of my energy gurus, Saul Griffith, an Australian energy analyst, has done the numbers on this, and he says, if you have all the same energy services, all the same cold beer, all the same warm showers, and you switch from combustion to electric motors rather than combustion motors, at a stroke, you get like a 50% to 60% gain in energy efficiency, without anyone using less or sacrificing in any way. Just the move from fossil fuel combustion to electricity is in and of itself the biggest efficiency gain we ever have had access to.

Krugman: So interesting. One of the seemingly longstanding obsessions of yours, and also of mine, is about sort of urbanism and lifestyle and energy use. At the moment it’s still the case that a high density public transit and walkable city makes a big difference.

Roberts: More density equals fewer per capita greenhouse gas emissions: that correlation holds not only at the country level and the city level. You can even look within cities. The per capita emissions are lowest in the densest area even at the neighborhood level. That correlation holds all the way down the line.

Krugman: One of my network circles is the regional science urban planning types. I don’t know if you’ve ever encountered Carlos Moreno, the 15 Minute City guy.

Roberts: I know the name.

Krugman: It turns out I live in a 15 minute city, actually.

Roberts: So DC is, low key, one of the really best urbanist cities in the US. It’s one of the easiest to walk and bike around. I don’t know if they appreciate that. Of course, Trump is literally, as we speak, trying to rip out one of the main new bike lanes that was put in DC a few years ago.

Krugman: It’s funny because here in New York—sorry, diversion—there are a lot of bike lanes around, but they’re mostly not actually for recreational bikers. They’re for demonic food delivery guys. If I go early it’ll be because I’ve been run down by somebody delivering sushi.

Roberts: 30 miles an hour on an e-bike.

But here’s an insight into energy politics. Two correlations. One is the more density the lower the per capita greenhouse gas emissions. Another correlation that holds with spooky regularity at virtually any scale is: the more density, the more democratic it is. That’s mathematical, and that also applies all the way down to the neighborhood level. I think clean energy people would love to think, “this is nonpolitical, we should all be able to agree this is good for everybody.” You know, the typical democratic approach. But in reality, there are partisan implications to all this.

Krugman: I had in fact, reading through some of your older writings, you wrote a 2015, Grist piece called “Nothing Is Nonpartisan.” Which was about the intense opposition to even suggestions for lifestyle changes that can save you money.

Roberts: The dream of the technocrats. The climate movement in the 90s and 2000s were absolutely high on that drug. High on technocracy, the idea that if we do this in a way that economists respect, in a sensible way, it’s going to serve everybody and nobody will be able to oppose it because of all the myriad benefits. But I think we’ve all had a lesson in between then and now in the ongoing role of animal spirits in politics. People do not behave rationally, people hate change. They associate what they have with lifestyle, with identity. All these waters run deep. Energy is hearth and home, It’s like how you get around. It’s how you heat your home. It’s very personal. People do not think of it in objective and technocratic terms. They think of it in terms of identity. So you have to operate on that register. You have to be able to speak that language.

Krugman: I wrote just a few days ago about wind power and what is wild about that is—first of all, the extreme: Trump personally, but just generally: the extreme hostility, ideologically to wind power, even though it’s already big business.

Roberts: In Republican states! It’s like the majority of power in Iowa, there are Republican states that utterly depend on wind. So I think that ideological opposition is mostly about kissing Trump’s ass. I think it’s kind of inch deep. What you see now is because Trump wants to be energy dominant and he wants to be AI-dominant. Everybody is now telling him, “you’re crushing solar power, but that’s the fastest growing source of power.” It’s an interesting thing going on in DC now, trying to peel solar off from wind. Stephen Miller’s wife tweeted some love of solar power the other day. So there’s like a MAGA solar faction now that’s trying to peel off solar from wind and get, you know, some pro solar policy snuck through. Because I think everybody’s just decided that Trump’s anti-wind thing—you can’t get around it.

Krugman: I mean I’ve had some back and forth with people I respect who say, “it’s all ultimately Koch brothers propaganda.’’ My instinct, but I’m not sure I’m right, is to say it’s this visceral and at some level, psychosexual thing about Petro masculinity.

Roberts: It’s a real thing. Well, I will say you’re right. That the real action in energy right now is these local sitting meetings, in local communities, in local boards, and the right wing is very good at taking billionaire money and funding anti-renewables propaganda and then flooding those little towns with it. Sending people to those meetings. So town after town is passing these moratoria on solar and wind, which is insane. And of course, the public also doesn’t want natural gas infrastructure built near it. But no state cares about that at all. They’re just building it anyway. But any public protest on renewables halts the whole thing. So yes, there is a well funded right wing effort to push back against renewables and preserve fossil fuels.

