A simple model of authoritarian nationalism

I frequently refer to the concept of authoritarian nationalism, which is currently the driving force of history (just as it was from 1900 to 1945.) But why combine those two terms? Is there any link between authoritarianism and nationalism? In this post I will argue that the two are linked. Indeed in a sense the subtitle of the post provides the “model” that was promised in the title. I could stop now. But I imagine you’ll want a bit more explanation.
The term ‘nationalism’ has many different interpretations. Supporters of nationalism regard it as a good form of identity politics, whereas opponents (like me) view it as bad identity politics. In this post, I’ll mostly focus on another aspect of nationalism, its aversion to rules designed to constrain policymakers.
Nationalists often embrace the term nationalism while rejecting the term authoritarian. But you can probably already see why I see a link between these two ideologies. Just as nationalists reject rules than constrain the behavior of sovereign governments in the international arena, authoritarians reject rules that constrain the behavior of sovereign governments in the domestic arena. Thus the defining feature of authoritarian nationalism is its rejection of constraining rules.
[BTW, just as the line “Play it again, Sam” is never spoken in Casablanca, “We don’t need no stinking badges” never appears in Treasure of the Sierra Madre. But in both cases the famous phrases more effectively represent the film’s dialogue than do the slightly different phrases that are spoken. That’s why they are better remembered than the actual dialogue in these two classic films.]
Authoritarian nationalism is a matter of degree, not an either/or condition. I’ll illustrate this concept by comparing the Benelux countries with Putin’s Russia. Then we’ll consider the intermediate case of Hungary, a small country that is much more important than many people recognize.
I don’t plan to waste time arguing that Putin is an authoritarian nationalist. If you don’t already know that fact, then this blog is probably not for you. Instead, let’s consider the Benelux countries. What makes them the polar opposite of authoritarian nationalism?
The nadir of nationalist ideology occurred in 1945, when the devastation produced by two world wars led to an almost universal rejection of authoritarian nationalism, at least in the West. People immediately recognized that the existence of nuclear arms would result in even greater devastation in any future WWIII. The world set up all sorts of international organizations in an attempt to engender cooperation.
The European Common Market was created in 1957 with 6 members; France, Italy and West Germany, plus the three Benelux countries. The smaller European countries have traditionally been the most anti-nationalist members of the EU, as they have the most to lose from the bullying behavior of larger countries. They also have the most to gain from free trade zones. Take a look at the world’s biggest exporters. How many of you knew that the Netherlands exports more than Japan?
Over the course of my life, Europe has been a bit less nationalistic than the US, at least in terms of international affairs. That fact is not too surprising, as the US is a very large country and doesn’t have to worry about being bullied by smaller nations. In addition, the US mainland was not damaged in the two world wars.
Nonetheless, while we did not always adhere to international rules, only a cynic would argue that we were a completely lawless nation. Right after WWII, we were the only nuclear power and we had roughly 50% of world GDP. A more unconstrained nation could have taken even greater advantage of that situation. Instead, we participated in international organizations such as the UN, Nato, and various trade organizations. We funded the Marshall plan. (On the other hand we did not join the International Criminal Court.) I don’t think anyone would confuse Trump’s approach with the Marshall Plan:
Donald Trump’s demand for a $500bn (£400bn) “payback” from Ukraine goes far beyond US control over the country’s critical minerals. It covers everything from ports and infrastructure to oil and gas, and the larger resource base of the country.
The terms of the contract that landed at Volodymyr Zelensky’s office a week ago amount to the US economic colonisation of Ukraine, in legal perpetuity. It implies a burden of reparations that cannot possibly be achieved. The document has caused consternation and panic in Kyiv.
The defeated countries that suffered the greatest losses in WWII (Germany and Japan) tend to have an especially strong antipathy toward militaristic nationalism. Given the fact that West Germany was the EU’s largest member, its reluctance to bully other nations helped to insure a fairly stable balance of power within the organization.
I believe that many people get too bogged down in debates over minutiae, and fail to see the bigger picture. Over the past 10 years, I’ve done many posts at Econlog complaining of the US bullying of smaller nations. Many commenters had trouble understanding what I was talking about. Isn’t the US the victim? Aren’t foreigners taking advantage of us? Today, you’d have to be willfully blind not to recognize the extent that the US has become one of the world’s biggest bullies.
