Shipping 100+ PRs to production in a week

After pushing towards the goal for some time, I finally shipped 100+ pull requests to production in a week, reaching 115 the week of November 9th. Because I’m vain, I’ll cook the numbers slightly to take the highest seven day period rather than calendar week, which up to this point peaks at 170 merged PRs. Of those 170, 17 nuanced and UX-centric PRs were written on a harness running on my laptop, and the remaining 153 were written on Imprint’s internal cloud harness called fleet. About 150 of these were true production PRs that continuously deployed to production (but didn’t necessarily release), and the other 20 were skills, internal tools, and so on.

Weekly commits through 2026, split into authored (solid blue) and co-authored (orange hatched) bars, holding steady around 20-40 per week until a sharp climb starting in September that spikes past 110 in November

Many people in the industry are shipping far more PRs than I am, but I think it’s interesting to discuss how I got here specifically, especially in the context of a fintech company shipping software that’s critical from reliability (members’ lives depend on rapid access to credit), security (members require their credit is kept safe), and revenue (our partners rely on our cards to accelerate revenue) perspectives. We’re also six years old, so we were not built from zero to be an AI-native company, but have instead had to retrofit our approach at each step along the way.

The mental model we worked

Fundamentally, productivity with AI tooling comes down to optimizing the same software development loop we’ve been optimizing since I entered the industry. It’s just that we have many new techniques to optimize that loop, and many things that were previously unattainable for most companies (e.g. formal verification) are now attainable for anyone willing to make a persistent attempt.

The development loop from work to structured issues to pull requests all the way through release

At each step in pushing from 5-10 PRs per week, to 20 per week, to 40 per week, and now to 80-100 per week, it’s been optimizing a new place in this model. At first the problem was lack of structured issues that the harness could use, then it was a low quality of generated pull requests, then it was slow approvals, then it became running out of straightforward work, and so on.

Working the model

With the model at hand, let’s talk through the order of the specific problems that the model revealed in our workflows, and how we’ve solved our bottlenecks:

  1. Modernizing our practices for deployment (CI/CD) and release (feature flags) (December/January ‘26). I’ve written about these steps before, so I won’t belabor them, but we were very bottlenecked on deployment and release until we moved to a standard, modern process for both. Without this work, we would have never hit the subsequent bottlenecks.

  2. Reducing context poison in our knowledge base (February ‘26). After our CI/CD improved, we started to recognize the need to surface our RFCs and PRDs into the context window of the agents developing our software. We quickly realized that much of that context was wrong. Where possible, we moved context directly into our repositories themselves (e.g. terraform to manage cloud configuration so the harness can see the full networking and orchestration setup in addition to the code running on it).

    We also refactored our Notion documentation to ensure every document was largely accurate, and in particular to eliminate wholly inaccurate documents from our knowledge base. This has been running since, reducing the risk of inaccurate information surfacing in context windows, and one of our managers (ty Andrew) has subsequently gone further, adding loops that update stale documentation in our knowledge base based on code changes.

  3. Providing structured issue management with Linear (June ‘26). I’ve also written about this one before, but we had significant friction getting into a unified tool holding all of our issues, and which made it easy to add new issues via a UX, Slack, and agents. We moved the whole company from Jira to Linear in June.

  4. Supporting orchestrated agents instead of running only on a laptop (July to October ‘26). Even with folks running many agents locally, we found two problems. First, there were more tasks than they could work on simultaneously without losing track of them. Second, there were more grooming tasks than expected, for things like dealing with new merge conflicts, responding to comments on pull requests, and dealing with CI/CD failures. We built out the fleet cloud harness to make it possible to run work in the cloud, when your laptop was closed, and triggered by events rather than an emergent system composed of dozens of laptop-local loops.

    Building the first pass of this was quick, but it took longer than expected to get to a level of polish that drove substantial adoption. It had to not only be reliable, it had to be better than the local experience to convince folks it was worth moving. The biggest places we passed that bar were concurrency (run as many as you want), decoupling from laptop (trigger and respond when laptop is closed), MCPs and tools available by default (don’t have to maintain or manage the integrations, especially relevant for non-engineers), and reacting to events rather than polling (always and immediately pick up new comments or build issues).

  5. Standardizing around an internal MCP to reduce human actions and IT burden (September ‘26). Earlier in the year, we rebuilt how we handled configuration into a unified data model managed through a single UX. This substantially eased management, but it still required human involvement for checking and updating values.

    We introduced an internal MCP that offers all the same functionality as that internal UX, while doubling down on that UX’s existing pattern: anyone can propose a draft that gets automated review for safety, but approval of changes is managed via a series of task-specific roles only available via the UX. Now an agent can pull down all values, and can propose updates, but every update remains reviewed and approved by a human with full context. This has substantially increased the ease of management while preserving correctness and safety.

    This internal MCP also means that most folks can rely on it, rather than the numerous downstream per-tool MCPs provided by vendors, for their day-to-day work. For example, we were unlikely to provision everyone onto our feature flag tooling, but now almost no one needs that access since they and their agents can access the data directly.

    This tooling is also available in our Slack agents which has largely eliminated the prior access gates (and limited human expertise) that interfered with diagnosing what might have driven a shift in behavior.

  6. Slow approvals on pull requests (October ‘26). As the volume of pull requests started to creep up, we (like everyone else in the industry) started to run into friction getting approvals.

    We’ve adopted two primary mechanisms to address this. First, we’ve used the small-change approach to streamline a subset of clearly safe changes. Second, we allow some changes made using our cloud harness to be approved by a single person. Both of these have reduced load, with about half of our changes now going through one of these mechanisms, but I think the idea that “approval” was the bottleneck was actually a bit of a misread on the situation: the bigger problem was the quality of the pull requests wasn’t high enough, which we started to work on next.

  7. Using verification to increase confidence in changes and ease review (October ‘26). As some approvals got faster, we found that our agents were still frequently generating pull requests that were hard to approve either because they didn’t fully verify their work, or because it was ambiguous what they had verified. In this case, the bottleneck wasn’t pull request approval, but instead generating approvable pull requests.

    To address that, we adopted pieces of poteto’s pstack to structure how we verified changes. I wrote about adopting the verification pattern previously, and we’ve since then also adopted pstack’s formal verification approach.

    At this point, I largely review verification files and from that decide whether I need to review the pull request in more detail.

  8. Running out of easily addressable work (October-November ‘26). As the quality of verifications increased, it became increasingly fast to verify work. Fast enough that I started to run out of easy work to do. There was still hard work to do, but that required some focused time to set up, and I was pretty sure there was still a lot of easy work out there, it just wasn’t getting logged as structured issues that we could work.

    We solved this bottleneck in several ways:

    • loops to maintain verifications, review recent launches for performance and problems, check for new errors, prune stabilized feature flags, and so on
    • software-factory pattern is a subset of the loop pattern, and has been effective at generating ongoing work on a well-scoped problem. Getting this set up for a specific area requires some focused attention, as does triaging its suggestions, but it’s very much like having a mid-level engineer proactively thinking about a problem. There are a lot of problems where that’s quite valuable
    • events that provide new work. For example, security findings from static analysis, new errors showing up in error logs, customer concerns surfaced in customer support calls, and a distress tool provided to all of our harnesses that allows the harness itself to flag problems to triage

    I’m sure we’ll keep iteratively adding more of these. Many of these are categories of work that we’ve trained ourselves to stop thinking about because it’s valuable but has an insufficient return-on-attention to actually do… but now that’s not true. All this sort of cleanup work is eminently doable.

  9. Improving orchestration with /my-open-work (November ‘26). It seems too small to say, but the major unlock at this point was that orchestrating our issues and cloud harness had gotten too burdensome given the volume of concurrent tasks, and the final major breakthrough that got me to over 100 merged PRs was a skill I run once or twice a day to triage my open work. This can go from autonomously pushing the cloud harness to recover from a failure mode, to scheduling new work onto the cloud harness for new issues, to stepping me through open questions that benefit from human input, to identifying the changes that require my personal review.

    I imagine in a month or two this will be an automated process that happens for all of us every morning, but we’re still feeling through the nuances of doing it by hand.

  10. Accelerating hard work (November ‘26 - ?). The biggest problem we are dealing with now is figuring out how to accelerate hard work. The sort of work that requires deep thinking about partner needs, member experience, fintech nuances, and how the industry is moving. The bottleneck a year ago was development bandwidth, but that’s not true today, and we’re experimenting with the Explorer pattern to allow teams to take advantage of our newfound iteration speed.

Are we done working the model? No, of course not. As things stand today, our three biggest bottlenecks are:

  1. Accelerate our ability to complete hard work. I suspect there’s no end to the ways we’ll benefit from this kind of work
  2. Increase verification coverage to be able to verify even more complex and nuanced pieces of work. As a narrow example, our cloud fleet often creates one-off shims to manipulate feature flags for verification, but we should really provide a reusable tool for it to simulate modifying feature flags to ensure it can easily do so
  3. Improve our ability to facilitate orchestration without human involvement. For example, we should keep improving on our /my-open-work skill, and have it run automatically and push updates for each of us every morning

Based on our latest progress, I’m certain we’ll make substantial progress over the next month, and even more by the end of the year. These do feel like enduring points of optimization, but the bottleneck has continued to move over the course of the year, and I’m sure it’ll move again.

CI/CD is dead! Code review is dead! Etc!

There are a lot of narratives about how CI/CD is dead and so on. Maybe that’s true, I guess? But I don’t personally see a ton of evidence of those sorts of claims yet. Maybe as one gets to 1,000s of PRs per week for each engineer, you reach that point, but I’m a little bit skeptical that it is the expected outcome for the sort of software that Imprint is working on, which has substantial correctness, security, compliance, and partner integration points, along with needing to remain comprehensible to the human beings who rely on the software every day.

This isn’t a hard refutation–best-practice is shifting so quickly these days that I suspect everything we are doing today is long-term wrong–but I’m not a buyer on these memes yet.

Does merged PR per week matter?

No, not really. Merged PRs per week is just a number that asks questions, not a number that answers questions. Many of the PRs I work on are objectively much simpler than the PRs that our senior-most engineers work on. I don’t think that disproves the fact that merging 50x our p50 PRs/week/engineer from a year ago is a fascinating sign of how the fundamentals of software development have changed.

Increasing pay for lower wage workers

From 2014 to 2024, the share of U.S. hourly workers paid below $15 in real terms fell by two-thirds, from 38 percent to 13 percent. Why? We first distinguish the entry and exit of employers—wherein high-paying employers have supplanted low-paying ones—from organizational changes among incumbent employers. Organizational changes can be imposed on employers by external constraints, like labor market tightness, or emerge from the pursuit of new opportunities. Using panel data drawn from administrative records and job reviews, we bring this framework to bear on the recent wage gains at the bottom of the labor market. Contrary to predictions of creative destruction, we can trace only a small amount of these wage gains to the disappearance of low-wage organizations. Instead, the main driver of rising pay was low- and middle-paying incumbent employers of low-wage occupations increasing pay. These gains in low-wage occupations were associated with tightening labor markets and increased minimum wages. But over and above these external constraints, employers also pursued new opportunities for reorganizing work in low-skill jobs. Notwithstanding organizational inertia, major gains for workers’ pay can come from changes in existing workplaces.

That is from recent research by Clem Aeppli, Soohyun Roh, and Nathan Wilmers. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

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AI people are very, very, very, very rich

As you may have heard, Anthropic had its IPO this past Thursday. At a valuation of $1.5 trillion, it was actually just the second most valuable IPO in history, just behind SpaceX at $1.77 trillion. I bought some shares on the first day at what I thought was a reasonable price, only to see my shares drop the following day as the company’s valuation fell to $1.175 trillion, making it only the 14th most valuable company in the world. Such are the risks of buying individual stocks!

But that price drop doesn’t change the fact that Anthropic’s IPO was a staggeringly large wealth creation event. Anthropic began hiring lots of employees just a few years ago; now, almost all of those people have either hundreds of millions of dollars, or tens of millions of dollars. Andrew Benson had a good breakdown of exactly who would get what, if the company hit its initial valuation target of $2 trillion:

Who actually gets rich if Anthropic lists at $2 trillion?…

- $199B for the 7 controlling co-founders, about 10%
- $28B for Ben Mann, if his stake matches theirs
- $100B for the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund, 5%
- $331B in employee options and RSUs, about 17% , That pool covers about 5,300 employees, an average of $62M each…

[H]ere is roughly how many people made what at $2T:

- $110M to $400M each: ~300 to 500 people hired by 2023
- $200M to $300M each: ~440 to 640 hired in 2024
- $70M to $95M each: ~1,360 hired in 2025
- $10M to $20M each: ~3,000 hired in 2026

So about 940 people hired by the end of 2024 average nine figures. Everyone hired since averages eight figures.

The company’s (fully diluted) valuation is now only about 80% of that $2T number, so you have to scale those numbers down a little bit. But it’s still a staggering amount of money for just a few years of work! We’re used to seeing the first few employees at a generational company make hundreds of millions of dollars, but seeing several hundred people make that much is just unprecedented.

Let’s put these numbers in perspective. If Anthropic were worth $2T, it would have more centimillionaires than the entire city of Los Angeles. Even with only 350-400 centimillionaires, that’s about as many as Houston, Dallas, and Austin combined:

By some reckonings, Anthropic now has between 0.5% and 1.3% of all the centimillionaires in the U.S. Collectively, the company’s founders and employees have as much wealth as the entire bottom third of Americans, combined:

Of course, just looking at these numbers tremendously understates the amount of wealth that has been created in the AI industry over the last couple of years. There’s also OpenAI, which is targeting an IPO valuation of $1.25 trillion. And there are quite a number of AI startups that have gotten very valuable, very quickly. Just a few include Isomorphic Labs at ~$50 billion, Cognition at $48 billion, Prometheus at $41 billion, Safe Superintelligence at $32 billion, VAST Data at $30 billion, Reflection AI at ~$27.5 billion, Cohere at $25.5 billion, ElevenLabs at $22 billion, and so on.

And of course, all of this is just today. I wouldn’t have bought Anthropic stock unless I thought the company had a very good chance of becoming much more valuable than it is today. Despite the early price drop, I’m still very bullish. I think AI’s extremely cross-domain capabilities mean that Anthropic has a good shot at being a very large, diversified conglomerate:

Furthermore, I think the company is amassing a huge pool of top human talent, essentially giving them a hedge against a future in which AI continues to be a complement to top human talent rather than a substitute. Almost every smart person I know here in Silicon Valley either works there or has strongly considered working there. That makes Anthropic resemble Google back in 2004, which became a legendary brain trust. If anyone can figure out a way to make boatloads of money with AI, it’s probably Anthropic. And yes, someone will figure out a way to make boatloads of money with AI. Even if that means the company only becomes as valuable as Google or Microsoft is today, that means I’ll more than double my own investment.

If that happens, all of those wealth numbers from the top of this post will also more than double. And if the U.S. economy grows robustly and AI itself grows rapidly as a percentage of that economy, this could easily turn out to be the greatest wealth creation event in American history, by far — greater than the internet, far greater than crypto, greater even than the railroads.

I can definitely feel this wealth all around me. A lot of the people I went to potlucks with three years ago now have an order of magnitude more money than anyone I ever met before I turned 30. Some of those people are under 30 themselves. A few of them are billionaires. Now, when I go to house parties, they’re often in lavish designer-furnished mansions overlooking spectacular ocean views from high up on San Francisco hilltops.

As a social phenomenon, this is totally unprecedented. Sarah Chieng writes:

You can build a startup in 9 months, get acquired (but rly acquihired) by OpenAI, Anthropic, or Cognition, and walk away a multi-millionaire…You can join the right company at 22 and become effectively post-economic…And I don't think we've even begun to grapple with the degree to which this is warping an entire generation's relationship with money, ambition, work, and success…When your peers are making generational wealth before 25, what does a normal career even look like anymore[?]

I’m happy for my friends, of course. And I am not personally bothered by seeing displays of great wealth. But I find myself wondering what this is going to do to my society. If the AI class are the only people who get rich going forward, what kind of tensions will that produce among the country’s elites? What would it mean for America if wealth inequality goes up far further even than it already has?

What if only the AI people get rich?

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w/e 2026-11-22

It seemed like a busy week this week, the first full week of Mary being away. It feels like she’s been away for an age already.

Early in the week I finished the final bits of filling, sanding and painting of various holes in walls, which I wanted to get done before a real decorator arrived on Wednesday – I didn’t want him seeing my amateur attempts in progress.

Then I moved everything but bed and wardrobe out of our bedroom so our friendly local decorator could re-paint that in the latter half of the week. The walls are going from a kind of light beige to white, our default colour. It’s not very imaginative but we like the simplicity and calmness and, with wooden furniture and wooden, or otherwise “warm”-looking floors, it doesn’t feel too clinical. Just painting the woodwork white – which was previously varnished pine (I’m guessing) – has made such a difference and made the place feel much more like “ours” than I expected.


§ On the computer I finished updating December’s Mastodon/Bluesky posts for Samuel Pepys.

And, after putting it off for weeks, then months, I checked in behind the scenes on ooh.directory. I have not had the oomph or attention to even touch it for months but thankfully the fetching of new posts for over 2,000 blogs just carried on ticking over.

But there are always some where that starts to fail: blogs disappear; blogs redesign and move their feeds without a redirect; feeds disappear entirely; blogs continually respond too slowly; mysterious domain errors mean I can’t connect to the blog; and, the most frustrating, anti-bot measures prevent fetching of feeds.

That “403 forbidden” error is an increasing problem, especially with people putting their sites behind Cloudflare (or similar). When that happens I first try using curl_cffi to fetch the feed, instead of a standard request, which gets around some restrictions. But other blogs I eventually just have to give up on and remove from the site because I don’t know what else to try. I’ve submitted my crawler to Cloudflare’s Verified bots in case they accept it and that makes a difference.


§ Car chat… We’re still waiting to pick up our new-to-us Renault ZOE. The car has gone to Renault to have some interior things fixed and they’ve been waiting for the parts.

And we got our first ever recall notice, for the Kia e-Niro whose Battery Monitoring System could potentially have a problem and requires updating. So that’s booked in for a couple of weeks’ time. After the update it’s possible there will be a fault which will require the main battery to be repaired or replaced (at no cost to us). Ugh. In the mean time we hope it won’t burst into flames.


§ We recently got our first battery-powered drill. I bought a mains-powered Bosch hammer drill nearly 25 years ago when I got my first flat. It’s been fine for our very sporadic needs ever since and it didn’t seem worth getting a new drill just to dispense with the cable. Yes, it was a bit of a pain to get it out and plug it in, and probably get an extension cable too, and the cable sometimes got in the way, but why replace something that works?

But, faced with a lot of unscrewing of things recently I decided to take the plunge. The faff with the wired drill meant I usually ended up using a screwdriver instead so I wasn’t even using the drill for a lot of what we could use a drill for. I wasn’t sure that simply being cordless would make that much difference, but worth a try…

It makes a lot of difference. So much easier to carry around and set up and use. I can’t believe I’ve been manually screwdriving all this time. It’s a joy. We’ll keep the old drill because it’s probably a bit more powerful for some things (I’m guessing).

This reminds me of headphones. I didn’t get wireless earbuds for a long time because wired ones seemed fine, sounded good, worked perfectly well. Simply being cordless wouldn’t make that much difference, I thought. But eventually I got some Beats Fit Pros and, as most of you know, it would be annoying to go back now. So much simpler.


§ While not doing manual or digital chores I’ve continued fiddling with Home Assistant. It wasn’t long ago I was thinking, “It sounds like a real time-sink and I have no desire to automate the house.” But now I love tinkering with it (but still don’t want to automate the house).

Last week I spent a lot of time fiddling with this Heat Pump Hydraulic Card, which I ended up liking a bit more than this Heat Pump Flow Card. Working out which of the cryptically-named stats that are emitted from our heat pump’s controller, via a third-party integration, matched up with the often differently-named slots in the card took a while. It is nice to see an animated diagram of the system though.

This week I wanted to improve on the default Home Assistant charts, especially to combine things with different units in the same graph (e.g. °C and kWh), which HA can’t do.

ApexCharts Card looked like the most common recommendation but it hasn’t been updated in over a year and it looks like forks of it aren’t allowed due to the ApexCharts license. So I was wary of going all-in on that.

Lovelace Plotly Graph Card is the other frequent suggestion but, unlike most HA cards, it doesn’t have a nice form for editing its details, relying almost solely on having to edit the underlying YAML code, which didn’t seem like fun.

Then I came across Statistics Graph Chart Card which is amazingly good – incredibly flexible and detailed, great form editor. I created several charts using it but there are things about it that’s unsettling: the developer is anonymous; they don’t accept any pull requests; the JS is minified and obfuscated; it’s only been around since March but is a lot of work; the dev appears extremely responsive to feature requests (good but, again, a lot of work). In the absence of other evidence I’m assuming it’s created with an awful lot of AI which – aside from some perennial moral issues – isn’t necessarily the end of the world. But all of it added together made me uncomfortable relying on it.

Then I found it couldn’t do a chart that didn’t have time as the x-axis, so I needed an alternative… and so I’m now trying the Plotly card. It’s a lot more of a chore to set up charts but past evidence suggests I actually enjoy fiddling with the details of graphs and editing YAML is simpler than the working out how to use D3.js, something I’ve devoted an awful lot of time to slogging through.

One of the nicest things about this time-sink is that it’s only for us (well, mostly me so far), not something I’m doing to share publicly.


§ I wasn’t planning to buy Grand Theft Auto VI immediately, although I was sure I’d get it at some point. But the reviews have been so good, the reactions of the manosphere so hilarious, and my desire to play it while everyone else is too so great, that I succumbed a week after release. Thankfully it “only” took about 24 hours to download over our connection, despite the initial estimate below. I’ve yet to start it yet though.

A photo of a close-up of part of a TV screen showing the text 'Auto VI, 40 h 15 m left'.

§ On telly I watched the first and currently only season of Rooster. It’s quite good, fun. The cast is generally great and really on top of the snappy dialogue. Archie is as weird and dull and unbelievable as Jamie is in Ted Lasso, like a diagram of charisma. And it felt like there was something missing from all the romantic/sexual relationships (not helped by Archie being involved in two of them) – there was little actual connection between people. And after the first few episodes I wasn’t sure what the point was, I didn’t care about what happened. I’m not really selling it am I.


§ Onward. My sister’s staying here a few days so I have some company other than the cat. Hopefully the Renault will get sorted this week, I’ll make HA graph progress, I’ll get back to the gym after an end-of-cycle week of rest, and I won’t entirely lose myself in Vice City.


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Muru

Muru

Graham Dumpleton started mod_wsgi 20 years ago, and has been thinking about the ideal way to serve Python web applications in production ever since.

Muru is his new, AI-assisted Rust server that aims to provide the best possible tools for running ASGI and WSGI Python apps both in development and production.

As he did with wrapture, he's been publishing an extraordinarily detailed account of the project as he works on it - as part of his development process.

Here's everything he's published so far, all in the last three weeks:

That post about AI as a lifestyle choice is particularly worth a read:

The AI may be doing a lot of the work on the surface, but deciding what isn't good enough yet is still down to me, and twenty years of getting things wrong with mod_wsgi turns out to be useful for that. I am prepared to put in the hard work to keep polishing Muru until it is something I would trust, and something you would too.

Tags: graham-dumpleton, modwsgi, python, wsgi, ai, rust, asgi, generative-ai, llms, ai-assisted-programming

llm-gemini 0.38.1

Release: llm-gemini 0.38.1

Gemini 4 Carbon only supports low, medium and high reasoning levels - but Gemini 4 Hydrogen and Gemini 4 Neon both have an extra xhigh level.

I missed that when I added those models to the llm-gemini plugin, which is now fixed in this dot release.

The xhigh setting for Hydrogen makes a significant difference. I updated my Gemini 4 comparison grid - note how Hydrogen at high used 5,311 output tokens and cost 3.99 cents, but the same model at xhigh used 31,477 output tokens, cost 23.61 cents, and produced a pelican that's competitive with Gemini 4 Neon:

Screenshot of a comparison table of illustrations of a pelican riding a bicycle, generated by three models at two thinking levels. Column headers: Thinking, gemini-4-carbon, gemini-4-neon, gemini-4-hydrogen. Row XHIGH: gemini-4-carbon cell is empty and reads "Unsupported". gemini-4-neon shows a detailed white pelican with a large orange beak riding a red cruiser bicycle along a beachside road, a fish in the wicker basket on the handlebars, with sea, a sailboat, clouds and sun behind, captioned "40 input tokens, 26,546 output = 39.83 cents · 3m 47s". gemini-4-hydrogen shows a similar pelican on a teal bicycle on a sandy beach with a blue fish in the basket, captioned "40 input tokens, 31,477 output = 23.61 cents · 2m 36s". Row HIGH: gemini-4-carbon shows a pelican wearing a sailor hat riding a red cruiser bicycle with a fish in the basket beside the sea, captioned "40 input tokens, 20,305 output = 20.31 cents · 4m 11s". gemini-4-neon shows a pelican on a simpler red bicycle on a dark asphalt road with yellow dashed lines and the sea behind, captioned "40 input tokens, 9,691 output = 14.55 cents · 1m 11s". gemini-4-hydrogen shows a plainer, flatter pelican on a red bicycle over a green strip of ground with no basket or sea, captioned "40 input tokens, 5,311 output = 3.99 cents · 19s".

Tags: gemini, llm, llm-reasoning, pelican-riding-a-bicycle, ai, llms, google, generative-ai

Sunday assorted links

1. Jonathan Yardley, RIP (NYT).  One of the great book reviewers.

2. Summary of the RH proof.

3. A site collecting my talks and links.

4. Humans were never in control.

5. The Buddhist AI cult? (New Yorker)

6. Teortaxes on user data vs. curated data.

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Claude Watermarks Your Words, and You Can’t Check Them (Yet)

I love using AI as a writing tool. But like I wrote in “Why Does AI Write Like Yoda?,” it’s not because AI is a good writer. In fact, it’s pretty bad at writing, and I edit absolutely everything it generates, so the end result is basically unrecognizable compared to what it created. Unfortunately, just because AI is, on average, a pretty lousy writer, that doesn’t stop people from using AI to write all sorts of things that people end up reading, and that’s how we end up with slop.

That’s where watermarking comes in. If AI-written text carries a hidden signal that a machine can pick up, someone could build slop filters with it and add a little friction to mass-producing AI text and stuffing it into every nook and cranny of the internet and, maybe, manage to keep some spaces on the internet for people. (Anthropic and OpenAI give a more official reason: the EU AI Act now requires them to mark AI-generated content in a way machines can read. I don’t know how they feel about slop.)

The upshot is that almost everything Claude writes now carries a hidden watermark. A slop filter needs a way to check for the watermark. And, unfortunately, for the time being, only the big AI companies and a few organizations they’ve approved can check for it.

Anthropic’s support page on marking AI-generated content now reports all of its newest models, and some older ones, watermark their text on every surface where you can use Claude, worldwide. (Bruce Hopkins covered what Anthropic announced here on Radar.) Google has used a text watermark in its Gemini app since 2024, and in October OpenAI announced it’s adding one to ChatGPT and Codex text in the EU. But none of those companies lets the public check text with its detector. (Google’s synthid.com lets anyone check images, video, and audio for its watermark, including images made with ChatGPT, but it won’t let you check text from any AI lab.)

I’ve read articles about watermarking, but I didn’t really know much about how it worked. So I did what any good developer would probably do: I took a shot at reasoning about it, and I came up with what I thought was a plausible way watermarking could work, based on what I know about how large language models work. And, strangely enough, it turned out I was basically right, and not because I’m some sort of amazing genius. It’s because watermarking is actually pretty straightforward, and if you know how the output part of an LLM works, you can probably design a decent watermarking system yourself.

The reason I’ve got such a big interest in how models work right now is my next O’Reilly book, a deep dive into how models work called Be the Model, which we’re planning on releasing early next year. I’ve spent a lot of time over the last year thinking really hard about how to explain the internals of LLMs, and it turns out that you don’t need to understand most of the parts inside a model to see how watermarking works. All you need is the very tail end.

So let’s try an experiment. I’m going to describe the relevant bits of how models work, and then, before I explain how watermarking works, I want you to take a guess and see how close you come.

The only part of the model you need

There’s a lot of stuff that happens inside a model. You’ve probably heard of transformer blocks, and you might know what a context window is. That’s all part of the whole machine. But at its core, a model is a next-word-predicting machine: You feed it a bunch of text as context, and it predicts the next word. The part that matters for watermarking is what goes into that machine and what comes out.

What goes into the machine is tokens. We all know that when you pay an API bill, you pay some number of dollars per million tokens, but we don’t always explain what a token is. Remember when people discovered that AIs were really bad at counting the r’s in the word strawberry? Part of the reason for that is that the AI never sees letters. It only works with numbers.

Every model has a fixed vocabulary of tokens, which are every word and piece of word it knows, and each token has a number called its token ID. On the way into the machine, a tokenizer splits your text into tokens and replaces each one with its ID. For example, if you ask GPT-2 (an early LLM created by OpenAI in 2019) “how many r’s are in strawberry,” its tokenizer turns the word strawberry into a single token, number 41236. The model gets that number, not the letters s-t-r-a-w-b-e-r-r-y, so it doesn’t have any actual letters to count.

Common words usually get a token of their own. But a word that isn’t in the vocabulary gets split into smaller pieces that are, which is how a tokenizer can handle any text you give it. GPT-2’s vocabulary has a token for "strawberry" with a space in front of it, but not for "strawberry" without the space. So if strawberry is the very first word of the text, with no space in front of it, the tokenizer splits it into three pieces that are in the vocabulary: st, raw, and berry.

GPT-2 has 50,257 tokens in its vocabulary. If you have Python and install the Hugging Face transformers library, you can check GPT-2’s vocabulary size and strawberry tokens with this command:

python3 -c "from transformers import AutoTokenizer; 
t=AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained('gpt2'); print(len(t)); 
print(t.tokenize(' strawberry'), t.tokenize('strawberry'))"

If you don’t have Python or don’t feel like installing transformers, you can go to ChatGPT, Claude.ai, or Gemini and paste that command in, and they’ll (probably) install the library and run it for you. It should print 50257, then ['Ġstrawberry'] ['st', 'raw', 'berry']. The Ġ is how this tokenizer writes the space. (If you don’t have PyTorch installed, you’ll see a warning about it first, which you can ignore.)

The token IDs go into the context window, which is just a big array of numbers, and then the AI does its thing. The context window contains every token the model sees when it’s making its next-word prediction. If you’re using a chat, it usually includes the whole conversation so far (your earlier prompts and the AI’s earlier responses) plus any instructions or files the chat app adds behind the scenes. When you send a new message, it typically gets added to the end of the context window, as does every token the AI writes in reply, so the window keeps growing as the conversation goes on (up to a size limit, at which point the app has to compact or drop older parts of it).

What comes out the other end of the machine is a probability for every token in the entire vocabulary: the model’s estimate of how likely each one is to be the next token, with all of them adding up to 100%.