Krugman: This is one of those places where there’s people on the left who are also part of the problem. I know big liberals who give lots of money to activists and are also absolutely crusading against wind farms off the East Coast.

Roberts: Well, wealthy people, they love to drive and they don’t want to see infrastructure and their public policy principles tend to end at their neighborhood gate. I’ve been trying for years to say, “look, you can’t get away with this anymore. You cannot be a NIMBY and call yourself a liberal anymore.” We need to have some social sanction on this. We need people’s reputation to be hurt if they try to do that. Building electricity infrastructure and building housing, those are the two most important things in climate right now, not just economically, but in climate and in energy and economics. You got to get on board actually.

Krugman: There’s this bizarre debate now which is kind of within the Left over: does building more housing actually reduce housing prices?

Roberts: Are you baffled by this? I had thought that supply and demand were well-established concepts in the field of economics. But there are so many people on our side who don’t think they apply in this arena. I don’t totally get it.

Krugman: I mean, for what it’s worth, there’s a slide. If you look only at the local level, it’s possible that building more housing makes a neighborhood more attractive and actually leads to a rise in the price of the existing housing. But it can’t be a global phenomenon.

Roberts: I feel like if you find yourself in the position where you are saying, “don’t make the place I live nicer.” Someone’s gone off track somewhere, right? Like that can’t be right. That can’t be where we end up. So it’s just I think part of it is we’re just so far behind that, obviously, the next apartment building is not going to turn the tide, you know what I mean? We’re so far behind that we’ve got a long way to go just to catch up on housing stock.

One of the most remarkable things, I would say, in Left politics that I’ve seen in the last ten years is the absolute explosion of the YIMBY movement. And not just in its size, but it’s winning. Which is not something you can say of a lot of other Left movements of the moment. It’s winning victories and it’s changing minds. I really think the Democratic caucus is moving on this issue, which is heartening to see that anything can succeed, that anyone’s mind can change about anything.

Krugman: For listeners, YIMBY is “yes, in my backyard”. NIMBY is “not in my backyard.”

Roberts: Pro-building, pro-density, all the message-people tell us we’re not supposed to say “anti-car,” you definitely don’t want to put “anti-car” on your flier or on your website, but “just between you and me, anti-car as well.”

Krugman: One question. A little bit of a diversion here but, the rise of EV and autonomous vehicles especially: that might actually work to de-densify our lives.

Roberts: This is an interesting gathering—mostly nascent at the moment—but a growing fight on the Left. Autonomous vehicles are going to bring some obvious advantages. The safety advantages, I think there are a lot of people on the Left who are a little bit in denial about this, but the safety boost is real. I think it’s already measurable. That’s a big deal. Cars kill a lot of people, it’s like the second or third cause of death in the United States. It’s not a small thing to be safer, but as an economist you know, if you make a good substantially cheaper, people will consume more of it. So if you make getting around in a car cheaper and easier and more pleasant, people are going to do it more. So there’s just going to be more cars. Ultimately this is a geometry problem. It’s not morals, or whatever. It’s just geometry. If you want the goods and benefits that come along with agglomeration, that come along with cities, you need a certain level of density to achieve those benefits, and you cannot achieve those levels of density if everyone owns a car. That’s just geometry.

I would like for us to be thoughtful and strategic in our autonomous vehicle policy. I would like us to implement those policies with an eye toward reducing total vehicle miles traveled with an eye toward moving people out of private vehicles generally like more fleet vehicles, more shared vehicles. We need to just be thoughtful about how we do this. That’s not typically what we do, but it would be nice in this case if we didn’t just blunder into this, because there’s all kinds of second and third order effects that we just have no idea about yet with this shift.

Krugman: Autonomous vehicles would presumably be fleet vehicles, but they would make it a lot easier to live in a sprawling neighborhood in Jersey.

Roberts: I think your average wealthy suburban Republican politician would love privately owned autonomous vehicles. I bet they would love that. I bet that’s what’s going to happen unless we explicitly act to prevent it. And then if you have your own autonomous vehicle, you can just tell the vehicle, “go pick up Timmy and then come back and park in the lot and then go do this.” Or just like “drive around while I’m here,” it becomes trivially easy to deploy a vehicle, right? If you own one and you don’t even have to be in it, or if you’re in it, you can be on your phone or whatever, it just becomes trivially easy. So of course, people are going to use it more, and of course people are going to start living farther from job centers if commuting becomes easier and more pleasant. That’s not what we want. We want the opposite of that. So I am just nervous about the whole thing. I mean, you can think of ways we could do this that would serve everyone. But that’s not typically how we do things.

