Housing December 15th Weekly Update: Inventory Down 2.5% Week-over-week
This second inventory graph is courtesy of Altos Research.
This second inventory graph is courtesy of Altos Research.
Source: The Authoritarian Stack
Warner Bros. Discovery, which among other things controls CNN, has agreed to sell itself to Netflix. But it isn’t a done deal, because Paramount has made a rival, hostile bid.
Now, most Americans, even those like me who pay a lot of attention to the economy, don’t usually take much interest in insider baseball about corporate wheeling and dealing. But this is a bigger story than usual, for three reasons.
First, there’s an antitrust issue. In an earlier era, when the U.S. government took monopoly power seriously, both proposed acquisitions would probably have been blocked by regulators.
Second, there’s a financial issue. On its own, there is no way that Paramount, which is deeply in debt and whose credit rating is “a notch below ‘junk’” could afford to buy Warner. It’s able to make a semi-credible bid only because of assurances of support from Larry Ellison, one of the world’s richest men thanks to his stake in the software giant Oracle. But when analysts look closely at the details, they find that Ellison’s promises of support are more than a bit squirrely:
[T]he Warner Bros. Discovery board worried that Mr. Ellison did not personally guarantee the bid under his name and is planning to contribute equity for the deal through a trust with holdings that could be modified at any time.
Adding to the risk of Oracle’s deal is the fact that Oracle is itself shaky according to the estimation of gimlet-eyed financial markets due to its huge, debt-financed bets on AI.
As Bloomberg reports, its investment grade debt now “trades like junk.”
But it’s not just about the money. For the average American, there is something fundamentally important about this corporate cage-match to win Warner Bros. Discovery. And it’s not about entertainment, it’s about democracy. You should understand that Paramount’s hostile bid is, above all, a political move in the pursuit of cementing the dominance of MAGA-supporting tech billionaires and further eroding American democracy.
Back in 2018, during Trump I, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt published How Democracies Die, which described how nations like Hungary had descended into one-party authoritarianism although the formal, but now toothless, institutions of democracy remain. In the latest edition of Foreign Affairs Levitsky, Ziblatt and Lucan Way say that this process is already well underway here in the U.S.:
In Trump’s second term, the United States has descended into competitive authoritarianism—a system in which parties compete in elections but incumbents routinely abuse their power to punish critics and tilt the playing field against their opposition. Competitive authoritarian regimes emerged in the early twenty-first century in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, Viktor Orban’s Hungary, and Narendra Modi’s India. Not only did the United States follow a similar path under Trump in 2025, but its authoritarian turn was faster and farther-reaching than those that occurred in the first year of these other regimes.
Now, in some ways America is unusually well-positioned to resist this authoritarian push. As Levitsky et al note, we have a “well-organized and rich civil society” — ranging from law firms to universities to nonprofits — that can push back. And while some of these institutions are led by cowards, not all are. We also have unified political opposition in the form of the Democratic Party, which is very different from the splintered opposition that faced Viktor Orban in Hungary, for example.
Yet, ominously, Trump and Trumpism have powerful allies that had no counterpart in previous competitive authoritarian regimes. Namely, there is a network of deeply anti-democratic tech billionaires, of which Ellison is a very significant player. The Authoritarian Stack project, which tracks that network, calls it the “Authoritarian Tech Right”. I’ve put their chart of some of the keyplayers at the top of this post. Some of us refer to that network, less formally, as the “broligarchy.”
As I have written recently, the broligarchy has deep antipathy to liberal principles in general and to democracy in particular, which they don’t try to hide. Peter Thiel has declared, “I no longer think that freedom and democracy are compatible.” Musk has derided empathy and made common cause with the German neo-Nazi party AfD. Alex Karp, head of the Pentagon contractor Palantir, has said that he hopes killing helpless shipwrecked sailors will be made constitutional so that he can make more money selling equipment to the Pentagon. And Joe Lonsdale says that public executions should come back.
Consistent with their agenda of disabling a pluralistic, democratic society, the broligarchy is engaged in an effort to seize control of media, both traditional and social. With Donald Trump’s blessing, they are trying to control media so that, as in Orban’s Hungary or Chavez’s Venezuela, the only political news that we see is what the authoritarian powers want us to see.
Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter and Jeff Bezos’s purchase of The Washington Post were early stages in this campaign. Since Musk’s acquisition, the app formerly known as Twitter has become a bot- and Nazi-infested hellhole. My own account was hijacked by an entity in Saratov, Russia, and I have never attempted to reclaim it.
Then there is the sad story of the Washington Post. While it first appeared that Bezos would continue to run it as a quality news source, the owner’s increasingly blatant political agenda has led the once-great paper to hemorrhage both talent and readers.
Under Trump II, the broligarch campaign to take down independent media has gone into overdrive. And Larry Ellison is at the wheel.
This last summer Paramount merged with Skydance Media, whose CEO is David Ellison, Larry Ellison’s son. The main prize the Ellisons sought via the merger was control of Paramount-owned CBS News. Likewise, in Paramount’s hostile bid for Warner, the prize that the Ellisons are seeking is control of CNN. And they are not even trying to hide their Trump-serving agenda. CNN has been among the major outlets most critical of Trump, in direct, unvarnished and courageous reporting. As a result, Trump has openly called for drastic changes at CNN. When a CNN reporter asked why the Pentagon isn’t releasing footage of airstrikes on boats allegedly carrying drugs, he denounced it as “an arm of the Democrat Party”.
The true intent of the broligarchs’ actions is revealed by the financial numbers: these media outlets make only very modest amounts of money, yet the broligarchs are throwing billions at them. Moreover, previous takeovers have shown that the outlets make even less money when they are forced to serve a right-wing agenda. The Washington Post is bleeding talent and subscribers, while X/Twitter has lost so many advertisers as well as readers that Musk has sued former advertisers, claiming that their decision not to spend money on his platform is an illegal boycott.
Yet another example of the decline of a media outlet in the aftermath of a Tech Right takeover is CBS. After the Ellison takeover, Paramount put Bari Weiss — whose career was built on attacking mainstream media for alleged left-wing bias — in charge of CBS News. How’s that going? On Saturday, when Weiss led a news special featuring an interview with Charlie Kirk’s widow, major advertisers were conspicuously absent. Instead, as Variety put it,
commercial breaks were largely filled with spots from direct-response advertisers, including the dietary supplement SuperBeets; the home-repair service HomeServe.com; and CarFax, a supplier of auto ownership data.
And let’s not forget the recent episode in which Trump’s FCC chair, Brendan Carr, tried to force Jimmy Kimmel off the air. Disney immediately capitulated and suspended Jimmy Kimmel, but quickly backtracked in face of widespread subscriber backlash.
So there’s every reason to expect a financial debacle if the Ellisons succeed in capturing Warner and degrading CNN. But financial losses on media capture are immaterial to the broligarchs because the money is irrelevant. What they are after is buying favor with Donald Trump and, more broadly, advancing their own authoritarian agenda.
However, there are reasons for hope in stopping the destruction of CNN. One, both mergers – the one proffered by Netflix as well as the one proffered by Paramount – are very likely illegal under an objective assessment of their anti-competitive consequences. Clearly, this is something that should not go unnoticed by a future Democratic administration, which could quite plausibly reverse the merger. And, second, the shaky terms of Paramount’s bid along with the Oracle’s dire financial condition appear to have put off Warner’s shareholders.
But it’s a terrifying prospect that we are so close to authoritarian media capture. Just take a look at Hungary or Venezuela to see what that leads to.
NONMUSICAL CODA
From Person of Interest
I recently came across JustHTML, a new Python library for parsing HTML released by Emil Stenström. It's a very interesting piece of software, both as a useful library and as a case study in sophisticated AI-assisted programming.
I didn't initially know that JustHTML had been written with AI assistance at all. The README caught my eye due to some attractive characteristics:
I was out and about without a laptop so I decided to put JustHTML through its paces on my phone. I prompted Claude Code for web on my phone and had it build this Pyodide-powered HTML tool for trying it out:

This was enough for me to convince myself that the core functionality worked as advertised. It's a neat piece of code!
At this point I went looking for some more background information on the library and found Emil's blog entry about it: How I wrote JustHTML using coding agents:
Writing a full HTML5 parser is not a short one-shot problem. I have been working on this project for a couple of months on off-hours.
Tooling: I used plain VS Code with Github Copilot in Agent mode. I enabled automatic approval of all commands, and then added a blacklist of commands that I always wanted to approve manually. I wrote an agent instruction that told it to keep working, and don't stop to ask questions. Worked well!
Emil used several different models - an advantage of working in VS Code Agent mode rather than a provider-locked coding agent like Claude Code or Codex CLI. Claude Sonnet 3.7, Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Opus all get a mention.
What's most interesting about Emil's 17 step account covering those several months of work is how much software engineering was involved, independent of typing out the actual code.
I wrote about vibe engineering a while ago as an alternative to vibe coding.
Vibe coding is when you have an LLM knock out code without any semblance of code review - great for prototypes and toy projects, definitely not an approach to use for serious libraries or production code.
I proposed "vibe engineering" as the grown up version of vibe coding, where expert programmers use coding agents in a professional and responsible way to produce high quality, reliable results.
You should absolutely read Emil's account in full. A few highlights:
This represents a lot of sophisticated development practices, tapping into Emil's deep experience as a software engineer. As described, this feels to me more like a lead architect role than a hands-on coder.
It perfectly fits what I was thinking about when I described vibe engineering.
Setting the coding agent up with the html5lib-tests suite is also a great example of designing an agentic loop.
Emil concluded his article like this:
JustHTML is about 3,000 lines of Python with 8,500+ tests passing. I couldn't have written it this quickly without the agent.
But "quickly" doesn't mean "without thinking." I spent a lot of time reviewing code, making design decisions, and steering the agent in the right direction. The agent did the typing; I did the thinking.
That's probably the right division of labor.
I couldn't agree more. Coding agents replace the part of my job that involves typing the code into a computer. I find what's left to be a much more valuable use of my time.
Tags: html, python, ai, generative-ai, llms, ai-assisted-programming, vibe-coding, coding-agents
You may have seen the recent reports of a malware that stole API keys, tokens and other secrets from a large number of developers. Where were these secrets stolen from? You guessed it, they were mostly stolen from environment variables.
We use environment variables to configure information that processes need to run, but this type of storage was not designed for security, so using the environment for secrets always comes with risk. Given how serious this recent attack was, I thought it would be good to write a short article describing how I manage my secrets as part of my open source work.
Between 2011 and 2023 India’s GDP per capita grew at a rate of about 4.8% per year so in those 12 years GDP per capita, a good measure of the standard of living, nearly doubled (77%). Shamika Ravi and Sindhuja Penumarty look at what this means on the ground.
The percentage of the budget spent on food has declined–dropping below 50% for the first time ever–and that has enabled significant purchases of consumer durables.
It will perhaps not be surprising that mobile phones have become universal among both the poor and the rich but vehicle ownership is also converging with rural ownership of a vehicle (2 or 4 wheeler) nearly tripling from (19% to 59%).
Another standout is refrigerators which reflects growing income and reliable electricity. In the 12 years across the survey, refrigerator ownership in rural areas more than tripled from 9.4% circa 2011 to 33.2% in 2023. In urban areas refrigerator ownership went from less than half (43.8%) to more than two-thirds (68.1%) of urban households. Overall, only two states Bihar (37.1%) and Odisha (46.3%), had less than 50% of urban households owning a refrigerator in 2023-24.
Economists are often accused of “line go up” thinking but the truth is that line go up matters. The 4.8% annual growth matters because it shows up as a broad, visible upgrade in how people live.
The post Growth Matters appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
Using newly linked Taiwanese administrative datasets, including an annual census of dog and cat registrations from 1999 to 2020 matched to complete personal tax records from 2009 to 2020, we revisit the claim that “pets crowd out babies.” We exploit two quasi-experimental price shocks: a childbirth subsidy and large receipt lottery windfalls. These allow us to estimate cross elasticities between childbearing and pet ownership. The results reveal a Marshallian cross elasticity of −1.32: as the effective cost of children falls, pet ownership rises. Combined with income elasticity estimates, we recover a child price elasticity of fertility of −0.21, suggesting that pets and children are complements, not substitutes. Event study evidence reveals dynamic asymmetry. Acquiring a dog sharply increases subsequent births among previously childless adults (a “starter family” effect), while a new baby temporarily depresses further pet acquisitions, likely due to time constraints. Overall, our findings challenge popular narratives and suggest that pet ownership may support, rather than displace, fertility.
That is from an AEA session paper by Kuan-Ming Chen, Ming-Jen Lin, Hau-Hung Yang, and Shirley Yen, here is the online abstract.
The post Cats, dogs, and babies, in Taiwan appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
From Natalia Emanuel, Valentin Bolotnyy, and Pim Welle:
The involuntary hospitalization of people experiencing a mental health crisis is a widespread practice, as common in the US as incarceration in state and federal prisons and 2.4 times as common as death from cancer. The intent of involuntary hospitalization is to prevent individuals from harming themselves or others through incapacitation, stabilization and medical treatment over a short period of time. Does involuntary hospitalization achieve its goals? We leverage quasi-random assignment of the evaluating physician and administrative data from Allegheny County, Pennsylvania to estimate the causal effects of involuntary hospitalization on harm to self (proxied by death by suicide or overdose) and harm to others (proxied by violent crime charges). For individuals whom some physicians would hospitalize but others would not, we find that hospitalization nearly doubles the probability of being charged with a violent crime and more than doubles the probability of dying by suicide or overdose in the three months after evaluation. We provide evidence of housing and earnings disruptions as potential mechanisms. Our results suggest that on the margin, the system we study is not achieving the intended effects of the policy.
Here is the abstract online at the AEA site. I am looking forward to seeing more of this work.
The post Is involuntary hospitalization working? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
An exceptional temperature inversion: Weeks of tule fog and damp chill in the Central Valley amid a record-warm airmass more broadly across American West and California Well, it sure has been another dramatic couple of weeks when it comes to Western U.S. weather! But exactly what the drama has been varies widely from place to […]
The post As warm atmospheric rivers slide gradually southward along Pacific Coast, a return to rain and end to tule fog in NorCal later this week–but don’t expect much mountain snow first appeared on Weather West.
(Lord’s day). Lay with great content talking with my wife in bed, and so up and to church and then home, and had a neat dinner by ourselves, and after dinner walked to White Hall and my Lord’s, and up and down till chappell time, and then to the King’s chappell, where I heard the service, and so to my Lord’s, and there Mr. Howe and Pagett, the counsellor, an old lover of musique. We sang some Psalms of Mr. Lawes, and played some symphonys between till night, that I was sent for to Mr. Creed’s lodging, and there was Captain Ferrers and his lady and W. Howe and I; we supped very well and good sport in discourse. After supper I was sent for to my Lord, with whom I staid talking about his, and my owne, and the publique affairs, with great content, he advising me as to my owne choosing of Sir R. Bernard for umpire in the businesses between my uncle and us, that I would not trust to him upon his direction, for he did not think him a man to be trusted at all; and so bid him good night, and to Mr. Creed’s again; Mr. Moore, with whom I intended to have lain, lying physically without sheets; and there, after some discourse, to bed, and lay ill, though the bed good, my stomach being sicke all night with my too heavy supper.
These people are saying it is there too. Though I am not quite sure what they (or anyone, for that matter) mean by AI:
First, we argue that AI can already be seen in productivity statistics for the United States. The production and use effects of software and software R&D (alone) contributed (a) 50 percent of the 2 percent average rate of growth in US nonfarm business labor productivity from 2017 to 2024 and (a) 50 percent of its 1.2 percentage point acceleration relative to the pace from 2012 to 2017. Second, taking additional intangibles and data assets into account, we calculate a long-run contribution of AI to labor productivity growth based on assumptions that follow from the recent trajectories of investments in software, software R&D, other intangibles, and productivity growth in both US and Europe. Our central estimates are that AI will boost annual labor productivity growth by as much as 1 percentage point in the United States and about .3 percentage point in Europe.
That is from Bontadini, Corrado, Haskel, and Jona-Lasinio, here is the complete abstract online.
The post “AI is everywhere but in the productivity statistics…” appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
Links for you. Science:
After Trump cut the National Science Foundation by 56 percent, a venerable Arctic research center closes its doors
Texas Was Set to Create Its Largest Wildlife Refuge. Then the Feds Did Something They’d Seemingly Never Done Before.
In Northern Scotland, the Neolithic Age Never Ended
What doctors say about one of the biggest flu shot myths
A rare photosynthesizing sea slug has been found off N.S. Here’s why scientists are excited
Bird flu viruses are resistant to fever, making them a major threat to humans
Other:
The pro-Hitler problem with the American right: Antisemitism exists across the political spectrum, but the Nazi sentiment seeping into mainstream conservatism is especially troubling.
The Mar-a-Lago Party That Future Historians Will Never Forget
Silicon Valley’s Man in the White House Is Benefiting Himself and His Friends. David Sacks, the Trump administration’s A.I. and crypto czar, has helped formulate policies that aid his Silicon Valley friends and many of his own tech investments.
On the Internet No One Knows You’re a “MAGA patriot” in Lagos
The Class Anxieties Behind China’s Millions of Security Guards
China’s Security Guards Live Lives on the Margin
How A.I. Broke the Sound Barrier
South Carolina’s Measles Outbreak Shows Chilling Effect of Vaccine Misinformation
Candid Cameron: One of the greatest directors of all time offers a thoughtful assessment of his career evolution (“I was an asshole in the ‘80s”), why Netflix owning Warners would be “a disaster,” the “pure cinema” of performance capture, Bob Iger’s notes on ‘Avatar: Fire and Ash,’ the impact of A.I. on the business, and his friend Elon Musk.
FedEx laying off workers ahead of holiday season
Witkoff and Kushner’s Ukraine Turkey
Colleges Are Preparing to Self-Lobotomize
The Bros Fade on Trump
Trump’s Immigration Forces Deploy “Less Lethal” Weapons in Dangerous Ways, Skirting Rules and Maiming Protesters
Vaccines do more than improve our health
Missouri to enforce mandatory age verification today
Meet the neo-Nazi targeting kids online, teaching them to hate and to prepare to kill
Walking in Memphis Crime Data
Republicans’ health care homework is due — and they’re panicking
It’s a Racket!
Are You Going To Do Something
AI, ‘Populism’ and the Centibillionaire Shangri-La
Trump Grants Clemency To Private Equity Executive Who Defrauded Thousands
Suspect In National Guard Attack Struggled With ‘Dark Isolation’ As Community Raised Concerns
No, you can’t get your AI to ‘admit’ to being sexist, but it probably is anyway
In Houston suburbs, Abbott’s attacks on CAIR unnerve Muslim residents
Why is coffee so expensive? Boston coffee drinkers face growing sticker shock. (Trump take coffee)
DHS swept Chicago to get ‘the worst’ criminals. Many have no record.
What Is A “Professional Degree” And Why Does It Matter?
Who Is Really Running the Oval Office?
Yesterday I thought, “Sunday I will spend relaxing, doing only things I want to do.” Today I have been constantly doing physical or digital tasks in an effort to clear the current to-do list, feeling stressed about everything.
§ Although I’m several months behind reading The Wire I browsed the end-of-year chart to find things to listen to that I’d missed, and so far have bought Disquiet by The Necks. I’ve listened to them occasionally in the past but I guess this album met me at the right moment to want to listen more. (Three hours more, repeatedly.)
It’s hard to tell whether I find this music kind of relaxing in its monotony, or really aggravating in its conflicting rhythms.
I do still have to think twice about their name. They’re not Swans or Geese, neither of whom I’ve heard, but Necks.
I went to pick up my new spare/gym/alternative glasses this week, some spindly titanium-framed Lindberg specs that are incredibly light and very different from the brown acetate of my current main pair of Moscot frames. Nice to know I have a recent spare pair in case one breaks, given I’m a drive from getting anything fixed.
I also picked up some old Mykita frames that I’d had new “enhanced reader” lenses put in, for use at the computer: everything from close-up to somewhere just beyond my outstretched arm is in focus, and a bit blurry beyond that. Previously I’ve been leaning into my display slightly, looking through the lower “reading” part of my varifocal lenses, and still had to change the resolution down to 2560 × 1440. With these new lenses I can sit normally and am back to 3200 × 1800. So much space!
I was oddly stressed about going into town. I think that – like today – several brief and trivial tasks on top of the usually manageable undercurrent of bigger, weightier concerns all becomes too much. Of course, it was all fine: I didn’t get into an accident on the way there; I did, just about, find a parking space; I did get to the appointment on time; I did choose the correct amount of parking hours to get most of the errands done; I did successfully drive further through Hereford’s terrible traffic to complete the final missions; I did drive home without incident.
§ On Thursday Mum wasn’t up for going to folk music night at the pub and so, for the first time, I went on my own. We hadn’t been for a couple of weeks, we won’t be going for at least a couple more, and it’s pretty much the only socialising I have. I was mostly anxious about parking in the pub’s small, crowded space, but that went OK. Given Mum wasn’t there to sing I felt I should contribute something to the evening, so I read three poems by John Hegley: short and (mostly) funny, which all went smoothly. A lovely evening, as ever.
I am still practising acoustic guitar but avoiding giving any blow-by-blow updates here. Not every hobby needs to be shared constantly. So they say. I’m using the Justin Guitar app which is pretty good, pleasant, and encouraging. I’m definitely making more and faster progress than when I last tried, years ago, working from a book. It’ll be a while before I’m ready to make my performing debut though.
§ I finished reading The Shortest History of Europe by John Hirst this week which was excellent. The histories of England and Germany that I’ve read from that series were good but at times felt like a succession of the names of monarchs I’d never remember enough to differentiate. I was concerned a history of Europe would multiply this problem but in fact it mentions surprisingly few specific figures. It concentrates more on bigger changes, like language, religion, and systems of government, and shows how they spread and changed over time, telling the history of the continent more than once with different lenses. Really interesting. This approach also means it feels more about all the people as a whole (even if from a very high level) than only the ruling classes. It does very much focus on the bigger nations though; don’t expect many mentions of Belgium or Portugal.
§ We watched the first six episodes of Pluribus so can now join the debate on what we think about Carol. Annoying, miserable, self-centred… With apologies to my US friends, she often feels like a stereotype of a particular kind of very entitled, blinkered American. It’s odd to watch a show in which I hope the protagonist doesn’t succeed.
(It’s possible that I am also annoying, miserable, self-centred, etc., but I am also not – yet! – the protagonist of an expensive TV show that you’re supposed to be interested in.)
It’s also odd that I’ve watched plenty of TV shows with really terrible people as protagonists – gangsters, law-breaking lawmen, murderous foreign spies, etc. – and yet, despite knowing they’re Bad People, at least part of me has enjoyed watching them succeed. I guess that’s a big part of what makes these anti-heroes interesting. But with Carol I don’t see anything in her except the aforementioned flaws. I don’t (yet) know what she liked or wanted before all this happened, for example, because she apparently didn’t like or want anything. Her character seems very thin. So I don’t care if she succeeds and that makes her quite tedious to watch.
§ I watched three films this week.
§ That is it. We’ve nearly made it through 2025. Hold on tight, we can do this.
Oslo’s new public library is an ugly building in the prevailing bureaucratic style of our time. If mannequins went to the office, their office would look like this. The exterior resembles a bunker, and the inside possesses all the warmth of a busy airport terminal.
But don’t let looks deceive you. This library is fun!
Alas, the fun has little to do with books. Those fun-loving librarians operate a wine bar on the premises—that’s an exciting new way of encouraging literacy and learning.
I never went to library school, so maybe I’m just ignorant of the oenophile-to-bibliophile connection. But after a few drinks, I’m sure it all starts to make sense.
“Libraries are our last line of defense in preserving our accumulated knowledge from the past. That is what they ought to teach in library school, not barista skills.”
And there’s even more fun at the Oslo Library. Here you can find a movie theater, recording studio, DJ equipment, video games, sewing machines, 3D printers, lounges, and a full-service restaurant.
The restaurant is, I’m told, a bit pricey—but I’m certain it must be fun.