The model’s job ends at the probabilities, and it never picks a word. Picking the next token is the job of a separate program called the inference runtime, or runner. The runner can take the most likely token every time, or it can roll the dice and pick a token at random, giving each one a chance that matches its probability. We’re used to thinking of AI as nondeterministic: give the same AI the exact same prompt 10 times in a row and you’ll get 10 slightly different answers, sometimes wildly different answers. That randomness is all done in the runner. Give the model the same context window and it produces the same probabilities. Then the runner adds the token it picked to the context window and runs the model again to get the next one.

Can you guess how a simple watermark works?

If you wanted to hide a pattern in an AI’s text that you could detect later, and all you could touch was the probabilities or the runner’s dice roll, how would you do it?

Here’s what I guessed. I’d divide the tokens into two groups, then I’d nudge up the probabilities for one group and nudge down the probabilities for the other. Then, since I’d know which tokens are in the favored group, I could do some pretty basic statistical analysis to figure out whether they show up more often than they should, and if they do, the text is probably watermarked.

That turns out to be a real, well-known watermark called the green list method, from a 2023 paper by John Kirchenbauer and his colleagues at the University of Maryland, “A Watermark for Large Language Models.” They called the favored group a green list, and the rest of the vocabulary a red list. Right before it picks, the runner gives every green token’s probability a boost. The red tokens never get touched, but each one’s share goes down, because the probabilities still have to add up to 100%.

Here’s an example. Say a tiny model only knows five words (cat, tree, the, by, and sat), and it has just read the word the, so it’s predicting the next word. The first probability column shows the probability the model gives each of its five words. Now say tree and by are on the green list for this spot, so the runner boosts those two before it picks. The second probability column shows the probabilities after the boost:

next wordprobability beforeprobability after the boost
cat56.3%37.9%
tree20.7%37.9%
the12.6%8.4%
by7.6%13.9%
sat2.8%1.9%

Tree is now tied with cat. The model produced the same probabilities as before, and the runner boosted two of them after the model was done.

My guess missed an important detail, though. The green list can’t be the same every time the runner picks a token. If it were, the same favored words would show up all over the text, and anyone who read enough of it could work out which ones they were. So the runner determines the green list for each token using a secret key mixed with the token right before it. To check for the watermark, take each token in the text, use the key and the previous token to rebuild its green list, and check whether the token is on it. If the green list is half the vocabulary, you’d expect about half the tokens in ordinary text to be green by chance. In watermarked text, a lot more of them are green. A statistical test tells you how unlikely it would be to get that many green tokens by chance. You don’t need the model to check, just the key and the tokenizer.

SynthID: What Claude actually uses

Anthropic says Claude’s watermark is a version of SynthID-Text, a method Google DeepMind published in Nature in 2024 and uses in its own Gemini app. It works in the runner, just like the green list, but it gets the pattern into the text a different way. Anthropic describes it as a watermark that “only changes the source of the randomness used to pick among words.” So my guess was a real method, but Claude uses a different one.

Here’s the basic idea. Instead of boosting some words’ probabilities, the runner rolls its dice a few times, so it ends up with a few candidates for the next word. Then it flips a coin for each candidate. Whether the coin comes up heads or tails depends on the secret key, the candidate word, and the few words right before it, so anyone with the key can flip the same coin later and get the same result. The runner writes a candidate whose coin came up heads. If every candidate is the same word, there’s nothing to choose between, so the watermark only gets into the spots where the model had a real choice.

To check a text, a detector with the key goes through it word by word, redoes each coin flip, and counts the heads. Ordinary text comes up heads about half the time, and watermarked text comes up heads more often. The real detectors do more than count, but that’s the idea.

That’s kind of involved and hard to picture from a description alone. Luckily, I’ve got a better way for you to understand how watermarking works.

Be the Watermark

I mentioned that my new book, Be the Model, will be out next year. It starts from the fact that AI tools have gotten incredibly sophisticated, even the web chats like ChatGPT and Claude.ai. They can run Python code for you, and they can write an entire interactive HTML page from a single prompt. So why not use them as learning tools?

That’s one of the main ideas behind the book. You’ll use AI tools to create web pages (which I call “toys”) that let you play with different parts of LLMs, and that helps you get an intuitive feel for how they work. The toys let you literally do part of the job that a model does, so you learn how a model works by being the model.

Each toy starts with a short prompt and a picture of what the page should look like. I figured that for this article, you could build a toy to Be the Watermark. I think this is actually a good way to get a feel for how SynthID actually works.

Save the picture below, then copy the prompt under it, and paste them both into a fresh ChatGPT or Claude.ai chat. (In the book, you aren’t handed canned prompts; you come up with most of them yourself.)

Once the AI finishes building it, you’ll have a page with a short story and a secret key, 3 1 4 1 5. Most of the words in the story have a dropdown with near-equivalent words, like creek, pond, lake, and pool. Click Run, and the page checks the story the same way a detector does. It goes through the story one word at a time and flips each word’s coin. To flip the coin, it multiplies the token IDs of that word and the four before it by the five key digits, adds them up, and calls it heads if the last digit is 5 through 9. (In the toy, a word’s token ID is just its position in an alphabetical list of every word on the page.) In the picture, the page is checking creek. The five words tabby, rested, by, the, and creek have token IDs 62, 48, 8, 63, and 11. Multiplied by the key digits 3, 1, 4, 1, and 5, that’s 186 + 48 + 32 + 63 + 55 = 384, and the last digit is 4, so creek comes up tails. Then the page counts the heads. The starting story comes up heads on 14 of its 32 coin flips, which is about half, so the page shows “No watermark found.”

Paste this four-paragraph prompt along with the picture into your favorite AI (it works great with ChatGPT):

Build one HTML page with a white background that works like the attached picture. Make all of the text, including the button labels and the key digits, a dark color with high contrast against its background. A word’s token ID is its position, counting from 0, in an alphabetical list of every different word in the story and the dropdowns. Ignore case and punctuation.

The story starts: On a sunny day, the tabby rested by the creek. A duck glided over the water. The dog ran to the beach and barked. The toad jumped onto a rock. The bird sang in the tree.

Each word after the first four that’s in one of these groups gets a dropdown with its group: cat/kitten/kitty/tabby, sat/rested/waited/stayed, by/beside/near, pond/lake/pool/creek, duck/goose/swan, swam/paddled/floated/drifted/glided, across/over, dog/puppy/hound/pup, ran/raced/dashed/hurried/rushed, to/toward, shore/bank/beach, barked/yapped/growled/howled, frog/toad, jumped/hopped/leaped/sprang, onto/upon, rock/stone/log, bird/robin/sparrow/wren, sang/chirped/tweeted/whistled, in/from, tree/oak/elm/maple. In an open dropdown, every option shows whether its coin comes up heads or tails in that spot with the current key; a closed dropdown shows just the word.

The coin flip is the sum in the picture: the key digits times the token IDs of the four words before and the word itself. If the sum’s last digit is 5 to 9, it’s heads; 0 to 4 is tails. Check the story one word at a time, starting with the fifth word, animating each product and the growing sum, highlighting the word and the four before it, and counting the heads. A full run takes about 10 seconds. When the check finishes with at least 60% heads, animate a checkmark badge reading “Watermark detected” beside the heads count; otherwise show “No watermark found.” Changing the key or a word clears the heads count. Use only Step, Run, and Reset buttons. Reset keeps the key and the words.

Your job is to be the watermark. When you open a dropdown, it shows whether each word in it would come up heads or tails in that spot with the current key. Swap some tails words for heads words and run the check again. When at least 60% of the coin flips come up heads (20 of the 32), the page shows a “Watermark detected” badge. Every time you pick a heads word from a dropdown, you’re doing the runner’s job. The one difference is that the runner can only choose among the few candidates its dice rolls turned up, so sometimes there are no heads word to pick.

It’s a little harder than it seems because when you swap one word, it changes the coin flips for the next four words too. Each word’s coin flip uses that word and the four words before it, so the word you just swapped is part of the next four sums, and any of those coin flips can come out differently. A few things to know:

  • A swap never changes the coin flips for words before it, so it helps to work from left to right, the same way the runner writes.
  • A swap can cost you a heads on a word that doesn’t have a dropdown, like the or water. The only way to fix one of those is to change a word before it.
  • If you go back and change an earlier word, some of the words you already picked might now come up differently, so check the dropdowns again.

See if you can get the page to show a watermark for your story.

Once you get the badge, change the last digit of the key to 6 and run the check again. Your heads count will probably drop back toward half and the watermark badge will disappear, even though the watermark is still there, because the page is checking with the wrong key. (A story can still pass with the wrong key by chance.)

You’ll also notice that the first four words, “On a sunny day,” don’t have dropdowns, and the check doesn’t start until the fifth word. A coin flip needs a word and the four words before it, so the first four words don’t have enough words before them to flip a coin.

If you want to see the math for a particular word, ask the AI that built the page how it calculated whether that word comes up heads or tails. It should walk you through the token IDs, the key digits, and the sum. And if the animation feels slow, you can ask it to redo the page so the animation runs faster. To get the original story back, reload the page.

The toy’s vocabulary has 75 words, and 48 of them, like pool and puppy, don’t show up in the starting story. They’re the near-equivalent words in the dropdowns. A real model’s vocabulary works the same way because it’s fixed ahead of time and any one passage uses only a small part of it.

A story this short also shows why real detectors work better on longer text. With 32 fair coin flips that don’t affect each other, you’d get at least 60% heads about one time in 9, so a badge on a story this short doesn’t prove much. Over hundreds of words, the odds of that proportion of heads by chance get very small.

The toy is a lot simpler than the real thing. Real token IDs aren’t alphabetical. Real SynthID uses a much bigger key, mixes the key and the words together with a hash function instead of a sum, and plays several rounds of coin flips for every word instead of one. And its detectors weigh those rounds differently and are trained on watermarked and ordinary text for each key, instead of just counting heads.

Why you can’t check it yet

You just did the thing the AI companies are worried about. With the key, you could see which words came up heads and swap them, and the same trick works in the other direction: Someone with the key could strip the watermark out of AI text or write text that’s heavy on heads on purpose and make something a person wrote look like Claude wrote it. If the companies made their keys public, someone could easily write a watermark detector for your favorite text editor that fixed the text to remove the watermark, and that would defeat the whole purpose.

That’s likely why they keep their keys to themselves, and why right now only they and a few organizations they’ve approved can check for the watermark. I don’t know whether or not I agree with that reasoning, but I can understand that the issue is complicated. In the meantime, I’m applying for access to Claude’s detector (hence the “yet” in the title of this article).

What Happened to Silicon Valley?

On October 16, 2026, I delivered the second Annual Margaret Levi Lecture in Political Economy  in conjunction with the AI and History conference at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. This is my original lecture as written, which incorporates material from many pieces I’ve written over the years. As delivered, I departed significantly from the script, as you can see from the embedded video below or the transcript that you can see at the link above.

It’s an honor to give a lecture in Margaret Levi’s name. I’ve been asked to reflect on the changes in the political economy of Silicon Valley throughout my 40-plus year career in and about it, and I can’t imagine a better framing for my remarks than Margaret’s vision.

Margaret understood that advances in our ability to work together are essential to a better future. Cooperation is the human superpower. She also asks what happens when the systems of cooperation we have constructed over time stop holding up their end of the bargain.

That is very much the question that Silicon Valley is facing today. An industry that pioneered advances in collective intelligence at scale used to engender love from its customers because of the way it solved new problems in their lives. It now too often inspires fear and loathing. How did things go so wrong?

The web I thought we were building in 1993

But let me start with my own history. I started my company more than 40 years ago with a $500 initial investment. We took in no venture capital, and we built a business that now generates hundreds of millions of dollars in profitable annual revenue, funded by customers who love our products and pay us for them. We got there the slow way, through steady organic growth. That is quite anathema to the rush to the top of whatever appears to be the latest hill that seems to characterize Silicon Valley today. Even when climbing that hill traps a company at a local maximum, the hope is to get to payday before the industry moves on to the next hill.

My original corporate goal was stated as simply “Interesting work for interesting people.” That evolved into two principles: “Change the world by spreading the knowledge of innovators,” and “Create more value than you capture.” Those principles shaped not only my company but what I expected the internet to be. When we launched GNN, the Global Network Navigator, in 1993, it was the first web portal and the first ad-supported site on the World Wide Web, and for two years it was the place people went to find other sites. What we built was a machine for pointing you at the best of what other people had made, and then getting out of your way.

Even our idea of advertising was not what you think of today. It was inspired by direct mail advertising, where you’d read articles in a print magazine or look at accompanying ads, and then you’d call an 800 number or circle a number on a “bingo card” that you’d send in to the publisher so that the advertiser could send you a brochure. I realized that the web would be a good replacement for that awkward system, that every company ought to have its own website that provided more information about its products and services. What we invented was not the “grab your attention” kind of advertising. It was all about utility, and sharing information that customers really wanted and needed. In short, it was the commercial web, which no one any longer thinks of as advertising, even though it is the most durable and useful kind.

The commercial web was only a small part of what the web became. The web was the playground of amateurs, not entrepreneurs. It was a marvelous collective work of human imagination, creativity, sharing, and ultimately (though that became toxic only later), competition for attention. Our hand-curated catalog of the best websites was soon surpassed by algorithmic solutions like those provided by Google. The amount of content produced was far larger than purely human curation could manage. It was an early example of what Richard Sutton was later to call “the bitter lesson” in his analysis of AI training.

In my 2005 essay “What Is Web 2.0?” I described how the companies that survived the dotcom bust had all, in one way or another, figured out how to help people navigate the resulting information explosion at scale. As Herbert Simon noted in 1971, an abundance of information leads to a scarcity of attention. In the face of increasing information abundance, he predicted that we would use machines to help us better allocate our time and attention. And so it has transpired: Information has become so abundant that it defies manual curation. Instead, powerful, proprietary algorithmic systems use the data they collect to match users with the answers, news, entertainment, products, applications, and services they seek. Today’s AI is in many ways a continuation of this arc.

I called this “harnessing collective intelligence.” All of it was, in economic terms, a set of remarkable advances in networked, data-enabled market coordination. It felt like a public good even when it was privately owned.

Hal Varian, formerly Google’s chief economist, once told me that only about 6% of Google search result pages carry any advertising or are otherwise monetized by Google. The other 94% were served up by search in a glorious demonstration of abundance, the surplus of value created over value captured. And while many of the pages themselves were commercial, even more were the product of the joyful exuberance of humanity, people creating and sharing for the joy of it. Google’s algorithm matched that creation to the people who wanted it, with no price involved anywhere in the transaction. Forty thousand times a second, Google’s organic search algorithms were performing the coordination that twentieth-century economists thought could only be done by self-interested actors haggling over prices. And for Google’s first decade and a half, the priced market of advertising ran alongside organic search as a sidecar, not the engine.

That’s the Silicon Valley I signed up for. Some of this is nostalgia. The early web had plenty wrong with it, its share of greedy hustlers and hypesters. But value creation for both users and suppliers was the winning strategy. Companies won by solving real problems for their customers. Investors won when the company delivered on their promises. Unfortunately, that didn’t last.

The turn to the dark side

Google, a company once known for “Don’t be evil,” now faces the same surveillance-capitalism charges as Facebook, a company that never made any such promise. On Google, advertising now pushes organic search far down the page. Especially on mobile, you often scroll through pages of ads from national chains before you reach the site that has the best answer to your question. And in today’s AI-mode search, even the content is served up directly by Google, with far less traffic sent on to the sites that provide it. Likewise, Amazon, which used to call itself the most customer-centric company on earth, now puts sixteen ads and four organic results on a typical search results page. Sometimes, it may take scrolling past three screens of results to reach the first organic search result. And by “the first organic search result,” I mean “the best guess of the company’s smartest algorithms for what the user is actually looking for.” In former times, that was the top result. No more.

The reason isn’t that good people turned bad. It’s in the overriding economic incentives of today’s shareholder capitalism. The extractive behavior the tech giants exhibit has been the norm for modern companies since Milton Friedman reset its objective in 1970, in a sentence that became doctrine: “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.” Harvard Business School, through the work of Meckling and Jensen, enshrined that view not only into corporate law but executive compensation. Whatever people’s original motives, the logic of the market eventually prevails, except in extraordinary cases. In his recent book Incorruptible, Eric Ries describes a set of institutions, norms, and guardrails that can help to safeguard the values of a company, but you can count on your fingers and toes the high profile companies that have successfully deployed them to resist the market. Even tax policy rewards capital appreciation by taxing it at a much lower rate than labor income.

Our corporations and the financial markets that govern them and reward them are a kind of machine, what the science fiction writer Charlie Stross calls a “slow AI.” We built it. We set its objective function to reward shareholders and ignore everyone else. And then we tell everyone that it is a marvelous self-correcting system. This is an illusion. As I put it in “We Have Already Let the Genie Out of the Bottle,” an essay I wrote for a Rockefeller Foundation workshop on regulating AI:

Attempts at governance are futile until we recognize that we have built a machine and set it on its course. Instead, we pretend that the market is a natural phenomenon best left alone, and we fail to hold its mechanism designers to account. We need to tear down and rebuild that machine, reprogramming it so that human flourishing, not corporate profit, becomes its goal.

If the problem were just villains, you could fix things by firing them or shaming them or suing them or otherwise holding them to account. But if the problem is the design of the entire system, everyone is eventually incentivized to seek the same result. The machine rewards outsized growth of revenue and profit and brutally punishes any slowdown. Not only that, stock options tie every employee’s fortune to that reward.

Criticizing a company for turning extractive isn’t really about the values of a company or the character of its executives and employees, it’s about the incentives that have been given to them.

Rising tide rents and robber baron rents

Silicon Valley is a mirror of what’s wrong with our economy and our corporate governance, not the cause of it, and not even the worst exemplar. Tobacco, oil, pharma companies, and far too much of Wall Street vie for that spot. But Silicon Valley is a great place to study what went wrong, because companies rise and fall so quickly, making them the equivalent of laboratory mice or flatworms, where patterns can be quickly identified and followed across generations.

A few years ago, I found a useful language for describing what I was seeing in the theory of economic rents.

The essential idea is that when the reward accruing to an actor is larger than their contribution to value creation, the difference is rent. To the classical economists, to Smith and Ricardo and Mill, living in a world of inherited privilege, rents were not a temporary aberration on the way to equilibrium. They were both a persistent consequence and a persistent source of inequality. Joseph Schumpeter had a different idea, that disproportionate profits can be a reward for innovation. An innovator can earn outsized profits during the expansive phase of a new technology, when it’s solving new problems and creating value not just for consumers but for a whole ecosystem of suppliers and intermediaries and even competitors.

When economists talk about rent-seeking today, though, many of them mean what George Stigler called “regulatory capture” and what the public choice school built into its doctrine: rents extracted through government intervention at the behest of those who lobby officials and bureaucrats to get their way in despite the free market.

The rents I want to talk about are a different animal. They are collected in the market, not around it, by private firms with enormous power, whose power is unchecked precisely because the government has stepped back.

For my purposes here, speaking about the rents that accrue to Silicon Valley companies, I divide them into two rough categories.

The first is what I call rising tide rents. This fits with the classical idea of rent as a reward accruing to an actor that is larger than its contribution to value creation, but it is a virtuous kind, a kind of communal value creation, often the result of positive government interventions. Consider the rise in home prices that accrues to a homeowner who lives in a neighborhood that is improved by better schools or improved roads, which then may lead to new shops and restaurants or the home improvements made by neighbors. This is also a kind of unearned income. Everyone shares the improvements in quality of life. But homeowners get something bigger, the unearned income from the appreciation in home value.

In a similar way, leading companies make massive improvements to the neighborhood, so to speak, and we all benefit. I should point out that government plays a significant role in these improvements. It’s easy to forget the NSF grant that funded the research that became Google, the loan guarantees that made Tesla possible, and government as the founding customer for SpaceX’s commercial launch services. It’s a rising tide that lifts all boats, and the fact that the market leader takes the biggest share of it is not, to my mind, a scandal. But Schumpeter thought those outsized profits would eventually be competed away as knowledge diffuses through society. What is a scandal is the way that Business Strategy 101 and corporate governance today teach companies to build moats and barriers to keep profits high even when the company stops earning rewards by innovating and better serving customers.

Companies do this by turning to the second category of rents, which I call robber baron rents, the income above a competitive rate that gets collected because of asymmetries in power, the way the medieval baron’s troops collected their share of the harvest whether or not the baron had contributed anything to growing it.

The same company can collect both kinds of rent at different stages in its lifecycle. As far as I can tell, the shift from one to the other is close to a law of the technology business cycle. The rising tide doesn’t last. Once the growth of a new market slows, the now-powerful incumbents can no longer rely on new users and a vibrant ecosystem to sustain their extraordinary profits. So they turn to extraction. They use their market power to hold on to their now-customary level of profit in the face of competition that ought to be eating it away. Cory Doctorow came up with a catchy name for this. He calls it enshittification.

Two economies, two sets of rules

There’s another problem with Silicon Valley and the economy writ large.

At one point in early 2021, when Elon Musk first became the richest person in the world, Bernie Sanders tweeted about it, contrasting Musk’s fortune with the frozen federal minimum wage. Bernie was right that the comparison was shocking. But he was wrong to imply that Musk’s wealth came from profits extracted at the expense of Tesla’s workers. The median Tesla worker makes considerably more than the median American worker, and up to that time, Tesla had few profits to extract. Musk didn’t hoard Tesla’s profits like a robber baron of old. He won a different kind of game.

Musk was paid in what the financial writer Jerry Goodman, writing under the pseudonym Adam Smith, called “supermoney.” The essence of Goodman’s insight is that any company that has been financialized through stock issuance is valued today as if it were already delivering the decades of future earnings reflected in its stock price. This is another of those ideas that help you to see the world in a new way. Once you realize that owners of capital are literally living in a different economy from those who earn income from their labor, you start seeing two different economies operating under two completely different sets of rules.

There’s the operating economy, where companies make and sell products and services and earn a profit by, as Nick Hanauer and Eric Beinhocker put it, solving human problems. And there’s the betting economy, where wealthy people bet on which companies will win the beauty contest that the stock market has become. In the operating economy, a dollar is a dollar. The neighborhood dry cleaner earns one dollar of profit and has that one dollar to spend. In the betting economy, a dollar of profit becomes many dollars of market value. At the time when Musk first became the world’s richest man, a dollar of Tesla profit turned into roughly $600 of stock market value. A dollar of Amazon profit at that time was worth about $67. A dollar of Google profit, about $34. The local business that isn’t financialized gets only $1.

That gap is one of the biggest unacknowledged drivers of inequality in this country, and it’s why one slice of society has gotten so much richer in recent decades while everyone else languished. Most rich people—and really, all holders of capital assets—live in the supermoney economy, where our assets are valued as if the future had already arrived and can be borrowed against, tax-free, today. This is the ultimate unearned income, or rent. Most everyone else lives in the dollar economy. If you’re a public-company executive paid in stock, or a venture capitalist, or an entrepreneur lucky enough to place in the financial horse race, you live in the other one, and you get a large interest-free loan from the future.

The betting economy, within reason, is a good thing. Speculative bets on the future are how we fund innovation and build infrastructure ahead of the prosperity it will bring. Tesla is a real company building real factories and real charging networks, and it kick-started a genuine transition to renewable energy. SpaceX and Starlink likewise required massive amounts of capital. And now AI has dwarfed even those bets.

Carlota Perez has shown that bubbles are a normal part of how revolutionary technologies get adopted. I’m not against betting. I’m worried about what we bet on, and what will be left over when the bubble pops.

Hype is a big problem in the casino

If your biggest lever for wealth creation is not in the market for real goods and services, but in the market for future expectations, it’s easy to continue down the slippery slope to making money by manipulating those expectations. And that’s the road Silicon Valley has charged down.

Sam Bankman-Fried captured the zeitgeist with his line “Number go up.” Silicon Valley has gotten addicted to value capture without value creation. Think about it: 75 to 80% of IPOs are for companies without any profits. Add in acquisitions of pre-IPO companies and the numbers are likely even worse. It’s like a horse race where bettors can collect their winnings when the horse has rounded the first or second turn.

There are still venture capitalists who look for companies that succeed by delivering real value to customers, but the prevalence of the profitless IPO has turned the venture-backed company into a kind of financial instrument. Much as the bankers who invented the derivatives that nearly sank the global economy in the 2009 financial crisis eventually ran out of real mortgages to collateralize and turned to “liar loans” so they could keep the game going a little longer, the measure is no longer whether a company has a chance of living up to its promises but whether it can convince the investor in the next round that it can. Most startups are built to be refinanced all the way to the exit rather than to turn into sustainable businesses.

This dynamic is essential to the current AI infrastructure buildout. Data centers are built to meet expectations of massive future demand. But much of that demand is from companies that have not yet, as Silicon Valley used to describe it, found “product-market fit.” That is, they have not yet found customers willing to pay more than the product costs to deliver. In short, the future cash flows with which data center builders are expecting to pay back the trillions they have borrowed or invested are dependent on those customers’ ability to raise their next round at an ever-increasing valuation.

AI is the real deal, a transformative technology like the internet. And its leading company, Anthropic, looks to be turning into an actual business with cash flow and profits. But others, even those like OpenAI with enormous revenues, are still dependent on massive additional capital infusions to survive. But it’s OK, as long as “number go up.”

A structure like this does not need demand to collapse. It only needs the hype to recede enough that it is no longer possible to raise more capital at ever more stratospheric valuations. That’s why we see hype in increasingly desperate amounts.

I first started thinking about this turn to hype in Silicon Valley in the days of Uber and Lyft. The innovation of using GPS and smartphones to create crowdsourced taxis on demand using people’s personal cars was real and important. But building the matching marketplace of riders and drivers took enormous subsidies, and it wasn’t terribly profitable. So Travis Kalanick, the CEO of Uber, told investors that Uber wasn’t out to replace taxis, but the private automobile. Then in the run-up to the IPO, he started talking about self-driving cars, presumably to suggest that Uber would be much more profitable once it was able to get rid of the cost of drivers. Meanwhile, Waymo kept its head down and did the hard work of actually building out the technology, which is only now coming to fruition.

That kind of hype continued through the next one of Silicon Valley’s dry spells. There wasn’t much real innovation to talk about, so the masters of capital sold “the Metaverse” and eventually “Web3.” As the person who defined “Web 2.0,” I was asked frequently to opine on Web3. I tried to avoid answering. Most prognostications about the future turn out to be wrong. What we can do is ask questions that help us see the present more clearly.  So finally, I laid out my reservations in a piece called “Why It’s Too Early to Get Excited About Web3.”

I explained how Carlota Perez and Bill Janeway distinguish productive bubbles from unproductive ones. In a productive bubble, speculative excess builds lasting infrastructure the future can capitalize on. The dotcom bubble was, in that sense, productive. When it popped, it left behind billions of miles of high-speed fiber and the data centers and the know-how that the next decade’s boom was built on. The 2009 mortgage bubble, on the other hand, left behind mostly wreckage.

The issue with Web3 wasn’t that the prices were crazy, since prices are always crazy in a bubble. It was whether anything was being built that would outlast the crash. What Silicon Valley delivered in that period mostly turned out to be betting with only the barest nod towards actual product. You probably all remember the craze for “bored apes.”

Even when there is real substance to an investment bubble, Silicon Valley has learned to lean into hype as an instrument for drawing investment. For example, when Tesla’s stock began descending from the stratosphere, Elon Musk started touting humanoid robots as the future of Tesla and pitched SpaceX not on the basis of its actual business of commercial space launches and Starlink’s huge network of communications satellites, but on AI, and on promises of a self-sustaining city on Mars housing at least one million people, travel to any point on earth in 30 minutes, and a possible enterprise value of $100 trillion!

The quest for monopoly

Not everyone can be as bold and imaginative as Elon Musk. But there’s one pretty sure bet that gets the investors to pile on, and that’s the promise of a monopoly.

Look no further than that race between Uber and Lyft. When they went toward their IPOs, neither was profitable, and their enormous valuations rested entirely on the premise that if you grow big enough and fast enough, profits will follow. Most monopolies and duopolies used to develop slowly and were understood as dangerous to competitive markets. Now Silicon Valley decided they are something to seek from the start, as the holy grail for investors. Reid Hoffman and Chris Yeh called this strategy Blitzscaling, a term they cheerfully derived from the Nazi blitzkrieg. Their argument is that you need to move fast enough to seize a market before anyone else can, even when you don’t yet know how you’ll make money. If you can promise a monopoly, you can raise a great deal of money.

I don’t have a blanket objection to moving fast. But do I think blitzscaling is a morally bankrupt idea, a game that defines winning as extracting value rather than creating it.

The saddest part of blitzscaling is that it has turned the original genius of the competitive market on its head. It’s now a kind of oligopoly of capital. Instead of customers choosing the winners, the VCs do it up front. Sunil Paul, the inventor of the technology and business model that Uber and Lyft soon dominated, raised only $35 million for his company Sidecar, which was soon crushed when Uber and Lyft raised and spent billions on marketing and subsidized fares to quickly gain users.

If I had to name a villain in this transition, it would be Andreessen Horowitz. The firm was founded in 2009, at the start of the era of cheap capital I’ve been describing, and it built a media and narrative operation from the start. Benedict Evans, who worked there, later described the firm as “a media company that monetizes through VC.” The story that a company will win because of how much money it has raised becomes part of how it actually wins. But I don’t think it allocates capital anything like as effectively as a well functioning market where customers pick the winners.

The next rising tide

What connects the enshittification of search, the supermoney economy, the blitzscaling of Uber, the narrative machine of a16z, and the crypto casino is not a run of bad actors. It’s shareholder capitalism reaching the late stage of its own logic. In its youth, that system was oriented, however imperfectly, toward creating value. In its endgame it has reoriented toward extracting it.

We are standing at the beginning of the next turn of the cycle. This time, AI is the technology driving the boom. And once again, it represents the possibility of huge advances in human collective intelligence. Like the web was 25 years ago, it’s a new creative frontier enabled by technology.

The pattern I described earlier usually has a rising-tide youth that comes before the extractive turn. However, in some ways, AI has been enshittified from the very beginning. It skipped the youth. The AI labs have taken in hundreds of billions of dollars, with trillions committed to data center buildout, and capital on that scale doesn’t wait for a business to grow into itself. It demands a return, and the pressure to repay it will inevitably push these companies toward value capture before they’ve finished creating value.

AI was also built on an extractive foundation. Last year, when The New York Times reported that OpenAI and Google were training on transcribed YouTube videos and other copyrighted work, the host of The Daily, Michael Barbaro, called copyright violation “AI’s original sin.” Margaret Levi might have called it an act of enclosure, the privatization of what had been a commons, the accumulated writing and code and conversation and images that billions of people made and shared, much of it in the joyful exuberance I started this talk by describing.

AI also breaks the old bargain in a way even the enshittified web did not. Google, at its best, sent you somewhere else. It read the commons and pointed you back into it, 94% of the time without even trying to monetize it. AI doesn’t send you elsewhere at anything like the same rate. It offers a replacement for what you would once have gone out and found, an answer in place of the referral.