Now let’s consider the case of Hungary. In what sense is this small country an intermediate case between the Benelux nations and Putin’s Russia? Put simply, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary is much more authoritarian and nationalistic than other EU members, but much less authoritarian and nationalistic than Russia. Most importantly for American readers of this blog, it’s a sort of template for the “second Trump administration.” I use scare quotes because I regard this as the first Trump administration. It’s the second administration of Donald Trump, but it’s the first Trump administration in the sense of being composed of Trumpian loyalists.
Hungary’s nationalism is partly tribal, which makes the country a bit different than the US. Indeed the term “Hungarian” has an ambiguous meaning. Is it an ethnic Hungarian? Or a resident of Hungary? To a Hungarian nationalist, an ethnic Hungarian in a neighboring country seems more like a fellow countryman than a Roma citizen living within Hungary.
Nationalists in larger countries often have a complex view of their nation. Thus the Indian and Chinese governments define their nation both in ethnic and territorial terms. Taiwan’s population is 95% Han, an even higher proportion than on the mainland. And yet non-Han parts of the mainland are still viewed by the CCP as being “China”. Indian nationalism is basically Hindu nationalism, but non-Hindu parts of India’s territory such as Jammu and Kashmir are viewed as Indian.
MAGA nationalism is also complicated. People have rightly noted that Trump made gains among minority voters in the recent election. So MAGA is something more than white nationalism. But it would be wrong to view this as simply a decline in racial polarization, as it largely reflects the fact that the GOP has become the party of working class people who didn’t go to college. Within that demographic, the racial polarization has been increasing. In other words, the gap between the voting behavior of white and black working class voters is larger than when I was young, as many low-income whites switch from the Dems to the GOP.
Nonetheless, the tribal nature of nationalism is not the factor that is currently driving global politics. Rather it’s the “we don’t need no stinking badges” attitude that we need to be paying more attention to. That is what Trump has borrowed for Viktor Orbán.
Hungary is a member of the EU and Nato. That fact alone makes it far less nationalistic than Russia. And of course Hungary did not invade a neighboring country nor does its government assassinate political rivals. And yet Hungary is also clearly much more nationalistic than the Benelux countries, or indeed any of the other members of the EU (although a few other Eastern European countries are moving in the same direction.)
In terms of domestic policy, Orbán’s government has attempted to co-opt any institution that could offer a sort of countervailing power, anything that provides ”checks and balances” to the central government. This includes the courts, the media, the educational system, etc. And while Hungary is a member of the EU and Nato, it’s a very reluctant member. It frequently refuses to adhere to EU rules, and Orbán is by far Putin’s best friend within the EU, even opposing sanctions after the Ukraine invasion.
There’s been a great deal of discussion of the Trump administration’s decision to concede some key points to Putin on Ukraine before negotiations even begin. Why would the author of The Art of the Deal concede that Ukraine cannot reclaim lost territory or join Nato, without first getting any concessions from Russia? I think this misses the point. In the Ukraine War, Trump and Putin are essentially allies, opposed to the position taken by Ukraine and Europe. Trump isn’t trying to press Putin to make concessions, he’s trying to press Ukraine and Europe to make concessions. They are “the enemy”. Trump has hated Ukraine ever since that famously corrupt phone call in his first administration. His administration is staffed with Putin apologists that clearly prefer Russia to the EU. They like the fact that Putin supports “traditional values” such as the right to persecute gay and trans people.
You may think that I am overreacting, but if so I’m hardly alone:
If Vance hoped to persuade his audience, rather than simply insult it, he failed. Indeed, his speech backfired spectacularly, convincing many listeners that America itself is now a threat to Europe. In the throng outside the conference hall, a prominent German politician told me: “That was a direct assault on European democracy.” A senior diplomat said: “It’s very clear now, Europe is alone.” When I asked him if he now regarded the US as an adversary, he replied: “Yes.”