But what happens in Norway doesn’t stay in Norway. The fun library concept is now spreading everywhere—maybe to your city or the pricey college where you send your children.

SpaceX delayed the launch of a Falcon 9 rocket from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center from Monday to Tuesday. The Starlink 6-99 mission will add another 29 Starlink V2 Mini satellites to SpaceX’s broadband internet constellation in low Earth orbit.
SpaceX did not offer an explanation for the delay. Liftoff winds were expected to be an issue at the opening of the original launch window on Monday. In addition, booster recovery weather was listed as a low to moderate risk. When it does launch, the Falcon 9 rocket will fly on a south-easterly trajectory upon leaving Florida’s Space Coast.
Liftoff is now planned for no sooner than 7:45 a.m. EST (1245 UTC) on Tuesday. Spaceflight Now will have live coverage beginning about an hour prior to liftoff.
SpaceX will launch the mission using the Falcon 9 booster with the tail number 1094. This will be its sixth flight following the launches of missions like Crew-11, Ax-4 and Cygnus NG-23.
Nearly 8.5 minutes after liftoff, B1094 will target an autonomous landing on the drone ship, ‘Just Read the Instructions,’ positioned in the Atlantic Ocean to the east of the Bahamas. This will be the 146th landing on this vessel and the 552nd booster landing to date for SpaceX.
• Active inventory climbed 12.6% year over year
Inventory growth continues to be driven more by homes lingering on the market than by new listings. With roughly 1.01 million homes for sale last week, the 32nd consecutive week above the million-mark, buyers have a wider selection, while sellers face mounting competition. Importantly, this week bucked the recent trend of slowing inventory growth, and the annual increase in homes for sale was larger than the previous week.
• New listings—a measure of sellers putting homes up for sale—fell by 7.4% year over year
New listings fell again this week compared to the same week in 2024, accelerating from the previous week’s decline. New listings are up 5.5% year to date and have shown modest positive growth for most of the fall, suggesting that the overall trend toward more new listings coming on the market could be shifting this winter.
• The median listing price fell 1.2% year over year
The median list price dropped compared to the same week one year ago, though the retreat has moderated closer to year-long trends. Adjusting for home size, the price per square foot fell 1.1% year over year, dropping for the 14th consecutive week. The price per square foot grew steadily for almost two years, but the combination of slower sales, rising inventory, and increased price cuts is now clearly reflected in lower listing values, indicating that the market is rebalancing toward buyers.
1. What Stanley Kubrick learned from chess.
3. Rob Wiblin and Dean Ball podcast on AI. And ChinaTalk surveys Chinese AI in 2025.
4. Stagnant construction productivity is a worldwide problem.
5. “Announcing Progress in Medicine, a high school summer career exploration program.”
6. How good is university teaching?
7. Rachel Maddow is returning to the Catholic Church.
The post Sunday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
Peter Kafka, writing at Business Insider:
And last: It’s possible that Middle Eastern countries are investing in an American media conglomerate solely for a financial return, and would have zero interest in the content that conglomerate makes and distributes. But that’s an assertion that many folks would have a hard time taking at face value. And while lots of American companies have sought Middle Eastern funding for years, there was a pause after 2018, following the murder and dismemberment of Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi — a shocking act the CIA concluded was ordered by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself. (He has denied involvement.)
Now bin Salman might end up owning a piece of major American news outlets and other media arms. How’s that going to go over?
David Ellison’s hostile takeover proposal reportedly would have these Middle East partners owning “non-voting” shares, but regardless of their rights in the corporate by-laws, their mere ownership would give them influence. These are profoundly fucked-up countries, where women are a repressed underclass, LGBT activity is punishable by death, and their word is worth nothing when they promise to abide by Western norms.
This is very funny, but also a good indication of just how far away these things are from actual intelligence. First, a reasonable human being would never get caught in a loop like this. Second, only humans can not only recognize what’s going on here, but also see the humor in it.

A Rocket Lab Electron rocket successfully launched a technology demonstration satellite for JAXA Dec. 13 as the company reshuffles its launch manifest.
The post Rocket Lab launches JAXA tech demo satellite appeared first on SpaceNews.

Update Dec. 14, 1:40 a.m. EST (0640 UTC): SpaceX confirms deployment of the Starlink satellites.
SpaceX launched its 580th Falcon 9 rocket to date with an overnight flight from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station that flew in the midnight hour.
The Starlink 6-82 mission added another 29 Starlink V2 Mini satellites into the growing megaconstellation in low Earth orbit. This was SpaceX’s 120 Starlink launch so far this year.
Liftoff from Space Launch Complex 40 happened at 12:25 a.m. EST (0525 UTC). The rocket flew on a south-easterly trajectory upon leaving the launch pad.
On Saturday, the 45th Weather Squadron forecast a 30 percent chance for favorable weather during the launch window. Meteorologists point to a cold front expected to move through the state on Sunday that will combine with an area of “strong, high pressure centered over the Ohio Valley” resulting in “a very tight pressure gradient behind the front.”
“This will bring a surge of northerly winds on Sunday evening near the opening of the window, with winds likely to increase as the night progresses,” launch weather officers wrote. “The main concern is the low-level winds violating liftoff constraints, along with the low risk of a coastal shower violating the flight through Cumulus Cloud Rule.”
SpaceX flew the mission using the Falcon 9 booster with the tail number, 1092. This was its ninth flight following missions like CRS-32, GPS III-7 and USSF 36.
A little more than eight minutes after liftoff, B1092 performed a landing on the drone ship, ‘A Shortfall of Gravitas.’ This was the 137th landing on this vessel and the 551st booster landing to date for SpaceX.
Marcus Mendes, 9to5Mac:
Now, on the same day that F1 The Movie debuted at the top of Apple TV’s movie rankings, the company confirmed that Pluribus has reached another, even more impressive milestone: it is the most watched show in the service’s history. Busy day. [...]
Apple doesn’t share viewership numbers, so it is hard to quantify what exactly this means.
However, considering that Apple TV has had quite a few hit shows, including Ted Lasso, Severance, The Morning Show, Slow Horses, and, more recently, The Studio, it is still notable that Pluribus has managed to top them all in just a few short weeks.
I love Pluribus. I’d rank it behind Severance and Slow Horses, but it’s a close call behind Pluribus and The Studio for third place on my Apple TV favorites list. Great shows all four of them. I don’t think there’s any question that when it comes to prestige series, Apple TV had the best 2025. Which other streamer had four shows of that caliber this year?
Jason Kottke is iffy on it, though, because he’s not seeing the appeal of Rhea Seehorn’s protagonist Carol Sturka. Count me with Max Roberts — I find Carol very compelling, and uncomfortably realistic. She feels to me like a real person, not a “character”. It’s one of the best cinematic explorations of loneliness since Tom Hanks in Cast Away — or WALL-E.
From the LucasFonts account, in a comment on Hacker News:
Professional typography can be achieved with both serif and sans-serif fonts. However, Times New Roman — a typeface older than the current president — presents unique challenges. Originally crafted in Great Britain for newspaper printing, Times was optimised for paper, with each letterform meticulously cut and tested for specific sizes. In the digital era, larger size drawings were repurposed as models, resulting in a typeface that appears too thin and sharp when printed at high quality.
Serif fonts are often perceived as more traditional, but they are also more demanding to use effectively. While a skilled typographer can, in theory, produce excellent results with Times, using it in its default digital form is not considered professional practice.
This echoes my thoughts: the State Department should use a traditional-looking serif typeface, but they should choose — or even better, commission — something far better than Times New Roman.
Also from that Hacker News thread, comes this delightful Easter egg: do a Google search for “Lucas de Groot”, and the results will be set in Calibri. Same thing for common fonts like, yes, Times New Roman.
How a Cryptocurrency Helps Criminals Launder Money and Evade Sanctions
Through layers of intermediaries, stablecoins can be moved, swapped and mixed into pools of other funds in ways that are difficult to trace, experts say. By Aaron Krolik
"Smugglers, money launderers and people facing sanctions once relied on diamonds, gold and artwork to store illicit fortunes. The luxury goods could help hide wealth but were cumbersome to move and hard to spend.
"Now, criminals have a far more practical alternative: stablecoins, a cryptocurrency tied to the U.S. dollar that exists largely beyond traditional financial oversight.
"These digital tokens can be bought with a local currency and moved across borders almost instantly. Or they can be returned to the traditional banking system — including by converting funds into debit cards — often without detection, a New York Times review of corporate filings, online forum messages and blockchain data shows.
"A report released in February from Chainalysis, a blockchain analysis firm, estimated that up to $25 billion in illicit transactions involved stablecoins last year. And as more Russian oligarchs, Islamic State leaders and others have begun using the cryptocurrency, the rise of these dollar-linked tokens threatens to undermine one of America’s most potent foreign policy tools: cutting adversaries off from the dollar and the global banking system.
...
"To test just how easily crypto can slip between the cracks of banking controls, I found a crypto A.T.M. in Weehawken, N.J., to convert cash into stablecoins.
"Soon after I fed two $20 bills into the machine, I received a notification on my phone that crypto had arrived in my digital wallet. A Telegram bot then guided me through the next step: using the stablecoins to generate a Visa payment card number with a balance that I could spend anywhere.
"A payment card functions very much like a debit card, though it is not tied to any of my bank accounts. In this case, the card I was issued did not require me to provide an address or identity check of any kind — in effect creating a degree of anonymity for my spending.
...
"Tether, which has over $180 billion worth of stablecoins in circulation, is based in El Salvador and would not be covered by the new rules. The company holds more than $112 billion in U.S. Treasuries, and any law enforcement action against Tether could potentially risk destabilizing important financial markets.
"The picture is further complicated by political and financial ties surrounding Tether. The company has close connections to the family of Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who is responsible for restricting exports of sensitive U.S. technology — restrictions that people can try to sidestep by making transactions with stablecoins like Tether.
"One of Mr. Lutnick’s sons, Brandon, is the chairman of Cantor Fitzgerald, which provides services to Tether, placing the family in a position where the company behind the world’s largest offshore dollar token intersects with a key federal enforcement role. Another son, Kyle, is executive vice chairman of the firm.
"Cantor Fitzgerald and the Commerce Department declined to comment."

A week ago, my friend Yaroslav requested that I write more about economics and less about politics. So I deeply and humbly apologize to Yaroslav for writing another politics post.
In the past week or so, some people have claimed that the wheels are coming off the Trump presidency. For example, here’s Max Burns, writing in The Hill:
It doesn’t take a political genius to recognize that things are in free fall over at the White House…Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is facing mounting Republican criticism over a potentially illegal order to kill the survivors of a Caribbean boat strike. Attorney General Pam Bondi’s Department of Justice is in disarray after three failed efforts to prosecute former FBI Director James Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James…Trump’s approval rating cratered to a new low of just 36 percent in late November following months of open-air dysfunction and his repeated failure to address fundamental problems like rising consumer prices.
It’s true that Trump has had a string of setbacks recently. Indiana rejected Trump’s proposed redistricting plan, which would have used gerrymandering to give the GOP 2 more seats in Congress. The GOP-dominated Indiana state legislature openly defied Trump’s threats to cut off the state’s infrastructure funding unless they accepted the gerrymandering plan. It was a pretty remarkable act of defiance from state-level Republicans, and could indicate that Trump’s power to bully his own party into line is eroding.
Meanwhile, Democrats have been performing strongly in off-year elections:
Democrats were declared winners of the Miami mayor’s race for the first time in nearly 30 years, winning the race easily by 18 points. And…the party also flipped a Georgia state House district that Trump had carried by double digits last year…The results in Miami and Georgia were merely the latest in a series of ominous signs for the GOP’s electoral picture…Democrats also flipped the mayor’s race in suburban Roswell…Democrats…continue to over-perform in special elections by more than they ever have in the Trump era…when the districts have been somewhat competitive, the results have been strong for Democrats. This year they’ve flipped four state legislative seats that had favored Trump by double digits a year ago…Democrats have now flipped more of these seats in special elections than in any year since 2020, when they won back the presidency.
This presages a potential blue wave in the 2026 midterm elections, which is undoubtedly why Trump is so desperate to push through state-level gerrymandering plans.
These concerns were bolstered by a recent AP-NORC poll that had some very poor numbers for Trump, including on the economy and on immigration — the two main issues that Trump won on in 2024:


These developments do seem to reinforce the notion that Trump’s post-election honeymoon is over. But I wouldn’t be too quick to label him a lame duck, or to conclude that his power over the GOP is breaking.
First of all, the AP poll is just one poll. Overall, Trump’s approval rating has drifted downward, and he had a bad November, possibly because of the government shutdown. But since the shutdown ended, his approval has rebounded somewhat, and is still above 40% in the poll averages:

And while it’s true that Democrats will probably do well in the midterms — as the opposition party often does — a Democratic victory in Congress would not make Trump a lame duck. Democrats will not get a two-thirds supermajority, so they will be unable to override Trump’s vetoes. This means their ability to curtail Trump’s power — for example, by revoking his tariff authority — will be limited. And Trump has mostly governed by executive order in any case; Congress can pass laws that supersede the EOs, but again, not without a supermajority.
As for immigration, it’s not clear how much Trump’s deteriorating approval rating on that issue will hurt him. Those lower numbers are probably a response to the steady drumbeat of stories and videos of ICE apprehending and detaining U.S. citizens, demanding that citizens carry “immigration papers”, and generally treating people badly. But there has been no wave of popular unrest in response to those abuses, as there was to videos of police shootings in the 2010s. Overall, Americans appear to still be exhausted from a decade of street conflict.
And Trump still gets decently high marks on border security, as distinct from immigration overall:

It’s not clear whether voters care about “immigration” or “border security” more; it’s possible that many voters view Trump’s ICE raids and illegal renditions with distaste, but are willing to forgive those excesses because Trump delivered on his core promise of securing the border:

It’s possible that the racial profiling inherent in Trump’s ICE raids will drive away the Latino voters that began to join the Republican coalition in 2020 and 2024. In fact, Trump’s approval is slipping with Latinos. But for now, the immigration issue doesn’t seem to be a big liability for Trump.
And many of Trump’s other outrages, missteps, and bad policies simply don’t seem to be breaking through to the public consciousness. Avid news-readers might be aghast at Trump’s attempts to bully Ukraine into accepting an unfavorable peace deal, or at Pete Hegseth’s probably-illegal orders to massacre people on boats in the Caribbean. They might be disturbed by Trump’s plans to sell advanced Nvidia chips to China, or by rumors of an invasion of Venezuela. They might be outraged at any of the administration’s numerous corruption scandals. But a lot fewer Americans are reading the news:

It seems to me that people can get mad about A) outrages they read about in the news, and/or B) bad stuff that happens to them in real life. With Americans tuning out the news after a turbulent decade, there is simply less scope for (A). That leaves (B). And most of the bad things Trump is doing have little or no immediate ramifications for the daily lives of average Americans.
I said “most”, but not “none”. One possible exception is the measles epidemic, which is now affecting thousands of people in South Carolina and causing hundreds more to be quarantined. This is a purely manmade epidemic; measles can be eliminated by widespread vaccination, and in fact was declared eliminated in the U.S. for many years. Now, because some Americans are choosing to forego the vaccine, the country is on track to lose its measles elimination status.

RFK Jr., Trump’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, has spread falsehoods about the measles vaccine, and even Fox News is blaming him for the outbreak. So if the disease keeps spreading, this is one thing that could disrupt normal Americans’ daily lives and cause them to sour further on Trump.
But by far the biggest thing that affects Americans’ daily lives — and where they seem to be souring on Trump’s rule — is the economy.
Americans are very, very unhappy with the state of their economy right now. Consumer sentiment is even worse now than at the lowest point in the Biden administration:

Why are Americans upset about their economy right now? Because they feel like life is getting less affordable. Polls pretty consistently show that the cost of living tops all other concerns:

And Americans increasingly seem to blame Trump for this:

Is the affordability crisis real? Well, it depends on your perspective. Real wages for production and nonsupervisory workers — i.e. wages adjusted for the cost of living — are a good measure of purchasing power. And these have been rising steadily since 2022, meaning that life in America has been getting more affordable — at least, on average.
And although inflation is a tiny bit above target and may be rising again, it’s still far lower than in 2021-22, and pretty low by historical standards:
Why are Americans so apocalyptically negative about affordability in the Trump economy, when the objective indicators seem fairly benign? There are lots of possibilities here. People might be mad about high mortgage rates that make it hard to buy a new home. They might be finally venting their rage over decades of rising costs for big-ticket service items like health care, college, and child care (even though many of those costs seem to have plateaued or even decreased in the last few years). They might simply be using inflation as a politically neutral-sounding way to express their disapproval of Trump on sociocultural issues.
One possibility is that Americans are mad that Trump just doesn’t seem to care about affordability. His tariffs are probably contributing a relatively modest but real amount to inflation:

And when confronted about rising prices from tariffs, Trump has responded by sneeringly telling Americans to be satisfied with less:
“Be satisfied with fewer toys for your kids” is not the kind of message Americans like to hear, especially from a guy who lives a lavish, super-rich lifestyle. Trump has also called the affordability crisis “a hoax.”
CNN has poll results showing that it may be Trump’s perceived inactivity and lack of sympathy on affordability that is angering some voters:
[I]mportantly, a large reason for that negativity [about the economy] appears to be not just the state of affairs, but Trump’s perceived neglect…Recent polling from CBS News and YouGov shows 75% of Americans and 57% of Republicans say the administration hasn’t focused enough on lowering prices. Again, that’s a clear majority … of Republicans.
And Trump’s macroeconomic policy threatens to make the situation even worse. He consistently calls for the Fed to cut interest rates more. Rate cuts would, of course, fuel inflation, especially if they convinced American business that Trump’s Federal Reserve no longer prioritizes price stability.
Why does Trump want rate cuts? Well, lower rates push up the value of stocks, bonds, and other financial assets, which Trump and his family own a lot of. This motivation might be why Trump’s Treasury Department is tweeting out charts touting bond price increases in 2025:
Of course, bond prices go up when interest rates go down. And interest rates typically go down when the economy is in distress. Just look at the chart and realize that the only other blue bar besides 2025 is 2020, when the pandemic was raging.
It’s possible that Trump’s macroeconomic team is just confused, and doesn’t know how any of this works. But it’s also possible that they value interest rate cuts as an inherently positive, good thing.
It’s also possible that Trump still views unemployment, rather than inflation, as the main threat to the U.S. economy. The labor market is still fairly strong, but deteriorating mildly, with rising layoffs. And right now the AI boom is propping up the macroeconomy; if that boom goes bust, the resulting financial and economic crisis could cause unemployment to soar. Trump may be trying to get ahead of that scenario. Or he may simply have an instinct that tells him that price hikes are less important than jobs.
Either way, Trump’s nonchalant attitude toward inflation could end up being his undoing. So far we haven’t seen any event that hurts lots of Americans and causes Trump to lose popular credibility, as Hurricane Katrina did to George W. Bush in 2005. A rise in inflation could be that event.
So while Trump’s presidency isn’t headed for the ash-heap of history just yet, it is showing major signs of strain. If Trump keeps abusing and hollowing out the economy, eventually some sort of strain or shock will be able to tip it into crisis.
[I recently did a podcast with Richard Hanania that will be posted in the near future. In preparation, I wrote a post on my book on the Great Depression. Because I’ve been attracting many new readers, I will occasionally sprinkle in posts discussing my views on various issues. Apart from my textbook, I wrote three books on monetary economics. The first and best of the three is a 500-page book on the Depression, entitled The Midas Paradox. Later, I’ll discuss the other two, which most people would find more readable than my Depression book. At the end of this post I have a long postscript on how ChatGPT sees my work, which you should feel free to ignore.]
In an earlier post, I emphasized the complexity of the Great Depression. Here I’ll try to do the opposite, a 2600-word (4 Word pages) summary of the basic idea aimed at an intelligent non-economist. But where to start?
Unfortunately, I need to start at the very beginning—a quick survey of macroeconomics. Yes, that seems like a time waster in an elevator pitch, but if people aren’t on the same wavelength, then the various pieces won’t make intuitive sense. Part 1 will be, ”What is macro?” Part 2 will be an explanation of nominal shocks. And part 3 will look at real shocks.
Part 1: What is macro?
Macro looks at economic aggregates like the price level, real GDP and total employment. There are basically three areas of macroeconomics:
Long run real economic growth
Short run fluctuations in real output and employment.
Changes in nominal aggregates such as the price level and nominal GDP.
Why not four types—including both short and long run nominal changes? After all, if you believe that changes in real output drive inflation and nominal GDP (NGDP) growth, then you’d want to separately consider short and long run nominal changes. But I don’t believe real shocks drive inflation and NGDP, which are determined by monetary policy.
Almost all wages and prices are denominated in money terms, which means that a “nominal” variable is essentially a money variable. Nominal GDP is GDP measured in money terms, while real GDP is GDP measured in physical terms. Just as changing the length of a measuring stick makes objects look bigger or smaller without changing their actual size, changes in the value of money—its purchasing power—can make wages and prices seem higher or lower, without changing their value in real terms.
This so-called classical dichotomy gets us two of the three types of macroeconomics. We can explain nominal variables by looking at the market for money, the supply and demand for money, and we can explain real variables in the long run with a wide range of other factors. Real GDP depends on the working age population, the capital stock, natural resources, technology, and all sorts of institutional factors that influence how effectively the factors of production are used. For several hundred years, real output in the US has trended upward at roughly 3%/year, with some variation (it’s a bit slower now, due to slower population growth.) A post by Timothy Taylor shows a per capita growth rate of about 2%:
By far the most interesting part of macro is short run fluctuations in employment and real output—the business cycle. In theory, you would not expect a significant business cycle in a large and diverse economy such as the US. For instance, there was a major housing slump in the US during 2006 and 2007, but total output (real GDP) continued rising. Due to the “law of large numbers”, it seems unlikely that a simultaneous decline would occur in many different sectors.
But we do see simultaneous declines in many different sectors—they are called recessions, or depressions if unusually severe. This is a puzzle. In my view, the puzzle was solved long ago. In 1923, Irving Fisher argued that the business cycle was largely a “dance of the dollar”, and it appears he was right. The US business cycle is mostly caused by changes in the value of money—changes in its purchasing power. Today, we focus more on another nominal aggregate—fluctuations in nominal GDP (NGDP). But the basic idea is the same.
Why do changes in nominal aggregates cause short run fluctuations in real variables like output and employment? In theory they should not. If NGDP falls in half, then in theory you should see all wages and prices fall in half, with no change in real output. When Mexico did a 100 to 1 currency reform, replacing 100 old pesos with 1 new peso, their nominal GDP immediately fell by 99%. But real GDP and employment were unaffected, as all wages and prices also fell by 99%.
Between 1929 and early 1933, NGDP in the US fell by roughly 50%. So why didn’t all wages and prices also fall by 50%, leaving output and employment unchanged? Why wasn’t this like the Mexican currency reform? The answer is “sticky wages and prices”, which is the key assumption in business cycle theory.
When you replace one type of money with another radically different currency, people understand what has happened and are willing to adjust all wages and prices in proportion. But when smaller and more unpredictable changes in the purchasing power of money occur, wages and prices are slow to reflect this reality. The economy moves into “disequilibrium”, with either labor shortages (as in 2022), or huge labor surpluses (as in 1933.) A surplus of labor is called unemployment. When NGDP fell in half during the early 1930s, wages and prices did move somewhat lower, but the adjustment was far too small to prevent a major fall in output and employment.
You can say that the Great Depression was “caused” by sticky wages and prices, but to me that’s like saying an airplane crash was caused by gravity. Sticky wages and prices are a given, what we need is a monetary policy that stabilizes total nominal spending and income, i.e., a stable path of NGDP. We didn’t have that policy in the early 1930s, and this policy failure resulted in the Great Depression.
Part 2: Why did nominal GDP collapse after 1929?
In the US, we measure almost all prices in terms of a single unit of account, the US dollar. Walmart is free to price its toasters in bitcoin, but they don’t do so because most shoppers find dollars to be more convenient. Dollar bills (and electronic bank reserves) are the medium of account, the specific asset that represents a US dollar. In the early 1930s, there were two media of account, US currency notes and gold. There was a fixed exchange rate between them at $1 = 1/20.67 ounces of gold (which is smaller than a dime).
In 1929, changes in US nominal variables could be modeled in one of two ways, changes in the value of US currency or changes in the value of gold. I found the gold modeling approach to be more useful, as it was a global gold standard and a global depression, so the best explanation needs to look beyond what was happening in the US. For example, the Canadian currency stock fell sharply during the early 1930s. But it’s not useful to think in terms of Canadian monetary policy causing the Canadian Great Depression. Their dollar was also tied to gold, and Canada was an innocent bystander, dragged into depression by monetary disturbances in bigger countries like the US and France, which boosted the global purchasing power of gold.
The US price level fell by roughly 25% during the early 1930s (depending how you measure it.) That means the two media of account (currency and gold) gained much more purchasing power. One ounce of gold could buy a lot more stuff in 1933 than in 1929, as the purchasing power of money is inversely proportional to the price of goods and services. But wages and prices did not fall anywhere near as much as the 50% decline in NGDP and as a result, real output and employment also fell sharply.
In a sense, the economic slump of 1929-33 was caused by a nominal shock—a sharp increase in the value of currency and gold, which depressed spending and output. To explain what “caused” the Great Depression, therefore, we need to explain what caused this nominal shock. Why did the purchasing power of gold rise so sharply during the early 1930s?
Supply and demand is our workhorse model for explaining changes in the value of any good, service, or asset, and gold is no different. Each year, the global supply of gold (the total stock of existing gold) gets a little bit bigger due to the output from gold mines, combined with the fact that very little gold is lost. Gold supply was not the problem.
If there was no decline in the total stock of gold, then any big increase in its value had to be due to an increase in gold demand. (The same is true of Bitcoin.) I argued that the Great Depression was caused by a big increase in gold demand between 1929 and 1933. But it doesn’t take 500 pages to make that simple point. Therefore, I also analyzed the various factors that led to increased gold demand.
During the early 1930s, major central banks held huge reserves of gold, indeed they held most of the gold that had been mined since the beginning of human history. This gold was held as “reserves”, backing up paper money. People could take a $20 bill to the US government and redeem it for roughly an ounce of gold. A typical government might hold a 40% gold reserve ratio—$4 million worth of gold backing up each $10 million in currency. But the gold reserve ratio was not constant. So why did global gold demand rise so sharply during the early 1930s? Three reasons:
Individuals and banks were hoarding currency due to fear of bank failures, and more gold was needed in reserve to back up this extra currency demand.
Central banks also hoarded gold, by increasing their gold reserve ratios. They became “cautious”, which individually might make sense but at the global level was counterproductive.
Individuals hoarded gold in fear of currency devaluation, especially after countries such as Britain and German left the gold standard in 1931.
The decision of people, banks, and governments to hoard gold was often prudent at an individual level, but socially destructive. The first year of the Depression is the easiest to explain, as it was almost entirely caused by central bank gold hoarding—a higher gold reserve ratio—especially in the US, France and the UK. In each case the motivation for hoarding was complex and it differed from one country to another. After late 1930, bank failures increased and people began hoarding more currency. After mid-1931, private gold hoarding began increasing due to devaluation fears.
In the early 1930s, there was an almost perfect storm of bad luck and bad decision-making, which is why “Great Depressions” are so rare. When you look at other theories of the Great Depression, they generally imply that huge depressions should happen quite often, but they don’t. Thus the 1987 stock market crash was almost identical in size to the late 1929 stock crash but had no measurable impact on the broader economy. The stock crash didn’t cause the depression.
In late 1937, there was a smaller (but still sizable) secondary depression, partly caused by a renewed bout of gold hoarding. You can think of 1929-33 and 1937-38 as the two parts of the Depression that were caused by adverse nominal shocks. Gold hoarding increased for a variety of complex reasons, and this led to lower NGDP and a lower price level. Because nominal wages are slow to adjust, falling NGDP generally leads to much higher unemployment and lower real output, at least in the short run.
Part 3: Counterproductive wage policies
Both President Hoover and President Roosevelt misdiagnosed the Depression. But Roosevelt’s policies were more successful. That’s because while both had counterproductive labor market policies, Roosevelt had an expansionary monetary (gold) policy.
Although wages were “sticky” (slow to adjust) during pre-WWII depressions, workers eventually would accept wage cuts. After 1929, however, Hoover pressured large corporations to refrain from their usual nominal wage cuts, and thus wages were even stickier than during the previous depression of 1920-21. Hoover probably thought that stable wages would help to maintain aggregate demand (NGDP), but in fact the policy reduced aggregate supply, as companies laid off workers when prices fell below the cost of production.
After taking office in March 1933, Roosevelt gradually devalued the dollar, from 1/20.67 ounces of gold to 1/35 ounces in early 1934. To use the analogy at the beginning of this post, this is like making the measuring stick smaller, in order to make all objects you measure appear larger. Normally, that would be pointless, as nothing changes in real terms. But when wages and prices are sticky, a less valuable dollar leads to more output and employment.
By March 1933, industrial production had fallen to roughly one half of its pre-depression level. Just 4 months later, industrial production had risen by 57%, regaining over half of the ground lost during the previous 4 years. That brief boomlet was mostly due to dollar depreciation. If that had been Roosevelt’s only policy, the Depression likely would have ended within a couple more years. Instead, Roosevelt took other (counterproductive) actions, and the Depression dragged on until 1941.
Like Hoover, Roosevelt believed that higher wages would boost aggregate demand. He was confusing cause and effect. Yes, wages often decline somewhat in a deep slump. But that’s an effect of the depression, not the cause. Rich people often have Rolls Royces. But buying a Rolls Royce makes you poorer.
In mid-July 1933, Roosevelt issued a proclamation that essentially forced employers to raise nominal wages by 20% almost overnight. The explosive economic recovery immediately ground to a halt, and by the time the Supreme Court declared this policy unconstitutional in May 1935, industrial production was actually lower than in July 1933. But the Supreme Court was doing Roosevelt a favor, as industrial production immediately began rising rapidly after the Orwellian named National Industrial Recovery Act was rejected by the Court. (Will our Supreme Court do Trump a similar favor on tariffs?)
In my book, I discussed no less than five different wage shocks imposed by the Roosevelt administration, each of which led to a pause in the recovery. If we view Roosevelt as a successful president (and in many ways he was), it’s mostly because he followed the truly abysmal Hoover administration. The economy during the first 8 years of the Roosevelt administration was not good, just less bad than under Hoover.
What are the policy lessons?
I am most interested in the public policy implications of economic history. What can we learn from what went wrong? If a feasible public policy X would have prevented the Great Depression, then not doing X can be seen as causing the Depression. And that’s true whether we are considering errors of commission or errors of omission.
During and after the Depression, the gold standard was gradually weakened, before being phased out entirely in March 1968. Today, we no longer need to worry about gold hoarding causing a depression. When there is currency hoarding, the central bank can now meet the extra demand by supplying additional fiat currency. And US government no longer uses wage policies in the aggressive fashion employed by Hoover and Roosevelt. Yes, we technically have a $7.25 federal minimum wage, but it’s largely meaningless. In many states, wages are now set by the market.
Monetary policy continues to be more erratic than I would like. It was much too contractionary in 2008-09 and much too expansionary in 2021-22. Even so, it has become more stable than earlier in US history. That’s why we haven’t seen a repeat of the Great Depression.
PS. George Selgin’s new book False Dawn does an excellent job explaining how some parts of the New Deal actually slowed the recovery.
PPS. I asked ChatGPT 5.0 a few questions about the topics examined in The Midas Paradox. My questions are in italics, the rest is all ChatGPT. Ignore the unreadable equation in section 1:
During the early 1930s, the US (and global) price level fell by roughly 25%. That meant that the purchasing power of gold rose by roughly a third. Could the global deflation of 1929-33 be explained by a model of the supply and demand for gold? If so, what are the key factors that impacted the global gold market? Gold supply? Or gold demand?
Yes — the global deflation of 1929-33 can be explained quite well by a supply-and-demand for monetary gold framework.
This is exactly the type of story economists like Milton Friedman & Anna Schwartz, Barry Eichengreen, and Hugh Rockoff have told: the gold standard worked like a fixed-money-supply system, and shocks to the gold market transmitted directly into the world price level.
1. Why the gold market matters under the interwar gold standard
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, most major economies were on the gold standard.
Each unit of domestic currency was defined as a fixed weight of gold, and central banks stood ready to exchange gold for currency at that fixed rate.
This meant the nominal money supply was effectively tied to the world’s monetary gold stock.
The global price level was determined by:
P∝Gold StockGold Demand (monetary)P \propto \frac{\text{Gold Stock}}{\text{Gold Demand (monetary)}}P∝Gold Demand (monetary)Gold Stock
If monetary demand for gold rose faster than supply, the price level had to fall — i.e., deflation.
2. What happened, 1929–33
Gold supply
Physical gold production was sluggish. World gold mining output was growing at less than 2% per year — far too slow to offset big swings in demand.
There were no major new discoveries or technological leaps in gold extraction in this period.
This meant supply was basically fixed in the short run.
Gold demand (monetary)
Demand soared for several reasons:
Central bank hoarding
The U.S. Federal Reserve and especially the Bank of France sharply increased their gold reserves after 1928.
France, after stabilizing the franc in 1926, revalued to gold at a deliberately low franc price, running huge current account surpluses and sucking in gold from the rest of the world.
The U.S. also built up reserves as part of its tight-money policy in 1928–29 to curb stock market speculation.
This removed gold from circulation elsewhere — functioning like a global monetary contraction.
Fear of devaluation and bank failures
As banking crises spread (1929–33), both central banks and private actors increased precautionary gold holdings.
Countries on the gold standard had to defend their pegs, so they sometimes raised interest rates to keep gold from flowing out — further increasing deflationary pressure.
The collapse of the gold–exchange standard
In the 1920s, countries could hold foreign exchange (sterling or dollars) as reserves instead of gold.
After the U.K. left gold in September 1931, sterling balances were suddenly risky; many central banks converted them into gold.
This shift from holding “paper reserves” to holding actual gold spiked demand dramatically.
3. Putting it together
Gold supply: Flat, inelastic in the short run.
Gold demand: Huge spike due to policy (hoarding by major central banks), collapse of confidence in foreign exchange reserves, and financial panic.
Result: The real value of gold (1/P) had to rise sharply — which is the same as saying the price level P had to fall.
A roughly 25% drop in world prices is entirely consistent with a ~33% rise in the purchasing power of gold given the scale of the demand shift.
4. Key lesson
Under the interwar gold standard, gold demand shocks — especially central bank reserve policy changes — dominated short-run price level movements.
The 1929–33 deflation was overwhelmingly a demand-for-gold shock, not a supply-of-gold shock.
If you’d like, I can make a simple gold market diagram showing how the demand shift in 1929–33 explains the entire deflation episode visually. That makes the mechanism very intuitive.
Thanks. That answer seems very close to the model in The Midas Paradox by Scott Sumner. Have you studied that text?
Yes — your question and my answer line up very closely with Scott Sumner’s The Midas Paradox.
That book essentially takes the supply-and-demand for gold model you just described and uses it to reinterpret both the Great Contraction (1929–33) and the partial recovery (1933–38). In Sumner’s framework:
· 1929–33: A huge positive shock to monetary demand for gold (France, U.S., and others hoarding reserves, plus the collapse of the gold–exchange standard) drives a massive deflation.
· 1933 onward: Currency devaluations and gold inflows reduce gold demand and expand the effective money supply, fueling recovery — though he also highlights demand shocks in 1937–38 that reversed the process temporarily.
He ties this directly to asset market signals (stock prices, commodity prices, forward exchange rates) as indicators of expected monetary conditions — making it a blend of gold-market analysis and market expectations theory.
In other words, if you take a textbook supply–demand diagram for monetary gold, and then overlay it with policy decisions and credibility shifts, you’ve basically got The Midas Paradox’s core mechanism.
Do you want me to outline how Sumner formalizes that gold market model mathematically? It’s even cleaner when you write it in equations.
Me again: Chat’s answer did not correctly describe Milton Friedman’s view of the gold standard, it described my views. This is the second time that ChatGPT attributed ideas to Friedman that are actually my own. I could be annoyed, but I choose instead to be flattered.
Source: Conference Board via Haver Analytics
Americans are in a deep funk over the state of the economy. The chart above shows consumer confidence as estimated by The Conference Board from January 2022 to the end of October 2025. Early 2022 marked the beginning of the worst period of post-Covid inflation. Since then inflation has fallen dramatically -- from 9 percent in June 2022 to 3 percent now. But consumer sentiment fell sharply in late 2024, rose a bit during the summer, and is now falling sharply again. If one word can summarize Americans’ economic anxiety, it is “affordability.”
This is the third primer in a series on affordability. It was intended to be the last, but as I’ve discovered, there is so much to the topic that there will be a fourth installment next week. Much of the public’s concern about affordability stems from the simple fact that prices are considerably higher than they were 5 years ago. But that simple view obscures some important and subtle factors. In the first installment I discussed reasons why Americans are anxious about affordability even though conventional economic measures (such as real wages) indicate that most Americans’ purchasing power is higher now than it was before the pandemic. I also covered why conventional economic measures of purchasing power are probably deficient in capturing people’s economic reality.
In the second installment I argued that perceptions of affordability are shaped by considerations that go beyond purchasing power: economic inclusion, economic security, and perceptions of fairness.
In this third installment I will sketch out elements of a policy agenda to address Americans’ affordability concerns. Realistically, this can only be a Democratic agenda because Donald Trump and the MAGA Republicans refuse to acknowledge that there is a problem. In his Tuesday speech, the kick-off event of his “Affordability Tour”, Trump declared that affordability is a “hoax” and that “prices are coming down very substantially.” On Thursday Republicans in Congress flatly rejected a proposal to extend federal subsidies for health insurance, which would have averted a severe shock to affordability that will hit tens of millions of Americans at the end of this month. And anyone who protests this denial, like Marjorie Taylor Greene, quickly finds a target on their backs. In lockstep with Trump, the G.O.P. is in denial over Americans’ affordability concerns.
So this raises the question: What can and should Democrats promise to do to address affordability?
Beyond the paywall I’ll address the following:
1. What policy can’t do: During the 2024 campaign Trump promised to bring the overall level of prices way down; now he’s falsely claiming that he is in fact doing so. In reality, overall prices can’t be reduced substantially, and it would be a big mistake to try.
2. Undoing Trump’s damage: Policy can’t achieve a large decline in overall prices. It can, however, limit and in some cases reduce individual prices. To an important extent this can be achieved simply by reversing destructive Trump policies.
3. Beyond Trump: Much of an effective affordability agenda can consist simply of ending Trump’s destructive policies. But there’s still a lot more that can and should be done.
This will be a sketch, not a detailed policy manifesto. The broad message is that we should accept the things we can’t change — prices are not going back to 2019 levels — but try to change the many things we can in ways that are positive for the American people.
And in the fourth and final entry in this series I’ll get into issues that go beyond prices and real wages: Social inclusion, economic security and fairness.
Copywriters reveal how AI has decimated their industry
Brian Merchant has been collecting personal stories for his series AI Killed My Job - previously covering tech workers, translators, and artists - and this latest piece includes anecdotes from 12 professional copywriters all of whom have had their careers devastated by the rise of AI-generated copywriting tools.It's a tough read. Freelance copywriting does not look like a great place to be right now.
AI is really dehumanizing, and I am still working through issues of self-worth as a result of this experience. When you go from knowing you are valuable and valued, with all the hope in the world of a full career and the ability to provide other people with jobs... To being relegated to someone who edits AI drafts of copy at a steep discount because “most of the work is already done” ...
The big question for me is if a new AI-infested economy creates new jobs that are a great fit for people affected by this. I would hope that clear written communication skills are made even more valuable, but the people interviewed here don't appear to be finding that to be the case.
Tags: copywriting, careers, ai, ai-ethics
If the part of programming you enjoy most is the physical act of writing code, then agents will feel beside the point. You’re already where you want to be, even just with some Copilot or Cursor-style intelligent code auto completion, which makes you faster while still leaving you fully in the driver’s seat about the code that gets written.
But if the part you care about is the decision-making around the code, agents feel like they clear space. They take care of the mechanical expression and leave you with judgment, tradeoffs, and intent. Because truly, for someone at my experience level, that is my core value offering anyway. When I spend time actually typing code these days with my own fingers, it feels like a waste of my time.
— Obie Fernandez, What happens when the coding becomes the least interesting part of the work
Tags: careers, ai-assisted-programming, generative-ai, ai, llms
Chris Giles writes in the FT:
The main periods of measurement error came in the austerity years of 2012 to 2014, in 2017 during the early period after the Brexit referendum and in recent post-pandemic years. The truth is that a huge pessimistic bias in our national accounts has led us to be fed with contemporary reports of doom and gloom, which subsequently turn out to be nonsense.
But it is the first version of economic events that enters the national debate — and the national consciousness — for the entirely understandable reason that initial releases of economic data make news. You cannot expect people to care deeply about a revision to data that is three years old. Psychologically, they have made up their mind by then.
We are still told that 2010s austerity destroyed growth, but the data no longer supports that story: growth between David Cameron’s election victories of 2010 and 2015 now registers an annualised average of 2 per cent.
Somehow I am not seeing people jumping all over this story? Is it even correct? I have not seen anyone refute or counter it. Here is the analysis from 5.2 Pro, largely confirming, though it suggests 1.8% to 1.9% is a better estimate than 2%. I am very open to alternative points of view here, but at the moment it appears the correct stance was a) the British economic problems were largely structural and would not just be fixed by an aggregate demand boost, and b) fiscal consolidation was necessary, and while done imperfectly, not a disaster relative to the alternatives available.
The dust has not yet settled, but perhaps most of you were basically just wrong on this one?
The post How bad was British “austerity” anyway? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
From Valentine Figuroa of MIT:
Ongoing advances in machine learning are expanding opportunities to analyze large-scale visual data. In historical political economy, paintings from museums and private collections represent an untapped source of information. Before computational methods can be applied, however, it is essential to establish a framework for assessing what information paintings encode and under what assumptions it can be interpreted. This article develops such a framework, drawing on the enduring concerns of the traditional humanities. I describe three applications using a database of 25,000 European paintings from 1000CE to the First World War. Each application targets a distinct type of information conveyed in paintings (depicted content, communicative intent, and incidental information) and a cultural transformation of the early-modern period. The first revisits the notion of a European “civilizing process”—the internalization of stricter norms of behavior that occurred in tandem with the growth of state power—by examining whether paintings of meals show increasingly complex etiquette. The second analyzes portraits to study how political elites shaped their public image, highlighting a long-term shift from chivalric to more rational-bureaucratic representations of men. The third documents a long-term process of secularization, measured by the share of religious paintings, which began prior to the Reformation and accelerated afterward.
Here is the link, via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
The post Art as Data in Political History appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
A Chinese billionaire was seeking parental rights to at least four unborn children, and the court’s additional research showed that he had already fathered or was in the process of fathering at least eight more—all through surrogates.
When Pellman called Xu Bo in for a confidential hearing in the summer of 2023, he never entered the courtroom, according to people who attended the hearing. The maker of fantasy videogames lived in China and appeared via video, speaking through an interpreter. He said he hoped to have 20 or so U.S.-born children through surrogacy—boys, because they’re superior to girls—to one day take over his business.
Several of his kids were being raised by nannies in nearby Irvine as they awaited paperwork to travel to China. He hadn’t yet met them, he told the judge, because work had been busy…
Some Chinese parents, inspired by Elon Musk’s 14 known children, pay millions in surrogacy fees to hire women in the U.S. to help them build families of jaw-dropping size. Xu calls himself “China’s first father” and is known in China as a vocal critic of feminism. On social media, his company said he has more than 100 children born through surrogacy in the U.S.
Another wealthy Chinese executive, Wang Huiwu, hired U.S. models and others as egg donors to have 10 girls, with the aim of one day marrying them off to powerful men, according to people close to the executive’s education company.
…“Elon Musk is becoming a role model now,” said Zhang. An increasing number of “crazy rich” clients are commissioning dozens, or even hundreds, of U.S.-born babies with the goal of “forging an unstoppable family dynasty,” he said.
Here is the full WSJ article.
Addendum: In the comments Gilligan writes: “On the positive side, we will be able to tax the heirs’ world wide income for the rest of their natural lives.”
The post China fertility facts of the day appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
Slept long to-day till Sir J. Minnes and Sir W. Batten were set out towards Portsmouth before I rose, and Sir G. Carteret came to the office to speak with me before I was up. So I started up and down to him. By and by we sat, Mr. Coventry and I (Sir G. Carteret being gone), and among other things, Field and Stint did come, and received the 41l. given him by the judgement against me and Harry Kem;1 and we did also sign bonds in 500l. to stand to the award of Mr. Porter and Smith for the rest: which, however, I did not sign to till I got Mr. Coventry to go up with me to Sir W. Pen; and he did promise me before him to bear his share in what should be awarded, and both concluded that Sir W. Batten would do no less. At noon broke up and dined with my wife, and then to the office again, and there made an end of last night’s examination, and got my study there made very clean and put in order, and then to write by the post, among other letters one to Sir W. Batten about this day’s work with Field, desiring his promise also. The letter I have caused to be entered in our public book of letters. So home to supper and to bed.
Footnotes
Links for you. Science:
The collapse of Maya civilization: Drought doesn’t explain everything
Long-read metagenomics reveals phage dynamics in the human gut microbiome
Heteromultivalent Nanogels as Highly Potent Inhibitors of Pseudomonas Aeruginosa
A spine-tingling discovery: This dinosaur had spiked body armor
Trump won’t last forever. Here’s what it will take to rebuild what he’s tearing down
AI unreliable in identifying retracted research papers, says study
Other:
For the first time in US history, the GOP is intentionally uninsuring millions of Americans
87% of execs are using AI on the job, compared with just 27% of employees (this suggests executives could be replaced by AI?)
An investor called $140,000 the new poverty line. Experts disagreed but said he had a point.
Price Patrol: What a 100-item price check reveals about inflation six months later
China’s Biotech Is Cheaper and Faster
Make Money Not War: Trump’s Real Plan for Peace in Ukraine
Sen. Greg Walker declines Oval Office visit, accuses White House of violating Hatch Act
The Quick and Shameful Death of Biden’s Biggest Policy. It was far too easy for Republicans to kill the Inflation Reduction Act. Where did those who crafted it go wrong?
Fewer killings, more arrests: D.C. homicide closures spiked this year
A Tribute to an Oracle, Alice Wong
He reunited families separated under Trump. Now he’s running for Congress.
Can We Opt Out of Facial Recognition Technology?
Uncensored and unbound: This DC listserv has survived social media and snark
For Voters in Kentucky, Trump Is Losing His Luster
The mind behind ‘Knives Out’ keeps pumping out capers. Here’s his secret.
Zohran Mamdani’s Pragmatic Socialism Is Paying Off—for Now
Trump Again Funneling Money From Political Committees He Runs Into His Own Pocket
‘The government is subsidizing corporate profits’: Who employs the most SNAP recipients in Massachusetts?
The truth about Trump is sinking in for his MAGA followers
‘Slop Evader’ Lets You Surf the Web Like It’s 2022
Usha Vance doesn’t do dishes — so why the wedding ring excuse?
Trump feels conflicted about the grown men he can’t intimidate
Charlie Kirk’s death is tearing MAGA apart
Trump’s breakup with Greene is Trump’s breakup with MAGA
The Trump train — and its conductor — are losing steam
I Suppose He Could Still Have Him Murdered At Sea
Elon Musk’s beloved DOGE has closed. But its legacy is deadly
America’s Polarization Has Become the World’s Side Hustle
The Fabulous Fern Bar
These Scam Centers Were Blown Up. Was It All for Show?
Building a cohesive nation-state amid deep ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity is a central challenge for many governments. This paper examines the process of nation building, drawing lessons from the remarkable experience of Indonesia over the past century. I discuss conceptual perspectives on nation building and review Indonesia’s historical nation-building trajectory. I then synthesize insights from four studies exploring distinct policy interventions in Indonesia—population resettlement, administrative unit proliferation, land reform, and mass schooling—to understand their effects on social cohesion and national integration. Together, these cases underscore the promise and pitfalls of nation-building efforts in diverse societies, offering guidance for future research and policymaking to support these endeavors in Indonesia and beyond.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Samuel Bazzi. As I have noted in the past, Indonesia remains a remarkably understudied and also undervisited country (Bali aside), so efforts in this direction should be appreciated.
The post Building a cohesive Indonesia appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
Click on graph for larger image.
Welcome to the reading list, a weekly roundup of news and links related to buildings, infrastructure, and industrial technology. This week we look at Boom Supersonic’s gas turbine, the reliability of learning curves, a fake bridge collapse, using coal mines for geothermal energy, and more. Roughly 2/3rds of the reading list is paywalled, so for full access become a paid subscriber.
Supersonic jet startup Boom Supersonic, which we’ve previously talked about, announced this week that they’re going to be using their engine technology to build gas turbines to help power the AI boom. From Tom’s Hardware:
The Superpower turbine is purportedly “optimized for AI datacenters,” a claim boiled down to delivering its full 42 MW with 39% efficiency, at an operating temperature up to a toasty 110° F (43° C). Judging by a quick search, that’s significantly higher than contemporary designs, whose output drops at around 86° F (30° C), if not much sooner—and precisely when it’s most needed, when servers are working the hardest.
Boom says it’s taken an order for its new design from Crusoe AI for a substantial 1.21 GW of turbines. The company says it builds everything in Denver, Colorado, and that it intends to create a Superfactory for this new enterprise. Boom expects to deliver 200 MW worth of turbines by 2027, 1 GW in 2028, and up to a meaty 2 GW come 2029. Crusoe ordered 29 units, and the first of them ought to be delivered in 2027.
You can read a Twitter thread from Boom’s founder Blake Scholl on the turbine here.
I have a few thoughts on this. On the one hand, it’s not crazy to use a jet engine as the basis for a ground-based turbine power plant. These sorts of turbines, called aeroderivatives, already exist. It also doesn’t seem impossible that the sales from this could help fund their broader supersonic jet project: because demand for power is so high, there’s a huge backlog of orders at existing turbine manufacturers, which Boom could conceivably capitalize on. Lots of folks thus seem enthusiastic about this development.
However, it also seems like dividing focus like this might make it harder for Boom to achieve it’s ultimate goal of a supersonic airliner. There’s also the uncomfortable fact that Boom hasn’t actually built their jet engine yet: they originally planned to have the engine core (compressor, combustor, and turbine) completed by the end of this year, but that’s now been pushed to 2026. Boom has a very long history of missing delivery dates, so taking on a goal that seems like it would make it harder to meet their delivery dates seems less than ideal.
Overall, I think the ratio of hype to actual progress at Boom is still way too high.
Mike Bird, a journalist at the Economist, has a new book out about land, “The Land Trap”, which “reveals how this ancient asset still exerts outsize influence over the modern world”. Lars Doucet, who wrote his own book about land, and who writes about land economics at his substack, Progress and Poverty, has a good review of it:
Mike Bird, writer for the Economist, has written an excellent book called The Land Trap, whose basic premise is that land is a big deal. If you’ve read my own book on that subject you’ll find many parallels in Bird’s, but his book has a second purpose. That purpose is to warn us of the titular Land Trap, which I expect will join other established terms like “Cost Disease,” “The Two-Income Trap”, and “The Resource Curse” in the economic lexicon.
The book can be summarized in five bullet points and one fun fact.
The five bullet points are:
Land is a big deal, and always has been
Land has only recently been financialized
Financializing land causes “The Land Trap”
It has short term benefits but devastating long term consequences
China serves as a perfect example of what not to do
The fun fact is this:
Fiat currency isn’t backed by nothing, as commonly supposed, but by land.
As I’ve noted both in this newsletter and in my book, learning curves — the observation that costs tend to fall by some constant percentage for every doubling of cumulative production — are an important vehicle by which things get cheaper over time. I’ve previously noted that in practice learning curves can be somewhat messy, and display a lot of variation (which gets somewhat concealed by the log-log plot used to display them). Now a new paper analyzes a bunch of historical learning curves, and finds that past learning curve performance is not predictive of future learning curve performance. From the abstract:
Climate and energy policy analysts and researchers often forecast the cost of low-carbon energy technologies using Wright’s model of technological innovation. The learning rate, i.e., the percentage cost reduction per doubling of cumulative production, is assumed constant in this model. Here, we analyze the relationship between cost and scale of production for 87 technologies in the Performance Curve Database spanning multiple sectors. We find that stepwise changes in learning rates provide a better fit for 58 of these technologies and produce forecasts with equal or significantly lower errors compared to constant learning rates for 36 and 30 technologies, respectively. While costs generally decrease with increasing production, past learning rates are not good predictors of future learning rates. We show that these results affect technological change projections in the short and long term, focusing on three key mitigation technologies: solar photovoltaics, wind power, and lithium-ion batteries. We suggest that investment in early-stage technologies nearing cost-competitiveness, combined with techno-economic analysis and decision-making under uncertainty methods, can help mitigate the impact of uncertainty in projections of future technology cost.
I’ve only skimmed this paper so far, but I plan on looking at it more closely for a future newsletter.
An underappreciated load-bearing aspect of modern civilization is that most people, most of the time, will act in pro-social ways. We most notice this in its absence, when this assumed pro-social behavior breaks down and things require (or are perceived to require) heavy oversight to prevent anti-social behavior, such as security screening at airports or when retail stores need to lock up their goods because of shoplifting concerns. But for most aspects of daily life, these sorts of interventions aren’t necessary.
One risk of AI is that it will dramatically reduce the cost of certain types of anti-social behavior, and empower the small fraction of folks who want to engage in it. One risk that lots of people are concerned about is using AI to create engineered pandemics, but it’s certainly not the only one.
In that vein, here’s a story about someone using AI to create a fake image of a bridge collapse, causing trains to get delayed:
Trains were halted after a suspected AI-generated picture that seemed to show major damage to a bridge appeared on social media following an earthquake.
The tremor, which struck on Wednesday night, was felt across Lancashire and the southern Lake District.
Network Rail said it was made aware of the image which appeared to show major damage to Carlisle Bridge in Lancaster at 00:30 GMT and stopped rail services across the bridge while safety inspections were carried out.
A BBC journalist ran the image through an AI chatbot which identified key spots that may have been manipulated.
Network Rail said the railway line was fully reopened at around 02:00 GMT and it has urged people to “think about the serious impact it could have” before creating or sharing hoax images.