We’ve been told, again and again, that the secret of future prosperity is to create enormous, disproportionate rewards for innovators and their backers. The kind of people that tech companies used to serve as their customers don’t really matter. They are necessary casualties on the road to an unimaginably better future.

This is profoundly short sighted. An economy is a circulatory system. In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, the visionary poet and painter William Blake (writing during the first Industrial Revolution) put the circulatory logic perfectly: “The Prolific would cease to be prolific unless the Devourer as a sea received the excess of his delights.” In other words: Output has to be consumed. The system has to flow.

Today, many AGI narratives assume that the “prolific” can keep producing and the broad mass of customers (“the devourer”) somehow continue to buy, even as more and more human labor is displaced and labor income and bargaining power collapses. That’s not a future of abundance. It’s a recipe for a kind of congestive heart failure for the economy.

If the AI labs wish to be architects of a prosperous future, they must work as hard on inventing the new economy’s circulatory system as they do on improving model capabilities. They need to measure success by diffusion, not just capability. They have to ask always how their customers are going to make money, not just how they themselves will. They have to treat the labor transition as a core problem to be solved, not just studied. They have to be willing to win in the marketplace, not through artificial moats. That means committing to open interfaces, portability, and interoperability. General-purpose capabilities should not become a private toll road.

It’s an economy crying out for mechanism design. Mechanism design is a term that I’ve shamelessly stolen from the economists and redefined to describe what I think is missing from the AI economy. It’s a branch of microeconomics that studies how to design the rules of a market in such a way that even self-interested actors who have private information are more likely to produce outcomes that are better for everyone. Leonid Hurwicz, the founder of the field, called it “reverse game theory” because it works backward from a desired outcome to develop the rules that will produce it.

They give Nobel prizes in economics for advances in the theory of mechanism design. But it seems to me that many of the most successful mechanism designs happen in the real world. They evolve. They are discovered. Ken Thompson and Dennis Ritchie weren’t trying to invent the marvelous open-ended game that we now call open source software when they designed Unix. They were just trying to build a portable operating system able to run on multiple hardware architectures. That also happened to mean that you could only distribute software via its source code rather than just the binaries. And their breakthrough design of a protocol-centric operating system with a small kernel surrounded by cooperating, communicating utilities created what I call “an architecture of participation.” Anyone could add to the system, or easily replace one of its standard parts with an alternative.

That was a very different marketplace design than the proprietary operating systems of the day, which were created to tie software developers to specific hardware platforms. It led to a vibrant software sharing economy that is still going on today and that transformed all of software development.

You can see the same kind of evolution in AI. I don’t know that David Soria Parra and his colleagues at Anthropic meant to change the market structure of AI when they developed MCP, but that’s what happened. Rather than a winner-takes-most market in which developers call the APIs of the dominant, centralized platforms (as had happened previously with Windows for the PC, and iOs and Android for mobile), the agentic web began to take on the shape of the participatory economy of open source software and the web. People can bring their own models and infrastructure to the table as an alternative to the big centralized players. And that story is far from over. In fact, it is just beginning.

Every major technology wave arrives in two stages. The first stage is the development of the technology itself: the personal computer, the World Wide Web, the smartphone, and now, generative and agentic and physical AI. The second stage involves the development of new economic mechanisms that enable transformative business models to take advantage of the technology. The earliest business models often imitate what went before and encode the business ambitions of the old technologies the creators grew up with. As the technology matures, the problems with the original business models become apparent, and eventually, through a process of trial, error, and invention, new mechanisms enable new business models.

The web was invented in 1991. But the web advertising economy didn’t really take off until Google figured out PageRank, and then perfected pay-per-click advertising and the ad auction. Ecommerce didn’t take off until companies like PayPal made it safe to type your credit card number into a stranger’s website, and until Amazon built the warehousing and delivery networks that made rapid delivery possible. The smartphone put GPS in everyone’s pocket, but it wasn’t until Sunil Paul envisioned and built the first real-time location matching marketplace for ride sharing that Uber and Lyft and DoorDash were able to turn that capability into a huge on-demand economy. YouTube didn’t become the engine of the creator economy until it answered the takedown notices and lawsuits of the music industry not with stonewalling or settlements, but with Content ID.

It’s easy to look at the winners, and think the path to get there was obvious. It wasn’t. There were all kinds of failed approaches to solving the problems that only became apparent during the technology diffusion and adoption period. I don’t have time to chronicle the graveyard of failed search, advertising, and ecommerce experiments and standards. But you don’t need to look back. Just look around. How many proposals there are today for managing rights, blocking or allowing bots, enabling agents to cooperate, and payment. There are at least six competing agent payment protocols alone. We’re in the exploratory phase of mechanism design for AI.

That’s where I come back to the idea of mechanism design as reverse game theory. Rather than asking ourselves the rules of the game we are now playing, it calls us to ask “What game ought we to be playing?” And that question leads me imperatively to my answer: “The game of human flourishing.”

We have been told that the game is the quest for superintelligence. We have been told it is a winner-takes-all game that will bring untold riches to the winners and impoverish everyone else. And we have seen mechanisms designed to support that game: massive investments in data center capacity such that only the well-capitalized can play, colonialist appropriation of existing intellectual property, closed model weights with terms of service that forbid others from learning from them, memory that locks our context inside one provider’s walls, and PR stunts like dumping millions of dollars of compute to solve high-profile math problems, or hyping the cybersecurity risks of their offerings, for which only their latest, most powerful models are offered as the only remedy.

If the game we want to play instead is human flourishing, we need to design mechanisms that lead us to that outcome. We need mechanisms that provide a circulatory economy of value exchange, for and by humans in partnership with AI, rather than replaced by it. And in my experience, those mechanisms look like open source, open protocols, open memory, because these are things that give the freedom for users to shape and control this most wonderful new technology wave for ourselves.

Henry Farrell, Alison Gopnik, Cosma Shalizi, and James Evans argued in Science last year that large models are best understood not as independent intelligences but as a new kind of cultural and social technology, one that lets us take advantage of the information other humans have accumulated, in the lineage of pictures, writing, print, and internet search. AI may be the most powerful means of harnessing collective intelligence yet. The commons isn’t incidental to AI, it’s the material AI is made from.

In the world I see coming, AI is a medium, like painting or writing or music. If we get this right, everyone will get the same paints and brushes, the same words, the same notes, but some people draw more out of them than others, or do it better. We won’t decide up front that those who raise the biggest pool of capital are due all the rewards.

Our job is to draw something more, something better, out of the ocean of possibilities in the collected knowledge inside the model. AI was built from our collective intelligence. It should not be designed to replace us. It depends on us to create its value.

Thank you very much.

This Week in AI: AI’s Next Reality Check

AI’s growing role in business is exposing challenges that new models alone can’t solve. On the latest episode of This Week in AI, we examined restrictions on autonomous agents, NVIDIA’s leadership crisis, and research into making AI systems more reliable.

Agentic commerce is running into resistance

Anthropic is turning Claude into a broader workplace platform. Alongside its upgraded Fable 5.2 and Mythos 5.2 models, the company introduced Claude Meetings and Claude Sheets, Whiteboards, and Data. Anthropic also expanded its enterprise offerings with self-hosted agent infrastructure. Companies can connect agents to internal systems while keeping credentials and session histories on their own infrastructure, even though the models still run through an external provider.

OpenAI is bringing more of the shopping process into ChatGPT. Its new business profiles let companies manage how customers discover them, while business agents can answer questions and recommend products. The company also introduced ChatGPT Wallet, which allows agents to make purchases without accessing customers’ actual payment card details. Users still need to review and approve these transactions before payment. Bringing business discovery and payments into ChatGPT puts OpenAI in more direct competition with search engines and online marketplaces.

Airlines, banks, and retailers, however, are already restricting outside agents. United Airlines is blocking unauthorized agents from booking flights, while financial institutions and retailers, including Amazon and eBay, have imposed their own limits. Their concerns include privacy, security, and unintended purchases. An agent may be technically capable of completing a transaction but prohibited from accessing the service. Developers will need to account for those limits, while businesses that allow such transactions must establish who bears responsibility when an agent makes an unintended purchase.

NVIDIA faces a test of leadership and governance

NVIDIA founder Jensen Huang resigned as CEO following reports of personal relationships that prompted an investigation into potential national security concerns. US authorities have been investigating whether a Chinese businesswoman involved in the controversy had intelligence ties to Beijing. Those allegations remain unproven. NVIDIA’s board launched its own investigation, and longtime CFO Colette Kress has stepped in as interim CEO while the company searches for a permanent successor.

NVIDIA’s influence over the AI chip market makes its leadership transition especially consequential for customers and investors. Huang led the company for 33 years and helped establish its dominant position in AI infrastructure. Now Kress and the board must maintain customer confidence while navigating the investigation. We also discussed NVIDIA’s investments in other AI companies and the circular financing arrangements that have raised concerns about how the industry measures growth. Any changes to those investments could affect companies that depend on NVIDIA for both computing infrastructure and capital.

NVIDIA’s leadership transition also raises questions about succession at founder-led technology companies. After three decades with Huang at the helm, the board must show it can provide independent oversight and maintain the company’s direction through a period of uncertainty. How NVIDIA manages that transition could offer lessons for other AI companies whose identities remain closely tied to their founders.

Researchers are probing why AI systems fail

New research found that giving AI agents memory of previous tasks can make them perform worse than without memory when they learn the wrong lesson or apply past experiences out of context. The proposed WikiTrace system links memories to their original tasks and evidence, allowing agents to check what they’ve learned before acting.

Other researchers are investigating how to detect uncertainty in language models through internal signals, hidden states, token probabilities, and whether the model gives conflicting answers to the same question. This matters because AI can sound confident even when it is wrong. If we can spot when a model is unsure, we could prompt it to check its answer or acknowledge its uncertainty, helping people avoid relying on incorrect information when making decisions. Meanwhile, MIT researchers explored weight-space programming, using language models to inspect and edit other neural networks’ weights. In early experiments, the approach corrected a simulated driving problem and improved another model’s math performance.

Benchmark scores alone don’t explain why agents misuse memories, sound confident even when they are wrong, or fail at specific tasks. Research into these problems could give developers better ways to diagnose and correct mistakes as AI systems take on more responsibility.

What’s next

Next week, we’ll follow up on NVIDIA’s leadership transition and Anthropic’s anticipated IPO, along with other developments across the AI industry.

We’ll be back on Monday, November 23, for another episode covering the latest developments in AI research and applications. You can catch previous episodes on YouTube, Spotify, Apple, or wherever you get your podcasts.

A New Agenda for Healthcare Reform, Part I

The 2026 midterm results were a watershed event in American political history. The Democratic lead in the popular House vote is now above 14 points, the biggest such victory since the post-Watergate midterm election in 1974. Still, without veto-proof majorities in both the House and Senate, Congressional Democrats will have limited ability to pass legislation over the next two years. Yet now is the time to begin planning the Democratic platform for the 2028 election.

And one of the best places for Democrats to focus their attention is healthcare reform. Concern over healthcare costs is an important factor in overall concerns about affordability, and it’s the important issue on which Democrats have the largest advantage over Republicans. As soon as Democrats take control of Congress in January of 2027, they should attempt to repair the immense damage to healthcare coverage that Donald Trump and his party have inflicted on Americans, such as resurrecting the Obamacare subsidies and reversing the punitive Medicaid eligibility restrictions. As many as 12 million Americans may already have lost coverage so far.

However, they shouldn’t stop there. At this point, given Trump’s historic unpopularity and Republican weakness across the country, there’s a high likelihood that the 2028 election will deliver a Democratic trifecta: a Democratic president, House and Senate. Thus the Democrats should now plan a healthcare agenda that goes much further than restoring the pre-Trump II system.

There are signs that a consensus around major reform is already emerging.

One thing we can say with fairly with a fair degree of certainty is that the scope of major reform is much better now than it has been for decades. In particular, the 2026 Democratic congressional majority, although roughly the same size as the Democratic majority when Obamacare was enacted, is much more solidly progressive than the Obama coalition.

Today’s primer will review the basics of designing a healthcare system, followed by discussion of what we’ve learned about healthcare policy and — especially — healthcare politics over the past 20 years. I’ll then turn to what appears to be the emerging Democratic consensus for reform. In a subsequent primer I’ll talk more about what reform is likely to achieve and how to pay for it.

Beyond the paywall I will address the following:

1. How to move close to universal health coverage

2. The Obamacare story

3. The political economy of healthcare and how it has changed since Obamacare was enacted

4. The shape of an emerging Democratic consensus

Read more

Nine Lessons Hollywood Can Learn from Studio Ghibli

I wait until late at night when everybody else is asleep. And then I sit down in front of the screen. That’s where I pursue my secret indulgence.

The neighbors have no idea, and I barely even mention my furtive pastime to my closest family members. It’s hard to find words to explain it—would they even understand?

After all, why would a grown man of suitably advanced years watch animated films for kids?


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But these flicks aren’t kids’ stuff. Or, rather, they aren’t only kids’ stuff. That’s because I’m watching movies from Studio Ghibli, Japan’s most celebrated purveyor of stylized animation. Their work is beloved by audiences old and young.

Studio Ghibli has won all the awards, including two Oscars. The studio holds four of the spots on the top ten list of all-time highest-grossing Japanese films—yes, I’m clearly not the only adult drawn to their work.

You can read it in the numbers. The entertainment value here is high. But I’m not binging on Ghibli for diversion. I’m focusing on the aesthetic experience. I’m studying the priorities and techniques embodied in these films.

That’s because I believe Studio Ghibli is part of the solution to our current cinematic doldrums. They show a pathway to a different way of filmmaking and storytelling, teaching lessons that Hollywood ought to learn.

Or maybe Hollywood once knew these lessons, but now has forgotten them.

Disney is the obvious comparison point—and the two companies have often collaborated in the past. Of course, Disney is so much larger. But in recent years, a gradual consensus has emerged that Ghibli has surpassed Disney at making movies for youngsters.

Here’s what Henry Oliver has to say in his smart essay—fittingly entitled “The Superiority of Studio Ghibli—over Disney and over AI Slop”:

Remove the songs from the Disney film and what’s left? The plot is thin and mechanical. The Ghibli version is dense with narrative. Small details are carefully arranged, and each time the children watch this film (we must be on seven viewings) they realize how much has been anticipated with passing features and motifs, often in the background. There is real magic in Ghibli….Where Disney aims to entertain, Ghibli wishes to enchant.

Oliver sees Ghibli as an antidote to AI slop. There’s some irony to that claim—OpenAI got lots publicity when it released a Ghibli option for creating AI images. Social media went wild for a few days creating Ghibli versions of everything imaginable—from historic photos to internet memes.

AI Ghibli

But these images are amusing only because of their absurdity. There’s a total mismatch in aesthetic values. Ghibli stands for everything opposed to AI slop—so we laugh when we confront these awkward adaptations.

The folks at OpenAI ought to consult what studio co-founder Hayao Miyazaki said about AI animation back in 2016:

“I am utterly disgusted. If you really want to make creepy stuff you can go ahead and do it. I would never wish to incorporate this technology into my work at all.”

The reality is that Studio Ghibli is the anti-Disney. It embodies values that are antithetical to the stale formulas now dominant in Hollywood.

And that’s why I’ve spent so much time savoring this alternative approach to filmmaking and storytelling—which has somehow maintained artisan values in an entertainment business where they are mostly scorned.

But now the brand franchises are collapsing. Disney has eroded (and in some instances destroyed) the economic value of its big franchises in recent years. Star Wars is in decline. Marvel is in decline. Indiana Jones is in decline. And other Hollywood studios have witnessed a similar backlash to their incessant brand extensions and spin-offs.

So the time has come for them to learn from Studio Ghibli—and not just about entertaining youngsters. Even cinematic fare for adults can benefit from a Ghibli infusion.

Here’s my list of nine things other studios—and creators in all storytelling genres—ought to pay attention to in these cherished animated movies from Japan.

1. Ghibli films avoid the clichéd “Hero’s Journey” plotline that Hollywood loves.

A consultant working for Disney wrote a memo on the “Hero’s Journey” back in the 1980s, and it changed everything at the studio. This plotline drew heavily on Star Wars and the mythological studies of Joseph Campbell—reducing everything to a bland, predictable recipe.

“The ‘Hero’s Journey’ is everywhere. It is to movies what ultra-processed foods are to cuisine.”

A hero is called to action, but hesitates. A guide or mentor intervenes, and prods the hero into the adventure. Great things happen—filled with special effects, chase scenes, battles, etc. The hero is transformed in victory and returns from the battle to enlighten the world.

The Hero’s Journey (Source)

Does it sound familiar? Of course it does—because the “Hero’s Journey” is everywhere. It is to movies what ultra-processed foods are to cuisine.

It’s old and tired, but it has one benefit. The “Hero’s Journey” can keep a brand franchise going forever. It operates in a circle, and the conclusion of the circle is the starting point for the next installment.

Studios can also do spin-offs or prequels with the exact same formula. Just select a minor character in the franchise as a hero for an adjacent journey.

Ghibli heroes typically push against this formula. They often make friends with the villains they are supposed to vanquish—so the huge forest troll that Hollywood would turn into a destroyer becomes My Neighbor Totoro in Ghibli’s rendition. Or consider the endearing approach of Spirited Away, where the young female protagonist always finds a way to conciliate and soothe the monster.

That’s usually a good strategy for Ghibli heroes, but it also reflects the core values of cooperation and pacifism that recur in these films.

That leads to the second key differentiator of Ghibli from its competitors.

2. The stories are thematically-driven, not plot-driven.

Disney would never understand this. They build their movies on a ripping good story, not on the studio’s core values. It’s not even clear Disney has core values as a business beyond profit generation.

The Ghibli worldview is life-affirming. It refuses to glamorize violence—instead celebrating compassion and kindness. It respects the natural world, and celebrates the simple rituals of daily life.

You might find that boring. Or perhaps you doubt that these values are compatible with dramatic storytelling. Maybe you’re right—but that doesn’t matter. Ghibli is willing to sacrifice drama if it isn’t aligned with these priorities. Judging by the financial metrics, the audience does seem to mind.

3. The entire output of the studio over a forty-year period is unified and coherent.

The most obvious example is the look-and-feel of the films. There is an obvious Ghibli style that is instantly recognizable. But the thematic content mentioned above is also a key part of the holistic approach of Studio Ghibli.

Of course, it helps that Studio Ghibli relies on the same creative talent decade after decade. Animator and co-founder Hayao Miyazaki has been there since inception—presiding over a forty-year period of stability with a unified creative vision. The same continuity can be seen in the long tenures of director Isao Takahata (until his death at age 82 in 2018), producer Toshio Suzuki, and composer Joe Hisaishi. They all started with Ghibli back in 1980s, and have built a textured worldview that spans the company’s entire output .

That couldn’t happen in Hollywood, where everything is temporary and turbulent. Warner Bros, for example has changed ownership six times—including three times during the last decade. Paramount got a new owner last year, and Disney changed CEOs a few months ago.

In an unstable environment of this sort, even familiar brand franchises start to feel disconnected and ad hoc, despite the recurring presence of the same superheroes and action characters. You shouldn’t expect otherwise. Without a stable team and strong core values, continuity and coherence are almost impossible to maintain.

4. The pacing of the films is relaxed, with long interludes that don’t push the story forward but create the texture in which the story makes sense.

At the midpoint of Ponyo, several minutes are devoted to the preparation and drinking of honey milk tea. It’s no coincidence that we just finished an intense action scene—and this requires balance, according to the Ghibli rules of engagement.

You will encounter these comforting interludes everywhere in Ghibli films. They typically involve routine household activities or the natural world. The slow pacing runs counter to everything Hollywood stands for today—and is the antithesis of our now dominant swipe-and-scroll culture.

For example, there’s a very long scene in Only Yesterday devoted to picking and processing safflowers—this lasts around ten minutes, and isn’t essential to the plot. But you will love this film all the more because of the emotional valence of these scenes.

A similar scene in Howl’s Moving Castle is devoted to the careful preparation and eating of bacon and eggs. Other scenes are devoted to cleaning the kitchen, doing laundry, and other mundane tasks; but they are treated as quasi-rituals latent with significance. These films thus cultivate a degree of mindfulness no Disney movie can match.

“A Studio Ghibli film—and specifically a Hayao Miyazaki or Isao Takahata film—is not the way it looks.” explains animator Usman Riaz. “It’s what it makes you feel. It’s the moments in between that make those movies so special.”

5. Nature is not just the background to the story—it is a main character in the foreground of the film.

The nature scenes are especially endearing. They give these films warmth and beauty, but they also help advance the recurring theme of respecting the environment and finding a balance within it. No studio head in Hollywood would have a clue how to do this—or would even care about it.

The weather is often placed in the foreground. So rain, clouds, mist, wind, and sunlight all play key roles in the unfolding tales.

6. Brand extensions are rarely pursued—instead the Studio prefers self-contained tales that fit their vision.

If Disney owned this IP, they would keep churning out sequels, prequels, and spin-offs. But Ghibli prefers self-contained stories, often original tales created by the filmmakers or adapted from good books and popular manga.

They have an obvious preference for homegrown Japanese material—which resonates with the Shinto and animist attitudes that recur in Ghibli’s output—but they also have made animated films from works by Ursula K. Le Guin, Diana Wynne Jones, and Mary Norton.

And when Ghibli does do a spin-off, as in The Cat Returns, it feels like a complete aesthetic experience, and not a moving part in a hodgepodge cinematic universe. The saturation approach that Disney has pursued with endless Marvel movies would never get approved by the Ghibli team. They see their mission as storytelling, not brand proliferation.

7. There’s no sarcasm, irony, or cynicism in these stories. Sincerity is the winning strategy.

People aren’t perfect in these animated films—even Ghibli heroes have flaws. But the glib irony that permeates Hollywood isn’t one of them.

So you won’t find any of those witty sarcastic comments that US screenwriters love. The hipness quotient in Ghibli films is zero. Sincerity is everywhere, especially among the leading characters—frequently children and young women, who stand out for their earnestness and caring.

8. There’s a role for everybody in these stories.

You will notice lots of old people in Ghibli films. The creative team knows that the elderly have a role to play, especially in films about children. You will also find many people with disabilities or illnesses—scenes are sometimes set in care homes or hospitals. Elsewhere you might encounter a street cleaner or pregnant woman or farm worker or a fussy baby or some other person in the supporting cast who isn’t just one more glamorous figure or comic sidekick.

The viewer settles comfortably into these movies because they are so welcoming to real people, with all their limitations.

9. The films are magical in the best sense of the word.

This earnestness doesn’t make these young heroes boring—far from it. In the Ghibli worldview, children are not just miniature adults. Instead they are plugged into a world of magic and imagination that grown-ups can’t perceive.

So a Ghibli character doesn’t need to go to Hogwarts to learn how to become a wizard or travel to a galaxy far, far away, as in Star Wars. Magic is already present in the everyday world in which they live. The goal is to tap into it, and a child will show the way.


Can Hollywood learn from this? Well, It really should. Given the collapse in the brand franchises—they are quickly becoming toxic—it might be time for a different approach.

But it won’t be easy. Hollywood first needs to un-learn decades of bad habits—movies made by committee, creativity replaced by formula, tired storytelling driven by special effects, manic pacing, stultifying predictability, and all the rest.

So I fear that the US entertainment industry still isn’t ready to learn from Ghibli. Instead the top execs are looking to AI for a boost—or at least to cut costs. That will backfire, of course. Cheaper slop is still slop. And storytelling in the Ghibli manner is the last thing any AI bot will be able to grasp.

But sooner or later, even Hollywood execs will be forced to return to this kind of solid, thematic storytelling. Or else they will be out of a job. In that case, they will have brought it upon themselves.

Before that happens, they should consider joining me in my late night Ghibli pastime. They will enjoy it, I’m certain. And who knows, they might learn a thing or two to bring back to the office in the morning.

In Case You Missed It…

…a week of Mad Biologist posts:

Democrats Should End the Filibuster

Florida Conservatives… Defunded the Police?

Congratulations, Red District and State Democrats! You’ll Likely Be Gone in 2030 or 2032, So Vote Like It

A Great Week for D.C.’s Crime Stats

Moral Economics, in Swedish: Moral och marknad

The Swedish translation of Moral Economics is forthcoming in April (with a book event in Stockholm): 

Moral och marknad
Vad kontroversiella transaktioner avslöjar om hur ekonomin fungerar

Alvin Roth

Kommer april 2027.

Moral och marknad, bound 

 

A Bizarre Meeting

To read this letter, click here:

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November 21, 2026

“It all began so beautifully,” Lady Bird remembered. “After a drizzle in the morning, the sun came out bright and beautiful. We were going into Dallas.”

It was November 22, 1963, and President John F. Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy were visiting Texas. They were there, in the home state of Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson and his wife, Lady Bird, to try to heal a rift in the Democratic Party. The white supremacists who made up the base of the party’s southern wing loathed the Kennedy administration’s support for Black rights.

That base had turned on Kennedy when he and his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, had backed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in fall 1962 saying that Army veteran James Meredith had the right to enroll at the University of Mississippi, more commonly known as Ole Miss.

When the Department of Justice ordered officials at Ole Miss to register Meredith, Mississippi governor Ross Barnett physically barred Meredith from entering the building and vowed to defend segregation and states’ rights.

So the Department of Justice detailed dozens of U.S. marshals to escort Meredith to the registrar and put more than 500 law enforcement officers on the campus. White supremacists rushed to meet them there and became increasingly violent. That night, Barnett told a radio audience: “We will never surrender!” The rioters destroyed property and, under cover of the darkness, fired at reporters and the federal marshals. They killed two men and wounded many others.

The riot ended when the president sent 20,000 troops to the campus. On October 1, Meredith became the first Black American to enroll at the University of Mississippi.

The Kennedys had made it clear that the federal government would stand behind civil rights, and white supremacists joined right-wing Republicans in insisting that their stance proved that the Kennedys were communists. Using a strong federal government to regulate business would prevent a man from making all the money he might otherwise; protecting civil rights would take tax dollars from white Americans for the benefit of Black and Brown people. A bumper sticker produced during the Mississippi crisis warned that “the Castro Brothers”—equating the Kennedys with communist revolutionaries in Cuba—had gone to Ole Miss.

That conflation of Black rights and communism stoked such anger in the southern right wing that Kennedy felt obliged to travel to Dallas to try to mend some fences in the state Democratic Party.

On the morning of November 22, 1963, the Dallas Morning News contained a flyer saying the president was wanted for “treason” for “betraying the Constitution” and giving “support and encouragement to the Communist inspired racial riots.” Kennedy warned his wife that they were “heading into nut country today.”

But the motorcade through Dallas started out in a party atmosphere. At the head of the procession, the president and first lady waved from their car at the streets “lined with people—lots and lots of people—the children all smiling, placards, confetti, people waving from windows,” Lady Bird remembered. “There had been such a gala air,” she said, that when she heard three shots, “I thought it must be firecrackers or some sort of celebration.”

The Secret Service agents had no such moment of confusion. The cars sped forward, “terrifically fast—faster and faster,” according to Lady Bird, until they arrived at a hospital, which made Mrs. Johnson realize what had happened. “As we ground to a halt” and Secret Service agents began to pull them out of the cars, Lady Bird wrote, “I cast one last look over my shoulder and saw in the President’s car a bundle of pink, just like a drift of blossoms, lying on the back seat…Mrs. Kennedy lying over the President’s body.”

In the hospital, as they waited for news of the president, LBJ asked Lady Bird to go find Mrs. Kennedy. Lady Bird recalled that Secret Service agents “began to lead me up one corridor, back stairs, and down another. Suddenly, I found myself face to face with Jackie in a small hall…outside the operating room. You always think of her—or someone like her—as being insulated, protected; she was quite alone. I don’t think I ever saw anyone so much alone in my life.”

After trying to comfort Mrs. Kennedy, Lady Bird went back to the room where her husband was. It was there that Kennedy’s special assistant told them, “The President is dead,” just before journalist Malcolm Kilduff entered and addressed LBJ as “Mr. President.”

Officials wanted LBJ out of Dallas and rushed the party to the airport. Looking out the car window, Lady Bird saw a flag already at half mast and later recalled, “[T]hat is when the enormity of what had happened first struck me.”

In the confusion—in addition to the murder of the president, no one knew how extensive the plot against the government was—the attorney general wanted LBJ sworn into office as quickly as possible. Already on the plane to return to Washington, D.C., the party waited for Judge Sarah Hughes, a Dallas federal judge. By the time Hughes arrived, so had Mrs. Kennedy and the coffin bearing her husband’s body. “[A]nd there in the very narrow confines of the plane—with Jackie on his left with her hair falling in her face, but very composed, and me on his right, Judge Hughes, with the Bible, in front of him and a cluster of Secret Service people and Congressmen we had known for a long time around him—Lyndon took the oath of office,” Lady Bird recalled.

As the plane traveled to Washington, D.C., Lady Bird went into the private presidential cabin to see Mrs. Kennedy, passing President Kennedy’s casket in the hallway.

Lady Bird later recalled: “I looked at her. Mrs. Kennedy’s dress was stained with blood. One leg was almost entirely covered with it and her right glove was caked…with blood—her husband’s blood. She always wore gloves like she was used to them. I never could. Somehow that was one of the most poignant sights—exquisitely dressed and caked in blood. I asked her if I couldn’t get someone in to help her change and she said, ‘Oh, no. Perhaps later…but not right now.’”

“And then,” Lady Bird remembered, “with something—if, with a person that gentle, that dignified, you can say had an element of fierceness, she said, ‘I want them to see what they have done to Jack.’”

—

Notes:

https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/ctjd-19631122

Edward H. Miller, Nut Country: Right-Wing Dallas and the Birth of the Southern Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

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Danish daughters

Using Danish administrative data, we compare parents of only children who experience a stroke at the same age and differ only in the gender of their child.

Before the stroke, parents of daughters and parents of sons follow similar health trajectories, with comparable levels of pre-existing conditions and healthcare utilization. After the stroke, a survival gap opens and grows, and parents of daughters are 1.5 percentage points more likely to be alive by year five. Over the same period, daughters adjust more than sons along several margins: they become more likely to live near their parents, less likely to be married, and have fewer children, consistent with greater involvement in informal caregiving.

Crucially, parents of daughters use more physical rehabilitation, an elective type of formal care that requires sustained engagement. Rather than crowding out formal provision, daughters appear more likely to help parents navigate and use professional services. Informal and formal care can therefore operate, at least in part, as complements in the response to severe health shocks.

That recent work is from recent work by Elin Colmsjö, Francesco Ruggieri, and Matteo Saccarola.  Via the excellent Samir Varma.

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Will AI Growth Reach the Developing World?