The Washington DC elite finds this new reality to be so horrifying that they refuse to take Trump seriously. For years he has been telling us that he respects authoritarian nationalist leaders and has nothing but contempt for the leaders of many of our democratic allies, including our neighbor to the north. People simply are not willing to accept these statements at face value.
Even many right-of-center pundits that I greatly respect are silent when it comes to things like Trump’s support for China putting a million Uyghur Muslims into concentration camps, or his endorsement of the Philippine policy of murdering drug users, his characterization of peaceful Tiananmen protestors as “rioters”, his characterization of January 6 thugs as heroes, or dozens of other similar statements. It does not fit the self-image of the Washington elite, which views the United States as traditionally being one of the “good guys” (and not without reason.) So they block it out of their minds, and pretend that this is all business as usual. “Let’s focus on policy—will DOGE achieve some efficiency gains?”
I’m not denying that policy is important, or that Trump will likely achieve at least some useful policy reforms (at least if it can find some competent people.) But authoritarian nationalism is the elephant in the room. We ignore it at our peril.
Authoritarian nationalism is like a big jigsaw puzzle. No single item presents the entire picture, so it’s hard to explain to people. Indeed many individual examples seem of almost trivial importance. And you can frequently cite similar examples in administrations not normally viewed as authoritarian nationalists. Thus FDR’s court packing scheme of 1937 seems like a very Orban-type policy.
I think the only way to think about these facts is to bite the bullet and acknowledge that the FDR administration did have some authoritarian tendencies, especially when compared to relatively passive administrations like Calvin Coolidge. Biden also had a few authoritarian tendencies, as do almost all presidents. It’s no secret that most governments seek to gain and exercise power over their rivals. So what makes authoritarian nationalism distinct?
Like most things in politics, concepts are not either/or, they are a matter of degree. Thus between laissez-faire capitalism and a 100% command economy, there are many intermediate forms of “socialism”. But that doesn’t make socialism a completely useless term. Most intelligent people understand what is meant when someone says Cuba is much more socialist than Canada, even if both have “socialized medicine”.
In my view, it is almost impossible to understand the Trump administration by looking directly at the Trump administration, at least if you are an American like me. We are too close, and Trump is too much a larger than life figure that is almost impossible to view dispassionately. It’s like looking at the sun. Rather Americans should look to foreign countries to try to understand Trump. Look at Hungary, look at India, look at Italy, and even look at Mexico.
[As an aside, Europeans in the early 1800s couldn’t see Napoleon clearly, for similar reasons. Indeed, Trump recently compared himself to Napoleon.]
Mexico’s government recently abolished the commission that was charged with insuring that elections are free and fair. The Mexican leader that initiated that move, the recently “retired” President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), is essentially Mexico’s Trump, despite being nominally “on the left”. He is still the puppet-master.
The US doesn’t have that sort of electoral commission, but after taking office for a second time, Trump has begun to systematically eliminate any aspect of the federal government that might potentially check his power, or expose corruption. If Trump were younger, he’d certainly find a way to bypass term limits.
The Trump purges show some similarities to the McCarthy era purges of the early 1950s:
Writing in The New York Times, a quartet of Harvard Law professors worried the [anti-communist] program would “miss genuine culprits, victimize innocent persons, discourage entry into the public service and leave both the government and the American people with a hangover sense of futility and indignity.” . . . And that is what happened.
But at least those purges were aimed at getting rid of traitors. The Trump purges are aimed at getting rid of patriots. That seems like a difference worth noting.
Authoritarianism has such a bad connotation that its supporters generally justify it as a necessary evil to fight a deeper form of authoritarianism, the stranglehold on power of the so-called deep state. Trump’s fans implicitly buy into a sort of Mr. Smith Goes to Washington framing. Ordinary democracy is a cesspool of corruption, and we need an honest outsider to come in and shake things up, someone like Elon Musk. Move fast and break things. But Mr. Smith Goes to Washington is a myth, not reality. Washington cannot be fixed by sending authoritarian leaders there to shake things up, just as the French chaos of 1795 was not fixed by sending in Napoleon. The only way to fix Washington is to make our culture more rational, more honest, and less selfish.