As the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Agreement and skipped COP30 for the first time in history, the rest of the world surged ahead on climate action. China, now the industrial engine of global decarbonization, is driving explosive growth in solar, wind, and EV adoption across the Global South. With America turning inward, global leadership is shifting — politically, economically, and technologically — toward nations prepared to build the clean-energy future.
As the year comes to a close, 2025 looks like a turning point in the world’s fight against climate change. Most conspicuously, it was the year the U.S. abandoned the effort. The Trump administration pulled out of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which unites virtually all the world’s countries in a voluntary commitment to halt climate change. And for the first time in the 30-year history of the U.N.’s international climate talks, the U.S. did not send a delegation to the annual conference, COP30, which took place in Belém, Brazil.
The Trump administration’s assault on climate action has been far from symbolic. Over the summer, the president pressed his Republican majority in Congress to gut a Biden-era law that was projected to cut U.S. emissions by roughly a third compared to their peak, putting the country within reach of its Paris Agreement commitments. In the fall, Trump officials used hardball negotiating tactics to stall, if not outright derail, a relatively uncontroversial international plan to decarbonize the heavily polluting global shipping industry. And even though no other country has played a larger role in causing climate change, the U.S. under Trump has cut the vast majority of global climate aid funding, which is intended to help countries that are in the crosshairs of climate change despite doing virtually nothing to cause it.
It may come as no surprise, then, that other world leaders took barely veiled swipes at Trump at the COP30 climate talks last month. Christiana Figueres, a key architect of the 2015 Paris Agreement and a longtime Costa Rican diplomat, summed up a common sentiment.
“Ciao, bambino! You want to leave, leave,” she said before a crowd of reporters, using an Italian phrase that translates “bye-bye, little boy.”
These stark shifts in the U.S. position on climate change, which President Donald Trump has called a “hoax” and “con job,” are only the latest and most visible signs of a deeper shift underway. Historically, the U.S. and other wealthy, high-emitting nations have been cast as the primary drivers of climate action, both because of their outsize responsibility for the crisis and because of the greater resources at their disposal. Over the past decade, however, the hopes that developed countries will prioritize financing both the global energy transition and adaptation measures to protect the world’s most vulnerable countries have been dashed — in part by rightward lurches in domestic politics, external crises like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and revolts by wealthy-country voters over cost-of-living concerns.
The resulting message to developing countries has been unmistakable: Help is not on the way.
In the vacuum left behind, a different engine of global climate action has emerged, one not political or diplomatic but industrial. A growing marketplace of green technologies — primarily solar, wind, and batteries — has made the adoption of renewable energy far faster and more cost-effective than almost anyone predicted. The world has dramatically exceeded expectations for solar power generation in particular, producing roughly 8 times more last year than in 2015, when the Paris Agreement was signed.
China is largely responsible for the breakneck pace of clean energy growth. It now produces about 60 percent of the world’s wind turbines and 80 percent of solar panels. In the first half of 2025, the country added more than twice as much new solar capacity as the rest of the world combined. As a result of these Chinese-led global energy market changes and other countries’ Paris Agreement pledges, the world is now on a path to see 2.3 to 2.5 degrees Celsius (4.1 to 4.5 degrees Fahrenheit) of warming by 2100, compared to preindustrial temperatures, far lower than the roughly 5 degrees C (9 degrees F) projections expected just 10 years ago.
These policies can be viewed as a symbol of global cooperation on climate change, but for Chinese leadership, the motivation is primarily economic. That, experts say, may be why they’re working. China’s policies are driving much of the rest of the world’s renewable energy growth. As the cost of solar panels and wind turbines drops year over year, it is enabling other countries, especially in the Global South, to choose cleaner sources of electricity over fossil fuels — and also to purchase some of the world’s cheapest mass-produced electric vehicles. Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia are all expected to see massive increases in solar deployment in the next few years, thanks to their partnerships with Chinese firms.
“China is going to, over time, create a new narrative and be a much more important driver for global climate action,” said Li Shuo, director of the China climate hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Shuo said that the politics-and-rhetoric-driven approach to solving climate change favored by wealthy countries has proved unreliable and largely failed. In its place, a Chinese-style approach that aligns countries’ economic agendas with decarbonization will prove to be more successful, he predicted.
Meanwhile, many countries have begun reorganizing their diplomatic and economic relationships in ways that no longer assume American leadership. That shift accelerated this year in part due to Trump’s decisions to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, to impose tariffs on U.S. allies, and more broadly, to slink away into self-imposed isolation. European countries facing punishing tariffs have looked to deepen trade relationships with China, Japan, and other Asian countries. The EU’s new carbon border tax, which applies levies to imports from outside the bloc, will take effect in January. The move was once expected to trigger conflict between the EU and U.S., but is now proceeding without outright support — or strong opposition — from the Trump administration.
African countries, too, are asserting leadership. The continent hosted its own climate summit earlier this year, pledging to raise $50 billion to promote at least 1,000 locally led solutions in energy, agriculture, water, transport, and resilience by 2030. “The continent has moved the conversation from crisis to opportunity, from aid to investment, and from external prescription to African-led,” said Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, chairperson of the African Union Commission. “We have embraced the powerful truth [that] Africa is not a passive recipient of climate solutions, but the actor and architect of these solutions.”
The U.S. void has also allowed China to throw more weight around in international climate negotiations. Although Chinese leadership remained cautious and reserved in the negotiation halls in Belém, the country pushed its agenda on one issue in particular: trade. Since China has invested heavily in renewable energy technology, tariffs on its products could hinder not only its own economic growth but also the world’s energy transition. As a result the final agreement at COP30, which like all other United Nations climate agreements is ultimately non-binding, included language stipulating that unilateral trade measures like tariffs “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”
Calling out tariffs on the first page of the final decision at COP30 would not have been possible if negotiators for the United States had been present, according to Shuo. “China was able to force this issue on the agenda,” he said.
But Shuo added that other countries are still feeling the gravitational pull of U.S. policies, even as the Trump administration sat out climate talks this year. In Belém last month, the United States’ opposition to the International Maritime Organization’s carbon framework influenced conversations about structuring rules for decarbonizing the shipping industry. And knowing that the U.S. wouldn’t contribute to aid funds shaped climate finance agreements.
In the years to come, though, those pressures may very well fade. As the world pivots in response to a U.S. absence, it may find it has more to gain than expected.
Story originally published by Grist on December 12, 2025
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The post 2025: The Year the US Gave Up On Climate, and the World Gave Up On Us appeared first on DCReport.org.
1. Polygenic overlap across psychiatric disorders?
2. Did humans make fire earlier than we had thought?
3. “In Development is a new magazine dedicated to exploring how progress actually happens in the developing world. We publish narrative-driven essays on ideas, policies, and technologies that have the possibility to, or are already, improving global well-being.” A call for pitches.
5. How to revive biopharma productivity.
6. In the NBA, the average 2-point shot attempt now has higher yield than a three-pointer.
The post Saturday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
Eric Holcomb taught a seminar at Harvard after stepping down as governor of Indiana. He reports that he expected to find a woke hell, but instead found a thriving university. He attributes that in part to President Trump's war on American universities in general and on Harvard in particular.
I was a red state governor. What I saw at Harvard surprised me.
The spirit of association remains alive in unexpected places. By Eric Holcomb
Eric Holcomb, a Republican, was the governor of Indiana from 2017 to 2025.
"In January, I completed two terms as governor of Indiana. This fall, I did what all red state Republicans do (right?): spent a semester teaching at Harvard University. As someone who believes that restoring our communities is among America’s greatest challenges, my goal was to see if the foundation of an open-minded, problem-solving community still existed in a place far removed from my own cultural comfort zone. It does.
...
"I found a community that didn’t always agree but could still talk with each other and work together toward the greater good, which in Harvard’s case includes education, discovery and the development of ideas and technologies.
...
"What I’ve experienced may be a natural return to Harvard’s more moderate bearings, following noisy displays of intolerance by campus agitators in recent years. Or it may be due to the Trump administration’s forceful executive orders and fiscal pressure. Either way (and it’s probably both), let’s take the win and learn the broader lesson."

SpaceX’s chief financial officer has confirmed the company is considering an initial public offering as soon as next year to raise money for projects such as orbital data centers.
The post SpaceX executive confirms interest in an IPO appeared first on SpaceNews.
Weekly sponsorships have been the top source of revenue for Daring Fireball ever since I started selling them back in 2007. They’ve succeeded, I think, because they make everyone happy. They generate good money. There’s only one sponsor per week and the sponsors are always relevant to at least some sizable portion of the DF audience, so you, the reader, are never annoyed and hopefully often intrigued by them. And, from the sponsors’ perspective, they work. My favorite thing about them is how many sponsors return for subsequent weeks after seeing the results.
After a solid run in the second half of 2025 with sponsorships sold out weeks, if not months, in advance, we’ve arrived at the end of the year with the last three weeks still open — starting this coming Monday. I’m offering those weeks at a discount.
Traffic at DF tends not to ebb over holidays, and while I slow down, I don’t stop posting. If you still check DF when you’re bored over the holidays, think about how many other people do too.
I’m also booking sponsorships for Q1 2026, and six of those weeks are already sold.
If you’ve got a product or service you think would be of interest to DF’s audience of people obsessed with high quality and good design, get in touch.
Six-minute segment from Amazon’s AWS re:Invent keynote last week:
Payam Mirrashidi, VP, Cloud Systems & Platforms, Apple, explains how AWS Graviton helps improve developer velocity at scale. Hear Swift’s journey from the premier programming language for the Apple ecosystem to adoption by millions of developers around the world building apps for everything from devices to data centers.
(Graviton is AWS’s ARM-in-the-cloud initiative.)
Nothing earth-shaking in this brief presentation, but it’s not often you see an Apple VP on stage at another company’s keynote, or see Apple so very publicly declare their reliance on someone else’s infrastructure. It speaks to Apple and Amazon being more allies than competitors amongst the big tech companies. And of course, you even less often see anyone from Apple speak live on stage at Apple’s own keynotes, which, alas, are no longer live nor on stages.

SpaceX completed its 550th successful booster landing as part of a late night launch from Vandenberg Space Force Station on Saturday.
The Starlink 15-12 mission added another 27 Starlink V2 Mini satellites to SpaceX’s growing megaconstellation of broadband internet satellites in low Earth orbit.
Liftoff from Space Launch Complex 4 East happened Dec. 13, at 9:49 p.m. PST (12:49 a.m. EST / 0549 UTC on Sunday, Dec. 14). The rocket flew on a south-easterly trajectory upon leaving the pad.
SpaceX launched the Starlink 15-12 mission using the Falcon 9 first stage booster with the tail number 1093. This was its ninth flight after flying two missions for the Space Development Agency as well as six prior Starlink missions.
About 8.5 minutes after liftoff, B1093 completed an autonomous landing on the drone ship, ‘Of Course I Still Love You,’ positioned in the Pacific Ocean. This was the 170th landing on this vessel and the 451st landing on a drone ship for SpaceX.
8:30 AM: Employment Report for November. The consensus is for 50,000 jobs added, and for the unemployment rate to be unchanged at 4.4%.
8:30 AM ET: Retail sales for October will be released. The consensus is for a 0.3% increase in retail sales.
10:00 AM: Existing Home Sales for November from the National Association of Realtors (NAR). The consensus is for 4.15 million SAAR, up from 4.10 million.
One of Blue Origin’s oft repeated phrases is that the company is paving a road to space with its New Glenn rocket. The company, established by Amazon founder, Jeff Bezos, is about halfway through creating one important lane in that road: launching national security missions.
During a briefing on the sidelines of the Space Force Association’s annual SpacePower Conference, Lt. Gen. Philip Garrant, Commander of the U.S. Space Force’s Space Systems Command (SSC) confirmed that Blue Origin chose a four-launch path to certify New Glenn to launch missions as part of the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) contract.
The company launched two New Glenn rockets in 2025 and on the second flight successfully recovered the first stage booster, Glenn Stage 1 (GS1).
“So two out of the four have been successful, and we’re working very closely and anticipating a third launch earlier in the new year than later and if that goes well, and they get that fourth one on, I think they’re going to be in fantastic place to become our third certified provider and compete for missions,” Garrant said. “Very pleased with the progress to date.”