Here is the abstract from a new NBER paper by Daniel Björkegren, David Lagakos & Mitchell VanVuren:

This paper explores how economic growth driven by AI will impact the developing world. Our analysis is based on a growth model of a developed and developing economy where AI services are traded on the world market, and may substitute for or complement different labor inputs in production. Preferences allow for the possibility that demand for services provided by AI has an upper bound. The model predicts that developing countries may not benefit as much from AI-driven growth. First, they may lack complementary skills needed to fully utilize AI domestically. Second, they may be priced out of world markets due to their relatively lower productivity. We use our model to simulate how growth and welfare are affected by making workers more complementary to AI, subsidizing compute, speeding technology diffusion, and providing cash transfers. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that the potential for developing countries to be left behind – or having some workers lose in absolute terms – is substantial enough that researchers should study the impacts of AI on developing countries in real time.

I am more optimistic than the authors.  For one thing, in their model AI improves the productivity of legal services in say Africa, but not food.  That mix seems unlikely to me.  AI already makes rainfall prediction and crop management more productive, and it might over time help create more “miracle crops.”  A few other points:

1. I do not expect wealthy and poor countries to converge, and the gap might even increase with AI.  But the poorer countries can sell more of their resources to the wealthy countries, and are likely much better off anyway, compared to no AI.  If you read the authors carefully, they do not (seem to?) deny that, yet it is framed as being “left behind.”

2. You might think that AI and robots discourage the export-oriented industrialization for today’s poor countries.  In my view, that was not going to happen anyway, admittedly that is a subjective judgment.

3. The poorer economies typically have an excess of politics and corruption, even if government spending as a share of gdp is relatively low.  This suggests “AI lawyers” will not put “African lawyers” out of business soon, even if the AI lawyers are very good.  Practicing law is bundled with politics to a very high degree.  That fact is unfortunate, but it implies a high degree of job protection and a centaur model, rather than full work displacement.

4. Will the poor countries satiate in AI-provided services, such as legal services, as is the case in some versions of this model?  That seems unlikely, as more growth can boost the demand for legal services more or less indefinitely.  And so so many people in those countries right now cannot afford decent lawyers.  That prospect of satiation seems very far off indeed.

5. Rather than having a single world market for AI, why not have tiered markets, where the poor countries buy lower-quality AI services but at lower prices and also they avoid being shut out of the prime market?

6. The autors (p.11) hold TFP fixed for many parts of the economy.  Of course that will lower the gains from AI.

7. p.44 argues that developing economies are becoming priced out of AI inputs already.  I would be shocked if that prediction turns out to be true, rather I expect smartphone usage (as opposed to mere cell phones) to continue to increase at a rapid pace.

So overall there is way too much negative framing in this piece, and the negative framings seem deliberately chosen, rather than falling out of a more basic or primitive model.

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Reading List 11/21/2026

Picture Gallery with Views of Modern Rome by Giovanni Paolo Panini, via WikiArt.

Welcome to the reading list, a weekly roundup of news and links related to buildings, infrastructure and industrial technology. This week we look at BAAJA, rayon for missiles, US gas consumption, Cyberarmageddon, and more. Roughly 2/3rds of the reading list is paywalled, so for full access become a paid subscriber.

No essay this week, but I’m working on a long follow up to my technological search essay that should be out next week.

Housing and Cities

A neat dataset showing the relationship between excess deaths and temperature in cities around the world. You can really see the sensitivity to high temperatures in places without AC. [Our World in Data]

The Senate passes the permitting reform bill BAAJA. [NYT] And Kalshi now gives BAAJA a 75% chance of becoming law. [Kalshi] And New Mexican Senator Martin Heinrich is in the Economist arguing for BAAJA. “The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act—which the Senate voted to advance on November 9th and which I co-sponsor with another Democrat and two Republicans—does not remove environmental considerations, the ability to litigate projects or the ability for local communities to comment. Those are necessary. But it does make these reviews a standardised part of a predictable process.” [The Economist]

New type of nimbyism just dropped: people opposed to delivery drones flying over their backyard. [WSJ]

How Dubrovnik, the Croatian city where King’s Landing scenes were shot in Game of Thrones, is coping with huge masses of tourists and (checks notes) Montenegrin drug cartels. [The Times]

Manufacturing

From the annals of manufacturing bottlenecks: producing more Patriot missiles requires, among other things, a specialized rayon fabric called Raycarb, processed by a single US company who sources it from a tiny number of companies (apparently just two), who are unable or unwilling to ramp up capacity as fast as the US would like. “Only one rayon product of this kind is approved for use in the most advanced Patriot missiles, and it comes from the Kansas factory of a single supplier, Park Aerospace. With Patriot stockpiles shrinking, the Pentagon official pushed Park for more rayon to help ramp up missile production. It soon became clear that the company’s hands were tied. The problem lay not in Kansas but thousands of miles across the Atlantic near the vineyards of Bordeaux in France. That’s where Park’s supplier, ArianeGroup—a maker of space rockets and ballistic missiles—produces the carbonized rayon fabric, which it then ships to Park for further processing. ArianeGroup had been clear that supply was limited.” [WSJ]

Manufacturing automation startup Hadrian is buying Kutztown Foundry and Machine, a company that makes castings for, among other things, nuclear submarines. [Manufacturing Dive]

The US Marine Minerals Administration, formerly the BOEM, held an auction for seabed mining rights on 31 million acres of seabed near American Samoa. [Maritime Executive]

China produces a lot of air conditioners. [X]

Apparently Tesla will sell you a Cybercab, under a somewhat strict set of conditions. “Tesla is now inviting “select customers” to buy a Cybercab for personal use at $29,990, but the car won’t move unless you also pay $299 a month for an “Autonomy Subscription.” And it only works inside Tesla’s Robotaxi service areas in Texas and Florida, the same geofences that have turned out to be significantly smaller than what Tesla advertises.” [Electrek] And a factory to produce Tesla’s Optimus is under construction at Giga Texas. [YouTube]

A bunch of planned naval vessels have been cut by the US Senate appropriations committee. [X]

The GAO says the F-35 program has about 26 million spare parts, collectively worth about $31 billion, spread around 700 sites around the world. [Tom’s Hardware]

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★ A Week With the New Privacy Controls in MacOS 27.3 Beta 2

On Monday, when the second betas of the v27.3 OSes came out, I posted about Apple adding the new privacy controls they had promised a month prior, in the wake of Meta’s Muse app surprising some users with what information it had access to (e.g., incoming iMessages) after being granted Full Disk Access — which authorization some users just clicked right through. I also posted a link to Apple’s corresponding new support documents. My initial take on Monday:

I’m installing it now, but from what I’ve seen so far, these changes not only alleviate my concerns that Apple might over-tighten the screws, I actually think they add clarity and give users more, not less, control over their Macs.

After a week, I’m willing to call it: this overhaul of these settings and permissions is a win. I really like the way that, for apps asking for Full Disk Access, users can now grant access to a list of folders instead. That’s what I mean about these new settings giving users more control.

Are these new dialog boxes “scarier”? Yes, and the point is, they should be. You should be slightly jolted into attention when an app prompts for any of these permissions. The question is whether they are unnecessarily scary. I would say no, not at all. The descriptions are fair and accurate. Is it unnecessarily scary to show you thumbnails of your personal photos before permitting Full Disk Access that would grant an application unfettered access to your personal photos? No! It’s a bit of a jolt to see them, but that’s just reducing the abstraction. The words “full disk access” feel different than actually seeing a snapshot of what full disk access entails.

Might this discourage some Mac users from granting Full Disk Access to AI agent apps? Yes. And it should! Users who actually understand the stakes will not be dissuaded by these new permissions — when granting them is what they know they want to do. Additionally, I think these new dialog boxes represent very good UI design. They look like a new modern take on MacOS “system chrome” design — not skinny iPhone-sized alerts.

My only gripe about the new stuff is the prominent menu bar indicator that now appears when one app is controlling another. You can’t turn it off (except via an undocumented hidden defaults setting), and it’s distracting on most Macs, and extra distracting on the new MacBook Pros with PROLED displays because on those Macs, it appears in the Dynamic Island! Chance Miller, on Threads (with screenshots):

Most of the changes in macOS 27.3 are reasonable, but this Live Activity thing for system access has got to go. It’s way too aggressive.

It takes over the Dynamic Island on the new MacBook Pro!

As I write this article on a new MacBook Pro review unit, I have 8 of these indicators in my Dynamic Island: Scroll Reverser, Keyboard Maestro Engine, HazeOver, SteerMouse Manager, Moom, Chest (a promising new utility for managing menu bar icons), System Events, and a new text snippet expansion utility I’m beta testing.

Every one of these apps is running all of the time for me. This indicator being on, all the time, for every one of them isn’t helping me notice unusual activity. If anything, if Apple doesn’t rethink this idea, it’s going to make me miss the indication if an app is taking advantage of access permissions in an unwanted or unexpected way.

Zac Hall, Miller’s colleague at 9to5Mac, published an article on Tuesday showing the command-line defaults incantation to disable this. That’s better than not being able to disable it at all, but I expect Apple to revisit this based on feedback. It seems like a well-intentioned feature that was designed by people who didn’t realize how many always-on utilities “control other apps”.

The U.S. — Utterly Predictably — Has Lost Measles Elimination Status Under Trump and RFK Jr.

Sumathi Reddy, writing for The Wall Street Journal (gift link):

The U.S.’s loss of what is known as measles-elimination status is a massive public-health defeat that begs a question: How long will it take to regain it?

Based on other countries’ experience it could be up to five years, say doctors and epidemiologists. But that assumes the federal government is a robust and willing participant proactively working on measles vaccination.

Without that, it could take even longer.

Nilay Patel, in the headline of his endorsement of Kamala Harris two years ago: “A Vote for Donald Trump Is a Vote for School Shootings and Measles”.

 ★ 

Apple Documents Extra Apple Intelligence Usage Limits Per iCloud+ Paid Tier

Apple Support:

Starting with the 2027 software releases, Siri AI and Apple Intelligence features are available for free for users with a supported device set to a supported language. Some features rely on powerful server models and have limits where increased access is available with eligible iCloud+ plans, starting with the 27.3 release. These include, but aren’t limited to, features in these categories:

  • Siri AI
  • Images: Intelligent Photo Editing Tools including Clean Up, Extend, and Spatial Reframing, and Image Playground
  • Workflows and automation: AFM Cloud and Cloud Pro models in Shortcuts
  • Third-party apps using Apple Foundation Models in Private Cloud Compute

[...]

When you hit your daily usage limit for a particular feature category, you’ll be notified. Each device has its own daily usage limit per feature category. Once you reach a limit, you can wait until your daily usage limit resets on that device or immediately increase your limit by upgrading to an eligible iCloud+ plan.

Here’s Apple’s table with the usage limits by tier:

 ★ 

Saturday 21 November 1663

At the office all the morning and at noon I receive a letter from Mr. Creed, with a token, viz., a very noble parti-coloured Indian gowne for my wife. The letter is oddly writ, over-prizing his present, and little owning any past service of mine, but that this was his genuine respects, and I know not what: I confess I had expectations of a better account from him of my service about his accounts, and so give his boy 12d., and sent it back again, and after having been at the pay of a ship this afternoon at the Treasury, I went by coach to Ludgate, and, by pricing several there, I guess this gowne may be worth about 12l. or 15l. But, however, I expect at least 50l. of him. So in the evening I wrote him a letter telling him clearly my mind, a copy of which I keep and of his letter and so I resolve to have no more such correspondence as I used to have but will have satisfaction of him as I do expect.

So to write my letters, and after all done I went home to supper and to bed, my mind being pretty well at ease from my letter to Creed, and more for my receipt this afternoon of 17l. at the Treasury, for the 17l. paid a year since to the carver for his work at my house, which I did intend to have paid myself, but, finding others to do it, I thought it not amisse to get it too, but I am afeard that we may hear of it to our greater prejudices hereafter.

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Life is Better in GTA VI Except When It’s Not

Life is better in GTA VI except when it's not

Life is better in GTA VI except when it's not · youtu.be

I’m still very early in my GTA VI experience — Chapter One — a prologue that sets the standard for a 10+ hour tutorial for one of the best games you’ll ever play. Two brief thoughts:

First, prior to GTA, I’ve been an avid ARC Raiders player during my long post-Destiny depression. Whether you like extraction shooters or not, you can’t argue the game is gorgeous. There are times I just want to wander around on one of those maps. GTA is that level of detail, except it’s a mind-boggling open world with fewer killer robots. I’ll go further: it’s the most realized open world I’ve ever experienced.

Second, one of the games I play while playing is “I wonder if…” For example, there are iguanas everywhere. I stood at the side of the road as one of the iguanas ran across the road, and I thought, “I wonder if… the iguana will be killed.” It was.

Immersion is broken when you play I-wonder-if, and it fails to meet your expectations. GTA meets all I-wonder-if expectations and usually exceeds them.

But, yeah, there are a few bugs.

Links 11/21/26

Links for you. Science:

NIH director calls for new probe of controversial COVID-19 origin paper. Bhattacharya wants Nature Medicine to review whether former NIH leaders ghostwrote manuscript challenging theory an engineered virus caused pandemic (there’s no evidence that they did for what it’s worth)
Bacterial toxin produced by E coli leading suspect in rise in bowel cancer among under-50s (needs to be a lot more work done here, but interesting; B2 group E. coli have been implicated in several gut diseases before and those hypotheses didn’t pan out)
The US Lost Its Measles Elimination Status. It’ll Take Years to Get It Back
With measles spreading, do you need a booster shot?
The return of endemic measles is a likely harbinger of future crises
‘Just Ridiculous’: A Famed Philosopher Takes on AI Consciousness
This year’s humpback whale migration was missing something vital – the calves and their mothers

Other:

Oh, Elon Musk is ‘moderate’ now, is he? After spending nearly half a billion dollars to thwart Democrats, Musk tries to distance himself from MAGA.
Patch Me If You Can
Susie Madrak Lost Her Battle with Cancer, and with Our Healthcare System
If Democrats hope to do anything useful, they need to kill the filibuster (more and more people are saying this!)
Metro May Cut Bus Routes and Reduce Rail Service to Make Up Budget Gap
Hourly workers are living with 7.86% inflation. No wonder they voted against the AI boom
‘What Should the Leader Say?’: Hakeem Jeffries Staffer Built an AI Program for Surveillance and Advice
Don’t ICEwash or Griftwash the Midterms
Who Will Be Musk’s Candidates
The Trump DOJ Quietly Intervened to Ink a Huge Payout to a Trump Golf Pro
Bo French loses Texas country club membership (imagine how awful you must be for this to happen)
After gutting newsrooms, McClatchy plans to rebuild itself around AI (the executives sound like they are AI)
Jared Kushner Is Negotiating for Peace While Profiting From War
How D.C.’s Cash Payment Law Went Bankrupt
In a landmark judgment, top UN court says Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya
Republicans get the Hispanic backlash half-right. Trump’s draconian immigration policies played a big role in Latinos revolting against the Republican Party–but it’s not the whole story
Tech World Vibe Check: The tech barons are wilding out right now
Jeffries understands the assignment. Does Schumer?
Five Takeaways From the Most Detailed Data We Have on Midterm Voters
Copilot is “the new OS for work,” and now Office runs inside of it
Hillary Clinton: What Trump Should Have Said to Putin
It’s Rs, Not Ds, Who Are In Trouble in ‘28
Affordability Requires Class War
The Far Right Is The Butt Of The Joke In ‘GTA VI.’ They’re Angry For An Entirely Different Reason. (they’re so weird)
After the Logan Circle Shooting, an Old Foe Comes Back Into Focus: Mold
D.C. delays Medicaid work requirements, but thousands may still lose their health insurance next year
Before You Sign That Lease: A New Website Ranks D.C.’s “Worst Landlords”
The D.C. Jail’s food has been a health hazard for too long
Leaked: How Silicon Valley Elites Bankrolled an Anti-Migrant, Pro-Israel Propaganda Machine
2 Senators Block Trump Nominee Who Said Capitol Wasn’t Attacked On Jan. 6, 2021

SpaceX's Starshield troubles in Ukraine could threaten its broader military business

The representative in the US House expected to chair the House Intelligence Committee in January, Jim Himes (D-Conn.), has threatened to withhold support for funding government-owned systems from SpaceX amid the ongoing inquiry into the use of Starshield in Ukraine.

"SpaceX's potentially unilateral modification of a U.S. Government contract, combined with its lack of responsiveness to congressional oversight, calls into question every contract the U.S. Government has with SpaceX," Himes wrote in a letter to SpaceX founder Elon Musk on Friday.

CNN first reported the letter's existence. The network also reported that Himes sent a classified communication to Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton with a similar message that it would be difficult for Congress to authorize funding for systems with SpaceX as the primary vendor.

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Quoting Ravi Vakil

Alessandro Masullo has a proposed proof of [Generalized Riemann Hypothesis], and Brian Conrad has been looking closely at it for months and gave extensive feedback which is being incorporated, and it is so far looking good. It is all human, with no AI. The hope was to bring Alessandro to Stanford for a year to polish the writing and then announce it after running it by enough people. Now it seems best to put out the current draft.

— Ravi Vakil, Hurried Announcement: Alessandro Masullo GRH

Tags: mathematics

Saturday assorted links

1. Many federal agencies are hiring economists.

2. Theodore Zeldin, RIP.

3. Henry Oliver on Paradise Lost.

4. Quantum computing even weirder than you think? (NYT)  And an article bullish on quantum computing (NYT).

5. Good AI policy ideas from Joshua Saxe.

6. Podcast with SBF from prison, have not had a chance to listen, looks interesting.

7.. Possible implications of the generalized Riemann proof?

The post Saturday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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The Explorer Pattern for product invention and development.

tl;dr: the Explorer Pattern is one individual or team building a functional implementation that minimizes cross-team and cross-functional impacts as much as humanly possible, and then reconciling the details with other teams after that prototype is completed, accepting that this approach can require very substantial rework to that initial development.

Why write this?

Imprint previously called this the “Tech-led” or “Engineering-led” development model, but it’s pretty unclear to folks what that means. This writeup provides a more defined term, the “Explorer Pattern”, and explains in more detail how this works.

Why do we need to adjust the way we work?

Before 2026:

  • Code is expensive, and we design process to minimize implementation and rework

In and after 2026:

  • Writing software is extremely cheap, but it’s a wider phenomenon: generating output is effectively-free across many dimensions. Code is nearly free — if we have appropriate constraints. Designs are nearly free — if they follow patterns. Analysis is nearly free — if we’ve instrumented things properly
  • Reworking software is extremely cheap. Historically industry has optimized around avoiding engineering rework because engineering was the highest cost / narrowest constraint. In many companies this was interpreted as writing code being the constraint, which was never true, but many common practices were designed as if that were true (e.g. bringing engineering into problem-solving late “to protect their time”)
  • Working on the system is much more effective than historically if we get automated integration and feedback loops right, e.g. not improving a one-off design but improving the design system. Any place where improving the higher-leverage process is slower than solving the one-off is a bug in our process

Explorer Pattern: primary-and-replicas metaphor

Database replication diagram: three Writer boxes feed a single Primary database, which fans out to a chain of Secondary replicas

The easiest metaphor to think about the Explorer Pattern is database replication. Databases like MySQL and PostgreSQL have a primary database, where writes are performed. Every write is verified at that point, and once it’s verified, you know that the writes will flow downstream to various secondary replicas. Those downstream replicas can be delayed but they can’t be wrong because writes are verified upstream. (I’ve resisted the desire to talk about the CAP theorem.)

Diagram of three Writers writing to three separate Primary databases, with the write paths crossing and tangling to show inconsistency

A different model for database design is that used by Dynamo or Cassandra (or MongoDB to a certain extent), where you have a replica set, and have to get an acknowledgement from the majority of the replica set for a write to be strongly consistent. This is a very reliable setup, because it means you can tolerate losing a node, but it also introduces inconsistencies, and on a fixed amount of hardware they tend to be much, much slower than running a primary-secondary setup (or rely on bad performance metrics that don’t fsync to disk to create the illusion of throughput).

The Explorer Pattern is the former primary-secondary model, where the vast majority of the work is done by the working individual or team. This makes all work internally consistent because it’s passed through the same small group. It doesn’t, however, mean that the work is perfect. For example, you can always insert data that meets the table’s requirements but is still inherently wrong (e.g. 200 is a valid integer, but it doesn’t mean that my credit limit was supposed to be 200, that depends on the surrounding application logic).

Other teams become aware of the changes downstream, not synchronously upfront, and it’s instead the working group’s responsibility to both rationalize approach and create visibility into their work for other teams to engage in a non-blocking fashion.

Example: Support for Financial Aggregators

A concrete example of this practice at Imprint was rolling out financial aggregator support, e.g. allowing folks to connect to their Imprint powered accounts via Plaid. This has always been something folks want, but it’s particularly important in the realm of agentic commerce where more folks’ agents are analyzing their financial state for them. For this project, one of our engineering leaders (Ron), built the first pass of the feature at a low-burn while understanding the shape of the problem in a private alpha. He chatted through some of the details periodically to keep other teams aware, but it was a bit of a side project.

However, once he found the full shape of the problem and had implemented a full solution, we cut the replica-lag across teams down to near-zero, identified and ran through the small number of remaining issues, and shipped it. Like many of our projects this year, it was never officially on a roadmap, and shipped a quality feature that our members have wanted for some time.

How to follow the Explorer pattern

The rough rules for following the Explorer pattern:

  1. Know your goal and sponsor: every initiative ultimately has to have a specific outcome it’s pursuing and a sponsor who’s bankrolling that pursuit. This doesn’t always need to be explicit, especially for smaller projects, but once a project goes beyond ~3 weeks of effort, if you can’t very explicitly identify who the stakeholder is sponsoring your project and they would not enthusiastically agree, then you are likely closer to “lost” than “exploring”
  2. Small working group is small: at most 5 people, and preferably smaller. Everyone in the group has to keep the entire project in their head for as long as possible to detect problems and opportunities
  3. Small working group is flexible: folks in small working groups have to “find a way to yes” rather than “find a way to no”. Exploring is about uncovering the fundamental shape of a problem rather than pretending we know the fundamental shape
  4. Publish progress in a public channel: explorers have to report home with the progress they are making so others are aware. This is both a Linear Project and a Slack channel.
  5. Make the narrowest viable changes to what already exists: when we introduce unnecessary changes, we invalidate others’ mental models about how the world works. When we haven’t made those changes with care, we’re not only invalidating others’ mental model, we are creating the expectation that we’ve done it very intentionally for a good reason, which has a chilling effect on others improving them later, which is very expensive, whereas the Explorer pattern depends on being as inexpensive as possible
  6. Exercise good judgment to identify reasonable hypotheses: discard bad ideas immediately, and then filter the rest by trying to implement them as quickly as possible. Once you see the shape of the implementation, you can figure out which of the remainders are interesting
  7. Hold assumptions constant to avoid getting stuck: the only way to navigate complex ambiguous problems is to hold things constant, even when you know they are imperfect. For example, to do headcount planning we have to know our revenue, to know our revenue we have to forecast it, to forecast it we have to know the day that partners will go live next year. We don’t truly know any of those things, so just anchoring on a plausible guess to unblock us is much more valuable than trying to get them accurate. A little prework is useful, but a lot is just artificial precision that’s a distraction from progress
  8. Hold space for being totally wrong: when we move fast, with low information, we always find the way out, but often it’s not the way out we anticipated when we got started. Being open to throwing it all away, and starting a second, third, fourth time
  9. Ship all the way to production behind a feature flag: features and products move fast when we get the pieces working every step from frontend to backend to data pulls. This is the first step of exploration. Just make sure it’s behind a feature flag that’s only enabled for internal folks!

SpaceX launches intelligence-gathering satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office

A Falcon 9 rocket stands poised to launch from the Space Launch Complex 4E at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. File Photo: SpaceX

Update Nov. 22, 8 a.m. EST (1300 UTC): SpaceX landed its booster at Landing Zone 4.

SpaceX launched a batch of intelligence-gathering satellites to low Earth orbit on behalf of the National Reconnaissance Office on Sunday morning. Its Falcon 9 rocket took off from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, smashing the pad turnaround record at the site by more than 23 hours.

Liftoff from Space Launch Complex 4E at Vandenberg Space Force Base is scheduled for 4:23 a.m. PST (7:23 a.m. EST / 1223 UTC). It came 32 hours, 3 minutes, and 21 seconds after the launch of the USSF. The previous turnaround was set back in June at 55 hours, 48 minutes, and 21 seconds.

Prior to Sunday morning, SpaceX’s overall pad turnaround record was 45 hours, set by back-to-back Starlink flights from Cape Canaveral Space Force Base in Florida in January.

The mission, designated NROL-136, will add an undisclosed number of satellites to the NRO’s satellite constellation that it refers to as its proliferated architecture. This was the fourth such launch this year and the 15th to date.

SpaceX launched the mission using the Falcon 9 first stage booster with the tail number B1097. This was its 14th flight following the launches of NROL-172, USSF-259, Transporter-17, Twilight, Sentinel-6B, and eight batches of Starlink satellites.

Roughly 7.5 minutes after liftoff, B1097 touched down at Landing Zone 4, adjacent to the launch pad. This was the 38th landing at this site and the 680th Falcon booster landing to date.

A simple observation

The Riemann proof seems like a true surprise.  Yet on the same day Anthropic shares fell about ten percent.  In other words, the market feels that “capabilities” do not necessarily translate into significant social and economic outcomes.

Yet cybersecurity stocks are up considerably over the last few months, due to heightened cyber risk.  So the market is hardly unaware of AI and its potential, when the connection is real and evident.

Just a simple point to ponder.  Here are good comments from Alex Imas and Seb Krier.

The post A simple observation appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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Central Pacific Tropical Weather Outlook


Central North Pacific 2-Day Graphical Outlook Image
Central North Pacific 7-Day Graphical Outlook Image


000
ACPN50 PHFO 221710
TWOCP

Tropical Weather Outlook
NWS Central Pacific Hurricane Center Honolulu HI
Issued by NWS National Hurricane Center Miami FL
800 AM HST Sun Nov 22 2026

For the central North Pacific...between 140W and 180W:

Tropical cyclone formation is not expected during the next 7 days.

$$
Forecaster Blake
NNNN


The Powerful and the Pitiful

Image

Marketing note: I have a new ebook, Navigating the Chaos: Chronicles of Economic and Political Madness, which uses material from this Substack to construct a thematic narrative of the past two years and the issues that Democrats must now address to build an enduring progressive movement. Available from Amazon, Kobo,Bookshop, and Nook.

I’ve had a busy week, ending with a nasty cold. So no video/podcast today. But I thought I’d put up a brief note about the summit meeting that just took place in China, and its aftermath.

Clearly both Trump and Putin wanted Shenzhen to look like the Yalta conference in 1945: The leaders of three great powers, on the cusp of victory in World War II, divvying up the world.

The reality, however, is that late 2026 is nothing like early 1945. And the Chinese, at least, understood the difference perfectly well.

First of all, Russia simply isn’t a great power. Here’s 2025 GDP for the 6 largest economies, in current dollars:

These numbers look a bit different if we adjust for purchasing power, in which case China is #1. But Russia is just not a major player in the world economy.

Before Putin invaded Ukraine, many people on the US right nonetheless imagined that Russia was at least a military great power. After all, the Russians were manly, presumably with high testosterone. They weren’t woke! Surely they were great at warrior ethos and lethality!

But they have failed to conquer Ukraine, and in fact seem to be losing their war. Just before the summit the Ukrainians rubbed in how badly Putin’s war is going by taking down the central span of his beloved Kerch bridge.

The Chinese understand Russia’s true place in the world. As the photo at the top of this post — taken from Phillips O’Brien — shows, they literally didn’t even put Putin with Xi and Trump at the formal banquet. They seated him at the kiddie table.

America, by contrast, is a great power, with an immense, productive economy and a large military. However, our economic power is less than Trump imagined: At this point most of the world has realized that it can cope with Trumpian tariffs, and just shrugs off his economic threats. Meanwhile our military — its competence greatly degraded under Pete Hegseth’s leadership — has performed remarkably poorly in Trump’s war on Iran, while depleting its stock of advanced munitions.

America as a nation still has many strengths. But Trump himself is a deeply weakened leader, whose party just suffered the worst midterm defeat in half a century. And other nations have basically stopped taking him seriously. When the Pentagon’s top policy official criticized Ukraine’s policy of long-range strikes on Russia, Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius called it “quite a stupid thing.” Pistorius later apologized for his language — but didn’t back down on the substance.

The meeting in Shenzhen, then, was supposed to be a major event but ended up being a Potemkin Yalta. That is, it presented the façade of a great power summit, but the reality was that it was a meeting between one genuinely powerful autocrat, Premier Xi, and two wannabe world leaders, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, each of whom now cuts a pitiful figure on the global stage.

PS: Yes, I’m aware that Wile E. Coyote looked down yesterday, and it sure looks as if the AI bubble is popping. But I have a healthcare primer to finish, so The Market will have to wait until Monday.

NONMUSICAL CODA

So my IMF event is up. My presentation starts about 23 minutes in:

The Merge Is Upon Us: A Decade Of Neuralink

Photo Credit: Poupay Pinyodoonyachet

Over the past decade, I’ve visited Neuralink dozens of times. Its research labs and surgical centers. Its animal care facilities. Its brain implant production lines. I’ve also spent many weeks hanging out with patients who have received one of Neuralink’s implants. No other journalist has documented the evolution of Neuralink and its technology as closely.

The culmination of this reporting arrives today via a partnership between Core Memory and Life. We’ve produced a 10,000-word story that is part of Life’s spectacular return in print and online. It’s the tale of one of the most ambitious and controversial companies around and is based on hundreds of hours of reporting and interviews.

Subscribe now

You can read the story here and also obtain a beautiful, printed copy.

The first return issue of Life, now in an oversized, 11x16” keepsake anthology weighing almost 3 lbs, features full bleed imagery from this story, and the first Neuralink patient - Noland Arbaugh - on one of its covers. All Life subscribers will also receive a separately printed copy of the full Neuralink piece.

Photo Credit: Poupay Pinyodoonyachet

We’re also thrilled to announce that we’ve produced two documentary films on Neuralink and its clinical trial patients that will be premiering with Life in December.

Life is such an iconic brand and has been a storied force in journalism for decades. We welcome its return with unbridled enthusiasm and encourage you all to check out the work others have done to make the magazine sing.

We’d also like to give a big nod of thanks to Figma. Its technology played a massive role in the redesign of Life by helping the team move fast and bring their full creative vision to fruition.

Here’s a taste of the story:

Come November, the nights start getting cool in Yuma, Arizona, so Noland Arbaugh and his family will sometimes head to their back patio, toss some wood in the firebox, and hang out in the crisp desert air. It’s usually the three of them: Noland; his mother, Mia; and his stepdad, David, along with a menagerie of animals, both loose and caged, that includes dogs, chickens, quail, ducks, and goats. The most attention- seeking of these companions is Hope, a turkey who thinks she’s a dog. Hope cruises around the dirt backyard, then comes over to the family, pressing up against them to elicit pats and kind words.

The scene seems like it could take place anywhere in America, but that’s not the truth. That’s because this prefab house has Arbaugh in it, and he is the closest thing we have to a cyborg. He is the harbinger of a future way of life that can feel glorious, unnerving, or both, depending on how you look at it.