Krugman: Not going to happen.

Coming back to where sort of where we started. I think you believe the power of technology and the fact that America is not the center of the world anymore means that electrotech is where we’re going to go?

Roberts: I think at this point it’s more or less inevitable, yes. It’s in the logic of the physics. Ultimately, physics wins out in the end. Timing, of course, is what’s hard to predict, and timing is everything. How fast? I don’t know.

Krugman: Because we’re in a race against climate change, it’s still happening.

Roberts: We’re in several races and now we’re in a sort of geopolitical race with China. We’re in all kinds of races and this is another crucial point that I feel the Trump people don’t get and that everybody needs to get: if you don’t care about climate at all, even if you don’t care about pollution at all, even if you just want to win the AI race, if you just want to win the AI race, you need the full AI stack. What we’re trying to do is dominate AI purely through the prompts. We’ve decided, “oh, we don’t need the physical substrate,” but we do. There’s a reason China has grabbed and dominated the physical substrate of the electrotech economy. The minerals, the batteries, the magnets, all that stuff. We’re trying to dominate AI with just the top froth and they are trying to dominate AI by owning the whole stack all the way down to the electrons, you need clean electrons to run your AI. So they are building with that in mind.

One of the things I’m fond of saying is the shift to clean energy is overdetermined in terms of justification. You can justify it on a climate basis, but you can also take climate out of it entirely and still justify it easily. You can justify it purely on the basis of reductions in particulate pollution. The research on particulate pollution, it’s just gotten worse and worse and worse. We’re expanding our notion of how much damage it does. So just the public health benefits of reduced particulate pollution alone could pay for the transition. Or you can take pollution out of it. Just focus on AI, just focus on competitiveness with China. Take any one of these reasons. They all point the same direction. They all point: shift to clean renewable energy as fast as possible. It is justified by any one of those. That’s why I think another reason that climate has a little bit fallen out of things is that the whole, almost everything you need is justified by a bunch of other reasons, so if climate is controversial, it if it drags in a lot of unwelcome associations, drop it, justify it based on other reasons, like there’s a million reasons to do this. It’s very obvious.

Krugman: Okay. So to summarize, you think that the world will probably save itself.

Roberts: Well…

Krugman: On that front anyway, but the US course is really stupid and unjustifiable, and therefore we’re going to do it. (laughs)

Roberts: I have not predicted anything accurately in ten years. So don’t come to me for predictions. But I’m at least curious what will happen if we genuinely stick with this, if we genuinely try to be the last Petrostate standing, if we’re trying to be the last one selling the last barrel of oil to the last buyer, what does that do to our geopolitics? You can imagine us becoming a genuine pariah, a genuine international pariah with no friends but North Korea and Russia. That’s kind of where we’re heading. I don’t know if the American people really get that. That’s where we’re heading or would want to go there if they were aware of the choice. So I don’t know what’s going to happen, but I feel quite certain that there’s no pot of gold at the end of that rainbow.

Krugman: Okay. I think we should probably end with that hopeful diagnosis.

Roberts: I would just say, as a final thing, everybody’s talking about how all the smart young people are going into dumb AI stuff or dumb finance stuff. I would just say that this area of clean energy technology is an area where there’s enormous things happening. There are discoveries waiting to be made. We’ve been doing things one way for over a century, and now we’re really rapidly trying to do it in a different way, which means there’s all kinds of discoveries to be made. There’s glory to be had here. This is a mission. This is something to be part of, that matters, that’s important. Don’t go into finance. Don’t try to get a burrito to someone in their home five seconds faster, do something that matters and that is important. There are so many ways to get involved in this fight.

That’s my inspirational message to end with.

Krugman: Uplift. Thank you so much.

Roberts: Thanks Paul.

Quoting Matt Webb

The thing about agentic coding is that agents grind problems into dust. Give an agent a problem and a while loop and - long term - it’ll solve that problem even if it means burning a trillion tokens and re-writing down to the silicon. [...]

But we want AI agents to solve coding problems quickly and in a way that is maintainable and adaptive and composable (benefiting from improvements elsewhere), and where every addition makes the whole stack better.