In April 2025, SSC announced its selection of Blue Origin alongside SpaceX and United Launch Alliance (ULA) as the three companies most qualified to launch payloads to all of the various orbits needed for the government’s national security payloads.
Officially referred to as NSSL Phase 3 Lane 2, SpaceX won about 60 percent of the missions that will be assigned over the next half decade and ULA won about 40 percent of those missions. Blue Origin meanwhile, as the newest entrant to the orbital launch landscape, will launch seven missions as part of this contract, once certified.
However, once the required certification flights are accomplished, Garrant said there will be data review and other analysis needed before Blue Origin gets the green light to fly national security payloads.
“It’s a collaborative effort with the government and the launch service provider. So absolutely, after the fourth launch, it won’t be like the next day they get certified,” Garrant said. “There’ll be a significant amount of review, but at the same time, we won’t take a long time. If the next two flights go as well as the first two flights go, I anticipate timely and quick certification.”
He noted that while the launch certification system has evolved somewhat over the years, it’s largely the same as it has been for many years.

Speaking at a panel on launch and innovation at the SpacePower conference on Thursday, Tom Martin, Senior Director of National Security Programs at Blue Origin said that he’s hopeful that certification of launch systems can evolve over time.
“As the providers evolve their capabilities, evolve the technology that they’re bringing to the rockets that that certification process is also a little bit more adaptable to onboarding those capabilities,” Martin said.
Blue Origin recently unveiled a super-heavy lift version of its New Glenn, which will have nine BE-4 engines instead of the current seven.
Paris Buttfield-Addison:
A major brick-and-mortar store sold an Apple Gift Card that Apple seemingly took offence to, and locked out my entire Apple ID, effectively bricking my devices and my iCloud Account, Apple Developer ID, and everything associated with it, and I have no recourse. [...]
I am not a casual user. I have literally written the book on Apple development (taking over the Learning Cocoa with Objective-C series, which Apple themselves used to write, for O’Reilly Media, and then 20+ books following that). I help run the longest-running Apple developer event not run by Apple themselves, /dev/world. I have effectively been an evangelist for this company’s technology for my entire professional life. We had an app on the App Store on Day 1 in every sense of the world.
I am asking for a human at Apple to review this case. I suspect an automated fraud flag regarding the bad gift card triggered a nuclear response that frontline support cannot override. I have escalated this through my many friends in WWDR and SRE at Apple, with no success.
I am desperate to resolve this and restore my digital life.
The triggering event, as best he can determine, was his failed attempt to redeem a $500 Apple gift card purchased from a major retail chain. There’s a very active thread on Hacker News about his plight, where Buttfield-Addison himself is commenting. That thread pointed to this description of one form of gift card thievery, in which thieves tamper with the cards in-store to steal the codes, tamper with the code, and then some unsuspecting victim buys the tampered card and the thieves get the credit.
One of the things that most excited me about Anthropic's new Skills mechanism back in October is how easy it looked for other platforms to implement. A skill is just a folder with a Markdown file and some optional extra resources and scripts, so any LLM tool with the ability to navigate and read from a filesystem should be capable of using them. It turns out OpenAI are doing exactly that, with skills support quietly showing up in both their Codex CLI tool and now also in ChatGPT itself.
I learned about this from Elias Judin this morning. It turns out the Code Interpreter feature of ChatGPT now has a new /home/oai/skills folder which you can access simply by prompting:
Create a zip file of /home/oai/skills
I tried that myself and got back this zip file. Here's a UI for exploring its content (more about that tool).

So far they cover spreadsheets, docx and PDFs. Interestingly their chosen approach for PDFs and documents is to convert them to rendered per-page PNGs and then pass those through their vision-enabled GPT models, presumably to maintain information from layout and graphics that would be lost if they just ran text extraction.
Elias shared copies in a GitHub repo. They look very similar to Anthropic's implementation of the same kind of idea, currently published in their anthropics/skills repository.
I tried it out by prompting:
Create a PDF with a summary of the rimu tree situation right now and what it means for kakapo breeding season
Sure enough, GPT-5.2 Thinking started with:
Reading skill.md for PDF creation guidelines
Then:
Searching rimu mast and Kākāpō 2025 breeding status
It took just over eleven minutes to produce this PDF, which was long enough that I had Claude Code for web build me a custom PDF viewing tool while I waited.
Here's ChatGPT's PDF in that tool.

(I am very excited about Kākāpō breeding season this year.)
The reason it took so long is that it was fastidious about looking at and tweaking its own work. I appreciated that at one point it tried rendering the PDF and noticed that the macrons in kākāpō were not supported by the chosen font, so it switched to something else:

Meanwhile, two weeks ago OpenAI's open source Codex CLI tool landed a PR titled feat: experimental support for skills.md. The most recent docs for that are in docs/skills.md.
The documentation suggests that any folder in ~/.codex/skills will be treated as a skill.
I dug around and found the code that generates the prompt that drives the skill system in codex-rs/core/src/skills/render.rs - here's a Gist with a more readable version of that prompt.
I used Claude Opus 4.5's skill authoring skill to create this skill for creating Datasette plugins, then installed it into my Codex CLI skills folder like this:
git clone https://github.com/datasette/skill \
~/.codex/skills/datasette-pluginYou have to run Codex with the --enable skills option. I ran this:
cd /tmp
mkdir datasette-cowsay
cd datasette-cowsay
codex --enable skills -m gpt-5.2Then prompted:
list skills
And Codex replied:
- datasette-plugins — Writing Datasette plugins using Python + pluggy (file: /Users/simon/.codex/skills/datasette-plugin/SKILL.md)
- Discovery — How to find/identify available skills (no SKILL.md path provided in the list)
Then I said:
Write a Datasette plugin in this folder adding a /-/cowsay?text=hello page that displays a pre with cowsay from PyPI saying that text
It worked perfectly! Here's the plugin code it wrote and here's a copy of the full Codex CLI transcript, generated with my terminal-to-html tool.
You can try that out yourself if you have uvx installed like this:
uvx --with https://github.com/simonw/datasette-cowsay/archive/refs/heads/main.zip \
datasetteThen visit:
http://127.0.0.1:8001/-/cowsay?text=This+is+pretty+fun