On January 28, 2024, Arbaugh became the first person to receive a brain implant made by Neuralink, the company founded by Elon Musk. At nearby Barrow Neurological Institute in Phoenix, a surgeon removed a circular piece of his skull so that a robot made by Neuralink could sew a series of very fine electrode-laced wire threads into his motor cortex. The electrodes nestle right up against his neurons, which allow them to read the electrical signals produced by his brain activity.

In 2016 just after he had graduated from college, Arbaugh had been horsing around with some friends at a lake when he was hit in the head and almost drowned. He was left as a quadriplegic, paralyzed from the neck down and able to communicate only with the aid of a computer, relying on a cumbersome mouth stick to tap a screen and move a cursor. He spent the next eight years in a wheelchair, spinning through cycles of complacency at best and depression at worst about his condition and the burden it placed on his family. They were not well off, and the care and time required to tend to him only made getting by that much harder. “I just draw in resources,” he says, “and give nothing out.”

Keep reading here.

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NASA’s new Moon plan is taking shape, but some big questions remain

SpaceX's successful recovery of its Starship rocket last weekend cleared a major hurdle on NASA's path to the Moon, opening up possibilities for higher launch rates and an all-important, long-delayed orbital refueling demo next year.

For SpaceX's purposes, Saturday's mid-air rocket catch will help engineers learn how to rapidly reuse Starships. That should expedite SpaceX's deployment of its newest generation of Starlink Internet satellites. NASA, meanwhile, believes a higher launch cadence will lead to faster learning as SpaceX develops a deep space version of Starship to ferry astronaut crews to the surface of the Moon.

Early next year, SpaceX plans to bring online a second Starship launch site at Kennedy Space Center, Florida. A second Starship factory is also under construction at Kennedy, joining SpaceX's existing SpaceX production line at Starbase, Texas. With two launch sites, SpaceX will have the pieces in place to take the next leap with Starship.

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Jlateh Vincent Jappah (remarkable job market candidate) in his own words

 Vincent Jappah, who I blogged about the other day, posted his own description of his remarkable personal and academic journey here.  He's a target of opportunity for any university interested in health and Africa and market design.

 The Question I Couldn’t Stop Asking
A student's journey from medicine to blood donation research

by Jlateh Vincent Jappah,  November 17 2026

########

Earlier: 

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

 

Paul Litvak’s Evidence Guide

I’m excited to announce the launch of Evidence Guide, the place to store and find computational audits of papers. I built it to fill a major gap in research quality evaluation.

Here is the rest of the thread.  Here is the site.  This is happening quickly, people.  Via Andrea.

The post Paul Litvak’s Evidence Guide appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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The summit of the authoritarians

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November 20, 2026

On November 19—yesterday—the United States president, Donald J. Trump, met with Chinese president Xi Jinping and Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen, China, on the sidelines of the summit of economic leaders from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Putin attended the APEC summit for the first time in nine years.

APEC was founded in 1989, and its 21 members account for about 40% of the global population and more than 60% of the global gross domestic product (GDP). It includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam (a wealthy sultanate on the northern coast of the island of Borneo), Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam.

The work of the APEC forum was overshadowed this year by the trilateral summit.

From the beginning, the fact that the president of the United States would meet with the leaders of China and Russia was bizarre because, as Phillips Payson O’Brien noted on social media yesterday and in an article in The Atlantic today, both China and Russia have been helping Iran in its current fight against Americans in the war Trump launched in February 2026. O’Brien notes that instead of protecting Americans, Trump is celebrating his inclusion in the company of leaders who have helped Iran kill American service members.

Trump appeared to want the meeting because he loves the glitz and attention of foreign visits, and Xi played that up, greeting Trump at his airplane. As foreign affairs journalist Anne Applebaum wrote yesterday in The Atlantic, Trump gushed about “the fanfare, the beauty, the pageantry, the thousands of people, the young children, the soldiers, the whole thing.” Hemmed in by the courts, shellacked in the midterms after telling people to vote as if he were on the ballot, and facing two years as a lame duck, he appeared to bask in the idea he was doing something vitally important with the eyes of the world upon him.

Putin appeared to want the summit because it would suggest he and Russia are on the same plane as the U.S. and China. It was, as former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul suggested, a photo op that would help Putin “push the myth that Russia is respected [as a] great power.”

In fact, Russia is not a great power. Its per capita GDP is lower than that of Poland or, for that matter, that of California, Texas, or New York. Russia’s GDP is $2.8 trillion; by comparison, the European Union, which Trump disdains, has a GDP of $22.8 trillion. The GDP of the U.S. is $32.6 trillion; that of China, $21.5 trillion.

Especially as his war on Ukraine is going poorly, a tripartite summit with the U.S. and China would be a public relations coup for Putin. His war on Ukraine is approaching the five-year mark and has cost 1.5 million casualties. Ukraine has destroyed half of Russia’s ability to refine oil and, even as Putin headed off to China, struck his prized Kerch Strait Bridge. The war is forcing Russia to borrow, but sanctions mean that the government must borrow most of its money at home, mostly from the major banks, at high interest rates. Yesterday, the government enacted higher taxes and spending cuts, neither of which will be welcome at home.

For all that Trump claimed his waiver of sanctions on the global sale of Russian diesel was designed to bring down prices in the U.S., in fact the lifting of those sanctions has primarily helped pump desperately needed funds into Russia. On November 15, the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal noted what the deal really did and wrote: “It’s increasingly hard to resist the conclusion that Mr. Trump’s real goal is to appease Mr. Putin.”

Indeed.

Yesterday, Trump entered the room where he was to meet Putin and, pointing at Putin, said to his aides with a smile, “Who is he?” Then he answered his own questions, saying: “He’s my friend,” crossing to shake Putin’s hand and say quietly “Nice to see you, nice to see you” before saying something to Putin under his breath that made the Russian leader laugh.

Trump told reporters: “We look forward to our meeting. We’ve had a great relationship for many years. We know each other for a long time. And I think a lot of wonderful things can come out of this.”

Xi also used the meeting to broadcast propaganda around the world. Applebaum noted that Trump cooperated as Xi showed America’s decline. As the White House pushed pictures and video of Trump at the center of the event, it was also celebrating Chinese power while Trump appeared to fall asleep during the meetings. At the same time, Xi humiliated Putin by seating him away from the head table at dinner, reminding the world that Russia is dependent on China.

As Applebaum noted, the actual purpose of the meeting was “to produce propaganda photographs and video clips that each of the three leaders will now use to mask their political failures.” And, as Applebaum added, the event made China look like “the only serious country in the room.”

But behind the propaganda, the larger story is the destruction of the post–World War II rules-based international order that prohibited countries from violating the sovereignty of other countries. In its place, Putin has advocated dividing the world among superpowers that control nations around them in “spheres of influence.” Back in 2019, former White House advisor Fiona Hill told Congress that Russian officials suggested that they would give the U.S. free rein in Venezuela by stopping their support for Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro if the U.S. would let Russia do as it wished in Ukraine.

At the time, Trump sent Hill to Moscow to say “Ukraine and Venezuela are not related to each other.” But Trump has apparently come around to the idea of dividing the world by spheres of influence.

In a long, rambling press conference today, Trump made it clear he considered Russia, China, and the U.S. the three more important nations in the world not because of their economic might or their alliances or even their conventional military forces but because together they control, he said, 92% of the world’s nuclear weapons. Today he justified calling Putin a friend, saying “it’s nice to have people that have 4,000 nuclear weapons as a friend as opposed to an enemy.”

At the end of their ninety minutes of talks, the three leaders issued a statement together; the very fact of such a joint declaration with the U.S. siding with Russia and China rather than its democratic allies was itself a statement. The vague “joint declaration toward peace” called for increasing the production of fossil fuels and decreasing restrictions on the behavior of the three leaders and their nations. They vowed to “reform the UN” and weaken “the International Criminal Court and other similar bodies,” calling “respect for immunities of State officials…of paramount importance.”

Putin is already under indictment by the ICC for war crimes.

Former senior diplomat Ned Price told Michael Birnbaum of the Washington Post, “They’re basically saying, ‘We want to do away with these rules of the road, the rules of the road that have worked in our favor for the past 80 years in the favor of liberal, democratic, open systems around the world, and we want to replace them with something very different.’”

On his way home from the meeting, Trump made a surprise call to European leaders gathered in Berlin. The “Coalition of the Willing,” a group of more than 35 countries supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, was gathered in Berlin for discussions with Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky. Birnbaum reported that Trump told the leaders that Putin wanted peace and that ending the war in Ukraine would free up more money for their own countries.

After the summit, Russia launched a barrage of missiles and drones at Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Poland’s minister of national defense said that two Russian missiles and a jet drone fell on Poland during Russia’s massive attack on Ukraine overnight. Poland’s prime minister Donald Tusk called it “an intentional provocation” from Russia. As Claudia Ciobanu, Samya Kuliab, and Barry Hatton of the Associated Press reported, European leaders condemned Russia’s actions.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said Russia had committed “grave violations” of that country’s airspace. “This incident is clearly dangerous—a consequence of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine,” Rutte posted. “I condemn Russia’s attacks as well as its ongoing war. We continue to stand united as Allies and will continue to support Ukraine.”

Henry Foy, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Max Seddon, Christopher Miller, and Amy Mackinnon of the Financial Times reported today that Trump administration officials have told officials in Europe and Ukraine they want a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia before Democrats take control of Congress. They expect Democrats will increase the support for Ukraine that Trump has cut off, and restore sanctions against Russia.

—

Notes:

https://www.state.gov/asia-pacific-economic-cooperation

https://apnews.com/article/apec-economy-china-trump-xi-putin-asia-bb61e50e4b0bb0b975b0695dc4f7b64a

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/trump-shenzhen-summit-xi-putin/689522/

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/trump-xi-putin-summit/689503/

https://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/russias-minuscule-economy-the-mouse-that-roars

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/EU/EURO/EUQ/RUS

https://united24media.com/world/russia-slashes-social-programs-and-healthcare-to-fund-record-2027-military-expansion-24539

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-budget-healthcare-regions-military-spending/33889735.html

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/09/28/russia-has-a-budget-problem-borrowing-its-way-out-wont-be-so-simple-a93804

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-diesel-deal-vladimir-putin-russia-7c282795

https://apnews.com/article/russia-venezuela-putin-maduro-fiona-hill-b26a94ceaba69c6ddd9193e2b31cb97f

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trumps-historic-meeting-with-xi-putin-headlines-asia-trip-2026-11-18/

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/u-s-russia-china-heads-of-state-declaration-toward-peace/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/11/19/trump-putin-xi-agreed-work-jointly-reduce-constraints-power/

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/nato-calls-russian-missiles-landing-in-poland-a-grave-violation-of-airspace

https://www.ft.com/content/6c1b8a64-35f9-4aba-8605-45a4abdce6b8?syn-25a6b1a6=1

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/19/opinion/hillary-clinton-trump-putin-ukraine.html

X:

McFaul/status/2122565940269490550

adammocklerr/status/2123282338985443632

SecGenNATO/status/2123750678459752875

YouTube:

watch?v=XgyH17iZJKk (at 31:50)

Bluesky:

phillipspobrien.bsky.social/post/3n2osgoftpc2k

nicoreijns.bsky.social/post/3n2osvtubbc2q

mcfaulmike.bsky.social/post/3n2oxlqnw322n

ronfilipkowski.bsky.social/post/3n2qlk5dpgs27

maks23.bsky.social/post/3n2qecqbghs2w

united24media.com/post/3n2qfkxy2oc2d

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Lawyers for Democracy | Skye Perryman

Preparing for Investigations

To read this letter, click here:

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It’s a laugh (what a laugh)

There is a little-known song by Hall & Oates titled, “It’s a Laugh.” It was birthed nearly 50 years ago, on the duo’s lightly regarded “Along the Red Ledge” album.

The chorus goes something like this …

It's a laugh, what a laugh
It's so stupid, I gotta laugh

For some reason, the tune has always done something for me. I think, really, it’s the simplicity. Some things are so stupid, so trite, so inane, so inept … that you just have to laugh.

You just have to.

•••

I bring this up because, two nights ago, I attended the Westminster City Council meeting, and—after writing this recap—walked away feeling somewhat good about the ultimate resolution. I mean, it wasn’t perfect. But it seemed like Chi Charlie Nguyen, the outgoing Republican mayor and a stubborn ol’ boot, had given in on some points, and acknowledged he was messing up his exodus from the spotlight.

It’s a laugh

It felt like enough of us spoke up and spoke out, and we were heard.

What a laugh

It felt like democracy prevailed.

It’s so stupid, I gotta laugh

Um, no.

It turns out the whole thing was—to the Republican majority and their POS mayor—a laugh. A lark. A game. A gag. Nonsense. Bullshit. Hell, earlier in the evening someone deep in the local governmental know sidled up to me inside Westminster’s city hall and whispered, “They’re playing chess, and we’re playing checkers.”

I didn’t fully believe it.

Well, I was wrong.

When none of us were looking, the MAGA majority played chess. Or, put differently: They placed an item to be discussed (and voted upon) in the next meeting (on Nov. 30) that is nothing short of diabolical and disgusting and anti-democratic. In short, if they have their way, beginning in December (after Democrat Carlos Manzo jumps in as mayor) it will take three council members to put anything on the agenda. In other words: As we speak, in Westminster all that is necessary to have an agenda item is the mayor bringing forth, well, an agenda item.

That will likely change.

The Republicans know precisely what they’re doing. Come December, Manzo will take over as mayor, and Democrat David Johnson will join the council after his victory over MAGA nasal cavity Amy Phan West. That means the five-person committee will—going forward—have two Democrats, three Republicans. And, if you made it through kindergarten, you know three is bigger than two.

Hence, if you need three votes to push forth an agenda item, but there are only two of you …

You’re handcuffed and limited and fucked.

It’s a laugh.

What a laugh.

Australia is unable to control inflation

On 3 November the RBA raised the cash rate to 4.85%, its fifth hike this year and the highest since 2008. Trimmed mean inflation is 3.6% and unemployment is 4.9%, and both are going up. Despite this, the RBA keeps saying it can get inflation back to target while holding on to the gains in employment.

There's a recurring bit in The Castle where Darryl Kerrigan hears what someone is offering and has only one reply: "Tell him he's dreaming." I think that's the right reply to anyone promising low inflation, low unemployment and high wages all at once, with zero productivity growth. You might be able to have three of those at the same time, but not all four.

Video (open the post to see it)

I predict that Australian unemployment will scream past 5% before trimmed mean inflation falls below 3%. This isn't strictly the RBA's fault, it's just that their lever no longer connects to a sufficiently large part of the economy.

In April I argued that Australia will run an overt command economy by 2040. The government already pays for and sets prices across a third of the economy. Set prices cause shortages, and politicians respond to shortages the same way every time: subsidizing demand while ignoring supply, then price controls, then nationalization.

What inflation actually is

So what is inflation? It's what happens when the supply of money grows faster than the supply of stuff for that money to buy. Every dollar is ultimately a claim on some goods or services, so when more dollars are chasing the same amount of stuff, each dollar buys less. Printing money is easy. Making stuff is hard, because it takes workers, energy, materials, and the know-how to combine them more efficiently over time. Creating more money doesn't necessarily create any more stuff, so all it does is debase the currency.

In Australia the government doesn't literally run the printing presses. It spends more than it collects in tax and borrows the difference, and banks create new money every time they write a loan. The effect is the same: more dollars in people's pockets. That leaves exactly two ways to control inflation. You can slow the growth of money, which is the Reserve Bank's job, and its only tool is interest rates, which control the cost of borrowing. Or you can speed up the growth of stuff, which means productivity, and that's everyone else's job. This post is about why Australia has become structurally incapable of doing the second, and what that does to the first.

What the RBA is telling us

By central bank standards, the RBA has been pretty clear about this. In February a parliamentary committee asked Governor Bullock whether government spending adds to demand. Her answer was "Yes, it does … Because what it often does is it transfers money to people, and it gives them money to spend." With the economy at capacity, she added, "anything that adds to aggregate demand adds to those capacity constraints, be it public or private." When she was pressed in March to say which kind of spending was the problem, she said "Value judgments on private versus public are not for me to make. They are for the government." You can read between the lines there. Meanwhile Deputy Governor Hauser said last month that productivity is "pretty much around zero per cent growth, and it's been zero cumulatively for the last decade or more." This is a shocking statement in a world of rapidly accelerating technology.

If I were Bullock I'd be tempted to ask Canberra what exactly they want me to do. The government's inflation policy amounts to pointing at the RBA and hoping it can tame a second wave of inflation without pushing up unemployment and triggering a recession. Australia managed to ride out the 2008 GFC without a recession thanks to Chinese demand for iron ore, record rate cuts, and Rudd's massive injection of liquidity into the economy that was always going to cause an inflationary hangover if productivity didn't rise enough to slurp it up. But productivity didn't rise anywhere near enough and governments got drunk on cheap money. Meanwhile the Australian economy hasn't had a proper recession, and associated flushing out of unproductive nonsense business practices, since 1991. The brief 2020 COVID recession doesn't count, because JobKeeper paid firms to keep everyone exactly where they were.

The arithmetic

Inflation isn't about whether wages are high. High relative to what? It's about whether wages grow faster than the amount each hour of work produces. Roughly:

The Wage Price Index rose 3.2% in the year to June 2026, while labor productivity has averaged about 0.3% a year for the past decade. Subtract one from the other and unit labor costs are rising at about 2.9% a year, before you even get to oil, housing or insurance premiums. That puts a floor under domestic inflation right at the top of the RBA's 2–3% target band, with no room left over for shocks.

The RBA can't do anything about productivity. The only lever it has on this equation is to raise unemployment (i.e. increase spare labor supply) until wage growth falls back to whatever the economy is actually producing. Governor Bullock said as much in September, putting the unemployment rate needed to ease inflation at somewhere between 4.5 and 5%. Why? Unemployed people buy less stuff, reducing aggregate demand, and increase supply of labor, pushing down wages. Treasury's Intergenerational Report puts the non-inflationary rate at about 4.25%. The gap between those two numbers is what a decade of flat productivity costs us, and it gets paid for in jobs.

This is the bit that never makes it into the press releases. Low inflation with low unemployment was a realistic promise when productivity grew 2% a year and could absorb 3–4% pay rises. With productivity at 0.3%... you're dreaming.

Who pays for the hike

Interest rates are a blunt instrument, but they don't hit everyone equally. They hit people who borrow, like mortgage holders, home builders, businesses thinking about investing (including in productivity-enhancing technology), and shops selling things people can put off buying. They barely touch spending the government funds at a fixed price.

The non-market sector (health, social assistance, education and public administration) accounted for around 55% of new jobs over the five years to March 2025, and in 2024 alone 80% of job creation was in the public or non-market sectors. A lot of that is the NDIS, which bills by the hour at a regulated price and couldn't care less what the cash rate is. The RBA estimates the shift into this sector knocked about 0.3 percentage points a year off productivity growth between 2017/18 and 2023/24, and in the year to December 2025 non-market productivity fell 0.7% while the market sector grew 1.5%.

So every dollar of public spending that ignores interest rates and labor supply forces the RBA to squeeze the private economy harder to hit the same overall number. RBA can hike rates, decreasing private sector consumption and investment, but this has no real effect on wages if the government slurps up most of the newly unemployed into highly bureaucratized jobs-for-life. Private sector employers, whose tax pays for the whole thing, get hit from both sides: More expensive debt and more expensive labor, predictably further reducing supply of their products! So Treasury has its foot on the accelerator, the RBA is standing on the brake, and the private sector is the brake pad. And the sector getting squeezed is the one where productivity is actually growing, while the sector being spared is the one where it's shrinking, so every rate hike shifts the economy further toward the part that makes inflation worse.

In other words, not all spending in the economy is equal. Government spending on flat productivity schemes pumps up the supply of money in the economy, and thus consumer demand, without increasing the supply of stuff. Since money is ultimately traded for stuff, excess money drives down the value of money and pushes up inflation.

Worse, the actually dynamic, competitive, productive part of the Australian economy is being throttled ever tighter between the twisting coils of the vastly overgrown public sector, exploiting its monopoly on force to drive taxes higher and higher. If family finances are tight, you can choose not to take that vacation or purchase a new car, but you can't opt out of taxes! Yet a tax policy that skins the sheep rather than shearing them quickly runs out of sheep, and so it is with the Australian economy and its inevitable slide towards government control.

How Australia pays its way

If productivity is flat, why are Australians still relatively rich, that is to say, as rich as the median American c. 1995?

Mining exports. Iron ore, coal, LNG and gold bring in enough foreign currency to hold the Australian dollar up. A strong dollar makes imports cheap, so real wages stay high even though nobody is producing more per hour. Cheap Chinese consumer goods are a side effect of the exchange rate, not something anyone planned, and they snuff out any hint of dynamism in Australian secondary manufacturing, the one industrial sector which actually generates multiplicative wealth.

Additionally, cheap imports help with goods inflation, but not with services, which is where inflation is stickiest. Services are mostly wages, and productivity in services has barely moved. A haircut costs an hour of the hairdresser's time plus rent, insurance, licensing and compliance, and none of that got any cheaper because a bulk carrier left Port Hedland. Your imported Taiwanese computers and Korean televisions got radically cheaper and better, but anything that involves an Australian service worker in the loop (healthcare, housing, education...) has shot out of reach for the middle class.

The floating dollar is meant to act as a shock absorber. When commodity prices fall, the dollar falls with them, imports get more expensive, and real wages adjust without anyone having to take a pay cut. It worked in 1997, 2008 and 2015. It works a lot less well when there's no tradeable sector left to soak up workers on the way down. The dollar slipped below 70 US cents on the day of the RBA's 3 November hike, and by 19 November it was below 67 cents, its lowest since January, after unemployment jumped to 4.9%. Keep an eye on it.

Chart (open the post to see it) · FRED / OECD series CCUSMA02AUQ618N, inverted to US cents per A$ · quarterly, 1984 Q1–2026 Q3

Blame the capitalists!

The fashionable alternative to arithmetic is blaming profits. A few days after the hike, Paul Bongiorno, a Saturday Paper columnist and 35-year veteran of the Canberra Press Gallery, argued the fix for inflation was an excess-profits tax on big companies. He quoted Greg Jericho, chief economist at the progressive think tank the Australia Institute: "ordinary Australians … are not causing inflation. Inflation is being driven by the cost of fuel … and corporate profits." This doesn't make sense - if corporations are sucking excess cash out of the economy and either saving it, moving it offshore, or investing it in long term capital projects, it would have the effect of reducing inflation by reducing the over-abundance of money.

Bullock dealt with the fuel argument in the same press conference, saying monetary policy "cannot impact global oil prices" and that the hike was meant to "address domestic capacity pressures." The ABS excluded automotive fuel from the September trimmed mean anyway, and the biggest single contributor to inflation was housing, up 5.2%. Housing is getting more expensive because we don't let people build houses, not because of anything happening in the Middle East.

The column's two main examples of greed don't hold up either.

  • Ampol. Its first-half profit rose 376%. Refining margins always blow out during a supply shock, and that margin is the price signal that pulls in fuel cargoes and pays for keeping stocks on hand while the Strait of Hormuz is closed. When margins collapse, Canberra pays Ampol and Viva a Fuel Security Services Payment to keep their two remaining refineries open. If you subsidize the losses and tax the gains, you end up with exactly what Australia has, which is no new refining capacity, ever. Australia spent four decades building eight refineries and less than two decades closing six of them, and having squandered domestic oil self-sufficiency now complains about a lack of refined diesel on the continent(!).

  • The banks. The Australia Institute estimates the big four make about $12,200 in the first year of an average $731,000 owner-occupier loan. By their own method that's a pre-tax margin of about 1.7% after funding costs, running costs and bad debts, up from 1.51% in April as banks pass on rate rises faster than they pay them out to depositors. That hurts borrowers, but it can't be what's driving measured inflation, because mortgage interest hasn't been counted in Australia's CPI since 1998.

This is the same pattern I described in April. The government sets prices across a third of the economy and funds demand that interest rates can't reach. When the resulting inflation shows up in the other two thirds, the proposed fix is to tax whoever is still making money. Each time this happens, another chunk of the economy moves from market prices to prices set by bureaucrats. It is not somehow a moral failing to be good at creating wealth.

Australia's spending plans are built on wildly unrealistic assumptions

The latest Intergenerational Report assumes productivity grows 1.2% a year for the next forty years. Almost every figure in it, from tax receipts to NDIS affordability to debt, is built on that number. The past decade delivered 0.3%. The RBA's own medium-term assumption is 0.7%. Multifactor productivity fell 0.5% in 2024–25.

Over forty years, the difference between 1.2% and 0.3% growth compounds to an economy 43% larger. That's how big the hole is if the assumption is wrong, and nothing in current policy explains why it should be right. As HSBC's chief economist Paul Bloxham put it: "We are not building enough housing. We haven't got enough cheap energy. We haven't got enough infrastructure. How is AI going to solve all those problems?"

This is where inflation and the budget collide. If productivity growth does recover, 3.2% wage growth is compatible with on-target inflation and low unemployment, and the budget math works. If it doesn't, the only thing left to adjust is unemployment, and the RBA will adjust it. The RBA is pricing in reality. As for Treasury, "they're dreaming." Bullock herself admitted the last couple of hikes "haven't even started to flow through yet," and three board members voted to wait. They're right about the lags, but waiting won't change where we end up.

What would work?

If we expect the RBA to control inflation, then the economy has to be re-sensitized to interest rates, which means that it has to actually pay for the cost of borrowing money. Debt transports value through time and space - an extremely useful trick, but it's not free. Fiddling with the interest rates won't actually solve the root problem.

  1. Stop adding rate-proof demand to sectors that are already short of capacity. Any growth in NDIS and care spending above population growth plus inflation pushes up the cash rate for everyone else. Hold spending to that line (or below, since in the real world 16% of 6 year old boys don't need a lifelong disability scheme) and the RBA can cut.

  2. Pay for outcomes, not hours. Under hourly billing, a provider that gets more efficient earns less. Fund outcomes, or pay per participant, and let providers keep the gains.

  3. Build houses. Housing was the biggest single contributor to inflation in the year to September. Zoning reform and replacing stamp duty with (unimproved) land tax are the biggest supply-side levers we have, and both lower the unemployment rate the economy can sustain without inflation. It is literally impossible at this point for Australia to accidentally build too much housing. It could double supply in a decade and there would still not be enough.

  4. Make energy cheap. Fuel drove headline inflation this quarter. An economy that makes its own cheap energy is less exposed to the Strait of Hormuz, and can rebuild industry that doesn't depend on cheap labor. Australia is awash with every natural resource it could possibly want. There is simply no excuse for expensive energy.

  5. Let firms fail and pay workers to move. At full employment, most productivity growth comes from workers moving from weak firms to strong ones. Stop protecting jobs that should disappear. Australia's "job protections" actually discourage hiring, because they push the cost of an employee who isn't working out onto the employer, and through the employer onto every colleague who is pulling their weight. Any business owner knows a bad hire you can't let go is worse than no hire at all, so they hire less, and the people who lose out are the ones who could have been given a chance. There have to actually be consequences for failure.

  6. Try not to penalize success. Radical improvements in productivity are typically driven by new business models and innovative businesses starting new cores of cumulative wealth generation, rather than established businesses spontaneously getting religion on, eg, email. And yet Australian taxation policy could scarcely be better designed to drive Australia's innovators out of business and/or overseas. San Francisco is crawling with tens of thousands of Australians who found barren soil for their ambition in their home country and instead contribute billions of dollars to the US tax base.

Time to wake up

Arithmetic is not on Canberra's side. Wages are growing at 3.2% and productivity at 0.3%, and if productivity doesn't give, jobs will. The math doesn't care about your feelings.

So the next time the RBA promises to bring inflation down while protecting jobs, without anyone in Canberra doing a single thing to raise output per hour, there's only one sensible reply.

Tell him he's dreaming.

Atlantic Tropical Weather Outlook


Atlantic 2-Day Graphical Outlook Image
Atlantic 7-Day Graphical Outlook Image


000
ABNT20 KNHC 221712
TWOAT

Tropical Weather Outlook
NWS National Hurricane Center Miami FL
100 PM EST Sun Nov 22 2026

For the North Atlantic...Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of America:

Tropical cyclone formation is not expected during the next 7 days.

$$
Forecaster Kelly


Eastern Pacific Tropical Weather Outlook


Eastern North Pacific 2-Day Graphical Outlook Image
Eastern North Pacific 7-Day Graphical Outlook Image


000
ABPZ20 KNHC 221710
TWOEP

Tropical Weather Outlook
NWS National Hurricane Center Miami FL
1000 AM PST Sun Nov 22 2026

For the eastern and central North Pacific east of 180 longitude:

Tropical cyclone formation is not expected during the next 7 days.

$$
Forecaster Blake


*The Great Enrichment*

The author is my colleague Vincent Geloso and the subtitle is A New History of American Growth and Inequality, 1865-1945.  Here is an excerpt from the very beginning:

…regardless of what improvements you think occurred during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, you are underestimating how much improvement there truly was.  From 1870 to the start off World War I, America experienced the fastest and most stunning rise in the quality of life of the downtrodden, the poor, the unskilled, the midskilled, and the average Joe (i.e., the poorest 90% of Americans) ever seen in human history up to that point.  Second, it was the period from World War I to the end of World War II that was marked by slower — though still substantial — gains for people at the bottom of the income ladder.  Third, the improvements in the living standards of the poorest 90 percent of the population were faster than those of the top 10 percent and as fast as those of the top 1 percent from 1870 to 191.  During those four decades, America was a lean and mean egalitarian growth machine.  Fourth, this machine was fueled by America’s exceptionally dynamic market economy, which allowed people to move to pursue better opportunities (either in terms of industries or in terms of geography).  While some state actions did contribute to this machine, market forces own the lion’s share, and, in many cases, they actually made government actions more effective.  Fifth, America developed a welfare state only because, in the aftermath of World War I, the growth machine slowed down.

An excellent and much-needed book, definitely recommended.

The post *The Great Enrichment* appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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The post Emergent Ventures, 60th cohort appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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It’s Golden Dukes Time of Year – Golden Stefaniks?

If you’re a long time TPM Reader you’ll know we have a special place in our hearts for members of Congress who have mystery buyers buy their houses for wildly more than their worth. So we put together this quick explainer about the breaking story about Rep. Elise Stefanik’s mystery home buyer.

Everything is Breaking

The markets are crashing. AI is out. Doomsday prepping is in. Today on TPM’s Friday Live Show (Name TBA), we’re going to talk about the week that was, and what a week it was. So join myself, Nicole LaFond, Hunter Walker, and Derick Dirmaier at 1 p.m. ET on YouTube to discuss.

The Talk Show: ‘A Whoopsie Treason’

Christina Warren returns for a jam-packed show: Jensen Huang-gate at Nvidia, the HomeView, the new iPad Mini, more on the iPhone Duo, and Robert “R-Patz” Pattinson taking the role of James Bond.