The common thread in most authoritarian nationalists is an unwillingness to be constrained by rules. Thus Trump refuses to adhere to international trade agreements such as Nafta. Of course a president has a legitimate right to renegotiate a trade agreement that he believes is not in the national interest. But even after negotiating a new version of Nafta, a version that he insisted was a great treaty, Trump still refuses to adhere to its provisions.
To achieve the sort of lawless society envisioned by hardcore nationalists, you need to weaken your opponents, strengthen your supporters, and co-opt anyone who can be bribed or intimidated.
On taking office, Trump immediately began trying to remove anyone seen as putting the Constitution above personal loyalty to Trump. Corruption watchdogs were fired without Congressional authorization. FBI agents who had arrested Jan. 6 criminals were placed under investigation. IRS tax cops are to be weakened, because they audit MAGA voting small businessmen. Call it “defang the police.”
In contrast, supporters were helped, even if they had broken the law. Thugs who beat up police officers were pardoned. Even history is being rewritten, as Confederate traitors are increasingly viewed as heroes deserving of statues. One unifying theme for nationalists all over the world is a desire to rewrite history in such a way as to cover up or even deny a country’s previous sins. The German nationalists supported by Musk don’t want their schools to focus on the crimes of the Nazis.
Another tactic is to co-opt one’s opponents. The Biden administration had begun to prosecute NYC mayor over corruption charges. Trump had the Justice department call off the prosecution, with the implied threat that the prosecution would be resumed if Adams did not become a loyal vassal, carrying out Trump’s wishes on immigration policy. RINO senators and congressman are forced to kiss the ring, or face a primary opponent.
I’m old enough to recall when even GOP senators were so repulsed by Nixon’s crimes that they forced him to step down. That sort of action is unimaginable in today’s America, even though Nixon was far less corrupt than Trump. The Senate used to reject unsuitable cabinet nominees like John Tower, whereas far less acceptable nominees are now waved through by senators cowed by threats Some of the choices are so repulsive that one wonders if Trump is merely trying to humiliate the Senate, as Caligula supposedly did a couple thousand years ago. (Even apocryphal stories often contain a deeper truth)
This post was easy to write—any rational person can see what’s going on. To his credit, Matt Yglesias predicted the coming authoritarianism way back in 2015, even before Trump appeared on the scene. His entire Vox article is worth reading, but this paragraph caught my eye:
Those who like these actions on their merits comfort themselves with the thought that these uses of executive power are pretty clearly allowed by the terms of the existing laws. This is true as far as it goes. But it’s also the case that Obama (or some future president) could have his political opponents murdered on the streets of Washington and then issue pardons to the perpetrators. This would be considerably more legal than a Zelaya-style effort to use a plebiscite to circumvent congressional obstruction — just a lot more morally outrageous. In either case, however, the practical issue would be not so much what is legal, but what people, including the people with guns, would actually tolerate.
Replace “political opponents murdered on the streets of Washington” with “send a violent mob to the Capitol to try to intimidate Congress into overturning a presidential election”, and you’ve described what happened 6 years after Yglesias used that seemingly “far-fetched” example, including the pardons. And I doubt that even Yglesias expected the assassination hypothetical to be discussed in the Supreme Court just a few years later.
In the end, our Constitution won’t protect us, there are too many loopholes. What matters is how much authoritarian nationalism the public is willing to stomach. I’m an optimist by nature and still expect Trump’s project to fail. My bigger concern is that the trajectory that Yglesias so presciently described in 2015 is likely to continue for many more years. Future presidents will become even more authoritarian that Trump.
To summarize, here’s how I think about the authoritarian nationalist’s credo:
We don’t need no stinking election monitors. We decide who won the election.
We don’t need no stinking trade rules. We set the rules.
We don’t need no stinking refugees, except Afrikaners who’d vote MAGA.
We don’t need no stinking international criminal court. We decide what’s torture.
We don’t need no stinking Nato.
We don’t need no stinking IRS audits of our supporters.
We don’t need no stinking press critics.
We don’t need no stinking United Nations
We don’t need no stinking federal court oversight
We don’t need no stinking European Union rules
We’ll do whatever the hell we want to, and who’s going to stop us?
I hope it doesn’t take another global war for the world to come to its senses.