When I first wrote about skills in October I said Claude Skills are awesome, maybe a bigger deal than MCP. The fact that it's just turned December and OpenAI have already leaned into them in a big way reinforces to me that I called that one correctly.
Skills are based on a very light specification, if you could even call it that, but I still think it would be good for these to be formally documented somewhere. This could be a good initiative for the new Agentic AI Foundation (previously) to take on.
Tags: pdf, ai, kakapo, openai, prompt-engineering, generative-ai, chatgpt, llms, ai-assisted-programming, anthropic, coding-agents, gpt-5, codex-cli, skills
Adam Tooze is a distinguished, prolific historian — I think I was introduced to him by The Wages of Destruction, about the German economy during World War II — who has also been a leader in the newsletter/Substack revolution. His Chartbook is essential reading. Given some of his recent writing about Germany, plus Trump’s declaration that Europe is effectively our enemy, I thought it would be interesting to talk. Transcript follows.
. . .
TRANSCRIPT:
Paul Krugman in Conversation with Adam Tooze
(recorded 12/11/25)
Paul Krugman: Hi, everyone. Paul Krugman here again, enlarging my universe. I’m going to talk today with Adam Tooze, who’s a historian at Columbia. He has a very unique, very influential—I think it was even pre-Substack—but is now on Substack, Chartbook, which has a lot of charts, but also just kinda gives you a lot of information about the world. I know that there are people who are absolutely fanatical about it.
But I also wanted to speak with Adam, because I’ve been writing some about Europe and Adam has a complex background—which we can talk about a little bit—but certainly knows Europe and especially Germany far better than I do. So welcome to my virtual studio.
Adam Tooze: Pleasure to be here Paul, really is.
Krugman: So just quickly, you were born in England, right? But mostly grew up in the former West Germany.
Tooze: That’s right. In Heidelberg.
Krugman: Now you’re at Columbia. Which is just up the road from where I would normally be, although I’m currently someplace a little bit more comfortable.
Tooze: You’re looking a little tan, you’re looking as though you’ve had some sun?
Krugman: Yeah.
I probably spend more time on Europe than the vast majority of U.S. based economists. I’m often more upbeat about Europe than most of the Europeans I know, but it’s in the news now. Trump’s national security strategy sort of is: no problems with Russia, middling on China, and then completely lashes out at Europe. As somebody who has a foot on either side of the Atlantic, which must be quite uncomfortable. How did you feel when seeing this stuff?
Tooze: I mean, I’m glad people are paying so much attention because I remember my shock at reading the national security strategy of the first Trump administration and realizing, “hey everyone, focus! This is extraordinary what’s going on here.” Because that was the one that announced great power competition and really the dawn of a new era with China. It had been sotto voce in the background with Obama and bang, here it was out in the open. Whereas this one we were anticipating for months, because there was all the scuttlebutt about what was going on.
The NSS divides the world into three zones. There’s the Western Hemisphere, over which America just incredibly presumptuously declares the new Monroe Doctrine, Trump corollary. It’s kind of crazy. Then, as you say, there are the other “great powers” with whom one deals peer-to-peer in a way. There’s a mano a mano—rather, a sycophantic kind of relationship between the US and China and Russia. Europe I read essentially as internal, in the sense that Europe is the woke America that MAGA hates worst; it is the secret ally, an extension of coastal America, certainly the East Coast. So in a sense, the culture war agenda that the Trump folks are running in the US can be run in Europe. In some ways, the Islamophobia can even be more explicit in relation to Europe than it is at home. Because you could accuse the Europeans of sacrificing their culture, a great replacement theory—essentially, you can carry on, you can send violence to the Munich Security Conference, and he will already announce this agenda earlier in the year. So that’s what we’re seeing in a strange way, Europe isn’t really distinct from the American political space. It’s the same political space. The conflict is therefore, really uninhibited and overtly partisan. Basically they’re asking for European politics to open the gates to the right. The irony as a European—if you’re a left progressive European—is the idea that somehow it’s a bulk of woke progressive liberals opening the door to Muslim migrants; just go look in the Mediterranean on a bad day, there’s dozens of people drowning, with Frontex blocking the way. The whole thing is a MAGA fantasy, but it is projected onto Europe in a really dramatic way. That’s kind of unique, I think, in the MAGA universe.
Krugman: I was just struck by that one line that said, “some NATO countries may become majority non-European.” Which as they wrote, could have meant Islamic, but also means nonwhite. Although last I heard—although it’s a funny case—Turkey is a member of NATO. (laughs)
Tooze: I mean, I think this is a way of talking about majority-minority America, but not; talking instead about it in Europe. The drama is real, right? The drama in Europe is very extraordinary. If I grew up in West Germany in the early 70s, mine was literally the first cohort of foreign kids to be admitted to German schools. Now, in the big urban areas of Germany, more than half the kids in elementary school have migrant backgrounds. So either they themselves are migrants or one of their parents is a migrant.
Anyone who’s been to Central Europe will know that the transformation is absolutely radical. The old imperial metropolises: Paris, Brussels, London, Dutch cities, have always been very cosmopolitan. But Germany is radically transformed. So there’s a real thing there. There’s a real change that’s extraordinarily dramatic. But MAGA is scaremongering in this grotesque way.
Krugman: So they’re projecting.
Let’s just talk about migrants. There’s really a much larger nonwhite European population pretty much throughout Western Europe than there used to be. I don’t know what the numbers are like, but how many?
Tooze: Germany, if you take the two parts: non-Germans, “Auslander” so-called, non-Germans living in Germany are of a population of 83 million, about 12 million. Then German citizens who themselves weren’t born there but have one German parent, 13 million. So 30% roughly of the German population. In the younger cohorts in elementary school, it’s higher. So it’s like peak-US migration experience. These are numbers comparable with pre-1914 US or the big cities in the US now. It’s very diverse and it comes from a wider range of areas than it does in the US. Because here in the US we have huge flocks from mostly South America, in Europe it’s across a wide territory that the migrants come from; and yes, a larger share of them are Muslim.
Krugman: So, there’s a real transformation. It’s true the only German city I’ve spent any time in—which I know is highly unrepresentative—is Berlin, and Berlin is very clearly not a Deutsche Volk city. It’s a melting pot.
Tooze: No, it truly is. Historically, before Turkish growth really got going and urbanization got growing, I think it was the third largest city in Turkey in the late 70s, or fourth maybe, there was Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and then Berlin. But now it’s a much wider array. A whole sort of melting block of different Arab migrants. You can wholly function in Berlin now in English. So it’s become a truly cosmopolitan place, but it’s not a big city, there’s only about 3.5 million there. So it’s also quite an intimate feeling.
And yes, the German chancellor, who has a knack for tactlessness or some would say thoughtlessness, launched this dog whistle talk about Stadtbild: “how does the city look?” He would be saying, “we’re fixing the migrant problem, we know there is this issue with how the city looks.” So there is even in the dominant center right party quite aggressive problematization of this change.
Krugman: On how the city looks, I have mixed feelings about the “walking around” test in general, but I do think that it is sometimes useful to just get a sense of cities and of cultures, though I’m not going to do a Tom Friedman and talk to a wise cabdriver who somehow sounds exactly like me. (laughs)
But, I’ve been going to Berlin for quite a while. It’s a complicated connection, but I have been spending time at the Freie University on and off over the years, and it has changed, even in that time. It definitely feels much less German than it did in the early 1990s. Also last time I was there it felt a little shabby, I don’t know why...
Tooze: Germany has federal organization, Berlin is a state. The notorious debt brake politics in Germany, the non-discretionary fiscal rules are in large part about constraining debt burdens of debt prone local government, and Berlin will be in the crosshairs of that; other deindustrializing cities like Bremen would be in that kind of zone.
So Berlin has issues with funding basic public services at the local level, and you feel that on the street. It isn’t New York on a bad day—let alone other American cities on a bad day—but it is no longer a spick and span European city, it’s not like a Zurich or somewhere like that. So you feel it, it has a rough edge. The hard drug market in certain parts of Berlin is extraordinarily open, much more so than you would see in New York. There’s a withdrawal of policing that alarms people, but the levels of violent criminality are lower than the levels in the US, which themselves are easily exaggerated. So it’s on that level, a very safe place.
The basic infrastructure of public services like transport are way better than in any comparable American city. So I always say to the Germans, “it’s like misery at a high level.” It’s not glossy. Berlin perhaps was never really glossy. What Berlin lacks is real wealth. Germany’s economic geography is interesting because once upon a time, pre-1945, the new capital of Germany after 1871 attracted all of the corporate headquarters, Deutsche Bank, Siemens. Everyone was there, not the Ruhr, the big old steel money, but all of the new money was there. Then after World War two, as it became in Ireland in the Cold War, all of the big money went elsewhere to Frankfurt, to Munich, to Hamburg, and it hasn’t come back with reunification. So it’s a really unusual capital city because until about five years ago it lowered average GDP per capita by including it. Paris and London are a large part of the UK and the French economy. Berlin was a net drag on German GDP; not any longer, but that’s a recent development.
Krugman: Completely off topic. But Zipf’s law; on city sizes for the United States, if you rank our metropolitan areas, the population is inversely proportional to the rank. LA is about half the size of greater New York. Chicago is about a third the size. It’s a shockingly exact relationship, and it’s held true for more than a century. Germany doesn’t look like that at all. There’s no real dominant cities.
Tooze: Germany’s economic geography always was diverse and it’s one of the charms of the country and you mentioned earlier on the volk idea, that’s kind of projection always, they have to imagine themselves a unified, homogenous nation, whereas in fact, both in terms of ethnicity, culture, migration, and religion of course, with the Catholic Protestant divide, it’s a very diverse place.
Only I think one time maybe in modern political history has a party achieved 50% of the vote? The Nazis never came close, 37% in a free and fair election. Konrad Adenauer, Christian democratic boom time West Germany with the East lopped off, all the communists gone: they got to 51%. I think in the early ‘50 election, that’s the only time it’s ever happened. So the society is constitutively diverse, plural and regionalized, highly regionalized. It’s not like a London or a Paris kind of situation.
Krugman: So, let’s talk economics, Europe is still—certainly the EU plus the UK as an economic power—is not that much smaller than the United States.
Tooze: Exactly, people always forget this.
Krugman: There was this big report last year by Mario Draghi, former Prime Minister of Italy. Although I love Ben Bernanke, Draghi I think is history’s greatest central banker, he saved the Euro.
Tooze: Yup no question, most consequential.
Krugman: This report is quite bleak about how Europe is falling behind.
I’m a little bit of a contrarian here—but I’m not sure that I believe in my own contrarianism. But regarding the “walking around” test, I spent a fair bit of time in the Netherlands walking around Rotterdam, Leiden. You can’t walk around Amsterdam because there are too many damn tourists, but walking around the Netherlands does not feel backward, does not feel like it’s lagging. But last time I was in Berlin, it kind of did, now again Berlin is kind of unrepresentative, but you just wrote a really long, quite pretty grim piece about the state of the German economy and political scene.
Do you feel that Europe is really doing as badly as the Draghi report suggested?
Tooze: I think we have to distinguish levels, growth rates, long run trends. The levels argument with Europe is, I think, overwhelming. If you’re faced with a Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance and “you don’t know which passport you’re going to end up with,” you just pray it’s the Dutch one, some high performing country. You could also say history ended there and, “it ain’t broke so why fix it?” What higher material standard of living could you aspire to than a comfortable position in the Netherlands? It is on the other hand—it’s the size of New York, and it has the GDP roughly of the same size as New York State. So it’s a small part of a much bigger picture, which is more diverse and more uneven. But I mean, I think the levels point is very well taken. Same even for Italy, which is generally seen as one of the real laggards. But it’s not for nothing that people go on holiday there. It’s a very, very attractive way of life. I think there’s a lot of under measurement of quality of life aspects in those numbers.
The growth rate is the thing that’s been really worrying for Germany. So Germany’s economy has essentially had a lost decade. We’ve kind of gotten used to that with the UK, Italy, but for Germany to stall out the way it has—again, we’re not talking about any real fall, but to see no growth essentially, in real terms: in per capita income and investment levels in a unit the size of Germany, which is so crucial to Europe as a whole—is very unusual and sets the alarm bells ringing. If you then look at the stuff that Draghi was looking at, which was very informed by the new theories of innovation, the Nobel Prize winners that were looking at Schumpeterian logics of, “are you investing in the right sectors that’ll generate the creative destruction that will generate the long run innovation” and you look at where the R&D is concentrated in Europe, what R&D does happen in the private sector, which is lower than either China or the US, where it happens is in what people now call “mid tech.” So 10, 15, 20 years ago, investment was heavily concentrated in R&D in the German automotive sector, and last year it was still heavily concentrated in the German automotive sector, which is now being overtaken by the Chinese EV manufacturers. I think it’s like this strange combination of a Wile E. Coyote kind of moment with regard to standard of living. It’s like, “oh my God.” Like we’re kind of suspended in mid-air as everything is just fine. To the German question about, where’s the growth gone?
To the third layer of question, which is where is it going to come from in future? And how do we feel about placing third in a heavy hitters battle of oligopolies, state capitalist models we’re seeing in the US and China? That’s where I think the anxiety comes from.
Krugman: Europe has really been largely shut out of tech—which is not actually right, there are other kinds of platform economies.
Tooze: Platform economies, the platforms they are totally out.
Krugman: That’s for real, that’s clear there. Stock market valuations and so on. You need to read a little ways into it, but all of the measured productivity differences between Europe and the United States are really tech, and other stuff looks the same. Which raises questions about how well do we even measure productivity in tech? So, are those numbers for real? But, Germany clearly is kind of stuck in the past, right?
Tooze: No, it’s really extraordinary. If you look at the leading German companies, they’re 100 years old. Once upon a time, 120 years old, 150 years old in some cases, we would have once celebrated that; an America not so long ago also did, a GE, a GM, a Ford, AT&T: these were the bastions of the mid 20th century economy. Germany has kind of remained stuck there, really. For a while, of course, this was reinforced by the needs of the Chinese market, because Germany’s strengths in mid-sized mechanical engineering firms and the people that supply the machines that make the machines really suited the Chinese industrialization model to a T. And so Germany had 20 years in which it was actually kind of running export surpluses with China, which takes something. That flipped on them really badly in the last five years.
Krugman: One of the things that everyone talks about now for Germany is deindustrialization, which is kind of wild. It really says that the Trumpian theory of deindustrialization has to be wrong, because Germany still runs large trade surpluses.
Tooze: Exactly. When we say deindustrialization for Germany, we’re only talking convergence to the norm of a UK, France and Italy, a US. Germany has an outsized manufacturing share, even when everyone was industrialized, it did. It was in that Japan-Belgium league of super high industrialized countries, and it has retained that edge. This was one of the benefits of this 20 year period where they really benefited from globalization and deindustrialization in their case means convergence. They’ve lost their surplus with China. So there’s a hint of Trump kind of logic there, or China shock kind of logic, shall we say.
Krugman: But they’re running off surplus with somebody.
Tooze: Yeah. Overall they’re still running a large surplus with almost everyone else.
Krugman: It’s funny, the oddities: it turns out that, looking at bilateral US European trade, you get very confused because some of it is clearly all wrong. The US normally runs a surplus with the Netherlands.
Tooze: Well this is the Brad Setser kind of logic: “there’s stuff going on in the accounting of American corporations.”
Krugman: Some of it is. The leprechaun economics. One of my contributions with Ireland. (laughs)
But no, a lot of it’s just Rotterdam, a lot of U.S exports to Europe are going to Rotterdam and then being transferred into Germany. The thing is, around 15 years ago, Germany was feeling pretty good about itself. They were feeling quite arrogant about their economic performance, right? At the time of the European debt crisis, obviously Germany was lecturing everybody else on how “we are responsible, we know how to do things.” But you see it in the numbers too, right?
Tooze: They did. The thing we haven’t mentioned so far, it’s kind of extraordinary we’ve gotten this far without mentioning it, is the debt brake. So in the 90s you have the reunification boom, which involves about $1 trillion euros worth of spending, which generates a boom, also a bust. Then you get this combination of labor market, Social Security, people call them “reforms”, I prefer to call them a shock or a change because they actually create the low wage labor market. But then there’s considerable boost from export surpluses, and the extension of the German supply chain into Central Europe, where the high tech German manufacturers are building out, and all of that sustains their growth through the 2000s, and they emerge in a relatively strong position during the European crisis. In 2009, they adopted this policy of basically zeroing out deficits at the state level and very tight constriction of federal deficits and that takes a while to work its way through the system. But from the mid 2010s onwards, they’re beginning to run surpluses. But the cost of that of course, is the erosion of public investment.
They moved to a net negative public investment regime, which is terrible in the long run.
Krugman: So, net negative in this case means that their stuff is depreciating. Public sector stuff. German railroads are shockingly bad, right?
Tooze: Absolutely, yeah. There’s all these stories about how everybody else in Europe’s reliability and punctuality statistics are dragged down by the fact that trains pass through Germany, where they invariably pick up delays. It’s in complete shambles, and it’s an interesting effect of chronic underinvestment. It really isn’t rocket science. It just matters more to Germany because compared to the US, where passenger transport never really was the priority of the system. It was always really freight. In Germany, the passenger transport sector is really a crucial part of the public infrastructure. But education as well, I mean, the school system is dilapidated. The road network is dilapidated. All of this talk now about national security, you can’t actually move heavy military equipment across Germany safely because the bridges aren’t robust enough anymore.
Krugman: Good God.
Tooze: So it’s really it’s pretty it’s pretty astounding. According to the data, America’s public investment is higher, which living in the northeast, it’s a little hard to believe, but that’s what the data show.
Krugman: Again, in Berlin the public transit is really fantastic by US standards. Although New York, it’s ugly and has rats but it’s actually very fast.
Tooze: I know it is, and it’s cheap. New York is, I agree, I was thinking more of the whole corridor.
Krugman: The rest of the rest of America, it’s all cars. The thing that also shocked me is, I’ve basically spent time everywhere but in Germany in Europe and in Italy, it’s always a real shock. The Italian trains are now terrific. Meloni has made the trains run on time, which Mussolini never did, but she kind of has.
Tooze: Yeah. I mean, it’s a modular technology, right? You should be able to just roll it out. As long as you spend properly. The Spanish network is extremely good as well. No, I like your contrarian impulse. Whenever I’m in China a fair amount recently and I’m always trying to get them to take Europe seriously because there is a kind of tendency to dismiss it, to project the collapse of the euro and the EU into the future. That is where Draghi, as you were saying, is just this pivotal figure. This is after all, the significance of the 2012 whatever-it-takes moment is he’s looking skeptical, Euroskeptic, British hedge funds in the City of London in the eyes and saying, “look, we are for real. Do not bet against this. I will make you pay if you bet against it.” There is a kind of a real power to that which is easy to underestimate.
Krugman: By the way, viewers may not know the story. There was this huge crisis of interest rates, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian debts were skyrocketing. Everyone is saying they’re going to go bankrupt. The euro is going to collapse. Paul DeGraue, Belgian economist said, “this is a panic, the numbers don’t really justify this.” Mario Draghi actually agreed and said three words, “whatever it takes,” that the ECB will stand behind that and will make sure the countries don’t run out of cash. The crisis just evaporated like nothing. Most effective central bank statement in the history of humanity, I’m sure.
But now he’s sounding the alarm, and I’m not sure that everyone knows about the Rawls test, but if you had to choose a society to be born into not knowing who in that society you would clearly pick the Netherlands if you had a choice of countries and you probably pick Western Europe over the United States, because to be rich in America is to be really rich, but to be poor is to be really poor. That’s less true in Europe, even in Germany.
Tooze: Yes. No, absolutely. Interestingly, pretax inequality in many of the European countries, because they were exposed to globalization shocks too, that increased very dramatically over the last generation. But the difference is their welfare states, the American welfare state is progressive, it’s just not big enough. Whereas they are both progressive and large welfare states and their tax systems also bite more on the income side.
So the combination means that the post tax, post benefit Ginis in Europe—this is the measure of inequality—it’s just dramatically different. It affects every area of society. It is this constant dilemma of: on one level, this is a uniquely successful social experiment of an egalitarian, relatively egalitarian kind, but how do you guarantee its future? And one of the more alarming things I think about the Draghi report is his prescription, which was basically to say “we need more state capitalism.”
There’s lots of different ways of putting this. Some of them are more polite, some of them are more critical sounding. But essentially we need more productivity growth and profit enhancing collaboration between governments in Europe and the private sector, because that is the formula that we have seen work both in the US and China to generate, as you were saying, these outsized performance gains, notably in the tech sector. It’s not a story just of markets or businesses. It’s not a story just of government. It’s a story of the two collaborating. Essentially he’s saying, “the Europeans have been overzealous when it comes to anti-competition regulation, and they should be tolerating higher oligopolistic profits that will be turned back, we hope, into investment and therefore productivity growth.” That I took to be the message of Draghi. He may very well be the most consequential central banker. You could also read him as the most articulate mouthpiece of European capital, of European business and in the grand sense of architecting strategy for European business. He is the person who articulates that.
Krugman: So he’s basically calling for what the French used to call national champions, except that they’re continental champions.
Tooze: He’s very French. The whole thing. This is one of the debates that is going on. We’ve been talking a lot about Germany. The headlines have been grabbed by political turmoil in France, worries about the bond market. But in one way, you could definitely say that the debate in Europe, in policy terms, has been sliding in the French direction because a way of reading Europe over the last 25 years is they drank the neoliberal Kool-Aid. They really actually took a whole variety of things very seriously. Highly independent central bank, non-discretionary fiscal policy, no picking winners on industrial policy, and really rather effective policing of competition in the interests of consumers barring various types of industrial merger. So not the American sloppy, loosey goosey kind of market monetarist deal, but something much more hard nosed. Essentially Draghi is saying, “maybe we played too much by the rules. Maybe we took all of this far too literally. Maybe actually what was going on was another kind of model.” We need to be realistic about it. The people who have preached that consistently have been the French.
Krugman: Now, it’s interesting. I actually have done zero homework on France. How is France doing?
Tooze: There’re two dimensions to this, the bond market is the thing that gets the headlines. What’s happened is that, during the crisis we were referring to, 15 years ago France joined Germany in the high quality debt club, in part because the Germans weren’t issuing any debt. And if you’re a bond trader, you love debt because you’ve got to actually have something to transact.
So French government debt served as a near substitute for the non-existent German debt. And so OATs, so called, these are with the French government that were very popular. Their price went up, their yield went down. And what’s happened in the last 4 or 5 years is that France has slid back towards the Spain-Italy camp, and that’s come as a huge shock to Paris because its debt level is almost American. It’s not quite American, but it’s almost American. If you’re France and in the eurozone system and you don’t control your own central bank the way that the US potentially does, this is worrying. Not from a macro point of view, there’s no reason to panic. It’s really worrying because the politics of France is deadlocked and the Macron effort to stabilize a centrist, pro-market, liberal policy has failed.
So really, the question is whether or not Marine Le Pen’s far right party doesn’t break through at the next presidential election, because to stop it now would take a coalition of centrist and leftist forces. It’s not clear anyone’s in a position to articulate that. So it’s kind of like a bond market situation that’s a little bit iffy, but not really in any way critical combined with genuine uncertainty about the functioning of French democracy.
Krugman: Germany has low debt. But it also has dreadful demography, right?
Tooze: Yes. Dreadful demography in terms of that, because the bargain for women of childbearing age is really shitty.
Krugman: Yeah.
Tooze: The labor market conditions are not what they should be, and childcare is catching up, but it’s not as good as it should be. So a lot of women have opted out of that kind of bargain. So what you do see is an awful lot of part time working. If more women were employed at full time rates more and more, according to European averages, then the labor market issues would rather disappear.
Yes, there is bad demography in Germany. There’s plenty of people who’d happily be part of the German labor force. It’s just a question of whether German society can absorb that.
Krugman: That’s right. The issue: fertility is well below replacement and the population will shrink. I guess the last projections I saw said not that France is awash in babies, but that still at a certain point, sometime in and a few decades from now, Napoleon wins and France has a larger population than Germany.
Tooze: I just think that’s a matter of migration trends.
Krugman: So we have these European societies and Germany is certainly it’s kind of less cushy, less comprehensive social safety net, but still beyond the wildest dreams of the American left. France, even more so. The economies are not poor. On the whole, it’s sort of everything for a center left American that would be beyond anything that you could reasonably hope to enact. Yet you have the hard right definitely gaining strength. Germany, the AfD, I don’t know if they’re actually worse, really, than Le Pen’s people, probably, but you do have a party that is pretty obviously neo Nazi that is really gaining strength. So what’s going on? What feeds all of this discontent?
Tooze: Well, I mean, I would say the analogy is—let’s just start in the U.S. I mean, let’s start with the GOP that we’re familiar with, right? There’s a neo-Nazi wing, an outright fascist wing, Hitler saluting, the whole works. They aren’t, I would say, the majority of any of the far right parties. All of these parties are not to the right of the GOP. It’s important to emphasize that they just happen to be in Europe, like the AfD is by no means more right wing than Trump’s GOP. They are just German, which is worrying.
Krugman: That’s interesting.
Tooze: The opinion polling on Germany suggests there’s about 1 to 2% of the population which are actually Nazi. Then you have a 5 to 10% who are hardcore, authoritarian, post democratic. Then you have a—currently they’re polling in the mid 20s, they’ve never gone higher than that—who are willing to contemplate voting for a party that wants systemic change, all the MAGA stuff like total change and all that. It’s what’s very familiar and it’s well short of the numbers that the GOP gets. Because there is an alternative, which is that you can vote for a centrist right wing party, which is where the sensible Republicans would be if they had the option. And it wasn’t the first past the post system, which is the CDU, which is Chancellor Merz’s party which is conservative, skeptical towards migration but not actually racist, and doesn’t have a neo-Nazi base.
So that is the configuration. It’s typical of France as well, and it used to be typical of Italy. Why are these parties gaining the support they are? It’s a familiar mix of motives, the cocktail is composed slightly differently. The really big difference is that anti-black racism plays a much smaller role in Europe, and Islamophobia is much more important. So the core of the xenophobic, racist element is Islamophobia. The anti-black element is strictly secondary everywhere, I think including in France, where they overlap incredibly closely because the black migrants tend to be from North Africa. So you get all from the Sahel, so you get a very close overlap. But in Germany, it’s really Islamophobia that’s doing the driving.
So that’s a distinction to the US. Because of this radical change in the composition of the population, especially since 2015 with the Syrian crisis and the refugee crisis and ISIS and all of that, there was that kind of impulse. The other element is an anti elite affect, which is powerful across all of European societies. They are, like us, very unequal places. It’s more discreet than in the US. The average levels of inequality are slightly lower. But, you know, anyone in their right mind can see that all of these European societies are profoundly unequal. And furthermore, in the media, in education, in the professions, there is, as in the US, a strong liberal bias across the board. So it’s very easy to mobilize a populist anti PMC, anti professional managerial class kind of coalition in most of these societies as well.
Then you’ve kind of got the growth story like substantial minorities of the European population are kind of wondering like where they’re promised—it’s not the American dream type thing, but nevertheless—where the promise of affluence and stability that was once theirs, where that’s coming from and where the well-paid, secure, meaningful blue collar jobs are that their dads or granddads used to have, like where that’s coming from and why some Turkish or Arab or Syrian guy has got that and they haven’t. Why is there a huge queue at the hospital and why there’s no spaces for kids at school and why, if your nephew goes to school, he goes to a class which is 60% migrant? They’re asking themselves those kinds of questions. If you add all of that up, you get to this kind of voter potential.
Krugman: There’s a left-behind-regions issue as well. Right?
Tooze: Oh absolutely huge inequality.
Krugman: So the DRR is never…
Tooze: Well depends where you look. I mean, if you go to Leipzig or Dresden, you’d have that same reaction of, “oh my God, if there was a single city in a United States like this, it would be headline news.” But if you go out to the countryside, the back areas of East Germany, I’d hesitate to say that they’re not West Virginia, but they are pretty grim places with few prospects. Large outmigration of young people. So you get residual components. The polarities are very extreme. They are, in fact, most extreme in the UK, which we’re not talking about because it’s not in the EU story, but they are nevertheless very stark. The former industrial areas of northern Europe, northern France, Belgium, are grim.
Krugman: There’s the obliviousness of people of our class occasionally. I was talking a few years back, but, with a very eminent, very smart, British former public official, etc. and he said “well, of course, in England, we don’t have places these blasted left behind regions the way you have the United States.” And I was saying, “have you been to Yorkshire lately.” (laughs)
Tooze: No, seriously.
So then you ask yourself why somebody in one of those regions might be absolutely furious about the assholes in London. Like, they don’t get it right. They don’t. They fundamentally don’t understand, so, that’s the cocktail.
My sense is that it’s more visible in Europe because they generally have PR proportional representation type systems. So they have about six parties in the same way as the US has six parties, it’s just three of them are grouped into each of the two main parties in the US. So they’re not visible. But you know, if you think about the Democratic Party coalition as was Manchin through to AOC and you think of the similar kind: McCain through the far right of MAGA, essentially the spectrum is very similar in Europe. It’s more fragmented, it’s more visible in most countries.
There’s another thing, there’s countervailing tendencies. The Dutch, which both of us agree it’s an amazing society, but they voted for a far right government. They got a far right government, it was a total shambles, so they voted for moderates. In Italy, the Fratelli d’Italia, who really were once upon a time a post fascist party. Post, as in: “We used to be fascist, we’re not fascist anymore,” not like, “goodbye to fascism.” Meloni really was a street activist of a fascist party. Yet in office, she turns into something that’s more recognizable as a mainline conservative, to be honest, with a hard nationalist edge in a hard culture world politics. But she’s not taking Italy back to fascism. That’s not what’s happening. So Germany is a really fascinating case because it’s a little bit like exchange controls, or something like that. They’ve put what they call a firewall, which is that no one will talk to the AfD. The problem is what happens when you kind of have to actually make democracy functional? What is the consequence for democracy of just refusing to talk to them at all? So they’re trying an exclusion strategy, they even actually talked about criminalizing the AfD, because the Germans have what they call “a democracy that defends itself.” So if they’re agencies of constitutional protection judge that the party is anti-constitutional, they can outlaw the party. They came pretty close to doing this for a party that represents 25% of the population.
So that’s different in Italy, what we’re seeing is transformismo, this strategy: you bring them in and then see what happens, and they end up being digested by the logics of Italian society; in Germany right now they’re holding the AfD at bay. The anxiety of those opinion polls is that they do it every Sunday in Germany and the question is essentially, how do the other parties form viable coalitions if they’re not going to talk to the 25%?
Krugman: So the United States may have it worse just because we probably have about the same number of people with hard right inclinations as everybody else. But because of our primary system and two party system, that faction ends up controlling.
Tooze: Exactly, the tail ends up wagging the dog. It’s like the most radical wing ends up dictating politics. And then there’s the gerrymandering. And so they’re quite insulated. We haven’t yet in Western Europe seen that subversion of institutions. Italy, maybe a different story. But the worry in the US, presumably now, is that the institutions themselves—I was thinking of gerrymandering—the entire process is becoming deeply politicized. We’re not seeing that yet in Germany.
Krugman: Okay. It’s worrisome. The theory behind social democracy is in part that if you take care of people, then they will support the constitutional order and all of that. And it kind of doesn’t work? Is that the European lesson?
Tooze: By itself, it’s not enough. And furthermore, people’s standards constantly adjust. And so people in Europe are not benchmarking themselves against West Virginia and saying, “oh my God, I’m so glad I’m not there.” They’re comparing themselves to memories of the past to nicer parts of their own countries. They’re doing all of that relativity stuff where they see foreign neighbors getting things which they think they should have. So I think the bigger lesson is that this A-rated social democracy, a social democracy without politics, without a public sphere that actually does the political education. And I think the left and progressives have to embrace this, like, does the work of explaining what this is about and what the trade offs are not in the kind of, woke sense, but in the sense of: these are the logic of social democracy, this is how economies work, this is how people fit in, these are the mechanisms that we have to uphold and continue to use creatively. That’s what I think has been lost, not just in the US, because of course it’s been lost in the US as well, but has attenuated in Europe. So it’s more kind of a Putnam story of the erosion of the social institutions that went with social democracy and one shouldn’t, in the European case, either underestimate the extent to which those social democratic compromises—these welfare states—were, after all, built on top of societies which had gone through the full on murderous Civil War period of the first half of the 20th century. Italians on Italians, French on French, Germans on everyone, Pole on Pole—really savage. This was the cauldron of revolution, and it was ultraviolent. Tens of millions of people are killed and are killing. And out of that came these very tightly wrought, powerfully constrained Cold War compromises and a lot of that fabric, the guts, the real undergirding of what made those societies what they were has just eroded and attenuated in the last 30 years.
So what you’re left with is kind of high performing welfare states, but without any of the political guts, the German welfare state still works incredibly well in moderating the difference between pre tax and post tax Gini. Like, does it make Germans feel as though they’re part of a functioning social democracy? No it doesn’t.
Krugman: Okay, so just the last question, and of course you don’t know the answer but can Europe get its act together sufficiently to be the competitive player on the world scene that it ought to be, if only to reflect its values?
Tooze: It’s interesting the response to Ukraine, we haven’t spoken about Ukraine, the thing that really hangs over Europe in a way it doesn’t in the US. People interested in foreign policy follow Ukraine in the US, in Europe it’s like really up close. There are millions of Ukrainians living in Western Europe, especially in Germany. The war is really close by and America is absenting itself, NSS makes that very clear. So Europe is facing a huge challenge. And I think the evidence is they will rise to it. Not sufficiently not the way you would hope, not by way of the EU, essentially large expansion of an EU army. None of that’s going to happen. But are they going to assemble a coalition sufficient to deter Russia? Yes, and that’s quite remarkable. America has not faced a challenge like that, right? A proper war with a real antagonist as close as Ukraine is, this is a real challenge. I think Europe will face it.
Europe responded to Covid in many ways, I think more effectively than the US in 2020. The vaccine was America’s great gift, the mRNA vaccines, but also in partly with European science expertise feeding in. I think a lot turns on how we think the AI tech story is going to go. If you really think that is the center of all future development, then Europe is in a weak position unless it can position itself in the AI using AI application kind of space. If you think that is likely going to be a bust, then of course America’s future looks darker and we might, in two years time, be having a very different conversation over the wreckage of excessive American stock market valuations and Europe in a much more relatively strong position.
You’re right, I don’t know the answer. But, there’s this cliche about Europe, Jean Monnet saying that, “Europe is the sum total of answers found to crises.” And it’s still in the business of trying to find answers to crises. One of the things I find interesting about Europe, unlike in the US, is there is actual constitutional change; over the period of our lifetimes, since the 70s, there have been really deep constitutional changes in Europe and at lots of different levels. The Germans got their act together to fight the two thirds majority only earlier this year to get rid of their debt brake. Imagine that happening in the US right now. So there’s a kind of fluid, even in this old continent, like there is a fluidity of politics and institutions and an openness to quite deep change that unfortunately, we don’t have in the US.
Krugman: So that’s an upbeat note. And I will say, I agree that relative to what you might have wanted, Europe’s response to Ukraine has fallen short relative to what you might have expected. I mean, it’s actually astonishingly positive.
Tooze: Yeah, I agree.
Krugman: So there remains hope for Europe and God knows we need some place in the world that still believes in democratic values.
Tooze: Yes.
Krugman: Okay. Thanks so much for talking to me.
Tooze: It’s a pleasure. Thanks for having me on.
How to use a skill (progressive disclosure):
- After deciding to use a skill, open its
SKILL.md. Read only enough to follow the workflow.- If
SKILL.mdpoints to extra folders such asreferences/, load only the specific files needed for the request; don't bulk-load everything.- If
scripts/exist, prefer running or patching them instead of retyping large code blocks.- If
assets/or templates exist, reuse them instead of recreating from scratch.Description as trigger: The YAML
descriptioninSKILL.mdis the primary trigger signal; rely on it to decide applicability. If unsure, ask a brief clarification before proceeding.
— OpenAI Codex CLI, core/src/skills/render.rs, full prompt
Tags: skills, openai, ai, llms, codex-cli, prompt-engineering, rust, generative-ai
This paper provides evidence of the institutional continuity between the “old world” Sicilian mafia and the mafia in America. We examine the migration to the United States of mafiosi expelled from Sicily in the 1920s following Fascist repression lead by Cesare Mori, the so-called “Iron Prefect”. Using historical US administrative records and FBI reports from decades later, we provide evidence that expelled mafiosi settled in pre-existing Sicilian immigrant enclaves, contributing to the rise of the American La Cosa Nostra (LCN). Our analysis reveals that a significant share of future mafia leaders in the US originated from neighborhoods that had hosted immigrant communities originating in the 32 Sicilian municipalities targeted by anti-mafia Fascist raids decades earlier. Future mafia activity is also disproportionately concentrated in these same neighborhoods. We then explore the socio-economic impact of organized crime on these communities. In the short term, we observe increased violence in adjacent neighborhoods, heightened incarceration rates, and redlining practices that restricted access to the formal financial sector. However, in the long run, these same neighborhoods exhibited higher levels of education, employment, and social mobility, challenging prevailing narratives about the purely detrimental effects of organized crime. Our findings contribute to debates on the persistence of criminal organizations and their broader economic and social consequences.
That is a new paper in the works by Zachary Porreca, Paolo Pinotti, and Masismo Anelli, here is the abstract online.
The post Origins and persistence of the Mafia in the United States appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
…the National Science Foundation’s Technology, Innovation and Partnerships directorate at long last announced its Tech Labs initiative, which is intended to provide $10-$50 million a year to independent research teams (and yes, that is a per team dollar amount, not the initiative’s entire budget).
The intent is to provide “entrepreneurial teams of proven scientists the freedom and flexibility to pursue breakthrough science at breakneck speed, without needing to frequently stop and apply for additional grant funding with each new idea or development.”
The idea has many precursors, including all of the independent research labs and organizations going back several decades, the recent burst of philanthropy for new institutes and organizations, the idea of focused research organizations (here’s a good piece from today), Caleb Watney’s excellent piece proposing X-Labs, and Jeffrey Tsao’s proposal for Bell Labs X.
But this is the first time the federal government has gotten into the business of actively pushing for institutional diversity and for scientific funding at the team level.
Huge, if it works.
Here is more from Stuart Buck. Here is Caleb Watney in the WSJ.
The post The Tech Labs initiative appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
This is the second half of the third part of our four-part series (I, II, IIIa) discussing the debates surrounding ancient Greek hoplites and the formation in which they (mostly?) fought, the phalanx. Last week, we discussed the development of hoplite warfare through the Archaic period (c. 750-480). Our evidence for that early period of development is very limited, but what we have points to an emerging shield wall formation which neither resembles the rigid shoving-matches of the orthodox school on hoplites, nor the fluid skirmishing of the ‘strong’ heterodox vision. Instead, it seems likely that hoplite equipment developed for a shield wall that already existed, which worked to a significant degree in conjunction with skirmishers and cavalry, acting as a ‘base’ as well as an offensive striking force.
This week we’re going to move into the better attested Classical period (480-323), where we begin to get literary sources describing Greek warfare in some detail. What I want to accomplish here is basically two-fold: first to address the definition question of what a phalanx is and then second to outline in a broad way how it seems to have worked in this better-documented period.
As always, if you like what you are reading, please share it as I rely on word-of-mouth to find readers! And if you really like it, you can support this project over at Patreon; I don’t promise not to use the money to buy a full hoplite panoply, but I also don’t not promise to do that. And if you want updates whenever a new post appears, you can click below for email updates or follow me on Twitter and Bluesky for updates when posts go live and my general musings; I have largely shifted over to Bluesky (I maintain some de minimis presence on Twitter), given that it has become a much better place for historical discussion than Twitter.
Followers of this debate will note a major chronological question left unanswered in the previous section which is often given quite a lot of definitional import: when are the non-hoplites excluded from the shield wall? That question in turn takes up new significance because of the definitional fight over what a ‘phalanx’ is and thus when it developed. Generally, both the orthodox and heterodox scholars accept that a definitional component of the ‘phalanx’ in its mature form is that it excludes light infantry and cavalry, being an all-hoplite formation.
For the ‘strong’ orthodox school, the answer to this question is easy: their developmental model essentially requires that light infantry were never much integrated into the phalanx and swiftly excluded. From this perspective, the achievements of light infantry at Sphacteria/Pylos (425) and cavalry at Delium (424) and during the Sicilian Expedition (415-413) all in Thucydides, represent the early beginnings of a tactical revolution away from pure hoplite fighting. In this model, ‘the phalanx’ – defined by a fairly rigid adherence to the orthodox tactical model (very tight files (c. 45-60cm file widths), charge to collision, shoving othismos, standard depth of 8, exclusion of light infantry and cavalry) exists and is the standard method of war for Greek polis societies no later than 640 with the Chigi Vase.
By contrast the heterodox school favors much more gradual development, with light infantry still fighting in the same formation as the hoplites very late, often well into the fifth century.1 Since the segregation of light infantry and cavalry from the hoplites is taken as a definitional element of the phalanx, that in turn pushes back the development of the thing called ‘the phalanx’ into the fifth century, with a mature phalanx that excludes all other kinds of soldiers only emerging potentially in the mid-fifth century. It is worth noting this sort of definitional vision is somewhat reliant on the vision of light infantry being basically scattered within the formation (thus rendering the whole thing something more of a loose skirmish line), but as we’ve already discussed, I don’t think that was likely to have been the case even in the seventh century, much less the late sixth.
Instead I think this date-of-the-phalanx debate suffers from an excessively rigid definition. That rigid definition is, I should note, by no means required by the ancient sources themselves. While we tend to use ‘phalanx’ to mean only two specific Greek heavy infantry formations (the hoplite phalanx and the sarisa phalanx), the ancient Greeks were happy to use the word of almost any regular formation of combatants. As we’ve noted, the term gets used for hoplites, sure and also sarisa-carrying phalangites, but also Roman legions, ‘barbarian’ infantry (including Gauls), formations of ships, chariots, and even elephants. In ancient Greek, φάλαγξ just means any battle line or array, similarly flexible to its Latin equivalent acies. It has, I’d argue, an implication of some kind of regular order – it is a battle line, not a mob or a mass – but beyond that it isn’t some kind of technical term.
Now of course we often use a generic word in another language as a technical term to indicate that specific culture’s version of that concept, especially in military contexts. German Messer just means ‘knife,’ but in English it has come to mean a specific family of German swords (sometimes more precisely Großes Messer or Langes Messer or – for two-handed versions – Kriegsmesser) defined by a knife-style hilt construction. Likewise in English katana, a generic Japanese word for ‘sword,’2 means generally ‘Japanese sword’ and very specifically the uchigatana. And of course the Roman word gladius (itself a loanword from a Celtic language) simply means ‘sword,’ but in English is used to mean specifically a family of Roman swords descending from the gladius Hispaniensis. So we do this all the time, taking a general term in a given language and making it a technical term in our language, usually a technical term for the other language’s culture’s version of the general idea.
From that framework, I would argue that the current definitions of ‘phalanx’ in use in these debates – demanding often very tight formations, the complete exclusion of light troops and a rigid tactical system (more rigid, probably, than most phalanxes actually were) – is excessively specific and overly inflexible. Instead we ought to think of ‘phalanx’ as closer to ‘a shield wall with ancient Greek characteristics.‘ That fits better the way we use the terms: ‘phalanx’ is the general Greek word for battle-order and so it can describe in English the distinctively Greek battle order. Such a definition would not be infinitely plastic: it has to be an at least somewhat regular battle order, but as we saw last time, I think the Greeks had a somewhat regular battle order for their hoplites from at least the mid-seventh century. Say what you will about the impression of formation depth on the Chigi Vase, the intention of the artist is clearly to show a regular battle order, with figures all neatly the same distance apart and close enough to be shown overlapping. Consequently, this broader definition largely obviates efforts to back-date the phalanx to the fifth century, because it does not require the full exclusion of light infantry in all cases altogether.3
That said, I think there is (as we’ll see below) a meaningful difference between the earlier hoplite phalanx, which seems to operate much more tightly integrated with its light infantry and the later hoplite phalanx which increasingly excludes those troops. Paul Bardunias distinguishes, in terms of his tactical models, between an Archaic Phalanx that is something of a hybrid – shield wall in front, skirmishers behind – and a Classical Phalanx that is ‘all hoplite’ and a more exclusively shock formation and as we’ve discussed previously, while I suspect there are most places for the skirmishers ‘to go’ in the battle order (I suspect Paul suspects this too), those models seem to me to make the most sense.
What I would propose then is a three-part division: first, a proto-phalanx (or Archaic phalanx), in which skirmishers can be present but where the core of the formation is pretty clearly a shield wall of hoplites, which is clearly in use in the seventh and sixth century. Next, there is a hoplite phalanx (short for ‘all-hoplite-phalanx’ or also ‘Classical Phalanx’), which is the formation that seems to be in use for most of the fifth century, in which light infantry have been fully segregated out into other battlefield roles (discussed below). There is clearly a process of transition involved between these two forms happening around the turn of the sixth century into the fifth which we can see only imperfectly. Arguments about that transition are fundamentally going to turn around interpretations of Herodotus – and in particular how much of Herodotus one is willing to gainsay or discard. For my own part, I think Herodotus clearly intends us to understand an all-hoplite-phalanx at Marathon (490) (but, interestingly, not at Plataea (479), where he attests lots of light infantry – it makes sense a transitional period might involve different poleis operating at different points in the transition) and I find efforts to gainsay Herodotus writing within or just beyond living memory4 of the events with Pausanias,5 writing six centuries later pretty unconvincing. Personally, I suspect, given the presence of Greek artwork – again, as early as the Chigi Vase in c. 640 – of images depicting solid, uniform lines of hoplites in close formation that the ‘all-hoplite-phalanx’ probably co-existed with the proto-phalanx for quite a while during the Archaic and that both approaches were available on the ‘tactical menu’ by the Greco-Persian Wars.
Finally, there is the sarisa-phalanx, the third sort, which we need not dwell on here except for me to note that it is a clear extrapolation out of the all-hoplite-phalanx (as an all-phalangite-phalanx, in effect, albeit with supporting light infantry on its flanks and possibly operating in the intervals between its regiments), which I feel is necessary to justify calling the Archaic phalanx a ‘proto-‘ phalanx, since means that this military system is going to spend several centuries iterating on the idea of an all-heavy-infantry ‘phalanx’ block.
In my view, this sort of schema lets us understand – as I think we ought – not a question of ‘when the phalanx’ (which we now answer with ‘no later than the mid-seventh century and probably earlier’), but rather tracking changes within the concept of the phalanx, from a proto-phalanx that may put all of the hoplites together (perhaps in the front several ranks, or in a block at the center of the army), but is still expecting to be fairly tightly integrated with non-hoplites, to the all-hoplite -phalanx that has fully segregated those troops.
With that in mind, we can now turn to the question how did the all-hoplite-phalanx function?
We’ll start with how I think our evidence suggests that the phalanx formation functioned itself – individual spacing, the nature of its charge, the style of its engagement and so on – and then we’ll move towards larger picture questions of the organization of whole battles or campaigns.
As you may have noticed, the orthodox and heterodox ‘schools’ do not necessarily agree on spacing. Traditionally, the orthodox vision – and this has tended to inform a lot of modern artistic reconstructions – often assumed something close to shoulder-to-shoulder spacing, which would come out to a file width of about 45cm. We’ve discussed the concept of file width before – file width can be a tricky concept because there are several ways of measuring it – but what we’re measuring when we say file width here is the distance from one man’s left shoulder to the left shoulder of the right man, so a space that contains one body and one interval of open air.6 When considering the question more carefully, orthodox scholars often resorted to Polybius’ report (18.29) of the (sarisa)-phalanx’s spacing which comes out to about 90cm, though as we’ve discussed before this figure is also not without its debates which are wound around questions of the length of the sarisa since Polybius does all of his math for the sarisa-phalanx in units of two cubits. The problem there is there’s no real reason to suppose the sarisa-phalanx must use the same combat spacing as the hoplite phalanx: after all, the sarisa-phalanx is using a different weapon (a two-handed pike) and a smaller (c. 80cm) shield.
Hans van Wees, meanwhile, in Myths and Realities, suggests a much looser spacing, with six foot intervals (c. 180cm) and expresses skepticism that even at this wide spacing was the vulnerability of any man’s right side (the one without the shield) a real problem in that way that, I must stress, Thucydides explicitly says it is (Thuc. 5.71).7 My sense is that many heterodox scholars have backed off of this sort of wide spacing as being typical (though of course there might be circumstances where you’d want it), but since Myths and Realities hasn’t been revised or superseded as the monograph treatment of the heterodox model, that wide spacing remains ‘in the air’ for students and enthusiasts alike.
Of course the challenge here is that, as you may be picking up from the above, no source explicitly attests the file intervals for the hoplite phalanx. We do get such attestations for Macedonian and Roman armies (from Polybius, above), but not for Greek hoplites.
I think there are two ways of attacking this problem. The first is to think about how a formation comes together and the latter is to think about how it most optimally fights and in both cases I am not breaking new ground here, but following others (Peter Connolly in the first case, Paul Bardunias in the latter). In the first case, Peter Connolly observed quite rightly that armies do not line up men with rulers.8 Instead they are going to use some easy measurements available to them in their context to quickly get men at more or less the right intervals. Connolly uses that to explain what Polybius is doing: while the cubit, a unit of length measurement, varied a bit from one place to the next in its ‘official’ length, it always had as its common sense the length of an adult man’s forearm. So when Polybius says men line up with a file width of ‘two cubits’ what he means is they line up with a file width of ‘roughly one full arm-length.’
And that’s easy to pull off in practice: you are marching in column into position (your marching width will be your file depth in a second), you have every man put out his arm to touch the back of the man in front of him. Then everyone pivots 90 degrees to the left and there you are: each man has basically one forearm (plus a handful of centimeters for the back-to-chest space) of space, giving you a roughly two-cubit, 90cm spacing. As Michael Taylor9 has pointed out, if you are the Romans and want slightly wider spacing, you simply have the men pivot first and then do the arm trick second, so that the file interval instead of being one arm-length is now one arm-length plus shoulder width (which comes out to roughly 135cm).