Sponsored by:

  • Uncommon Goods: Out of the ordinary gifts, great for the holidays. Save 15% off your next purchase after following that link.
  • WorkOS: Let agents sign up for your app without a browser.
 ★ 

America’s Earliest Globe

Speaking of the Library of Congress, I also enjoyed this post exploring the earliest-dated globe made in the United States. “Created in 1811 by James Wilson, the first commercial globemaker in the United States, it… More

Maps and Copyright

A fascinating post on Worlds Revealed, the Library of Congress map blog, about some of the difficulties the Library faces when navigating map copyright. In particular, how global crises—World War II and the collapse of… More

The Week Observed: November 20, 2026

What City Observatory Did This Week

Portland’s Carmaggedon:  Almost no net change in commute times. Portland’s five-week closure of a portion of Interstate 5 through Portland had very little overall effect on travel times. For Vancouver-to-Portland commuters, average weekday morning (southbound) commutes were about 11 minutes slower, but average evening commutes home were about 10 minutes faster.

ODOT claims that travel times would “double or triple” because of the closure didn’t materialize. The worst-affected travel time between downtown Vancouver and downtown Portland (at about 8 a.m.) increased by 48 percent, from 26 minutes to 37 minutes. Nearly all of this lost time was made up by faster afternoon (northbound) commutes.

Like every other predicted “Carmageddon,” devastation failed to occur because travelers quickly changed their travel times, routes, and modes, or combined trips, reducing travel volumes. The much-reduced northbound peak-hour travel times show the positive effects of travel demand management—our highway system works better if traffic is not allowed to exceed capacity.

Overall, this experiment again confirms that travel demand is highly elastic and responds to available capacity, which is why widening highways never produces sustained improvements in traffic congestion. It’s proof positive that throwing $3.6 billion at widening a mile-and-a-half-long stretch of I-5 near the Rose Quarter is a massive waste of money.

Must Read

The rise of the socialist YIMBY mayor: The November election marked the ascendance of two more left-leaning, pro-housing mayors in the nation’s largest cities: Nithya Raman in Los Angeles and Janeese Lewis-George in Washington, D.C. Writing at The New Republic, Ned Resnikoff says that this wave, following on elections of similarly styled mayors in New York and Seattle, has important implications both for our politics and housing policy. Each of these candidates is unabashedly pro-housing and endorses YIMBY (Yes in My Backyard) policies aiming to make it easier to produce more housing. While that seems like an uncomfortable endorsement of markets to many traditional socialists, Resnikoff points out that the new positioning better reflects the nature of class divides in today’s America:

In this case, the thing that defines one’s class position is not one’s relationship to the means of production but one’s relationship to real estate. YIMBYs are representing an emergent urban tenant class against the entrenched landowner class that has long dominated urban America.

In each of these cities, an important bloc of voters was urban renters, among whose chief concerns was housing unaffordability. Election results cleaved along housing class lines: each of these socialist mayors drew most of their support from renter-dominated neighborhoods; they challenged incumbents who leaned much more heavily on single-family-homeowner-dominated neighborhoods.

The high, high cost of affordable housing.  Portland seems to be close to setting a new record for expensive “affordable” housing: The Oregon Journalism Project reports that state officials just approved financing for a project that will build 57 apartments for a cost of about $56 million, which works out to about $985,000 per apartment. The project started out to be much less costly, but protracted disputes over whether the builder would have to pay prevailing wages led to significant delays (and damage to the partially built project). Despite misgivings, the state board reviewing the project allowed it to move forward:

Council member Ed McNamara, a retired Portland affordable housing developer, registered his objection by abstaining from the vote, but not before saying: “It’s extraordinarily expensive…it’s astronomical.” Another member, Javier Mena, the affordable housing manager for the city of Beaverton, also abstained. “It’s just way overpriced,” Mena said.

At nearly $1 million per apartment—in a neighborhood where existing single-family homes sell for about half that amount—this approach hardly seems like a scalable or fiscally feasible solution to housing affordability.

LA turns down funding for widening freeways–at least for now. Streetsblog LA reports that Metro, LA County’s transit and transportation agency, voted down funding for a series of freeway expansion projects. As Joe Linton explains, Metro’s governing body routinely rubber-stamps freeway projects, and there is a strong ethic of log-rolling. But at this meeting, Long Beach Mayor Rex Richardson questioned  the case for a project in his part of the region, arguing that a wider freeway was unlikely to be the best way to accommodate freight traffic. The proposed funding failed to get the needed four votes to move forward.

Today’s rejection slows a handful of freeway expansions that Metro sought to fast-track. It’s unlikely that this setback will permanently kill any of these widenings. Even when one funding source has been denied, these projects tend to come back over and over, like zombies. It would be surprising if these projects do not return to the board within a couple of months. At that time, the harmful widening may face further scrutiny, as Mayor-elect Nithya Raman replaces outgoing Mayor Karen Bass.

In the News

The Vancouver Columbian quoted Joe Cortright’s testimony to the Joint Oregon-Washington Legislative Committee on the I-5 bridge, calling out the financial risks of moving forward with a single bidder.

The Oregon Capital Chronicle highlighted Kiewit’s history of major cost overruns on highway projects, and quoted City Observatory’s analysis of the high risk of further cost increases on the $15 billion project due to the proposed progressive design build contracting process.

The Oregonian also reported on the same contracting risks.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Friday 20 November 1663

Up, and as soon as I could to my Lord Sandwich’s lodgings, but he was gone out before, and so I am defeated of my expectation of being eased one way or other in the business of my Lord. But I went up to Mr. Howe, who I saw this day the first time in a periwigg, which becomes him very well, and discoursed with him. He tells me that my Lord is of a sudden much changed, and he do believe that he do take my letter well. However, we do both bless God that it hath so good an effect upon him. Thence I home again, calling at the Wardrobe, where I found my Lord, but so busy with Mr. Townsend making up accounts there that I was unwilling to trouble him, and so went away. By and by to the Exchange, and there met by agreement Mr. Howe, and took him with a barrel of oysters home to dinner, where we were very merry, and indeed I observe him to be a very hopeful young man, but only a little conceited.

After dinner I took him and my wife, and setting her in Covent Garden at her mother’s, he and I to my Lord’s, and thence I with Mr. Moore to White Hall, there the King and Council being close, and I thinking it an improper place to meet my Lord first upon the business; I took coach, and calling my wife went home, setting Mr. Moore down by the way, and having been late at the office alone looking over some plates of the Northern seas, the White seas, and Archangell river, I went home, and, after supper, to bed.

My wife tells me that she and her brother have had a great falling out to-night, he taking upon him to challenge great obligation upon her, and taxing her for not being so as she ought to be to her friends, and that she can do more with me than she pretends, and I know not what, but God be thanked she cannot.

A great talke there is today of a crush between some of the Fanatiques up in arms, and the King’s men in the North; but whether true I know not yet.

Read the annotations

Opening a 400-Year-Old Cryptex

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Collections: On the ‘Sullan Republic’

This week, we’re going to talk about the version of the Roman Republic created by the murderous dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla in the late-80s B.C., what I am going to term here the ‘Sullan Republic.’ In particular, I want to lay out the nature of that political order, stressing the important ways in which it was not a continuation of the Roman Republic which had existed from 509 to 88 B.C. (or even the ‘republic of the nobiles‘ which had existed from c. 300 to 88) but in many ways a new thing. Viewed in that context, the fact that it failed utterly in just three decades speaks to how much less capable constructed it was than the earlier Roman political orders.

I think this is worth focusing on for two reasons. The first is simply that this distinction is often lost on students and enthusiasts. We have so much more evidence (as recently discussed!) for the Late Republic and specifically for the period of the ‘Sullan Republic’ that it tends to drown out everything else: Cicero’s republic gets understandably processed as the res publica as if it was the only one and that things had always worked that way.

Second, you may notice that the title structure for this post mirrors my retrospectives on Cleopatra VII and Alexander III. That is intentional: this is, in effect, my commentary on Sulla himself. My reasoning here is straight forward: almost any attempt to rehabilitate Sulla proceeds from his effort to ‘restore’ or ‘save’ the Roman Republic. It observes that Sulla seems to have been a sincere patriot who really believed in the republic (in an oligarchic, reactionary form) and then posits that he set out to ‘save’ the Republic and in some level did so. The reason for this approach is equally straight-forward: there is little else to defend in the man. There is no hint of the military virtuoso of a Caesar or Alexander in Sulla; he was certainly a very competent general, to be sure, but few of his military achievements were spectacular.1 In his conduct, there is nothing of the occasional glimpse of Alexander’s chivalry or Caesar’s mercy or even Octavian’s later-in-life forbearance – Sulla was cruel, ruthless and rapacious with some consistency.

So any defense of Sulla’s life and methods has to be predicated on the idea that he ‘saved the republic’ or some such thing. And I argue here that he did no such thing; rather than save the republic as it had been, he buried it (already slain by others) and built a new, inferior version atop its grave. That inferior version began falling apart almost immediately and wholly decomposed in 49, all within a single generation. Sulla thus ought to be judged a fairly comprehensive failure – all of his butchery and greed neither saved nor conserved anything and instead if anything further weakened what was left of Rome’s republican traditions.

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(Bibliography note: This can be a fairly short one – I am for the most part here following H.I. Flower, Roman Republics (2010) in the interpretation of the Sullan Republic, which Flower terms ‘Republic 6’ and which runs notionally to at least 60. There is more beyond this, such as A. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (1999) and E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (1995), and A. Keaveney, The Army in the Roman Revolution (2007), but for the most part one may find the relevant works in Flower’s bibliography. For the reader looking to get a grasp on the wider sequence of events in this period, H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (1959) remains a capable narrative, although I will be pushing back on its interpretation of Sulla as presenting mere ‘reforms’ that ‘restored’ elements of the pre-91 republic; more recent and also very solid is the aforementioned E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (1995). Finally, this entire topic is unavoidably cast in the very long shadow of R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), although it spares just a few pages for Sulla – but here I am also at variance with Syme’s review that presents Sulla’s bloodstained dictatorship as largely just reaffirming the Roman oligarchy that was already failing.)

The Situation

It is worth laying the groundwork here for the situation that Sulla and the Roman people were in by the period 83-81 when Sulla is in a position to impose his new republic. There is a tendency for this period to get somewhat limited mention in world history courses (often just treated as ‘Marius and Sulla’ as if they were dueling dynasts in the same way that Caesar and Pompey and Octavian and Antonius were) and thus often a failure to recognize how nearly total a break from what came before this moment was.

First we should note that in the run up to the explosion of civil war in 91 (note 91, not 88), there had been tremors. Our sources – most notably Appian – tend to begin their understanding of this period with the tribunates of Tiberius (133) and Gaius (123, 122) Gracchus and their violent ends. We’ve already discussed these, so no need to belabor the point. Modern historians often reach back a little further, recognizing in the irregular career of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (cos. 147, 134) many of the patterns – a general popular enough to buck the Senate, taking volunteers, holding office in defiance of the mos maiorum and/or the law – that would bear such poisonous fruit later. But Scipio Aemilianus never makes a disruptive play for power and dies in any event in 129, so if he posed any danger, it passed.

The boiling political issue from 122 to 91 was the question of citizenship for the socii. We’ve discussed this institution before – the subordinated communities of Italy got a ‘deal’ from Rome (which the Romans euphemistically referred to as an alliance) in which the socii were bound to Rome and required to supply troops to Roman armies but in exchange got protection from Rome, a (fairly ample) share in the loot of Roman conquests and no Roman taxes levied on them. This had been a good deal for a long time, but Roman overseas conquests altered the balance: increasingly Rome was getting not loot but tax revenue (of which the socii had no share) from its conquests and using those revenues – after the Gracchi – to pay for benefits (land distribution, grain distribution) which were restricted to Roman citizens. The balance of the deal had shifted and of course behind this was the understandable desire by the socii who had fought for Rome’s new empire for generations to share in legal equality at the top of it.

Social Classes in the Roman Republic. The left side of the diagram shows Roman citizen communities, the right side the communities of the socii.

The response across Italy was clearly split – some socii ‘wanted in’ (wanted citizenship) and some ‘wanted out’ (wanted to dismantle Rome’s imperial system over Italy). From 123 to 91, we see repeated attempts to resolve this problem politically: various figures (e.g. Marcus Fulvius Flaccus (in 125), Gaius Gracchus (in 122), L. Appuleius Saturninus (in 100), and Marcus Livius Drusus (in 91)) had tried to advance various schemes to resolve this issue by expanding – to a greater or lesser degree – Roman citizenship in Italy. These efforts had failed for a few reasons: immediately, the Roman voters were mostly sour on these plans, recognizing that expanding citizenship would dilute their votes and share of the revenues of empire. Behind that, I think, it seems clear that while the Roman political elite increasingly understood this needed to be done, whoever did it would suddenly have the gratitude (and clientage) of millions of new citizens and thus be an unmatched political powerhouse – so this needed to get done but no one could afford to let their political opponents be the ones to do it. As a result, the Senate drag their feet on the issue rather than – as they had with hard geostrategic choices in the fourth and third centuries – presenting a united front to the Roman people.

The discontent of the socii after repeated failed efforts then boils over in 91, leading to the Social War (91-88). This is very important because it creates the ‘state of exception’ in which all of the chaos happens. The wild events of 88 (which set the stage for everything else) are, I think, impossible to understand except that they are occurring already in the context of a huge rupture of norms and traditions in which the same state is being shaken so hard it is experiencing a kind of political liquefaction.

Via Wikipedia, a map of Roman Italy c. 100, with the territory of the socii marked in shades of red.

In the event, the Roman Senate finally does the obvious thing in response to the mass rebellion of the socii: it offers citizenship to the socii if they will lay down arms. That works to separate the ‘hard cases’ (most notably the Samnites) who ‘wanted out’ from the ones that mostly ‘wanted in’ and allows Rome to win the war. But it creates a huge secondary question concerning on what terms the new citizens will be enrolled and that furthers the state of exception here: now not only is there an ongoing civil war but also we’re adding a huge number of new citizens to the Republic.

That leads to the events of 88. P. Sulpicius Rufus, an ambitious tribune (politically somewhat cornered by being in no small amount of debt) pivoted to trying to alter the distribution of the socii in Rome’s voting tribes to be more equal (and thus swamp existing Roman voters) and enlisted the aging Gaius Marius to help him. Marius’ price was one last chance in the saddle – command of an army to fight Mithridates VI of Pontus who had tried to pry Rome out of the Aegean while the Romans were distracted with the socii (the command had been delegated to Sulla, as something of a reward for his hard fighting in Italy, itself an echo of Marius’ own bad precedent from 107 to 100). Blocked legally, Marius and Sulpicius worked up a riot (including some of Marius’ veterans) and thereby pushed through a law giving Marius his command and redistributing the Italians; Sulla, who was consul in 88 had been in Rome to veto the proposal and was forced to flee the city by the mob violence.

Sulla then famously marches his army on Rome. Sulla presumably understood himself to be acting, as the consul, to restore order. His soldiers – who had been fighting under him for at least two years in the Social War – seem to have had economic motivations: Marius was likely to enlist his own army if he went East and this would mean the rich plunder of a war in Greece would go to others. Sulla’s officers nearly all deserted him, recognizing that Sulla’s action in turning his army on Rome was unconscionable. In the event, Marius and his supporters fled; Sulla outlawed 12 of them, but only Sulpicius Rufus was caught and killed. Sulla then reversed Sulpicius’ acts before departing for the East.

Once Sulla and his army were gone, Marius and his partisans (most notably L. Cornelius Cinna, consul for 87, who seems to have been elected because he did not appear to have been a partisan of either Marius or Sulla, but who hopped onto Marius’ side for political expediency once elected; this faction is later led by Gnaeus Papirius Carbo) swooped back into Rome and essentially set up what we ought best to describe as a military junta of sorts which governs the city from 87 to 83. They murdered at least a hundred of their political opponents and at this point (if not earlier), we can say the res publica is no longer functioning.

Via Wikipedia, a coin of Sulla’s, minted in 82, depicting Roma on the obverse and Sulla in a triumphal chariot (for his triumph over Mithridates) on the reverse.

Sulla sweeps back from the East in 83, defeating the Marians at the Battle of the Colline Gate (in late 82). Sulla then has himself declared dictator rei publicae constituendae causa (“for reforming the constitution of the Republic”) in a matter that broke wholly with the traditional limits on dictators’ powers, scope and terms of office. In practice, Sulla had replaced the Marian military junta of Cinna and Carbo with his own. I stress this point because understanding the republic Sulla is about to create requires understanding just how substantial the rupture of the republic as it had been was.

Sulla secured his rule through a program of mass political violence. At the top of this program were the proscriptions, a published list of 520 of Sulla’s political enemies from the upper-classes who were to be made outlaws, killed if they could be captured and their property seized. The list included every Roman elected to office between 87 and 82 who had not defected to Sulla. Thus in practice between the Marians and Sulla himself, an entire generation of political talent in the Roman Republic had been wiped out. Sulla also butchered the prisoners he took in his civil war. The Samnites (the Oscan-speaking peoples who inhabited the uplands of southern Italy) were especially singled out for reprisals and seems to have perpetrated something close to a genocide against them (e.g. Strabo 5.4.249). That is not to say Sulla’s civil war was over at this point – a Marian-faction general, Quintus Sertorius, had a republic-in-exile in Spain that wouldn’t be crushed until 72, while civil war within Sulla’s coalition was to briefly break out in 78, immediately after Sulla’s death with Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (the elder, cos. 78)’s failed coup attempt.

It is in this context, with a knife to the throat of what was left of the Senate and the res publica, that Sulla set about his reforms.

The Reforms and Their Flaws

In getting a sense of how substantial Sulla’s departure from the Roman system of the Middle Republic was, it may help to read up on its overall structure. While Sulla’s ‘reforms’ are often presented as a restoration of the old Roman ‘oligarchy,’ in practice they represented a novel form of republican governance. In practice, we can pull out into a half-dozen major alterations Sulla made to the Roman political order, most of which were bad ideas which were either swiftly repealed or contributed meaningfully to the collapse of republican governance into the inferno of civil war in 49; the odd remainders were just laws that failed to understand that inscribing a norm into written law did not make it self-enforcing. The main of these were (grouped only by expedience for discussion):

  • Perhaps most dramatically, crippling the tribunate.
  • Formalizing the cursus honorum, specifying a rigid route to the Roman political career
  • Enlarging the Senate and increasing the number of quaestors and praetors
  • Setting formal rules for Roman provincial governors/commanders, whose orders are set by the Senate and who are required to remain in their geographically defined provinces
  • Setting the juries of the permanent jury courts to consist of senators, rather than members of the equites more broadly.
  • Finally, part of the pattern set by Sulla – though not, perhaps, in law – was of having more praetors and both consuls stay in Rome for most (if not all) of their year in elected office

In any event, it is worth noting that Sulla implements his reforms in 82 and 81, retires from public life in 80 and dies of old age in 78, by which point his system is already beginning to unravel (the above-mentioned coup attempt by Lepidus).

The first pair is formalizing the cursus honorum and crippling the tribunate, which have in common that they are both effectively undone by the end of 70 BC. On the first, Sulla crippled the tribunate, removing the ability of the tribunes to put legislation to the concilium plebis, their ability to obstruct other magistrates were curtailed and they were barred from seeking further office, making the tribunate a dead-end office and thus unattractive for any Roman with political ambitions. This was, by all indications, very unpopular (it represented a reversal of one of the earliest gains by the Plebians in the Struggle of the Orders) and also posed a legislative problem, since the tribunes were normally at the heart of a lot of regular law-making. These changes last about a decade before being repealed by Sulla’s two lieutenants, Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey) and Marcus Licinius Crassus when they jointly held the consulship in 70.

The customary cursus honorum as it stood through the second century BC

On the latter, Sulla had specified a rigid career path for holding Roman office, which specified terms as pro-magistrates when leaving office, a compulsory ten-year delay before seeking any office for a second time (which really only matters for the consulship), and age requirements for these offices. Now in theory these laws remained on the books through the end of the Republic. In practice the whole point of laws like this were not to govern the careers of typical Roman politicians – whose careers had followed the customary cursus honorum in any case – but to restrain exceptional politicians and in this they were an utter failure as the very next exceptional politician, Gnaeus Pompeius – again, one of Sulla’s lieutenants, just 23 when he rushed to Sulla’s side with a legion he raised himself as a private citizen – blew through all of these rules.

Sulla’s revised cursus honorum, with the plebian tribune effectively removed and the number of quaestors and praetors increased.

Under Sulla’s rules, Roman politicians were supposed to move through the offices in sequence and serve as pro-magistrates after holding the relevant officers – pro-praetor after being praetor, pro-consul after being consul. Pompey is already serving illegally in a pro-praetorian command (he has never been and will never be a praetor) under Sulla and is appointed to another illegal pro-praetorian command against Lepidus in 78, when he is 28 years old – eleven years too young to even be a praetor. And while notionally the purpose of the ‘ten year gap’ rule between office-holding was to prevent the kind of careers Sulla and Marius had – continuously in command year after year – Pompey bounces from one pro-praetorian command to another basically non-stop until he wins the consulship in 70.

Pompey’s consulship in 70 was illegal under Sulla’s fancy new written rules in multiple ways! First, Pompey has not followed the rigid plan of the cursus honorum; he hasn’t skipped one step, he has skipped all of them, having never actually held elected office before. He is also too young (36 when he should be 42) and he’s held back to back military commands basically continuously through the 70s and is going to straight into another set of back-to-back commands from 67 to 62. It did not particularly matter if Sulla’s new laws could contain the ambitions of men like – insert the sound of me drawing from a hat here – Lucius Octavius (cos. 75, d. 74); its purpose was to contain the ambitions of men like Marius and Sulla and the very next such man blew through it like paper, in part (as we’ll come to) due to weaknesses created by the rest of Sulla’s system.

Next we have the core of Sulla’s changes, aimed at placing the Senate clearly at the core of the Roman system. Sulla expands the Senate from 300 members to 600, while also substantially increasing the number of lower offices that fed into it: going from just eight quaestors to twenty and from six praetors to eight. The idea seems to have been that a larger Senate would have been more powerful as the collective influence of aristocratic men in it. In practice, the effort dilutes the Senate. The ranks of the Senate must already have been badly thinned from both Marian and then Sullan purges and Sulla’s rapid expansion of the Senate must thus have pulled in large numbers of relatively mediocre political figures. That wouldn’t change as time went on: with the ratio of quaestors to praetors going from 4:3 to 5:2, a lot more senators in the new Senate would have been junior men of insignificant accomplishments with no real hope of rising to higher office. The result was an increasingly two-tier Senate larded up with back-benchers whose presence added functionally nothing to the influence of the body.

A chart of the composition of the Roman Senate during the second century, where you can see the core groups, with consulars representing a little over 10% of the body and current/former praetors representing another 25%, giving experienced magistrates a very strong presence in the body.

Worse yet, increasing the number of quaestors and praetors made the ‘elimination contest’ of Roman politics sharper meaning, almost inevitably, that the ‘log jam’ for ambitious men seeking to earn the consulship would get worse, a problem that explodes in 63 with Catiline’s conspiracy (Catiline had tried to run in 66, been blocked from doing so and then had run for and failed to win the consulship in 64 and 63 and lost both times).

A chart of Sulla’s expanded Senate, showing that the number of men eligible to hold commands has not massively increased, but there is a huge expansion in the number of back-benchers. Consulars now make up only 6% of the body and former/current praetors just 17%. The role of the censors in selecting the most junior senators is largely obviating – the large number of quaestors now produce enough men to fill the benches, albeit one imagines of limited quality.
Note that this is a ‘steady state’ model, but for the first thirty years, the number of consulars and former praetors will have been lower and the back benches will have been filled with cronies selected by Sulla for personal loyalty. The system would only have stabilized into this form about thirty-years on from Sulla’s dictatorship as the first batch of post-Sullan quaestors neared their average life expectancy. Notably, thirty years on from the first open elections post-Sulla would have been 48, the year after the civil wars reignited, obliterating this system – so it never truly reached ‘steady state’ operation.

Going along with this were Sulla’s setting formal rules for provincial governors (that is, at this point, pro-magistrates) and shifting the permanent jury courts – which mostly judged political crimes like official corruption or political violence – to have purely senatorial juries. The idea is that there are now rules for the conduct of pro-magistrates in the provinces (no more freelancing!) and that senatorial juries will now stand in judgement of the conduct of senators in the provinces. Previously, the juries of these courts had been composed in whole or in part (their composition had been a political football kicked back and forth for a while) of equites – wealthy Romans who hadn’t gone into politics – rather than senators.

Now, we should be clear on something: our sources for these events mostly write later, in the imperial period, when the senatorial class was a distinct, defined group separate from the equites and they often retroject this clean division back on to the republic. But in fact, in the period of the republic, senators were equites too, as there was no ordo senatorius yet. So the shift here is from “the conduct of Roman politicians will be judged by other Roman aristocrats” to “the conduct of Roman politicians will be judged by other Roman politicians.” Honestly, to look at what these courts do on a regular basis, it’s not actually clear to me at all that this changed very much.

But the idea here is clear: the Senate is bigger (and thus, notionally, more powerful) and is given formal powers (through the new laws and juries) to police the actions of the pro-magistrates it appoints. That small army of back-bencher senators thus are primarily there to sit on juries judging Roman provincial pro-magistrates. What needs stressing here, however is that this is a formalization of power the Senate already had in practice. The Senate had been informally giving command directives to Roman commanders in the field since at least the late 300s if not earlier. The Senate absolutely dominates theater-level Roman strategy and the distribution of resources across Rome’s typically-multiple-fronts from 218 onward.2 In that period, the Senate was not afraid to occasionally censure commanders who got out of line and such senatorial rebukes could open the door wide for action in the courts or bring political careers to a sudden end.

The problem that had emerged, visible with Scipio Aemilianus, Gaius Marius and Sulla himself, was commanders becoming ‘too big’ as political figures – having too much popularity or influence – for the Senate to discipline them. That problem would, of course, remain even if the Senate was given more formal means for discipline.

And that problem was made worse by the change in consular habits namely the consuls of the year spending most if not all of the year in Rome rather than abroad in their provinces. Now, this is a point of some dispute – most scholars continue to follow Theodor Mommsen in assuming there was an (otherwise unattested) lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis which set a rule requiring the consuls to remain in Rome.3 The scholarly problem, as noted by several scholars over the years, most recently by Francisco Pina Polo in The Consul at Rome (2011), is that there’s no evidence of such a law, no ancient source reports it and the consuls don’t always seem to follow this rule in any event.4

What we do know is that it seems that after Sulla the consuls do develop a pattern of staying in Rome for most of their year in office: most seem to have remained for the whole year and some (about a third) departed Rome for assigned provinces (assigned for the next year) early. But there clearly an established expectation post-80 that the primary duties of both consuls would be in Rome. When consuls are given military forces, it is almost invariably to deal with military threats in Italy, like Lepidus’ rebellion in 78, Spartacus’ revolt in 73 or Catiline’s conspiracy in 63. So while we can’t say that Sulla passed a law formalizing this expectation, there is clearly an expectation here that is new – as recently as the last decade of the 100s, it went without saying that the commanders for Rome’s most important in any given year would generally be be the consuls elected for that year.

This change in practice meant, first and foremost, that a lot more of Rome’s magistrates would be in the city of Rome at any given time. And certainly the strong impression is that this creates a lot more political friction in Rome. Under the previous system, where two-thirds of the praetors and one or even both consuls were usually out of the city, the magistrates were operating essentially alone in their own spheres of responsibility (the coordination being provided by the Senate informally through its auctoritas), so while conflicts could happen, they certainly seem less frequent. Sulla’s system certainly seems to make these problems a lot more common and we run into ‘the consuls can’t agree’ problems almost immediately (Lepidus and his colleague, Q. Lutatius Catulus, are quarreling badly in 78 in the run up to Lepidus’ rebellion).

That also meant that most of Rome’s armies would be commanded by pro-magistrates rather than current, elected magistrates. Now we are never given the reasoning for this change, but it is often suggested that it was to ensure the consuls were in Rome to protect the city and maintain order. If that was the intent, it was a very foolish idea: what power would the consuls have to wield against rogue generals when – because Italy was rarely the focus of Roman military activity – they would almost invariably have few troops at their disposal? Sulla himself ought to have known this, having been – as consul in 88! – chased out of Rome by Sulpicius Rufus’ mob when he tried to use his legal, consular powers.

But pro-magistrate command created its own problems: elected offices were strictly for one year and they thus rotated regularly. But pro-magistracies had flexible duration and had been like that for some time, to enable to Senate to keep a commander mid-campaign in the field across campaigning seasons. Perhaps notionally Sulla’s notion was that by modestly increasing the number of praetors there would be enough candidates to rotate pro-magistracies annually, but that not only doesn’t happen, Sulla is instrumental in setting the first instance where it doesn’t happen, which is – again – Gnaeus Pompey.

The combined effect of these changes was to create a new version of the Roman republic, rather than reaffirming or trying to reinforce an old one. Perhaps most notably, Sulla efforts here to expand the Senate’s reach into realms where its influence had previously been limited by more clearly directing legislation to run through it and trying to make magistrates more responsible to it. He also seems to be trying to shift the system of official accountability from the tribunate, which he clearly despises, to the Senate.

To be fair to Sulla’s reforms for a moment, it was clear by this point that the powers of the tribunate had become a problem – every political crisis in the last several decades had involved an ambitious tribune (Tiberius Gracchus in 133, Gaius Gracchus in 122, Lucius Appuleius Saturninus in 100, Marcus Livius Drusus in 91, Publius Sulpicius Rufus in 88). But Sulla’s solution was to attempt to close the valve on one of the major feedback mechanisms the Roman people had to register frustration with the aristocracy. I would go so far as to say that Sulla is not – contra Syme – reinforcing or reestablishing a Roman oligarchy, but creating one.

And that oligarchy turned out to be unstable and fragile.

Things Fall Apart

Perhaps the single most famous modern scholarly verdict on Sulla is Syme’s, “But even Sulla could not abolish his own example and preclude a successor to his domination.”5

And that is quite clearly correct but I also think substantially incomplete. It is true that Sulla’s example would go on to haunt the remains of the republic, with one ambitious general after another attempting to repeat his feat of using their army to dominate the republic. One of the oddest elements of this sort of imitatio Sullae is oddly geographic: one Roman civil war general after another will attempt to repeat Sulla’s very specific ‘go East, get money, enrich the army, swing back to Italy’ sequence, which becomes very visible because it never works again but they keep doing it.6 Julius Caesar’s resort to the idea of the dictatorship – once again, as with Sulla, without the real form of it – also goes into this category.

But what I think is more striking is that Sulla does almost nothing actually effective to make his example harder to imitate. The one major thing he seems to have done is that he makes it illegal to actually swing back to Italy with your army (confining pro-magistrates to their provinces), but of course by the time a pro-magistrate is contemplating bringing their army to Italy, the horses are out of the barn and legally shutting the door doesn’t mean much.