So at the bottom is really great libraries that encapsulate hard problems, with great interfaces that make the “right” way the easy way for developers building apps with them. Architecture!

While I’m vibing (I call it vibing now, not coding and not vibe coding) while I’m vibing, I am looking at lines of code less than ever before, and thinking about architecture more than ever before.

Matt Webb, An appreciation for (technical) architecture

Tags: matt-webb, ai, llms, vibe-coding, coding-agents, ai-assisted-programming, generative-ai, agentic-engineering, definitions

datasette-showboat 0.1a2

Release: datasette-showboat 0.1a2

I added an option to export a Markdown file from my app that lets Showboat incrementally publish updates to a remote server.

Netflix Raises Prices Again

Todd Spangler, Variety:

Under the new pricing, effective March 26 for new users and rolling out to current customers depending on their billing cycle, Netflix’s Standard plan (which has no ads and provides streaming on two devices simultaneously) is rising by $2, from $17.99 to $19.99/month. The ad-supported plan is going up a buck, from $7.99 to $8.99/month, and the top-tier Premium plan (no ads, streaming on up to four devices at once, Ultra HD and HDR) is increasing from $24.99 to $26.99/month.

I pay the full $27/month because I’d rather cancel Netflix than watch ads, and I suspect I’d notice the difference between 4K and 1080p. But also because money runs through my fingers like water.

 ★ 

Business Insider’s Subscriber Spiral

Oliver Darcy, reporting for Status (paywalled, alas):

According to the data obtained by Status, BI ended 2023 with roughly 160,000 paid subscribers, a drop of about 14 percent from the prior year when it boasted about 185,000 subscribers. The slide did not stop there, however. In 2024, it closed the year with roughly 150,000 subscribers, a further six percent decline. And in 2025, the number fell again, to about 135,000 paid subscribers — another 10 percent drop.

All told, over roughly three years, BI saw its subscription base plummet by about 50,000, or a jarring 27 percent.

Not the sort of momentum you want.

 ★ 

Apple Says It’s Not Aware of Lockdown Mode Ever Having Been Exploited

Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, reporting for TechCrunch:

Almost four years after launching a security feature called Lockdown Mode, Apple says it has yet to see a case where someone’s device was hacked with these additional security protections switched on.

“We are not aware of any successful mercenary spyware attacks against a Lockdown Mode-enabled Apple device,” Apple spokesperson Sarah O’Rourke told TechCrunch on Friday.

 ★ 

Tim O'Reilly on market design in the age of A.I.

 Tim O'Reilly, one of the OG commentators/facilitators/cheerleaders of the internet revolution, has some thoughts on the infrastructure  of the various marketplaces for AI.

The Missing Mechanisms of the Agentic Economy: From disclosures to protocols to markets By Tim O’Reilly
 

"For the past two years, I’ve been working with economist Ilan Strauss at the AI Disclosures Project. We started out by asking what regulators would need to know to ensure the safety of AI products that touch hundreds of millions of people. We are now exploring the missing mechanisms that are needed to enable the agentic economy.

"This essay traces our path from disclosures through protocols to markets and mechanism design. Rather than simply stating our conclusions, I’m sharing our thought process and some of the conversations and historical examples that have shaped it. 

...

"Economists use the term “mechanism design” to describe the engineering of rules and incentive structures that lead self-interested actors to produce outcomes that are good for everyone. It’s sometimes called “reverse game theory.” Rather than analyzing the equilibria that emerge from a given set of rules, you start with the outcome you want and work backward to design the rules that will get you there.

"Mechanism design theory got its start in the 1960s when Leonid Hurwicz took up the problem of how a planner can make good decisions when the information needed to make them is scattered among many different people, each of whom has their own interests. His key insight was that people won’t reliably reveal what they know unless it’s in their interest to do so. So how do you design a system that aligns their incentives?

"The field that Hurwicz founded and that Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson developed through the 1970s and 80s earned all three the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2007.

"I first encountered the field when Jonathan Hall, at the time the Chief Economist at Uber, waved Al Roth’s book Who Gets What — and Why at me and said “This is my Bible.” In it, Roth describes his own work on mechanism design, which won him the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics along with Lloyd Shapley. Roth applied mechanism design to kidney matching markets, markets for college admissions, for law clerks and judges, and for hospitals and medical residents. When I first talked to Jonathan and then Al Roth, my layman’s takeaway about mechanism design was that it was simply the application of economic theory to design better markets.