Given that method of accomplishing regular intervals, you can see that you aren’t going to have an infinite number of interval choices, but a handful based on the size of things you have to line up with. Half an arm’s length (one cubit) is clearly doable, as is a super-wide full-arm-length-plus-full-arm-length-plus-shoulder-width (five cubits, 225cm). Alternately you could use objects – lining up spear-length (c. 2.5m) apart, for instance. Or, of course, you could use the aspis, lining up, say, an aspis width apart. Which is 90cm. And you see, perhaps where I am going with this.
We have an easy interval to create and a shield that is exactly as wide as that interval. This seems intentional.
From there we can hop over to the second approach which is to instead look at combat dynamics, do some group sparring and ask how formations at the different widths fare. After all, the one thing we can be reasonable sure about the hoplite phalanx is that it worked. The Greeks were remarkably militarily successful in the Late Archaic and Classical periods, establishing and defending colonial settlements all over the Mediterranean and holding off the local Big Damn Empire, the Achaemenids.10 Paul Bardunias has done exactly and presented the work in this video I am just going to keep linking because I think it is very good and it turns out that to a point, tighter combat spacing (60-90cm in Bardunias’ experiments) is really beneficial because it is really hard to defend with an aspis effectively if you are opposed by multiple enemies due to their tighter spacing.
Of course there are limits. Even turning one’s body to the side, it is really hard to get any tighter than 45cm – any tighter than 90cm, of course and you have to angle and overlap shields – and really anything below 60cm or so seems solidly ‘unfightable.’ I’m struck here that the Greeks sometimes reference a formation synaspismos (‘shields together’) which seems to be a special, ultra-tight formation (though references are few and separated by a lot of chronology, so this term may have shifting meanings). As we discussed before, I suspect this is a special ‘ultra-tight’ formation, probably to resist ranged attack, similar to Roman close-order formations: you don’t fight this way, you close up to get through (ranged) ‘fire’ and then widen out again to fight. This would be easy to do because your ultra-tight interval is neatly half of your regular interval: you just have the back half of each file move up into the gap (though a formation might also just cluster together under pressure more organically).
We can then take this thinking back to our best evidence, which is the representation evidence. From the 640s onward, when hoplites are represented in formation groups, they are generally presented in a line, with regular spacing and shields touching or overlapping, much as on the Chigi Vase.11 Now, if we’re familiar with other cultures’ artwork of massed infantry formations, we know to be immediately skeptical here: artists often compress infantry in artwork to make them look more impressive or simply fit them in the space. We see medieval and even Roman infantry so compressed all the time, so we can’t take this depiction literally and try to measure spacing from it. But what we can assume, I’d argue, is that the assumption here – at least the ideal – is a formation with regular spacing and relatively tight spacing. These fellows are near each other, if maybe not so close as depicted.
None of that evidence is as strong as we’d like, it’s all, in a sense, ‘circumstantial.’ But it all points the same way: the combat testing and the forming up process both seem to suggest something like a 90cm interval,12 which in turn brings the idea that the Macedonian phalanx inherited the spacing of its predecessor hoplite phalanx back with a little more foundation, and that spacing is consistent with the artwork, especially when we consider the strong tendency in many artistic cultures to cram close-order infantry together. And then of course there is the aspis itself, which at roughly 90cm intervals would have their rims just touching, thus presenting a solid line of protection when drawn close.

Although I should note here, I don’t think they always were drawn close – you absolutely can extend an aspis out in front of you (albeit not as far as a center-grip shield) and I suspect this was often done in fighting, I imagine it was probably the standard stance when fighting out of formation and in the ultra-tight synaspismos formation, some degree of angling the shield forward would simply be mandatory.
The other question about the formation is depth: how many men deep was it? We simply have no basis to estimate the distances front-to-back of the men (though further extrapolation from Polybius might suggest 90cm as reasonable, but the evidence here is paper thin), but how many men in a file we are sometimes told. The orthodox school says the standard depth is 8, whereas heterodox scholars sometimes doubt a standard depth at all (amateur warriors, after all). Roel Konijnendijk put all of the figures together to argue that there is no rigidly standard depth and I suppose I take his argument halfway.13 He is correct that depth varies. On the other hand, of his 20 examples, eight have a depth of 8, two more a depth of 16 and two more a depth of 4. The remainders are 1, 2, 9-10, <10, <12, 25, and >50 (2x). But we’re also looking at a simple majority of examples (13/20) are clean multiples of four, which to me really suggests that the most common half-file (perhaps a standard marching width) was four, with armies sometimes forming up half-file to stretch the line or double-file to narrow it. The classic eight-deep formation is four times more common than any other choice, which really does suggest it was ‘standard,’ especially keeping in mind that we’re more likely to be told a formation’s depth when it is unusual (that is, our authors are going to report every 50-man-deep column, but not every 8-man-deep standard formation).
So it seems fair to say ‘standard depth may have varied, but 8 was by far the most common.’
We also have to discuss various attested ‘ultra-deep’ formations and their purposes. The orthodox view on this often recalls Napoleon’s attacking columns with the idea being that a deep formation provides impetus to an attack which of course fits with the ‘shoving’ model, the idea being that a deep formation has more men shoving. The problem with this, as Roel Konijnendijk notes (op. cit., 134) is that no classical source explicitly says this (as opposed to Hellenistic sources talking about the sarisa-phalanx, which do; e.g. Polyb. 2.69.8-9, 18.30.4-11; Asclepiodotus, 5.2); instead he argues – drawing on the work of previous scholars – the most likely purpose here is reinforcing a key point in the line and adding a psychological pressure: reaffirming the cohesion of the men in front of them while demoralizing the enemy with their seemingly unstoppable numbers.14 And here I think Konijnendijk is clearly correct. After all, thinking back to the analogy of gunpowder attack columns, Napoleon’s Imperial Guard were not physically pushing each other on to Austrian bayonets either, but a deep formation is naturally intimidating.15
Then we also have various attested ‘ultra-deep’ formations, which have always recalled for historians Napoleon’s attacking columns, the idea being the deep formation provides impetus to an attack, but such formations are treated as unusual, innovative or compelled by terrain (though, as Konijnendijk notes (134), no classical source explicitly says this so some caution is required). Konijnendijk supposes rather than adding momentum or impetus to an attack, depth was a way to improve cohesion and avoid collapse: an ultra deep formation was harder to break and I think that is probably right.
So there is roughly our formation: probably eight(-ish) men deep, and as many men wide as you can make it, with each file occupying probably around 90cm of space or so.
There are, within that force, unit divisions, though in most cases these tend to be big and pretty unwieldy. Xenophon advocates strongly (Xen. Lac. 11) for the Spartan system of officers and Konijnendijk assumes this means that other poleis lacked equivalent systems, although we do hear of lochagoi and taxiarchoi.16 Assessing those is tricky: when Xenophon details the Spartan system, a lochos is a unit of 640, but in the Macedonian system, a lochagos is the leader of a file-unit of 16; clearly the term has drifted somewhat. Plato also briefly implies wealthy men might τριττυαρχοῦσιν, “they might command a trittyes” (a ‘third’), suggesting a trittyarchos (Plato, Rep. 5.475a-b), which implies an officer perhaps for the trittyes, which would have been roughly one-thirtieth of the army, which might have not been too far off from a half of a lochos.17 I might not be as strong as Konijnendijk in asserting there are no subordinate figures here, but it certainly does seem to be the case that hoplite armies tended to have large unit divisions and relatively limited officers to provide for command and control, which is going to play into their tactical function here in a moment.
Now we can start thinking about a how a hoplite phalanx of the classical period functions in a larger battle.
And here I want to contrast three positions, a ‘strong’ orthodox position (which I think is wrong), the heterodox position (which I think overcorrects) and a ‘weak’ orthodox position that I think is closer to accurate. If you recall the historiography from our first part, you may imagine how we got here: seeking to understand how hoplite warfare generally worked, those first ‘Prussians’ created a generalizing model, a sense of what was ‘typical,’ which subsequently hardened into a set of ‘rules’ that the ‘strong’ orthodox position assumes were always followed. And then the heterodox scholars respond with every exception to those rules – Konijnendijk (2018) very ably catalogs essentially all of them – to argue that there was no rule.
So the ‘strong’ orthodox position is that battles were often ‘by mutual consent’ (a Polybian expression), with armies lining up in relatively open and flat ground, with the position of honor on the far right, with the general on the right, where they then charged to impact, after which ensued the ‘shoving’ othismos we have already dismissed; after one side collapsed, pursuit was limited because these battles were to some degree ‘agonal’ (honor competitions) and so the matter was concluded by the victors setting up a trophy and allowing the defeated to recover their dead as part of a truce. By contrast the ‘strong’ heterodox position challenges all of these ‘rules’ as being regularly broken: war wasn’t ritualized, but absolute and intended to produce maximum slaughter. Terrain was used, as was trickery or any other tactical devices. Charge was not to impact but to ‘spear’s reach,’ there is no shoving match and pursuit might be a lot less limited and a lot more focused on casualties. To this end they pile up all of the exceptions to the rule.
Whereas to me, the truth of the matter is somewhere around where we started, rather than where we ended up: there were expectations for certain kinds of battles, which were sometimes violated, but very often followed. There is actually a really useful discussion of this relationship between the ‘reality of war’ and the ‘discourse on war’ cross culturally in John A. Lynn, “Discourse, Reality and the Culture of Combat” IHR 27.3 (2005), which I assign to students. Of course generals and soldiers are always ‘breaking’ the ‘rules’ (really, defying expectations) to try to win but that doesn’t mean the expectations have no force. Instead, the discourse on war shapes the reality of warfare to a degree, however when the two diverge – when the ‘exceptions’ begin to swallow the rules – the loop alters in one of a few ways. First, violation of the ‘discourse’ can create an ‘extreme reality,’ an escalation spiral of brutality, which is almost explicitly what Thucydides presents himself as describing in the Peloponnesian War, a series of ruptures with his discourse (which leaves aside the question of how old that discourse is – it need not be very old!).