It is always risky to psychologize any kind of historical figure, especially one like Sulla where we do not have any of his own speeches or writing and no real contemporary information, but one wonders – given the pattern of his actions and reforms – if Sulla was incapable of recognizing that he, himself, represented part of the problem in the republic and so was equally incapable of addressing any of the weaknesses he exploited. Because if he exploited them – and he is axiomatically good – then how can those weaknesses be bad?

Thus, as noted above, the problem with individuals holding repeated commands, chaining together years in office with pro-magistrate commands to more or less never be a private citizen, is not meaningfully addressed even though this was crucial to how both Marius and Sulla became threats to the res publica.

Worse yet, the overall effect of Sulla’s changes to the Senate was to make them more reliant on these sorts of men, rather than less. Sure, there were a lot more senators – twice as many – but the rate at which the system produces men qualified to handle provincial commands had only gone from 8 (6 praetors, 2 consuls) to 10 (8 praetors, 2 consuls), but of course with the consuls and praetors of the year removed.

In a ‘steady state’ system, the old 300-person Roman Senate would have had about 35 consulars and about 75 former/current praetors at any given time (taking life expectancy into account), out of that body of 300. Sulla’s new Senate has 600 members, but is still going to only have about 35 consulars and roughly 95 current and former praetors in any given year, but of course you’ve also lost two consuls and four praetors being regularly available for overseas commands, so in practice you’ve doubled the Senate, but ‘eligible provincial commanders’ has gone from ~110 to ~125. That is simply not a meaningful increase in the number of available commanders.

Worse yet, the Senate isn’t in a steady-state. It is instead recovering from the significant butchering by the Marians and then the far more substantial butchering by Sulla. And unlike in the Second Punic War – where Roman losses had depleted the Senate – there’s no sense Sulla refilled its membership from more junior men who had proved themselves in battle. He’s refilled it with his cronies, wherever he can find them, while rendering the family of the proscribed ineligible. So the overall level of talent here has gone down, but also it is going to take years – probably decades – for this new Senate to work its way back up to being able to marshal the same number of eligible commanders as the Senate might have done back in 197 when there were just four permanent Roman provinces. Whereas under Sulla there are now eight and by 63 there will be twelve.

So this new, weakened Senate ends up turning to the same small handful of ambitious military men over and over again: Lucius Licinius Lucullus, Pompey, Crassus and eventually, Caesar. Whereas Scipio Aemilianus and Gaius Marius had been aberrations, after Sulla, these sorts of careers become the rule and both the Senate and Roman voters (some of these exceptional commands are conferred by law) get pretty accustomed to responding to any real military difficulty with these longer, extraordinary commands. As a result, the norms about rotating commanders regularly – which Sulla has done nothing to reinforce – weaken further.

Even more notably unresolved was the ability of a general to secure their loyalty of their army through promises of wealth and land. Securing land for veteran soldiers had been a key issue in the crisis of 100 (Saturninus and Marius) and – again, if our sources are to be believed – the potential wealth to be gained in a war in the East was the major inducement Sulla used to get his army to march on Rome in 88 and was crucial to securing their loyalty to do the same in 83. That problem is not made any better by reducing the voice of the common Roman citizenry – who, you will recall, still filled the ranks of the army – in the actual running of the republic, thus potentially detaching them further from a government that now really was more of an oligarchy of the upper-classes.

What was needed was something to realign the interests of the soldiers with that of the state, which probably meant more democratic feedback rather than less, but equally taking the rewards of service largely out of the hands of their generals. We’ll see Augustus do just this, regularizing army pay and establishing a treasury to pay out standard retirement bonuses, thus realigning the state (in the form of the emperor) with the loyalty and self-interest of the soldiery. There’s no reason this couldn’t have been done earlier, with a regular colonial settlement program or cash bonuses at campaign’s end, funded from Roman revenues, administered by junior officials (the quaestors, presumably) at the direction of the Senate on a regular (rather than general-specific) basis, thereby realigning the loyalty of the soldiers with the state (in the form of the Senate and assemblies). But this too isn’t done.

The result is that Sulla not only is incapable of abolishing his own example, he leaves the door wide open for whoever would follow.

We’ve alluded to the travails of this Sullan Republic already, but a brief narrative is useful here.

Sulla retires in 80 but exerts a strong influence on the elections for 79, so 78 is the first year with reasonably free elections. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (cos 78, not the triumvir) wins the elections and then leads a rebellion from Etruria – the Etruscans had largely sided against Sulla and he had punished them by taking a bunch of their land to settle his veterans, which produced continued unrest which will smolder into the 60s BC. Lepidus is defeated but ‘the new republic has its first attempted self-coup two years in’ was hardly a good omen.

Gnaeus Pompeius had been part of Sulla’s army – raising a legion as a private citizen, for which Sulla rewarded rather than punished him – in 83. Sulla kept him in command through 80, refusing to disband his army until Sulla gave him a triumph, which Sulla did, rather than punish him. Pompey was then given another illegal pro-praetorian command (against Lepidus) in 78, before being given another illegal pro-praetorian command (against the Marian dead-ender Sertorius) in 77 which Pompey kept until 72. On his return to Italy in 71, he was given another illegal pro-praetorian command in 71 (against Spartacus) before being illegally elected consul for the year 70 (with Crassus), after which he was given an can-you-believe-it-actually-legal-this-time pro-consular command against the pirates in 67, extended to allow him to deal with Mithridates. Pompey exceeded his mandate and remained in the East until 62 to comprehensively reorganize Roman affairs there, without consulting the Senate.

Meanwhile, the log-jam at the consulship and smoldering unrest in Etruria enabled Catiline’s attempted coup in 63, put down by the consuls of that year, Marcus Tullius Cicero and Gaius Antonius Hybrida. Pompey, returning in 62 and unable to get the land he promised his soldiers (it was being blocked in the Senate) forms the First Triumvirate in 60 with Julius Caesar and Crassus, leading to Caesar being consul in 59 and then holding a continuous, unbroken command in Gaul from 58 to 49 at which point, having had nine years to secure the loyalty of his army, he turned it against the state, functionally extinguishing the republic and reigniting the civil wars which would continue non-stop for the next eighteen years.

Assessing Sulla

It is relevant to begin any assessment of Lucius Cornelius Sulla with some acknowledgement that he was essentially handed difficult times not of his own creation. The actions of the ‘Marians’ – Marius himself, Sulpicius Rufus, Cinna and Carbo – largely created the difficult conditions that Sulla was effectively forced to respond to. I think it is worth keeping in mind that Sulla’s first alternative in both 88 and 83 was “do nothing and let these other guys rule Rome through violence.” Not an attractive alternative.

That said.

First, it should not go unsaid: Sulla was a vengeful, brutal, rapacious man. Our accounts of him are full to the brim of shocking moments: he burned and plundered Athens (Plut. Sull. 14), brutally carved his way across Boeotia, destroying at least three poleis (Plut. Sull. 26; Anthedon, Larymna and Halae), largely let his actual enemy Mithridates off the hook for political expediency while plundering Greece also for political expediency. Returning to Rome he pardoned effectively no one, murdering thousands of his political opponents (Plut. Sull. 31, “murders without number or limit filled the city”), inflicting something approaching genocide on the Samnites, enriching himself and his cronies on their property and settling his own veterans in a manner sufficiently disruptive and rapacious that their presence continued to stir up trouble – particularly in Etruria – two decades later.

A coin issued by Quintus Pompeius Rufus, Sulla’s grandson (through his daughter, Cornelia Sulla), with Sulla on the obverse. The reverse features Q. Pompeius Rufus’ other grandfather, also a Quintus Pompeius Rufus, who was Sulla’s co-consul in 88.

There is a reason that the ancient source tradition is universally hostile to this guy. Even men of his broad political leanings and faction – Cicero comes to mind – do not defend him.

And there is a certain sort of fellow who looks at all of that and thinks that it is smart and hard-nosed and ‘based,’ but the brutal truth of it is that all of the butchery and slaughter and greed was for nothing and no one. It was all piled into creating a new political system so weak and fragile that it began dying in its own crib. Indeed, the river of blood which created Sulla’s political order is part of what weakened it, both in that it robbed the Senate of the talent it needed to function properly but it also very clearly robbed this new beginning of the legitimacy it needed to establish itself. Even beyond that, the political order that Sulla envisaged was clearly unworkable, in part because of Sulla’s evident inability to address the problems that led to Sulla himself.

On some level, as Syme says, Sulla could not abolish his example but it also matters here that he doesn’t seem to have cared to do so either. I’ll be honest, combined with the rest of the personality, I find this suggestive of the sort of fellow so incandescently convinced of his rightness that he could not bring himself to close the door on his own methods, to the ruin of his new republic.

It is a verdict which leaves effectively nothing to salvage in the man: a solidly workmanlike general of the sort that the Roman Republic had churned out reliably in batches since at least the 340s, whose cruel and vindictive streak led him to further weaken the republic he very clearly believed in and wished to save. Sulla exists in our ancient sources largely as a negative more example, as a cautionary tale.

And while you all know I love caveating and complicating our ancient sources, here I think their verdict is broadly correct: Sulla was a monster and there are no real grounds for his rehabilitation.

Friday Squid Blogging: The Largest Squid Ever Filmed

This is the story of the largest squid ever filmed, in December 2006 near Japan’s Ogasawara Islands.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Blog moderation policy.

Links 11/20/26

Links for you. Science:

Where Have All The Spiny Oysters Gone?
How Kennedy let measles run wild in America
It’s official: Measles is endemic again in the US
Neil the Seal Management Plan (lmfao)
Eagles Are Killing Baboons the Size of Our Early Ancestors. That Wasn’t Supposed to Be Possible
Analysis finds no definitive link between hantavirus that caused cruise ship outbreak and outbreak strain in Argentina
A new drug could be the beginning of the end for sleeping sickness

Other:

Jeffries endorses lowering Medicare age, adding benefits and universal coverage for kids
Trauma, Not Dignity: What Federal Employees Experienced with the “Voluntary” Resignation Program (note the importance of working from home, at least part time)
The Revenge of the Girls Under the Bleachers. In memory of Susie Madrak.
The Democrats’ First Move After Their Big Win? A Giveaway to Big Oil.
To appoint the next comptroller general of the United States, follow the law
Unobserved Contributions and Political Influence: Evidence from the Death of Top Donors
Schumer urged Biden to go. Now it’s his turn. After the ‘blue wave,’ new direction and leadership should take precedence over his ego.
Climate Change, the Mother of All Affordability Problems
Bank CEOs, NSA Tell Congress That AI-Driven Patches Are Behind Outages
Run It Like a Business
Why We Can’t Let Enormous Weirdos Regulate AI
A spoiler in Alaska – but not who you think. Will a convicted felon disrupt the U.S. House race?
AI Probably Didn’t Cause the National Ground Stop, And It’s Big Tech’s Own Damn Fault No One Believes It
Catching AI’s mistakes is a mental burden – and a drag on productivity
Trump Has a Secret ICE Slush Fund—and His Plan for It Is Unnerving
She retired early to care for family. New work rules for food aid disrupted that
Trump Census Rule Change Could Leave Millions of Americans Uncounted. The new proposal would leave out millions of U.S. citizens in addition to many noncitizens. (this is another Republican power grab)
The Wachowskis Are Reclaiming ‘The Matrix’
They Were Just Admitted to the Bar. Now They’re Federal Prosecutors. Meet Trump’s New DOJ.
The Far-Right’s Big Conference Showed Christian Nationalism Isn’t Ready for Primetime Yet
Fed Governor Cook Won’t Attend White House Hearing Without Changes
Five Things to Know About Aparna Raj, DC’s Next Ward 1 Council Member
A Peek at What We Still Don’t Know About the Worst of Trump II … So Far
Senator opens investigation into evidence RFK Jr ‘unlawfully lied’ to Congress
The MAGA Manosphere Is Breaking Apart
Dirt, Death, and Triumph in Mississippi: What Scott Colom’s win does — and does not — tell us about race in the Deep South
RIP Susie Madrak
The Mind of a Megalomaniac
Ground Stop Came as Duffy Pushed to Rapidly Upgrade Aviation Systems
Excuse me. The Patriots Wore Blue. (lmfao)

What should I ask Walter Isaacson?

Yes I will be doing a Conversation with him, in part to celebrate the reissue of his earlier book The Innovators: How a Group of Hackers, Geniuses, and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution.  And also to celebrate his new podcast, The Builders.

He has other books too!

So what should I ask him?

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Plate Maintenance

First we're going to have to relieve the built-up strain, but we'll do it one hemisphere at a time, so you'll just need to briefly move all your fragile stuff like buildings over to the other hemisphere while we work.

Quoting Levent Alpöge

I believe I have, working with Claude, discovered a proof of the Riemann Hypothesis. In fact, the method easily extends much further, resolving the so-called Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, and I expect, with more time, the Extended Riemann Hypothesis too. Claude and I have also formalized the arguments without assumptions. It is natural to feel that this is an end, in my case a loss of a principal guiding light, but what I saw during the course of progress so amazed me that I believe it is one dawn across science of something far greater. [...]

Claude and I have had a great time together with such breadth in recent months, but this time Claude far outpaced me near the finish line. No, Claude flew, and danced, and sparkled near that finish line.

— Levent Alpöge, alpo.ge/remark.pdf

Tags: anthropic, claude, generative-ai, mathematics, ai, llms, levent-alpoge

Token fraud is here and it’s BAD (YouTube)

Token fraud is here and it’s BAD (YouTube)

Claire Vo runs ChatPRD, an AI platform that helps product managers "turn an idea into a spec". The product has been live since the GPT-4 era, and Claire has been building it in public for much of that time.

In this YouTube video (see also the accompanying Twitter post) Claire describes the flood of token fraud she has seen from groups abusing the product's free trial, sometimes just to get free AI usage but often to resell tokens or run other commercial enterprises on top of the ChatPRD agent.

I am funding a international Roblox and Fortnite map studio. They run a loop of free trials and promo codes and then tunnel to my agent and use it to build Roblox and Fortnite maps.

Apparently one of the common prompts Claire saw running through her agent involved SVGs of pelicans riding bicycles! Presumably the token scammers are using that to help sniff the underlying models - different model families have a definite signature, and I've used it like this in the past to try and guess the identity of stealth preview models on platforms like OpenRouter.

Claire is winding down her free trials entirely, which sadly looks like the right decision in the face of this abuse.

Tags: youtube, ai, generative-ai, llms, pelican-riding-a-bicycle, ai-misuse

Does it really matter if there’s an intelligence explosion?

Vernor Vinge is possibly my favorite science fiction author of all time.1 The Singularity, which he famously predicted would happen somewhere between 2005 and 2030, features heavily in most of his stories. It usually happens the same way: an Intelligence Explosion, of the type envisioned by I.J. Good — the smarter AI gets, the faster it’s able to make itself even smarter, meaning that AI becomes godlike nearly instantaneously once it reaches a certain threshold of capability.

Almost every discussion about AI safety that I hear in San Francisco or read in the tech blogosphere centers around this sort of event. The discussions are all about whether recursive self-improvement (RSI) is near, and whether we should “pace the frontier” — i.e., deliberately slow down or pause AI progress — to stop RSI from creating an intelligence explosion.

As I’ve listened to these arguments, I’ve grown increasingly skeptical that this is the right discussion we should be having. But before I explain why, let me quickly summarize the debate itself, to give an idea of what the arguments look like.

The intelligence explosion debate, in brief

In fact, I’ve published some pieces of that discussion on this blog. Back in September, Ramez Naam wrote a guest post arguing that an intelligence explosion is not imminent:

His basic arguments were:

  • OpenAI data show that AI is still only able to automate short chunks of the AI research process.

  • AI research is subject to diminishing returns, so that each increase in AI capability should buy less of a speedup in the pace of automated research.

  • Diminishing returns also mean that accelerating AI progress will require exponentially more of other resources, such as compute and money.

  • There’s no sign yet of an acceleration in the rate of AI progress.

In a follow-up post, Ramez did a deeper dive on the topic of agent swarms, arguing that they’re not as effective as many people believe.

Theo Jaffee echoed these arguments, noting that OpenAI’s data shows that AI hasn’t even been able to fully automate smaller research tasks yet:

Source: OpenAI via Theo Jaffee

Luis Garicano and Alex Imas also wrote a post downplaying the likelihood of an intelligence explosion:

Silicon Continent
Are we approaching an intelligence explosion?
(Dear reader: this is an unusual post; it gets a bit technical. Alex and I are trying to do something hard here: look at the data and try to understand what they tell us about the intelligence explosion. There is math, Greek letters, and two models. So please bear with us, and if you are bored, apologies. We think it is worth making an exception here…
Read more

Their arguments are more economic in nature. They show that although AI progress has accelerated, it also shows diminishing returns in terms of research spending, meaning that every unit of progress has come with a higher price tag:

They also estimate an economic model of RSI,2 and conclude that ideas in AI research are probably getting harder to find, reducing the likelihood of an intelligence explosion.

On the other side of the debate, we have the recent METR report about Anthropic’s internal progress in automating AI research. The report uses Anthropic’s own internal measure of AI capability, AECI, rather than the better-known public ECI. It also relies on data that aren’t public, meaning that deciding how much of the report to believe requires a lot of guesswork and assumption-making. But the basic story METR tells is that Claude is already speeding up Anthropic’s research process by a lot:

As we describe below, we were able to confidently determine that the acceleration [of AI progress in late 2025] was not due to an acceleration in the rate of growth of training compute…We guess that a majority (perhaps ≈80%) of the current…acceleration is due to AI.

Dwarkesh Patel, meanwhile, argues that AI research isn’t that different from math, and that the same factors that made AI suddenly go from useless to godlike at math will happen soon with AI’s own self-improvement:

Dwarkesh Podcast
The avalanche that hit math is coming for AI development
Read more

He writes:

It’s crazy how fast we went from, in 2023, “This model can’t reliably add four-digit numbers,” to…about a month ago, “Okay, it fucking solved a Millennium Prize problem in 88 hours.”…

AI research is actually surprisingly similar to the type of mathematical progress that current AIs are disproportionately good at: unlocking a ton of low-hanging fruit by applying a combination of incredible persistence and a superhuman capacity to connect ideas from lots of adjacent domains…In every domain where we can check answers and give AIs thousands of rounds of practice—for example, competitive programming contests, or well-scoped open math problems—they’ve gone from worse than most humans to better than the best humans within a few years…AI research has those same verifiable properties…

Once AI is as good as the best humans at AI research, algorithmic progress will get radically faster…Today’s AIs already do work at about 10 times human speed. And automated researchers would also be working around the clock, nights and weekends included. As a result, each individual automated researcher will be cramming in roughly 50x more work every calendar week than a human researcher can do…During the intelligence explosion, automated engineers will build tens of thousands of times more [reinforcement learning] training environments than we have currently.

So that’s the debate. Basically, it depends on whether ideas get harder to find faster than AI gets better at finding ideas, and only time will tell which one wins.

But as I said, while this debate is intellectually interesting, I’m not sure how much it matters.

How useful is this debate?

Whether an intelligence explosion happens is obviously very important. A sudden unfathomable leap in AI capabilities to godlike levels would be, to put it mildly, a very big deal. But that doesn’t mean an intelligence explosion is the thing we should be thinking and arguing about.

First of all, if an intelligence explosion is possible, it’s going to happen, and there’s probably just not much we can do to affect how it all shakes out.

Although people disagree about AI’s contribution to its own uplift, everyone agrees that AI capabilities are improving at a steady, rapid rate. Here’s Epoch AI’s ECI number, the most common measure of AI capabilities:

Source: Epoch AI

Most discussions about AI safety policy revolve around the idea of “pacing the frontier” — i.e., using government policy and AI labs’ own decisions to bend that trendline of progress downward. The usual reason given is that this will allow alignment research time to catch up, so that more powerful AI is safe by the time it arrives.

But this approach simply can’t deal with an intelligence explosion. If there’s some threshold at which AI gets good enough to start an intelligence explosion, that threshold will be reached. Even if we “paced the frontier” and slowed the rate of AI progress down by half, that would mean we’d hit the intelligence explosion in 2037 instead of 2032, or 2030 instead of 2028, or something like that. It would only buy us a few extra years.

I guess two years or five years isn’t nothing — we could use it to hang out with our loved ones and try some cool new restaurants while we waited for the arrival of the computer gods. But ultimately, it seems like small potatoes, especially if you’re an AI safety type who thinks an intelligence explosion would be a catastrophic event for humanity.

If an intelligence explosion is possible, the only way to prevent it is to halt AI progress completely, rather than just slow it down. In 1993, Vernor Vinge made a powerful argument as to why that’s impossible:

But if the technological Singularity can happen, it will. Even if all the governments of the world were to understand the “threat” and be in deadly fear of it, progress toward the goal would continue. In fiction, there have been stories of laws passed forbidding the construction of “a machine in the form of the mind of man”. In fact, the competitive advantage -- economic, military, even artistic of every advance in automation is so compelling that passing laws, or having customs, that forbid such things merely assures that someone else will get them first.

I’m a little more optimistic than Vinge here — I think we could engineer an AI slowdown if we got sufficiently scared — but I don’t for one minute believe we could engineer a complete halt.

Nor do I believe that alignment research will be able to make an intelligence explosion safe. “Pacing the frontier” so that alignment research can catch up might be effective in a world of steady linear AI progress.3 But in a world of sudden superexponential progress, AI alignment research will immediately be left behind. Even if there is a Singularity for understanding alignment, in a world with an intelligence explosion it will be the superintelligent AI, not us, that carries out that Singularity and decides on its alignment for itself.

A second point is that it’s not obvious why an intelligence explosion would be more dangerous than — or even distinguishable from — the type of rapid, non-explosive progress we’re already getting. Remember, AI going from “can’t add two numbers together” to “solves problems too hard for all human mathematicians combined” in three years is not counted as an intelligence explosion!

It’s clear that at the current rate of steady progress, AI will become superhuman in most domains in a fairly small number of years. Even robotics and other physical tasks look conquerable with the current type of AI that powers Claude and GPT. This means that AI will basically look like a god within our lifetimes, whether or not it looks like the kind of infinitely self-improving gods that populate Vernor Vinge novels.

This is why I’m not sure what an intelligence explosion means for our economy. It’s easy to write down a model in which smoothly increasing AI capabilities drive a smooth increase in GDP. But why should we believe a model like that? Other technologies haven’t really worked that way.

Usually, technologies reach some threshold of usefulness where adopting them makes economic sense. When they hit that threshold, their local contribution to productivity growth becomes very rapid, but also finishes fairly quickly. Fiszbein et al. (2024) shows this for electrification, Bartel (2005) shows it for IT-enabled machines. Each new invention creates a whole bunch of little local Singularities. It’s only when you add all these up across the economy that you get something that looks like a big smooth wave of growth.

A suddenly superintelligent AI isn’t really limited by locality — it could, essentially by definition, take over all or most human tasks if it wanted to. Whereas if an intelligence explosion doesn’t occur, these takeovers are likely to be staggered and irregular. But they will still happen, and the economic effect after the first few years probably won’t be that different.

In other words, I think:

  • The AI we’ll get from our current trend of improvement will look about as godlike — and as economically important — as an AI that suddenly bootstraps itself to godhood.

  • It’s not possible to stop AI improvement completely, and so if an intelligence explosion is possible, it’s going to happen to us soon.

  • Slowing down the rate of AI progress will not help us deal with post-Singularity superintelligence.

This is why I think this whole debate is misplaced. We need to be thinking about how to deal with the AI we already have, and the one we’ll almost certainly get soon — an AI that’s smarter than all humans at most economically important tasks. We need to think about how to regulate that actually existing superintelligence, how to prevent AI-enabled bioterror, how to make sure the economic benefits of AI are widely shared, and so on. We need to think about competition policy, to make sure the benefits of AI don’t exclusively go to one company.

I think we need to accept that nobody is “pacing the frontier” enough to prevent the emergence of superintelligence — and that nobody is likely to do so. If the machine god awakes, then it awakes, and we’ll simply deal with it. In the meantime, we need to focus on dealing with the AI we have now.


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1

The other contender would be Lois McMaster Bujold, who writes a very different kind of sci-fi.

2

This estimation is done with only 16 data points, so I don’t really trust it. But we’re basically flying blind here, so this is the best we’ve got.

3

In fact, I invested in a company called Goodfire that’s at the forefront of AI alignment research.

Friday assorted links

1. Markets drive moods, and not vice versa?

2. AI literary scandals and the future of the Latin American novel.

3. New Stripe Press website.

4. Does Claude’s constitution mean anything?

5. Did the Baby Boom help cause the later divorce boom?

6. “Social adversity in early life has minimal, predominantly positive long-term consequences for social behaviour in mountain gorillas.”

7. University of Austin hiring in economics.

8. Good book on the Riemann hypothesis, whether or not it turns out to have been proved.  An interesting related question is whether this rumor (or is it more than that?) will at all budge the Anthropic share price, as Claude was running the proof.  Also claims of Unforced Navier-Stokes.

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An Unusual Triple System ‘Close’ to Home

I’m always interesting in discoveries unusually close to the Sun, maybe because I keep hoping that there really is a brown dwarf or rogue planet much closer to our system than Proxima Centauri. In the absence of that discovery, let’s talk about the unusual triple-system that has just turned up thanks to work at the University of Montreal, where the Trottier Institute for Research on Exoplanets (IREx) brings together research from a number of Canadian institutions.

Located some 28 light years from Earth, the system has been dubbed Welopōʻai, which is a Hawaiian coinage from the Imiloa Astronomy Center of Hawai’i, an institution whose existence explains some of the Polynesian names that have begun appearing in our astronomical catalogs. In this system, then, we have Welopō‘ai Aa, Welopō‘ai Ab and Welopō‘ai B. I had to resort to AI to retrieve the pronunciation here, and found that it’s weh-loh-POH-eye, which linguistically combines a notion of lineage with the circle depicting an orbit.

So let’s take this complicated system into focus. Using the SPectropolarimètre InfraROUge (SPIRou) spectrograph at Mauna Kea, the researchers led by the University of Montreal’s Étienne Artigau had been looking for the signature of exoplanets around the red dwarf IRAS 21500+5903 in the constellation Cepheus. The velocity change found via SPIRou dwarfed what they expected from an exoplanet, leading to the conclusion that there must be a massive companion object, one which would have to total as much as half a solar mass. Follow-up work using the Gemini North telescope turned up the image of a white dwarf.

This was interesting indeed, for IRAS 21500+5903 was already known to be part of a binary system, with a second white dwarf considerably farther away from the primary than the new discovery. Using the new nomenclature, we can call the outer white dwarf, which is about 124 AU from the red dwarf, Welopōʻai B. The newly discovered white dwarf, which we can now call Welopōʻai Ab, is a scant 4.6 AU from the primary, a bit less than Jupiter’s distance from the Sun.

Intriguing, no? Patrick Dufour, who specializes in white dwarf stars at Montreal and is a co-author of the paper on this work, points to its allure:

“We have no clean explanation for how it got here. That is the question driving our next observations.”

Image: Observations of the Welopōʻai triple-star system, located 28 light-years from Earth. The image on the left shows the two components of the system: Welopōʻai A, a closely orbiting red dwarf and white dwarf pair, and Welopōʻai B, a second white dwarf located much farther away. The image on the right provides a close-up view of the inner pair, revealing the faint white dwarf companion (Ab) detected using the Gemini North telescope’s ‘Alopeke instrument. The overlaid curves illustrate the stars’ orbital paths. Credit: Pan-STARRS1/STScI/MAST (left); International Gemini Observatory/NSF.

The assumption is that the inner white dwarf in this system was once about 40 percent more massive than the Sun, which would mean at some point it became a red giant, so that the red dwarf near it would be engulfed. Yet the red dwarf clearly survived, and is in what appears to be a stable orbital configuration with its close companion. The paper suggests that Kozai-Lidov oscillations involving the outer of the three stars could result if that object’s orbit were sufficiently tilted. Such interactions could have profound effects on the orbital eccentricity of the inner stars, but it will take more observations to figure out whether this explanation fits and how such interactions evolved over time.

The team’s video so impressively uses sound to depict the system’s orbital interactions that I’ll add not only the video but their lengthy description.

Image: Animated simulation and sonification of the Welopōʻai triple-star system, illustrating how the gravitational interactions between its three stars could influence their orbits over time. The animation begins with a close-up of the inner red dwarf and white dwarf pair before zooming out to reveal the more distant second white dwarf. It then explores the possibility of Kozai-Lidov oscillations, a phenomenon in which the gravitational influence of the outer star causes the inner pair’s orbit to cyclically change in shape and orientation. Although these oscillations are expected to occur in the Welopōʻai system, observations have yet to confirm how pronounced they are.

The accompanying sonification translates the stars’ orbital motions into sound, allowing listeners to hear the changing rhythms of the system. Musical tones accompany the stars as they move along their orbits, with changes in the timing and character of the sounds reflecting their evolving motions. As the inner orbit becomes more elongated and then more circular again, these changing patterns in pitch offer an audible representation of the gravitational dance between members of this stellar family. Credit: Heidi White, Trottier Institute for Research on Exoplanets (IREx), Université de Montréal. Simulation data from Alexandre Correia, University of Coimbra.

Being surprised by our observations is hardly a new phenomenon, as Galileo demonstrated when he decided to look at Jupiter and found its moons, and as the paper on this work points out, the first exoplanet around a main sequence star (51 Pegasi) was confounding because the idea of a ‘hot Jupiter’ had little traction in the scientific community. Now we have an oddball survivor, an M-dwarf that somehow survived the red giant phase of a close neighbor and returned to a stable orbital arrangement with it. We’ll soon be learning more, as the collaborators on this find intend to tighten up the numbers using further Gaia data as well as archival-plate astrometry and JWST observations.

That work may also resolve an unexpected infrared excess at Welopō‘ai Ab which may involve a debris disk, although the authors consider this a tentative conclusion. Fortunately, JWST photometry is made to order for the follow-up.

Thanks to my good friend Antonio Tavani for the pointer to this discovery. The paper is Artigau et al., “Welopō‘ai: A peculiar triple system 8 pc from the Sun,” Astronomy & Astrophysics Vol. 715, A321 (November, 2026). Full text.

A Great Week for D.C.’s Crime Stats

As of 9am Friday, there were no homicides in D.C. this week, bringing the total to 86* homicides this year. Last year, during the same time period, we had 120 homicides, and in the surge year of 2023, there were 247 homicides during that same time period.

Both violent and property crimes were level this week.

2026 will be the first year since the last year of Biden’s presidency where homicides don’t decline by 33%.

Hoping for another great week next week.

*Three of the 89 murders reported this year actually occurred in other years (e.g., a missing persons case from 2023 turned into a homicide case this year with new evidence).

Why Are Tech Lords Rallying Around a Man Who Sold Out America?

Nvidia will lose deals without Jensen Huang, says Elon Musk

Marketing note: I have a new ebook, Navigating the Chaos: Chronicles of Economic and Political Madness, which uses material from this Substack to construct a thematic narrative of the past two years and the issues that Democrats must now address to build an enduring progressive movement. Available from Amazon, Kobo,Bookshop, and Nook.