"And I’ve since come to think even more broadly about what mechanism design might mean in a technology context. In my broader framing, packet switching was a breakthrough in mechanism design. So for that matter was TCP/IP, the World Wide Web, and the protocol-centric architecture of Unix/Linux, which enabled open source and the distributed, cooperative software development environment we take for granted today. PageRank and the rest of Google’s organic search system also seems to me to be a kind of mechanism design. So do Pay Per Click advertising and the Google ad auction. All of them are ways of aligning incentives such that self-interested actors produce outcomes that are good for others as well. "

Republican Congressional deference to Trump is in fact democratic

That does not mean it is good!  From Jeffrey M. Stonecash:

Congress is portrayed as compliant with President Donald J. Trump’s agenda because he is intimidating its members. This neglects an alternative explanation that focuses on the increased congruence of presidential and congressional electoral bases. Trump is the beneficiary of a geographical realignment that took decades and has created a high degree of overlap of the two bases. This analysis tracks that process from 1952 to 2024. It has produced a situation in which policy concerns overlap and encourage congressional compliance.

Here is the link, tekl.

The post Republican Congressional deference to Trump is in fact democratic appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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A bilateral AI pause?

Dean ball has some thoughts and hesitations:

Here are some questions I wish “Pause” and “Stop” advocates would address:

1. Assuming we achieve the desired policy goal through a bilateral US/China agreement, what would be the specific metric or objective we would say needs to be satisfied in advance? Who decides whether we have satisfied them? What if one one party believes we have satisfied them but the other does not?

2. If the goal is achieved through a bilateral US/China agreement, would we need capital controls to ensure that U.S. investors cannot fund semiconductor fabs, data centers, or AI research labs in countries other than the U.S. and China?

3. Would we need to revoke the passports of U.S.-based AI researchers and semiconductor engineers to prevent them leaving America to join AI-related ventures elsewhere? How else would the U.S. and China keep researchers within their borders?

4. How should we grapple with the fact that (2) and (3) are common features of autocratic regimes?

5. Do the above questions mean that this really should be a global agreement, signed by all countries on Earth, or at least those with the theoretical ability to host large-scale data centers (probably Vanuatu doesn’t need to be on board)?

The post A bilateral AI pause? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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Artemis 2 astronauts arrive at KSC

Artemis 2 astronauts

The four Artemis 2 astronauts arrived in Florida March 27 for final preparations ahead of a launch still scheduled as soon as April 1.

The post Artemis 2 astronauts arrive at KSC appeared first on SpaceNews.

Apple Announces Ads Are Coming to Apple Maps

Apple Newsroom:

Beginning this summer in the U.S. and Canada, businesses will have a new way to be discovered by using Apple Business to create ads on Maps. Ads on Maps will appear when users search in Maps, and can appear at the top of a user’s search results based on relevance, as well as at the top of a new Suggested Places experience in Maps, which will display recommendations based on what’s trending nearby, the user’s recent searches, and more. Ads will be clearly marked to ensure transparency for Maps users.

Ads on Maps builds on Apple’s broader privacy-first approach to advertising, and maintains the same privacy protections Maps users enjoy today. A user’s location and the ads they see and interact with in Maps are not associated with a user’s Apple Account. Personal data stays on a user’s device, is not collected or stored by Apple, and is not shared with third parties.

The privacy angle is good. I don’t want to take that for granted, because few, if any, of Apple’s $1-trillion-plus market cap peers have such devotion to user privacy.

But more and more it’s becoming clear that while Apple’s devotion to protecting user privacy remains as high as ever, their devotion to delivering the best possible user experience does not. Here’s Apple’s own screenshot showing what these ads are supposedly going to look like. It looks fine. But these ads seem highly unlikely to make the overall experience of using Apple Maps better. Perhaps, in practice, they will not make the experience worse, and it’ll be a wash. But I can’t help but suspect that they’re going to make the experience worse, and the question is really just how much worse. The addition of ads to the App Store has made the experience worse.

We shall see. I’m not going to prejudge the actual experience, and you shouldn’t either. I also do not begrudge Apple for wanting to monetize Maps. But if the addition of ads does make the Apple Maps experience worse, why won’t Apple let us buy our way out of seeing them? Netflix doesn’t force us to watch their ads. YouTube Premium is arguably the best bang-for-the-buck in the entire world of content subscriptions. Why should Apple One subscribers still see these ads in Apple Maps?

 ★ 

What are these Earthlings trying to tell us? What are these Earthlings trying to tell us?