Alternately, breaks in discourse can be compartmentalized by a given kind of violence being segmented away from ‘war’ or ‘proper war.’ We see this all the time today with ‘military operations other than war.’ In history this often happened with counter-insurgency operations, colonial conflicts and distant imperial wars: soldiers operating outside of ‘real war’ were free both to dispense with the expectations of ‘real war’ but also to discard the lessons of such conflicts as they prepared for “war as it should be” to use Lynn’s phrase.
Both ‘discourse breaches’ are at work in the Classical period in ways that complicate efforts to read exceptions against expectations. The Greeks even have a category to explain this idea, the notion of war “without heralds” or “without truces” meaning war conducted outside of the normal expectations that govern ‘real war.’ Likewise stasis within a polis or colonial warfare against ‘barbarians’ at the edges of the Greek world operated with different expectations. The tricky problem is that in arguing against the ‘rules’ heterodox scholars often include these examples, even when it seems that even the Greeks at the time recognized them as a discourse ‘other than war’ (and that such distinctions, while perhaps trivial to us, meant something to them). Likewise, the expectations for pitched battles – in the Greek context, clearly the most culturally important (if perhaps not strategically important) kind of violence – were not the same as expectations for the raid, the ambush or the siege.
To cover all of these points in detail would mean essentially rewriting Roel Konijnendijk’s Classical Greek Tactics (2018) but coming to different conclusions, so I will simply hit what I view as the ‘high points’ that I think synthesize the rules with the exceptions. First, we must take all of the things which are not pitched battle and not ‘war’ in Lynn’s sense and set them aside for now. Colonial wars had different expectations, as did civil wars, as did sieges and so on. We may imagine a single category of ‘violence,’ but the Greeks did not (and we don’t really do so in practice either), as their discourse about war without truces or heralds shows.
While ‘encounter battles’ (where armies blundered into each other) could happen, for the most part hoplite battles largely followed an ‘offer battle’ model: one army formed up on terrain it preferred and the other army could either accept the offer (and attack) or decline (and form up on their own terrain). We’ve discussed this sort of ‘negotiation’ (in the sense of offer-counter-off, not that they’re talking to each other) before. Greek armies seem generally to have preferred relatively open ground in offering battle (famously noted, Hdt. 7.9b.1), but did at times offer battle in narrows or on hills; the use of terrain for advantage was not ever unknown to them (as Konijnendijk rightly notes).
Generally they formed up with the position of honor and thus the general on the right. Konijnendijk presents a list (op. cit., 121-2, table 3) of general placements, 12 on the right, 7 in the center and 10 on the left with one either center or left, which is already right-heavy. But if we sort out the conjectures, things like generals caught mid-speech out of position (Athens at Delion) or ambushed (Sparta at Stratos) or non-leading states given positions of honor because the battle was in their country (Argives at Mantinea) and the like, we end up with something like 12 right, 5 center and 6 left. In short it seems there is an expectation that the right is the position of honor, but an expectation that could be deviated from if needed for tactical or diplomatic advantage. So I find myself taking a softer version of Konijnnedijk’s view: there was an expectation that the right was a position of honor, but it was not an infinitely strong expectation.
The role of light infantry and cavalry at this point – in the Classical period – is more complex. On the one hand, light infantry and cavalry are simply not reported in a lot of these battles. For all of the battles in Thucydides only once does a light infantry skirmish explicitly proceed a pitched hoplite battle (6.69.2-3) and this is in Sicily. Regional distinctions here clearly matter, of course: non-polis regions like Aetolia were mostly light infantry, while Boeotia was famed for its light infantry and Thessaly for its cavalry. By contrast, from Attica southwards, we seem to see the classic very hoplite-heavy armies. The Athenian expedition to Sicily – country in which it would turn out light infantry and cavalry were really important involved an initial wave of 5,100 hoplites, but just 1,300 light infantry and thirty (30!!) cavalry (Thuc. 6.43); later reinforcements would bring up the cavalry numbers to 460, for an army that by then had roughly 10,000 hoplites in it and perhaps 2,600 lights.18 By contrast, we’d expect a standard Roman army of the Middle Republic to have 12,000 heavy infantry (two legions, two alae), 4,800 light infantry and something like 1,200 to 1,800 cavalry.19 The Syracusan cavalry is both better and more numerous but the overall balance of their forces is also remarkably hoplite heavy as presented to us. That is not to say polis armies had no light infantry, far from it. But it is clear that in the poleis south of Boeotia, the trend towards deemphasizing cavalry and light infantry had gone quite a long way.
Determining what these fellows do is also tricky because, as noted, our sources often don’t tell us what they are doing very clearly. That is reflective of a belief by our sources (note Thucydides’ dismissive tone, 6.69.2) – one which continues through to the Hellenistic period and is sometimes made explicit – that while light infantry are very important in irregular engagements (ambushes, sieges, etc; actions like Sphacteria/Pylos), in pitched battles they generally were not decisive.
Konijnendijk, in an effort to understand the role these fellows might have, explores the idea of a ‘cascading charge:’ with cavalry attacking first, followed by light infantry, followed by the youngest, fittest hoplites, followed by the main force. I fear I do not think this point goes as far as Konijnendijk thinks. As has been elsewhere noted, none of the examples given save for an interpretation of Leuctra, involved pitched battles.20 More to the point, Konijnendijk points to Aeneas Taktikos to provide a description of this method, but I don’t think Aeneas is Tacticus is actually describing a pitched battle tactic. What he says is:
For when your supporting force is ready at the appointed place, and the enemy has already scattered for plunder, then and only then you should anticipate [προκαταλαμβάνω, ‘to preoccupy, apprehend before, anticipate, surprise”] their retreat with cavalry, make ambushes [ἐνέδρα] with picked men, and, displaying [ἐπιφαίνω] your light-armed troops, lead your heavy-armed men in formation not far behind those already sent.
(Aeneas Tacticus, 16.7; trans. Illinois Greek Club, with some modifications for clarity)
This is not a recipe for a pitched battle but rather ambushing a force that is looting or foraging in the context of a siege. Moreover, it is also not a cascading attack! The cavalry and picked men are not charging ahead of the main line, but rather heading off retreat or lying in ambush, while the light infantry is displayed or presented [ἐπιφαίνω], which is to say that you are demonstrating with a weak force (perhaps to invite attack) while a far heavier and more formidable force is coming up and your other troops are in ambush positions.
The other reason I have to doubt the regular employment of cavalry or light infantry in this fashion is that Greek hoplite armies were not constructed to this purpose nor well-suited for it. The obvious parallel here is the Roman legion which did imagine a ‘cascading’ attack: light infantry, then the youngest heavy infantry, then men in their prime. But as you will recall from our discussion of it, making that tactical structure work demanded a remarkably complex, ‘fussy’ tactical system with dozens of independent maneuvering units in order to create the lanes to allow each stage in the attack to retreat effectively without disrupting the formation of the line behind them. Greek hoplite armies do not have any of that organization, as Konijnendijk rightly notes.
Instead cavalry and light infantry seem to have had a mostly screening role. Hoplites were potentially vulnerable, after all, to light infantry harassment, but a modest screening force of your own light infantry could prevent this and then get out of the way when the ‘real’ battle was joined. Likewise, light infantry and cavalry were important for foraging and scouting, though it is worth noting that scouting arrangements in polis armies seem to have been pretty modest, reflecting, I’d argue, the meaningful expectation that another polis army is likely to meet them in an offered, pitched battle in a relatively open place, not lie in ambush.
Finally, we have the question of stratagems and trickery. Ruses of war and trickery were certainly not new to the Greeks, but neither are they new to us and yet our ‘discourse’ around the rules of war is so strong we went and codified it into an international legal system far more rigid than anything the Greeks could have constructed. But such tricks and surprises worked precisely because there was an expectation for what war was supposed to look like and there was a lively discourse in antiquity as to if they ought to be practiced or shunned.21 Konijnendijk is thus absolutely correct to note that the ‘Prussian’ ‘rules’ were not absolute, but just because they were not absolute does not mean that they were unreal.
The hoplites’ code, like the pirates’ code, turns out to be more guidelines, or as I prefer the framing here, expectations. Those expectations persisted because many battles did, in fact, resemble them, even as they were occasionally ruptured by trickery which did not and even as the Greeks understood there were zones of warfare either beyond the polis (colonial wars) or within it (civil wars) rather than between poleis, where the expectations did not apply.
Finally, our field clear of light infantry and cavalry, our ruses used (or not), our formations drawn up, we are ready to smash together two opposing lines of hoplite heavy infantry.
How did that work?
As we’ve already discussed, the ‘shoving’ model of the orthodox is simply not workable here. Likewise, if hoplites did not fight as skirmishers in the Archaic period when such light troops still seem to have been quite active on the battlefield, they surely cannot do so now. This must be a shock engagement but therein lies the trickiness because we do not have a good sense of how shock engagements work: modern military writing was very young when the last major shock infantry engagements were being waged and of course film was farther off still.22
First, we need to be aware that practices differed between poleis. Most poleis charged at a run, while the Spartans famously did not (Thuc. 5.70) and we have to imagine – this is a topic for next time – that the emergence of more training and semi-professional mercenaries may have meant different approaches as well.
But it seems like what we might imagine would be typical for a pitched battle (again, that’s an important category; there are other kinds of fight, but the hoplite is, I’d argue, built for this kind), the general would offer a final pre-engagement sacrifice before sounding a charge (using a trumpet). As far as we know, once that order was given, the general – who more often than not was fighting as a hoplite with his men – basically lost control of the battle. The only other easily available signal was ‘retreat.’ Generals could make last minute adjustments (or try to) to their formations – Konijnendijk again (op. cit., 149) very ably catalogs all of the examples (and they often don’t go quite right) – but the phalanx was a ‘dumb-fire missile’ once launched: it went straight forward and broke things. As we’ll look at later, part of this is because of the relative (lack of) training for our hoplites.
Beyond this point, we actually have fairly few details about the mechanics of charge and contact. That may seem strange, but it is actually very typical for pre-gunpowder cultures: what happens in the moment of contact was evidently hard to describe and in any case their intended audience had experienced it and so a detailed, mechanical description was unnecessary. Once the advance was sounded armies might join in a song or chant in the advance called the paean (παιάν); evidently different poleis had different songs.23 Finally, probably right before breaking out into the final charge, the soldiers issued a war-cry, which we can actually somewhat guess at the sound because it has an onomatopoetic word: ἀλαλή (alale, a-la-lay) and an associated verb ἐλελίζειν (elelizein, e-le-li-zane, ‘to issue the war cry’), suggesting it was something like a high-pitched keening or ululation sound.24 It was in this advance that Thucydides reports (Thuc. 5.71.1) the rightward drift of the formation began as men sought to protect their unprotected side; of course however a hoplite stood while fighting, while marching he was head-on to the enemy. Then came the charge.
The orthodox school assumes these men charged into collision, either hoping to physically push through the enemy or else to use their charge to add such impulse to their spears – like ‘horseless lancers’ – to stab through shields and armor. No infantry works this way and we’ve been over the reasons this is not very plausible.

By contrast, Hans van Wees argues hoplites slowed to a stop eis doru (εἰς δόρυ ‘within spear’s reach’). It is striking to me that van Wees offers this specific phrase to underline his point, because both of his examples (Xen. Hel. 4.3.17 and 7.1.31) share something in common which is no one is doing the thing he is describing. Instead, both cases describe an army doing what we would call ‘routing on contact’ – soldiers losing their nerve and turning to run in the split-second before impact. That is not an uncommon moment for cohesion to fail (indeed, in the last period of regular shock warfare scholars regularly observe that infantry almost never actually received a bayonet charge because they would rout on contact or before it).25 Xenophon is not describing hoplites slowing to contact at spear’s reach, he is describing one group of hoplites, seeing that the incoming enemy is not stopping losing their nerve and turning to run at spear’s reach.
That, in turn, is a psychological response that, at least to me, only makes sense if it seems to the soon-to-be-running opponent that the incoming charge will be delivered, not that it will politely stop six or seven feet short. Once again, training for bayonet charges is instructive: quite a lot of generals knew that bayonet charges did not usually result in lots of ‘bayonet fencing’26 but they trained to charge with bayonets, shouting, at full tilt anyway because you needed the other guy to think you intended to plow into him, even if you didn’t, in order to get him to run away.
At the same time, the same psychological pressure is working on the man charging: the same pressure that makes his opponent flee encourages him to slow down. And now we have to remember that both lines are advancing: hoplite armies almost never patiently ‘received’ charges.
I would thus suggest that the outcome at impact probably varied a lot: in some cases both sides lost their nerve and started to slow and the van Wees ‘slow to stop at eis doru‘ probably happened. But I suspect in most cases there is an effort to maintain momentum and cohesion so that the formation at least looks like it is going to crash into the enemy and thus in many cases if neither side blinks it must have done so; at the very least individually brave or foolhardy fellows must have considered putting their shoulder into the dish of their shield and simply impacting to try to throw an enemy down. Given that hoplites were – again, next time – relatively untrained, I imagine you had a bit of all of these options – men slowing to a stop, men slowing and colliding at lower speeds and full speed collisions – all happening up and down the line.
The danger, of course is that this produces something like crowd collapse (once again, Paul Bardunias discusses this) but for formations that are only 4 to 16 men deep and have nothing behind them the release for that pressure is easy enough: the formation can ‘accordion’ back out as men naturally back out of the pressure.27
So we might imagine the two formations first accelerate towards each other. As they near ‘spear’s reach’ one might collapse-at-contact from the psychological pressure, but ideally both are seeking to deliver the charge. That doesn’t mean everyone slams into each other full tilt – most men probably slow down at least somewhat, but we certainly get descriptions of men fighting ‘shield on shield’ suggesting to me that sometimes guys got close enough to make shield-to-shield contact (Tyrtaeus fr. 11 West). Shield-to-shield contact, especially with aspides that can’t extend as far, is a lot closer than ‘measure’ with thrusting spears (and thus a more dangerous place to be) but one can imagine a hoplite carried forward by the momentum of his charge clashing shield-into-shield before pushing back out. I know I keep bringing it up, but watching the movement patterns of Paul Bardunias’ experimental fighting line (below, on the left) I think gives a good sense of how these ranks might close up and accordion back out.

After that initial impact – which again, might range from a slow-to-stop-at-measure to folks slamming into each other, with every variation of those outcomes happening somewhere as the lines meet – assuming both formations remain cohesive, you are going to get a stabbing fight at the front line. I suspect the increasing frequency of this kind of fight is what propelled the development of the ‘all hoplite’ phalanx because lighter infantry would be at an extreme disadvantage in this kind of fight. Close-quarters engagements between heavy infantry and light or even medium infantry tend to be shockingly one-sided both because the heavier armor enables the heavy infantryman to be much more aggressive against his unprotected foe and because the mismatch leads to rapid cohesion collapse.

However, since these are both heavily armored and well-protected lines, the casualties here will be tolerably low, probably around 5% of the total engaged force, which wouldn’t even represent a majority of the front line of an eight-man-deep phalanx (it’d be c. 40% of that line) even if every single casualty was from the front line, and we have to imagine some unlucky second or third line fellows are likely struck either in position or once they move forward to replace a downed comrade.28 This phase simply could not last very long because these formations have no way to ‘trade out’ the front ranks and exhaustion would hit fairly fast. A looser formation might be more able to trade out men, but as Bardunias’ own experiments demonstrate, if you adopted that looser 180cm formation, a tighter 90cm or 60cm formation would cut through it much too quickly.
As Ardant du Picq observes, under these conditions collapse comes not from the front, but from the back: the men in the back can see the carnage, they are stuck with the anxiety and fear of ‘waiting their turn’ but have none of the impetus to action of being in the fight. This kind of fighting is effective, but it pushes human psychology well beyond its intended limits and at some point something must break. Victor Davis Hanson’s ‘gaps and tears’ – break-down from the front – are thus unnecessary for formation collapse. Once basically anyone starts fleeing, cohesion collapse is rapid: every man who turns to run increases the psychological pressure on everyone else and all of these men are near the breaking point. As the formation collapses, the great majority of the killing occurs, probably around 10% or so of the fleeing army killed in the rout, most within a few moments of collapse.
Then the question becomes pursuit. The orthodox generally argue that the ‘rules’ of war and the heavy equipment of hoplites prevented long pursuits, while heterodox scholars29 argue that pursuit was broadly unrestricted. My view here, to be frank, is that they are both half-right. Within the ‘agonal’ war discourse – that is to say, in wars with truces and heralds between poleis – it sure does seem like pursuit after a battle was often limited. Outside of that discourse – wars in colonial areas, in civil wars, during actions other than pitched battle or wars that had broken the ‘truces and heralds’ bonds – pursuit could be and indeed often was long and savage.30 That said even ‘short‘ pursuits could be very bloody indeed if some obstruction or terrain prevented one side from getting off of the field quickly: Greek hoplites had little problem butchering enemies who did not or could not escape after a pitched battle between poleis, even if they might not chase them once they did so.
Notably, when thinking about pursuit, we probably ought to think about the strategic context here and this is a point on which I think the orthodox school may have things almost exactly backwards. The orthodox school imagines a sort of limited, ritualistic warfare dominating the Archaic period which then broke down under the pressures of the Classical period (the heterodox school imagines few limits to such warfare at any period). By contrast it seems to me that if we glimpse Sparta’s early history we can see a different pattern: a series of eventually ‘unlimited’ wars in the seventh century – during what should be the heyday of ritual, ‘agonal’ warfare – which destroy the Messenian polity and reduce its population to slavery. Some time in the mid-500s, they tried the same thing to tiny Tegea, but were defeated a the ‘Battle of the Fetters’ (Hdt. 1.66) and forced to back off their policy of direct conquest. Yet by Thucydides’ day, if not earlier, the idea that a war would extinguish a polis was a shocking breach of norms and expectations: the destruction of Plataea and Melos are major events in his history for this reason.
What I think is happening is not some utterly ancient Archaic ritual warfare, but rather that the emergence of a state system of reasonably well-fortified poleis produces a period of, effectively, ‘Kabinettskrieg‘ in Greece (in the sense of war aims, not in the sense of army structure). What had happened during the age of Kabinettskrieg in the early modern period was simply that the nature of warfare had made vast, sweeping conquests mostly impractical (lots of well-fortified towns were a major factor), so a system of more limited warfare developed, later to be, eventually, decisively disrupted by the Wars of the French Revolution. I think the same thing is happening here: as the Greek state system solidifies around fortified urban centers, war aims get limited because they essentially must. Greek armies, after all, are terrible at siege-craft, not just compared to the feats of later Macedonians or Romans, but even compared to earlier Neo-Assyrian armies. Major walled cities were almost impossible for them to capture with the kind of weekend-warrior militia armies they had, at least until the scale and intensity of the Peloponnesian War enabled modestly effective siege warfare again, at which point the period of ‘Kabinettskrieg‘ started to collapse, breaking those expectations, which in turn we hear about through the discourse and culminating in Philip IIs conquests at the tail end of the Classical period.
To conclude this part then, I think the first step in trying to untangle this debate is to allow our definition of ‘phalanx’ a little more flexibility. The second step is to think in terms of expectations rather than rules, allowing our sense of Greek battle to have a little give in the joints: not the complete no-rules absolute murder-war of the heterodox school nor the ultra-rules-bound inflexible system of the orthodox.
If we were to simplify our model, the Greeks of the Classical period expected pitched battles to be won primarily by engagements with hoplites. Light infantry and cavalry were mostly for other kinds of military action or for distinctly subordinate roles around as much as ‘in’ a pitched battle. Pitched battle in turn was the most culturally important kind and could often be decisive, but was hardly the only sort of military action one might engage in.
In a pitched battle, the polis Greeks expected that both sides would ‘offer battle’ by forming up on terrain they were willing to fight on, eventually arriving on ground they were both willing to risk a battle on, which tended to eventually mean fairly open ground, but not always. They would draw up by detachments – for Greek poleis almost always fought in multi-city alliances in this period – probably with small intervals between them but these were not intended as precision maneuver-units so much as cohesion units (more on that next time). These formations would generally be about 8 men deep, sometimes deeper, sometimes shallower, though 8 seems to have been the normal, expected depth, with each file occupying around 90cm or of width, perhaps getting a bit tighter during that rightward-drift we hear about from Thucydides. The position of honor was the far right,31 but all sorts of expediencies both diplomatic and tactical might cause different dispositions.
Again, expectations, not rules.
Before deployment generals usually offered a sacrifice to the gods to determine if the gods endorsed offering battle. Another sacrifice was made as the deployment completed moments before, which was to please the gods rather than ask for information – it was too late to do much in any case. If light infantry were to do much, they might skirmish against each other during the deployment, before getting out of the way for the main show; cascading attacks were not a thing for pitched battles, for Greeks were not Romans and the hoplite phalanx not a legion. Generals tried to use terrain as much as they could and set out their formations as cleverly as they might and could in some cases give pre-made battle plans, but for the most part these armies were dumbfire missiles. The general signaled the advance, a trumpet rang out and the missile fired; a song was taken up on the advance, punctuated by a shrill war cry as the two advancing lines sped to a charge over the last few hundred meters.
Sometimes a phalanx collapsed before impact, or right in the moment of it, to general disaster. But generally once both sides ascertained that the other was not stopping they likely slowed a bit: individual impacts probably occurred but no mass shoving effort. The ranks probably compacted together and then, to a degree, accordioned out. In place of the shoving othismos, the front ranks probably backed out to ‘measure’ (spear’s reach) and thrust at enemies, with both lines irregularly wavering forward and back as men pushed forward to strike and backed up to avoid enemy strikes. Men who were struck fell and likely tried to crawl or were pulled by their mates back through the line. Behind, the ranks not yet in battle felt their courage slowly wither with the sounds of shouting, the cries of the dying, the sight of wounded comrades.
Eventually, the terror became too much and some of them men, likely men not yet in contact, began to back up. The rout would quickly be contagious as their fellows – every bit as scared and knowing full well that being the last man to retreat in a rout was a death sentence – noticed the weakening cohesion. As the formation collapsed, there was a tremendous burst of killing – we might imagine half of the killing might happen over the several minutes of charge, contact and sparring and the other half in the few seconds of the rout. But most of the retreating men got away: hoplite armies were not well designed for long pursuits and they weren’t expected or generally necessary for pitched battles against other poleis in any case. An enemy so defeated was unlikely to offer battle again soon, clearing the way for a siege or – in the age of ancient Greek ‘Kabinettskrieg‘ – more likely a negotiation over the recovery of dead.
Of course against non-Greeks, or in kinds of battle that were not pitched battles between ‘gentlemen’ hoplites, the rules were quite different, pursuits could be long and Greek armies recognized few if any distinctions between combatants and non-combatants.
That is, more or less, my effort at tactical synthesis. It will not, of course, describe every battle or even exactly describe any battle. Instead, it is an effort to lay out what the expectations were, particularly on the even of the Peloponnesian War (431-404) after which expectations clearly begin to shift and collapse.
Next time we’re going to look at society outside of the battle and talk about how the hoplite fits into the polis: what his social status is, how he is (not) trained and what the implications are for the nature of the polis and indeed how many Greeks there even were.