You might think that billionaires are completely self-interested, that their attention is exclusively focused upon making themselves richer. But that’s unfair. Because quite a number of the wealthiest men in America are now banding together and advocating for the greater good — that is, the greater good of the billionaire class. Billionaires such as Elon Musk, Sam Altman, Bill Ackman and Greg Brockman have been showing vociferous support for Jensen Huang, the disgraced former CEO of the chip giant Nvidia, and demanding that he be given his job back.

It’s true that Huang’s fall has been particularly shocking. Before his fall, he was a virtual potentate in the world of AI. He controlled access to the most sophisticated chips for AI data centers and, critically, the financial backing that his customers needed to purchase those chips. More so that any other single person, Huang both engineered the chips that made AI possible and inflated the AI financial bubble that looms over the economy.

But as we now know, Huang had an extended affair with Alice Huang (no relation), who has been identified by U.S. intelligence as a likely Chinese asset. Alice Huang is the controlling shareholder of Megaspeed, a Singapore-based data center company that provides compute to Chinese companies and, quite possibly, to entities tied to the Chinese military.

Yet the focus on Huang’s apparent fall into a Chinese honeytrap obscures the fact that Nvidia was systematically undermining U.S. security for financial reasons, not just carnal ones.

Nvidia’s advanced chips are one of the few major advantages America has in its technology competition with China — a nation that is not an outright enemy, yet has consistently worked to undermine America’s interests globally, including providing significant technological and financial support to Iran. Moreover, China is an autocratic surveillance state that has bolstered anti-democratic forces around the world. The U.S. has had a policy, initiated by the Biden administration, of denying China access to the most sophisticated chips, Nvidia’s in particular.

Then Jensen Huang intervened. Huang successfully lobbied the Trump administration for a relaxation of Biden’s export restrictions, after contributing $25 million to Trump’s hideous ballroom. Howard Lutnick, the Commerce secretary, appears to have played a special role in undermining U.S. sanctions. Members of Congress have leaked data showing that Commerce approved the sale of hundreds of thousands of advanced chips to Chinese companies, including some with known ties to the Chinese military.

Furthermore, Nvidia also sold chips to third-party buyers — Megaspeed in particular — which appear to have smuggled these chips to China. On Monday the Justice and Commerce departments revealed that they have launched a criminal investigation into Megaspeed. Announcements of investigations in progress are rare; obviously Trump officials are scrambling to contain the political damage from the Huang revelations. Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, said in an interview last week that he had been pushing for months to have Megaspeed on a trade blacklist, but that Commerce — “which has the pen” — failed to act.

Cantor Fitzgerald, the financial company run by Lutnick’s sons, reportedly has a large financial stake in Nvidia, and Congressional Democrats are investigating. Lutnick looks like a prime target for impeachment once Democrats take control of Congress.

For a lot of money was involved in Nvidia’s dubious dealings: In fiscal 2025 customers with a billing location in Singapore, which accounts for only around 0.5 percent of world GDP, accounted for 18 percent of Nvidia’s revenue. Presumably the bulk of those purchases went to other nations, especially China.

So regardless of whether you want to frame it as a honeytrap or a moneytrap, Huang was effectively selling out U.S. national interests. (Democracy too.) Yet rather than make it clear that they would never betray America the way Huang (and apparently Lutnick) has, the tech oligarchy has rushed to his defense.

As the Wall Street Journal reported, at the latest New York Times Dealbook conference, “the technorati” — notably including Elon Musk — “took turns praising Huang.” David Sacks, the former White House technology czar, has defended Huang and argued that the “real story” is the leak of intelligence concerns to the New York Times. And of course Donald Trump himself has expressed support for Huang.

What’s going on here? As a number of observers have pointed out, many people in the tech-bro elite believe that corporations should be run in “founder mode,” in which one Big Man basically gets to do whatever he wants. And this is regardless of whether the company is publicly traded and thus legally obligated to act in its shareholders’ best interests.

As a recent op-ed by Amit Seru and David Larcker puts it, “some of Silicon Valley’s largest companies are basically authoritarian realms.”

So when these corporate strongmen see Huang fired for bad behavior that compromises national security, they see it not as a necessary corrective but as an implicit threat to their own authority. In their Ubermensch world view, only the little people need to obey the rules — including the rule of law. And of course they have an ally in Trump, the ultimate example of someone who revels in breaking rules and laws.

But do they realize how dangerous this kind of arrogance is about to become? Josh Marshall of Talking Points Memo, who has been writing along similar lines, doesn’t think so:

[I]t does not seem like any of these guys have entirely absorbed just how staggeringly unpopular they and their entire industry has become. They also don’t seem to have grasped how unpopular Trump — with whom they’ve cast their lots — has become.

Indeed. YouGov’s latest poll finds that Americans who believe that Huang’s affair compromised national security outnumber those who believe it hasn’t three to one. And most people probably don’t know how much Nvidia appears to have profited from chip-smuggling; if they did, their anti-Huang views would surely be even stronger.

In the aftermath of the midterm blue tsunami, quite a few tech lords will soon find themselves testifying before Congressional committees, as well as their businesses under greater regulatory scrutiny. So it’s a hell of a time for them to publicly rally for autocratic impunity. But, hey, that’s what they did when their tied their fates to Donald Trump.

Going forward, just as in the case of Elon Musk and Starlink, the Jensen Huang debacle shows that critical national security assets cannot be controlled by one person, no matter how impressive a businessperson he or she is. Just as the midterms results signaled the death throes of MAGA, let’s hope that the Jensen Huang debacle, along with Democratic investigations, will mark the beginning of the end of autocratic founder syndrome — and the self-dealing that so often goes with it — in the tech world.

MUSICAL CODA

“Failures in philosophy have brought me to this door”

Rocket Report: A weekend of ups and downs; Stoke celebrates engine milestone

Welcome to Edition 9.20 of the Rocket Report! Last weekend was a picture of the US launch business in miniature, and emblematic of the opposing trajectories of two of the nation's most experienced rocket makers. First, on Saturday, SpaceX completed a perfect midair catch of its Starship upper stage at its launch pad in Texas after spending nearly a day in orbit. The Super Heavy booster was lost at sea, but SpaceX proved it can recover that piece of the rocket on previous flights. While SpaceX showed it is well on the way to fielding a fully reusable rocket, United Launch Alliance suffered its first-ever total launch failure with the Vulcan rocket. That is terrible news for not only ULA, but also the US Space Force and Amazon, which have booked some 70 launches on Vulcan over the next few years. Your faithful correspondents will take a break from the Rocket Report next week for the Thanksgiving holiday, so we'll see you again the first week of December.

As always, we welcome reader submissions, and if you don't want to miss an issue, please subscribe using the box below (the form will not appear on AMP-enabled versions of the site). Each report will include information on small-, medium-, and heavy-lift rockets as well as a quick look ahead at the next three launches on the calendar.

Europe's leading satellite startup eyes Italian rocket maker. Finnish satellite developer ICEYE announced Tuesday that it is seeking to buy Italian rocket-maker Avio for more than $2.2 billion in a transaction aimed at creating Europe’s first true vertically integrated end-to-end space company, Ars reports. Avio builds the Vega C rocket, a solid-fueled launcher designed to carry up to 3.3 metric tons (7,300 pounds) of payload to low-Earth orbit. ICEYE is, by far, the most successful space startup in Europe, with a valuation of more than $12 billion after the company's most recent fundraising round in June.

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Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation-20th anniversary in Toledo

I'm blogging this morning from Toledo Ohio, where I've come to help celebrate the 20th Anniversary of the Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation (APKD), its founder Mike Rees, the U. Toledo Medical Center, and the city of Toledo.

 I gave an after-dinner talk last night, commemorating some of the APKD's milestones. Below are a few of my slides. Quite a few of the donors and recipients in the chains pictured below were present. Some of them I met for the first time.  It was a great event.

I 




 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

My grandmother was a seal

Abstract painting of a figure swimming underwater with fish and light beams illuminating the scene.

Many Irish families believed they descended from selkies. Their stories reveal the violence and grief in our kinship with nature

- by Jordan Lee Borgman

Read on Aeon

Cool flex AI bro

I am tickled by reports that, among elite AI researchers, cigarettes are back.

The logic goes like this:

If you really believe in AI and that AI will hit recursive self-improvement and achieve super-intelligence,

and that it will solve all disease,

and that all of this will happen imminently (or at least imminently enough that you have nothing to fear from smoking-related diseases),

and you want to show that you, yes you, are close enough to the action to have come to this conclusion, and you are a true believer,

then a really great way to signal this is to conspicuously take up smoking cigarettes.


Actually I think that smoking cigarettes shows great strength of character.

Or at least that’s the gag I say to my smoking buddies when they light up.

Given everything we know about what smoking does to you, and the relentless, gruesome anti-smoking ad campaigns for years and years, and the smell and the cost and the social shunning and the logistical difficulty of actually finding a legal place to stand, and the easy alternatives like vaping, you must be really independently-minded and strong-willed to stand up to all that and still be on the cigs.

Well done you, I say, well done.

This joke no longer works given the AI flex so I’ll have to stop using it. My friends, thoroughly fed up with me by now, will be relieved.


Another flex:

If your girlfriend isn’t a Chinese honeytrap, does your AI startup even matter?

The story goes that Nvidia founder Jensen Huang’s extra-marital girlfriend is actually a Chinese spy.

(What’s the benefit to China of her being a spy? Surely not just for lobbying. But to get access to Nvidia GPUs – which her company has been funnelling to Chinese AI labs, it turns out, breaking US export bans. The point being that frontier models can be trained only on cutting edge Nvidia chips, and this is a way for China to keep up, and there is forensic proof that this is what has happened. The second question to ask: why was this disclosed now? We can only guess.)

Rumours of this sort of thing have been bubbling for a while.

Female spies are waging ‘sex warfare’ to steal Silicon Valley secrets, The Times (October 2025). "China and Russia are sending attractive women to seduce tech workers…"

Even Elon Musk made a gag about it last year: "If she’s a 10, you’re an asset."

So if your startup isn’t even worth state-sponsored espionage, why are you bothering.

But if on the other hand you have have mysteriously out-of-your-league hotties (on whatever combination of axes you prefer, they have the psych analysis) sliding into your DMs, and you want to flex that, then heck take them on dates to very fancy, very public restaurants, let everyone notice. Ride the crocodile and watch your pillow talk. You’ll have VCs blowing up your messages, they’ll want in on that.


Remember. It’s only a Chinese honeytrap if she’s from honeytrap province in China otherwise it’s just sparkling industrial espionage.


What makes a flex work is that it is costly in some way.

Like, syphilis sores used to be fashionable:

the symptoms remained limited to a few painless sores on the genitals and face, which for a time were even a status symbol and indicated that the wearer had had a lot of sexual experience. A sore on the forehead, the ‘Crown of Venus’, was worn with pride.


Another social cost flex, more contemporary, fewer oozing sores: the hierarchy of wristwatches on Wall Street, Business Insider (2016), by OG finance bro anon Goldman Sachs Elevator.

The social signalling and potential faux pas on the ladder of intern, analyst, associate, VP, etc go as you’d expect:

You’re out of the analyst and associate compensation bands now and starting to make real money. It’s time to go pick up a Rolex Daytona ($12,500) – the quintessential investment banker watch. It’s not that expensive, but there’s an unwritten rule that you can’t have one until you’re at least a VP.

Reading this, you get the sense that everyone is clocking everyone’s wrists like all the time.

But when - if - you make partner, it flips:

Your Patek Philippe is at home. You gave your Panerai to your deadbeat brother-in-law, and your Rolex Yachtmaster is in the Hamptons. Just as Sam Walton drove a Ford truck and Warren Buffett drives a Lincoln, get yourself a Swatch ($66) like Lloyd Blankfein or a Nike sport swatch ($85) like Hank Paulson.

Or better yet, don’t wear one. The power move is to have a few watches stuffed away at home, and then, rarely, if ever, wear one. When you control time, you don't need to know what time it is.

Here’s a paywall busting link.


Not caring about time is truly the best flex.

19th century Paris, the ambling dandy, the quintessential man about town observing the hustle and bustle of society with nowhere to be, the flaneur.

The flaneur, who cares so conspicuously little about needing to be anywhere at all that:

"Around 1840 it was considered elegant to take a tortoise out walking."

More here.


brb strolling my tortoise to the corner shop to grab a pack of Camels.

Phonics-based Instruction and Student Achievement

That is a new NBER working paper by Alex Hollingsworth, Alberto Ortega & Nikolaos Zirogiannis.  Abstract:

Reading is a foundational skill, yet fewer than one in three US fourth graders read at a proficient level. How best to teach reading and improve educational attainment has been an active policy debate for decades. Recently, phonics-based approaches have surged in popularity, even though the largest attempt to put similar methods into classrooms was previously abandoned out of concerns that the program was ineffective. This paper studies Reading First, a nearly $1 billion per year federal program established under No Child Left Behind that promoted phonics-based instruction in K-3 classrooms. Exploiting administrative data from Texas and program eligibility formulas, we estimate effects via difference-in-differences and instrumental variables specifications. We find that eligibility increased third-grade reading test scores by 0.1 standard deviations and that effects persisted through at least the eighth grade. An analysis of digitized exam questions shows that treated students outperformed peers on questions that required basic decoding skills and those with more words, a benefit that also drove improvements in math scores. We follow exposed cohorts into early adulthood, finding that the program increased on-time high school graduation, college enrollment, four-year college completion, and adult earnings at age 25.

As with many “ban cell phones in schools” papers, I find these results underwhelming.  Nonetheless phonics education always has made sense to me.

The post Phonics-based Instruction and Student Achievement appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

       

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Politics Chat, November 19, 2026

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November 19, 2026

Democrats who will soon be at the head of congressional committees are indicating to members of the administration that they will soon be answering questions about their actions during the past two years. On November 18, Representative Robert Garcia (D-CA), who is expected to chair the House Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform, sent letters today to a number of Trump administration figures demanding they preserve all records, communications, and information pertaining to future investigations.

Those letters went to Donald Trump Jr. concerning alleged conflicts of interest, his stake in the World Liberty Financial cryptocurrency venture, and the fact a Russian oligarch close to Russia’s president Vladimir Putin paid for his wedding party; to Eric Trump concerning alleged conflicts of interest and World Liberty Financial; and to Jared Kushner over alleged conflicts of interest, his control of the private equity firm Affinity Partners—which received a $2 billion investment from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund and is a major stockholder in an Israeli company that has hundreds of millions of dollars invested in Israeli defense contractors—and allegations that he has used his role in the government to enrich himself and his companies.

The letter to Kushner arrived on the same day Ariel Sabar of The Atlantic reported that Affinity Partners updated a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, two days after the midterm elections, revealing that it also owns a $32 million stake in a U.S. defense contractor that makes crucial components for the U.S. systems deployed in the theaters in which Kushner has been acting as Trump’s negotiator. That information appears to have been so late it violated legal requirements.

Letters went to Kimberly Guilfoyle about pay-to-play schemes during her tenure as U.S. ambassador to Greece and to Trust for the National Mall chief executive officer Catherine Townsend on the $600 million in both taxpayer money and private donations from those with business before the government that are supposed to be funding Trump’s ballroom.

Letters went to White House chief of staff Stephen Miller about abuses by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement under his direction, to former DHS secretary Kristi Noem about abuse of funds and corruption, and to Noem’s advisor Corey Lewandowski regarding corruption and self-dealing, steering of lucrative contracts to allies, and his role in DHS and ICE abuses.

Letters went to Vice President J.D. Vance and former White House chief of staff Susie Wiles about the cover-up of the Epstein files; to Attorney General Todd Blanche about the cover-up of the Epstein files, the failure of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to comply with the Epstein Files Transparency Act, the DOJ’s botched release and review of documents, and the decision to transfer Jeffrey Epstein’s associate Ghislaine Maxwell to a minimum-security prison camp; and to Federal Bureau of Prisons Director William K. Marshall III and Federal Prison Camp Bryan Prison Warden Tanisha Hall about Maxwell’s transfer just days after she offered favorable testimony about Trump, as well as the privileges she has enjoyed since the transfer.

Garcia’s list is just a starting point. More news will continue to drop. Just today, Avi Asher-Schapiro, Andy Kroll, and Alex Mierjeski of ProPublica reported that Trump officials appear to have figured a way around the prohibition on the slush fund Trump wanted to create over the leaking of tax information by an IRS contractor during his first term. While the law allows a $1,000 payment to victims of such a leak, Trump appointees at the Department of Justice signed paperwork that settled with five individuals and companies connected to Trump for $2.5 million, with more plaintiffs on the way.

Administration figures are sending their own messages to the Democrats, either to bully them into backing down or to draw favorable attention from Trump and his allies. White House counsel William Scharf and U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas Aaron Reitz have sent public letters to Democrats warning that their promises to conduct oversight may be unconstitutional and illegal.

On Monday, Scharf sent an extraordinary memo to the general counsels of executive departments and agencies telling them that no personnel may agree to appear before any congressional committee without approval from the White House Office of Legislative Affairs and the Office of the White House Counsel: that is, himself.

A White House official told Liz Landers of PBS: “The Trump Administration will not be extorted, intimidated, or threatened into submission by politically motivated baseless investigations. We are ready to engage with Congress, this process ensures reasonable requests are respected, but baseless political attempts to undermine our mission will not be accepted as the status quo by Democrats’ [sic] who want to slow the administration down from its historic work.”

Legal commentator Liz Dye wrote in Public Notice that “this is a radical departure from prior policy, contrary to both law and precedent.” On November 11, Dye noted that Attorney General Todd Blanche, Trump’s former criminal defense lawyer, has been “desperately assuring” those who stick with the administration that “he’s got their backs.”

On the Fox News Channel he said: “If you work in this administration, you have a lawyer. It’s me.” Dye also noted that in fact, Blanche is likely going to protect Trump and himself rather than the little guys and that in any case, the lawyers leaving the DOJ since the election are well aware that “while a presidential pardon might keep them out of jail, it won’t save their law licenses.”

Reitz has targeted Garcia, as well as Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA). They are having no part of it. Slotkin noted that his public threats against members of Congress who have explicit constitutional protection for their speech “is evidence that your threat of investigation is more about publicity and your political ambitions than any sort of legitimate inquiry.”

Today Kyle Cheney of Politico reported that six experts in congressional power and constitutional law say Reitz’s threats are “farcical.” One said the administration’s attack on Congress is “even more laughable than usual.”

As Judd Legum reported in Popular Information on Tuesday, November 17, Reitz has repeatedly vowed to use the law to hurt “libs” and enemies of “our Christian values,” saying “it’s either kill or be killed.” In 2025, when he was running for the office of Texas attorney general, he told a group of supporters that those on “the left” “are deadly threatened by what’s coming. They know that I’m going to destroy them. If I can’t sue you, I’m going to investigate you. If I can’t investigate you, I’m going to drag you into so much trouble, you might as well just declare bankruptcy now.”

Reitz makes it clear that key administration figures remain tied to Trump. Senator Blumenthal has taken to asking Trump’s judicial nominees if they are willing to say that voters elected Joe Biden president in 2020 or if the U.S. Capitol was attacked on January 6, 2021. They still are not. As Blumenthal notes, Trump’s appointees’ refusal to acknowledge the fact that Biden won in 2020 indicates that they lack the objectivity and independence the justiciary requires.

Indeed, rather than moderating their positions after the historic midterm election made it clear how unpopular they are, Trump loyalists appear to have decided to hammer through their policies, despite their rejection by the American people on November 3. New White House chief of staff Stephen Miller, a white nationalist who describes immigration as an “invasion,” has said he intended to expand the administration’s deportation program despite its unpopularity.

And yet, in Strength in Numbers on November 17, pollster G. Elliott Morris explained that while much ink has been spilled about voters turning against Trump over rising costs in 2026, voters turned against Trump over immigration and deportations in 2025. That shift was especially clear in the Hispanic voters who helped to put Trump in office in 2024. Angry at sweeping deportations rather than the removal of violent criminals they thought Trump promised, they moved 28 points toward Democrats, helping to turn Texas, as well as other states, blue.

MAGA members of Congress are also doubling down on their ideology, especially after more moderate Republicans were swept out of office in November. In the House, Republicans have chosen MAGA bombthrower Jim Jordan, who is simply a messaging agent and who in almost twenty years in Congress has never sponsored a bill that became a law, to be their leader.

In the Senate, Republicans today declined, once again, to stop Trump’s war on Iran. While Senate majority leader John Thune (R-SD) blamed Trump for his party’s losses in the midterms, Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI), who in January 2021 tried to get a false slate of Trump electors into then–Vice President Mike Pence’s hand just before Congress began the counting of electoral votes, seemed to dismiss voters’ demand for affordability. Yesterday, on Fox Business, he called Social Security “grotesque” and a “Ponzi scheme.” He added: “You can’t fix it. You just shut it down and hope you can recover some of your money.”

Trump administration officials are trying to rig government programs in their own favor by replacing the acting comptroller general of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the nonpartisan independent office that audits federal programs, with MAGA Republican Eric Ueland. Ueland is an ally of Office of Management and Budget director Russell Vought, who has been withholding funds for programs he doesn’t like despite congressional appropriations. Norman Ornstein of The Contrarian says the Republicans’ attempt to force Ueland into the GAO is “a middle finger to the law and to Congress.”

At the state level, as Kate Riga of Talking Points Memo reported today, Republican MAGA officials are rushing to restrict voting before 2028.

The doubling down of MAGA political figures on their ideology stands in marked contrast to the right-wing figures trying to distance themselves from Trump and MAGA in the wake of the election.

Alex Karp, the chief executive officer of tech giant Palantir, who shifted rightward to ingratiate himself with the Trump administration, used the word “progressive” eight times when he talked to Politico’s Playbook after the election. “I’ve been a Democrat my whole life,” he said, adding “I know more about being a progressive than almost anybody on the planet.” He said the Democrats have “absolutely” corrected enough in 2026 that he could support them in 2028.

Billionaire Elon Musk put close to $300 million into the 2024 elections on behalf of Republicans, slashed government jobs when he headed Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), and pumped close to a half a billion dollars—that we know of—into the 2026 midterm elections to make sure Republicans continued to control the Senate and Texas, where Musk has located his businesses. And yet, in an interview at the New York Times 2026 DealBook Summit, Musk distanced himself from Trump and the Republicans, insisting he is “not MAGA.”

It turns out that some of those who cooperated with Trump and his allies now appear eager to work with incoming Democratic investigators. Michael S. Schmidt of the New York Times reported today that Kirkland & Ellis, one of the elite law firms that, under threats from the administration over its “diversity, equity and inclusion (D.E.I.) related employment practices,” agreed to do $125 million in pro bono work for charitable causes Trump supports, actually has done close to $12 million in free work for the Trump administration. This arrangement seems to have enabled the administration to circumvent Congress.

According to Schmidt, in its seven-page letter to Congress, the law firm noted that it hired a lobbying firm close to the White House to cut the deal with a deputy to Stephen Miller and that, apart from a social media post by Trump, the agreement had never been written down.

—

Notes:

https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/incoming-oversight-chairman-robert-garcia-launches-document-preservation-letters-on-trump-family-corruption-corporate-corruption-dhs-misconduct-and-epstein-cover-up

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/10/us/jared-kushner-saudi-investment-fund.html

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/11/jared-kushner-affinity-arxis/689488/

https://www.propublica.org/article/irs-settlement-golf-pro-shelby-lowman

https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/who-is-aaron-reitz-trump-doj-prosecutor-says-hes-working-with-main-justice-as-he-threatens-democrats-for-conducting-oversight/

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-the-full-white-house-memo-requiring-agencies-to-get-approval-before-testifying-in-front-of-congress

https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2026/11/GC-Letter.pdf

Public Notice
White House prepares to give Congress the finger
Read more
Public Notice
Memo to MAGA: Todd Blanche is not your lawyer
Read more

https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/6229401-slotkin-slams-reitz-investigation/

https://www.politico.com/news/2026/11/19/democrats-trump-oversight-aaron-reitz-letters-01173711

Popular Information
What the U.S. attorney threatening Democratic senators said when he thought only Republicans were listening
Over the last week, Aaron Reitz, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Texas, has sent letters to three U.S. senators suggesting he could criminally prosecute them if they investigate the Trump administration…
Read more

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/nov/17/david-horowitz-stephen-miller

Strength In Numbers
ICE may have cost Republicans more votes than inflation did in 2026
This is Part 2 of 2026 By The Numbers, a series that uses our bespoke polls, voter-file data, and election returns to explain how Democrats won the 2026 midterms and learn the real lessons of their victory. Read the whole series…
Read more

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/nov/06/latino-voters-midterms-republicans-trump

https://www.businessinsider.com/jim-jordan-never-had-a-bill-enacted-may-become-speaker-2023-10

https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/11/19/congress/senate-gop-war-powers-fail-01176132

https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/6229795-john-thune-gop-midterm-losses-voter-issues/

https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/21/jan-6-panel-trump-overturn-2020-election-00040816

https://www.ms.now/opinion/ron-johnson-social-security-retirement

The Contrarian
The Senate Cannot Allow Partisanship at the GAO
When I arrived on Capitol Hill in 1969, I had never heard of the GAO, then called the General Accounting Office. But that ignorance did not last long. As soon as I started to work on legislation, I learned about the vital organs of Congress that drove the deliberation, provided the history, and were vital to oversight, honesty, and competence in governm…
Read more

https://talkingpointsmemo.com/the-franchise/red-states-rush-to-restrict-voting-before-2028-elections

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/digital-future-daily/2025/11/06/the-maga-evolution-of-palantirs-ceo-00639832

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/playbook/2026/11/11/the-tech-right-pivots-left-01160648

https://www.mediaite.com/media/news/im-not-maga-elon-musk-scrambles-to-distance-himself-from-trump-in-bizarre-pivot-at-ny-times-forum/

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/19/us/politics/kirkland-ellis-law-firm-trump.html

YouTube:

watch?v=pem4xfD8q7I&t=6681s

X:

USAttyReitz/status/2120632462686711838?s=20

Bluesky:

atrupar.com/post/3n2mamadli227

wired.com/post/3n2mvhv75nc2y

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Politics Chat, November 19, 2026

Watch today’s live recording here.

Listen on Apple Podcasts
Listen on Spotify

Get full, free access to Letters from an American here.

You can also find Heather:
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Bluesky
Instagram
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AIs vs. humans in economics papers

Is agentic research any good? Dr Yanagizawa-Drott and his colleague, Olaf Willner, used an AI verifier to check 1,000 APE papers. None was error-free; 842 contained at least one severe error, including ones invalidating headline results. To see roughly how Ape stacks up against human primates, The Economist teamed up with Refine, the research-verification firm founded by Dr Golub. Refine chose 100 papers at random from those accepted for publication in the top five journals (including QJE and JPE ) in the first nine months of 2026. It then subjected them to thorough review using several frontier AI models plus a once-over for serious errors by a human reviewer. The exercise flagged 4,158 issues in the 100 papers. One in ten papers contained at least one grave error (other problems concerned interpretation or inconsistencies between tables and text).

The two exercises are not directly comparable, but human economists’ lower error rate might give them some hope. In ideas, too, people retain the edge. One experiment, by Alexis Akira Toda of Emory University, found that when considering papers on economic theory alone, AI lowers the cost of checking for a candidate flaw but “does not yet reliably substitute for the human judgment that locates the flaw in the first place”. Another, which compared APE papers with published papers found the difference is mostly in ideas, not execution. In a further study, Michele Zampa of the Geneva Graduate Institute used an AI referee to grade 981 AI papers and 41 human ones on things like the novelty of research questions and acknowledgment of methodological limitations. AI did better in crowded fields with lots of existing research to digest. Humans performed at the same level regardless of the size of the literature.

…Benjamin Kohler of ETH Zürich, another Swiss university, and colleagues, let AI reproduce 48 social-science papers, using only the studies’ raw data and a description of the method. The discrepancies between the original papers and the AI versions were due in roughly equal measure to problems with the AI and human work. But the better the AI model, the more the balance tilted against humans.

Here is more from The Economist, interesting throughout.

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SpaceX launches satellites for the U.S. Space Force’s data network constellation

A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket flies away from Space Launch Complex 4 East at Vandenberg Space Force Base on the USSF-317 mission on Nov. 20, 2026. Image: SpaceX

Update Nov. 21: U.S. Space Force confirmed the payload for the mission.

SpaceX launched an undisclosed number of satellites on a Falcon 9 rocket on behalf of the U.S. Space Force on Friday night. SpaceX scrubbed the launch Thursday night, but didn’t state the reason why.

The mission, designated USSF-317, flew from Space Launch Complex 4 East at Vandenberg Space Force Base at 8:20 p.m. PST / 11:20 p.m. EST (0420 UTC on Saturday, Nov. 21). The rocket took off on a south-easterly trajectory upon leaving the pad.

Following deployment, the government issued a short statement, confirming publicly for the first time the intention of a series of missions launched this year that have received an ‘R’ designation in public filings.

“With three successful launches in two weeks, the Department of the Air Force is accelerating the development and launch of the Space Data Network Backbone constellation, advancing a government-owned and controlled communication system that will provide secure, high-speed data transport globally for the Joint Force,” said the Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs in a press release.

“The accelerated schedule is on track to deliver regional capability this year and global support by next year.”

The Space Data Network (SDN) Backbone comes from the Portfolio Acquisition Executive (PAE) of the Space-Based Sensing and Targeting (SBST), an acquisition office within the Space Force. Back in May, the Space Force announced its award of a $2.29 billion contract to SpaceX to build a satellite constellation that “functions as an integrated network, providing robust, resilient, high-capacity, and low-latency data transport for the Joint Force.”

The Space Force said back in May that the SDN Backbone would operate alongside the Space Development Agency’s Transport Layer, a constellation of data relaying satellites manufactured by Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and York Space Systems.

Previously identified simply as ‘R’ missions assigned to SpaceX, these are the five previous such missions which include:

  • Aug. 16 – USSF-366 (R-1)
  • Sep. 10 – USSF-153 (R-2)
  • Sep. 26 – USSF-385 (R-3)
  • Nov. 06 – USSF-432 (R-4)
  • Nov. 12 – USSF-627 (R-5)

Following each of these launches, 23 satellites have been catalogued. Prior to the Nov. 21 statement, the U.S. Space Force had not confirmed details about these satellites and has not made statements following these launches to confirm successful deployments.

SpaceX launched the USSF-317 mission using the Falcon 9 first stage booster with the tail number B1100. This was its 11th flight following the launches a NROL-105-, USSF-385, and eight batches of Starlink satellites.

A little more than eight minutes after liftoff, B1100 landed on the droneship, Of Course I Still Love You. This was the 235th landing on this vessel and the 679th Falcon booster landing to date.

SpaceX is scheduled to launch at least two more missions for the U.S. Space Force before the end of the month.

Heavy to Excessive Rainfall in South Texas; Lake Effect Snow in Michigan; Tropical Storm Warning for American Samoa